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ABSTRACT
BRINGING THE BALLOT BOX TO THE PEOPLE: ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
AND THE ORIGINS OF INCLUSIVE VOTING PRACTICES
SEPTEMBER 2013
KEVIN PALLISTER, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
M.A., BOSTON UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor FREDERIC C. SCHAFFER
Countries holding competitive elections vary in the extent to which the administrative
practices surrounding the voting process facilitate or impede voter participation.
Differences in the requirements for voter registration, the distances voters must travel to
reach a polling place, the mechanics of casting a ballot, and the provision of voter
education, among other factors, pose varying obstacles to participation. This variation
poses a puzzle that this dissertation addresses: Why do some democracies adopt election
administration practices that lower barriers to voter participation, while others adopt
practices that raise prohibitive obstacles to the participation of at least some citizens?
More simply, why is it easier to vote in some democracies than in others?
This dissertation develops the concept of election administration inclusiveness, consisting
of numerous administrative and procedural factors that affect voter access to the ballot.
To develop a theory of why election administration inclusiveness varies across countries
and over time, the project undertakes an in-depth comparison of three country cases:
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. The case studies document and explain the
origins of striking differences in election administration inclusiveness across the three
countries in their early years of democratic transition, as well as variation in inclusiveness
within each case over time. The case studies draw on elite interviews and archival
research carried out by the author in each country.
The study identifies a number of factors that influence the choice of election
administration practices that bear on voter access to the ballot box. Of particular
significance are historical legacies of election fraud, patterns of partisan identification
among voters, the composition of electoral commissions that administer elections, and
international political pressures.
KEYWORDS: election administration; voter participation; Central American politics
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Elections are complex affairs, requiring an administrative apparatus that can
undertake a wide range of activities prior to, during, and after election day. The
administrative requirements involved are extensive, including among other tasks
appointing and training election officials, registering voters and candidates, distributing
voter identification documents, carrying out voter information campaigns, installing
polling places and delivering election materials prior to election day, administering the
voting process, and counting the ballots and transmitting the results. Given the logistical
complexity of conducting elections, potential exists for electoral fraud, voter exclusion,
or general mismanagement at numerous steps in the process.
The administration of elections bears directly on election quality through a
number of avenues, such as by making fraudulent practices more or less likely and
influencing the fairness of electoral competition. Many of the administrative procedures
involved in conducting an election also bear directly on another aspect of election
quality: the ease or difficulty with which citizens can exercise the right to vote. Indeed,
election administration practices, and the institutions that govern them, vary dramatically
across countries in the extent to which they make the voting process accessible to all
citizens. In some countries, citizens are required to register to vote on their own initiative
months in advance of an election, while other countries automatically register voters up
until Election Day. In some areas, voters must travel long distances to reach their polling
place to cast their votes, while elsewhere polling stations are located in even the most
remote villages. From voter registration requirements and the location of polling stations
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to the voting technology used and the identification documents that voters are required to
show, there is a great deal of diversity in the extent to which countries holding
competitive elections make voting accessible to all citizens.
Why do some democracies adopt election administration rules that facilitate voter
participation, while others adopt rules that raise prohibitive obstacles to the participation
of at least some citizens? More simply, why is it easier to vote in some democracies than
in others? Despite growing interest in election administration in recent years, scholars
have not systematically studied the origins of different election administration practices
and institutions, especially as they bear on voter access to the ballot box. Through a
comparative study of three Central American countries that have differed widely in their
election administration practices, this project contributes to an understanding of why
some countries lower barriers to the ballot box while others impose administrative
obstacles to voter participation.
As the following chapters show, election administration is a contentious arena in
which political parties, election administrators, civic groups, and international actors try
to shape the administrative rules of electoral competition and voter participation. This
study is the first to address how these groups interact in constructing election
administration rules and why efforts to reduce or raise administrative barriers to voter
participation are successful in some times and places and unsuccessful in others.
The study of election administration speaks to enduring normative concerns of
equality and democracy. Because elections serve as a central means for citizens to hold
their representatives accountable, administrative obstacles that suppress voter
participation – particularly among marginal groups least able to overcome such obstacles

2

– may diminish the quality and legitimacy of representative democracy. In general terms,
as Schaffer (2008, 195) puts it, “[t]he conduct of elections determines the degree to which
people’s preferences are expressed freely, weighed equally, and recorded accurately.”
Specifically, procedural barriers to voting may effectively keep some voters from
participating, which in turn may affect election outcomes. Even where election outcomes
are not clearly swayed by barriers to voting, by turning some voters away, onerous
procedural hurdles may disengage some citizens from politics more generally.
“Conversely, easy access to the franchise enhances the likelihood that marginal voters
will participate, which may encourage challengers to run and to stimulate competition or
launch effective appeals that could further draw voters into the active electorate”
(Hayduck 2005, 16). Of course, the ease of voting is only one element of ensuring
citizens their right to freely cast a ballot. Where meaningful electoral competition is
circumscribed, or where a voter’s choice is coerced or effectively ignored through the
manipulation of election results, the ease with which one may vote means little; thus “the
Soviet Union went to the extreme of enabling astronauts in space to vote” (Birch 2011,
21, note 14), but the vote offered little choice to Soviet citizens. In the context of
relatively fair competitive elections, however, administrative barriers to voting carry
significant practical and normative implications.

Election Administration Inclusiveness
As chapter 2 shows, since the late 1990s scholars have increasingly studied the
effects of election administration variables on voter turnout. The underlying theoretical
basis for most studies of election administration’s effects on turnout is an informal
rational choice framework: rules and procedures that raise the cost of voting (in terms of
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money, time, or effort) will lead some potential voters to weigh the costs greater than the
benefits and therefore abstain (Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz 2007, 5-6). Beyond the rational
choice framework, election administration practices may also impede participation by
invoking or exploiting fear, distrust, or embarrassment (Schaffer 2008, 21) rather than by
affecting the costs of voting.
Of course, the administrative procedures surrounding voting are not the only, or
even the most important, determinants of voter participation. As an enormous body of
research shows, both individual-level demographic and socioeconomic variables (such as
education, age, and residential mobility) and institutional and contextual variables (such
as political mobilization, proportional representation, and compulsory voting laws) affect
turnout levels (see, e.g., Blais 2006; Geys 2006). But administrative measures that make
voting more or less accessible to citizens may affect turnout and other outcomes of
interest.
The administrative rules and procedures that shape voters’ access to the ballot are
wide ranging. The difficulty of voter registration requirements, whether elections are held
on weekends or holidays, the number and location of polling sites, the ways in which
voters cast a ballot, the discretion of poll workers to turn away voters, and many other
factors can all contribute to voter inclusion or exclusion. Table 1.1 (below) provides an
undoubtedly incomplete list of relevant factors affecting voter access, divided into four
broad categories (voter registration, getting to the ballot box, casting a ballot, and voter
education), as well as descriptions of the types of rules and practices that make up high,
medium, and low levels of inclusiveness.

4

Collectively, these electoral procedures determine the level of what I call election
administration inclusiveness, or the degree to which the administration of the electoral
process facilitates or hinders the ability of eligible citizens to vote. The concept of
election administration inclusiveness is related to, yet distinct from, other concepts in the
literature and broader debates about election administration. One such concept, voter
suppression, tends to assume a partisan intent to manipulate electoral outcomes by raising
the costs of voting for certain groups of citizens (see, e.g., Wang 2012). Similarly, the
concept of administrative disenfranchisement has been used to denote situations in which
“a citizen formally and legally has the right to vote and to register to vote, but is
prevented from exercising that right because the costs of doing so are too high” (ACE
Project 2013a). While useful, this definition only treats a limited range of the
inclusiveness spectrum – namely, the end of the spectrum in which administrative
restrictions effectively prevent voter participation. Finally, the concept of convenience
voting has been employed in recent research on election administration in the United
States, and refers to measures such as early voting and vote by mail that offer voters more
accessible means of casting a ballot. Like administrative disenfranchisement, however,
convenience voting treats a narrow range of variation in inclusiveness and does not
address the inclusiveness of traditional electoral procedures such as voter registration.
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Table 1.1 Election Administration Inclusiveness
High
Voter Registration
Extent of state
responsibility for
registering voters

2

Difficulty of
registration process
(applicable to voterinitiated registration
systems only)

3

Ease of access to ID
documents required
for registration
Registration closing
date1

6

1

4

The state is responsible for voter
registration. Achieved through
automatic registration (drawing
voter rolls from a national civil
registry or other data-sharing
arrangements between government
agencies) or door-to-door
registration by election officials.
Simple registration process.
Registration sites are accessible and
have ample hours of operation; mail
and/or online registration is allowed;
and voters can complete the
registration process (including
obtaining voter ID, where
applicable) in one step.
ID documents are easily accessible
with minimal effort and are free of
charge.
Registration closes within one week
of election day.

Medium

Low

Registration is voter-initiated, but
the state makes efforts to facilitate
registration (such as registration
drives targeted at certain populations
or mobile registration units in
remote areas).

Registration is voter-initiated, and
the state makes little or no effort to
facilitate registration.

Moderately complex registration
process involving at least one
barrier, such as: difficult-to-reach
registration sites with limited hours
of operation; process requiring
multiple trips to a registration office
by the voter; or complicated
registration paperwork serving as de
facto literacy test.
Obtaining ID documents is difficult
for at least some voters and/or
entails a modest financial cost.
Registration closes between one
week and three months before
election day.

Complex registration process
marked by some combination of
barriers, such as: difficult-to-reach
registration sites with limited hours
of operation; process requiring
multiple trips to a registration office
by the voter; and complicated
registration paperwork serving as de
facto literacy test.
Obtaining ID documents is difficult
for many voters and/or entails a
significant financial cost.
Registration closes more than three
months before election day.

Continued on next page

1

The significance for inclusiveness of the voter registration closing date depends on whether registration is automatic or voter-initiated. Where registration is
automatic, the closing date is less relevant.

Table 1.1, continued
Medium

Low

Residency
requirements

There is no residency requirement to
register in a new precinct, and
registration automatically transfers
when voter changes residence.
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Provisional
registration

Citizens may pre-register in the year
or two before coming of voting age.

There is a lengthy residency
requirement (more than 3 months) to
register in a new precinct, and reregistration is required when voter
changes residence.
Citizens may not pre-register prior
to reaching voting age.

7

Registry consultation

Provisional voter rolls are
distributed to parties and posted
publicly in accessible locations and
formats for voters to review and
correct errors.

8

Purging of voter rolls

Voters are not purged from the rolls
for failure to vote.

There is a modest residency
requirement (3 months or less) to
register in a new precinct, and/or reregistration is required when voter
changes residence.
Citizens coming of voting age may
pre-register under limited conditions
(e.g., only during a registration drive
of limited duration).
Provisional voter rolls are available
for review, but are not easily
accessible (e.g., posted in a limited
number of places, not searchable
online) and/or do not contain all
relevant information (e.g., the
polling places to which voters are
assigned).
Voters may be purged from the rolls
for failure to vote in three
consecutive elections.

Voters may be purged from the voter
rolls for failure to vote in one or two
elections.

Polling places are generally a short
distance from voters' residences, but
some polling places are distant and
public transportation on election day
is limited.

Polling places are highly centralized
or otherwise distant from many
voters' residences, and public
transportation on election day is
limited.

7

High
5

Provisional voter rolls are generally
not available for review by parties or
voters.

Getting to the Ballot
Box
9

Accessibility of
polling places

Continued on next page

Polling places are generally a short
distance from voters' residences;
public transportation is available on
election day, where needed; mobile
voting units used for remote areas,
where applicable.

Table 1.1, continued
High
Assignment of voters
to polling places

Voters are assigned to the polling
place closest to their residence.

11

Convenience voting
measures

Several convenience voting
measures are widely available, such
as early voting, absentee voting, and
voting by mail.

12

Electoral calendar2

Voting is held on a weekend or
holiday during a time of year when
travel to the polls is not unduly
burdensome.

8

10

Medium

Low

Some voters are assigned to polling
places based on residence, while
others are assigned by non-residence
criteria (e.g., alphabetically).
Some convenience voting measures
are available, but their accessibility
is limited (e.g., early voting is
available for only a short period, or
the availability of absentee voting is
limited to small segments of the
electorate).
Either the day or the season when
voting is held presents a modest
barrier to participation for some
voters.

Voters are assigned to polling places
by non-residence criteria (e.g.,
alphabetically).
No convenience voting measures are
available.

Voting is held on a day or during a
season that presents significant
barriers to participation for a large
number of voters.

Casting a Ballot
13

Voter identification
requirements

No identification is required to vote,
or many types of identification or
witnesses are accepted as proof of
identity.

Identification is required to vote, and
only a limited number of ID forms
are accepted.

14

Wait time at the
polling place

Waiting time for most voters is
minimal (less than 30 minutes) and
most polling places open on time.

Long lines and/or late opening of
polling places result in modest
waiting times (30-60 minutes) for
many voters.

Identification is required to vote, and
only a limited number of forms of ID
are accepted. Obtaining the requisite
ID is costly (either directly or
through lost wages to visit an office
to obtain it).
Long lines and/or late opening of
polling places result in long waiting
times (exceeding one hour) for many
voters.

Continued on next page

2

The barriers posed by holding voting on a weekday or during a particular season depend on local conditions, including labor migration patterns and prevailing
work schedules, and the availability of convenience voting measures such as early voting and absentee balloting.

Table 1.1, continued
High

Medium

15

Provisional or
tendered ballots

Provisional or tendered ballots are
available for all or most voters
whose information on the voter
rolls appears to contain errors.

Provisional and tendered ballots
are not allowed.

16

Assistance for
disabled, illiterate, or
other voters at the
polls

Ballots are available in all major
local languages and include party
symbols or pictures of candidates,
and voting mechanics include
measures to assist disabled voters
in casting a ballot.

Provisional or tendered ballots are
available only for a limited
segment of voters whose
information on the voter rolls
appears to contain errors.
Ballots and/or voting mechanics
pose difficulties for relatively
small segments of voters (e.g.,
blind, illiterate, or language
minority voters).

Low

The EMB or other state agency
makes efforts to inform voters of
electoral procedures, but voter
education campaigns are limited
in territorial reach, linguistic
coverage, diversity of media
usage, or duration.

There are no efforts to
disseminate information to voters,
or efforts are severely limited in
reach and duration.

Ballots and/or voting mechanics
pose significant difficulties for
substantial segments of voters
(e.g., blind, illiterate, or language
minority voters).

Voter Education
17

9

State efforts to
inform voters of
where and how to
register and vote

The EMB or other state agency
makes extensive efforts to inform
voters of electoral procedures;
voter education campaigns have
extensive territorial reach, are
conducted in all major languages
and carried out through diverse
media appropriate for local
conditions, and are carried out for
a significant period of time before
key deadlines (e.g., registration
closing date).

I propose election administration inclusiveness as a broader conceptualization of
the administrative and procedural steps that a prospective voter must negotiate in order to
cast a vote. The concept does not assume partisan intent in making voting easier or more
difficult, nor is it limited to instances in which the costs of voting effectively prevent the
participation of some voters.3 Rather, the concept considers election administration from
the voter’s perspective, incorporating all of the administrative measures – both formal
rules and procedures and informal practices4 – that bear on the ease or difficulty of
voting, and ranges from high inclusiveness (where registration and voting are highly
accessible and convenient for all eligible voters) to low inclusiveness (where registration
and voting procedures pose significant barriers to large numbers of voters).
This section provides an overview of some of the key dimensions of election
administration inclusiveness; a discussion of the effects of election administration
measures on voter turnout and other outcomes is taken up in the following chapter.

Voter Registration
A principal election administration measure that may pose an obstacle to voting is
voter registration. As Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 61) explain:
Registration raises the costs of voting. Citizens must first perform a separate task
that lacks the immediate gratification characterizing other forms of political
3

It is worth noting that operationalizing the concept of election administration inclusiveness by reference to
its effects on turnout would capture not only administrative inclusiveness, but also a variety of motivational
and contextual factors that influence turnout. It is logically possible that even under highly burdensome
election administration procedures that raise the costs of voting, all voters may be highly motivated and
undeterred by administrative barriers; conversely, even mild administrative burdens may be sufficient to
deter the participation of many voters.
4
I include measures that are specified in electoral laws and bureaucratic regulations as well as practices
that are not legally mandated. In part, this is because elements of election administration vary in their extent
of legal institutionalization across countries – such that one aspect of election administration may be
regulated by the electoral law in one country and left entirely to the discretion of election administrators in
another. For instance, in the case studies, the location of polling places was regulated by the electoral law in
Guatemala, left to the discretion of election administrators in Nicaragua, and jointly regulated by legislation
and administrative discretion in El Salvador.
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expression (such as voting). Registration is usually more difficult than voting,
often involving more obscure information and a longer journey at a less
convenient time, to complete a more complicated procedure. Moreover, it must
usually be done before interest in the campaign has reached its peak.5
A range of details may make the voter registration process more or less
accessible. These include: 1) whether the responsibility for registration falls primarily on
the citizen or the state; 2) the complexity of the registration process, including the
accessibility of registration offices and their hours of operation and the number of
required visits to a registration site; 3) the documentation required to register; 4) the
registration deadline; 5) how a change of residence affects one’s registration status; 6) the
ability of underage citizens to provisionally register; 7) the measures in place for voters to
consult the registry and correct inaccuracies; and 8) whether those who do not vote are
purged from the voter rolls (see ACE Project 2013a; Carbó and Wright 2008, 66;
Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978, 24). On top of these formal aspects of voter registration,
incumbents may manipulate the process to make it more difficult for likely opposition
supporters to register.6
The types of obstacles voter registration imposes depend on the particular voter
registration system used by a given country. A basic distinction is between ad hoc voter
registries that are compiled before each election, either through door-to-door visits by
enumerators or the use of registration centers, and a permanent voter registry, which is
maintained from one election to the next and updated to incorporate new voters and
changes of residence. Ad hoc registration tends to be inclusive, as the burden placed is on
5

Hershey (2009, 88-89) similarly notes the costs imposed by both registering to vote and obtaining the
requisite identification documents, as both “take place in advance of Election Day,…are bureaucratic
procedures, lacking the partisan content of the vote[,]… require spending time to find out what documents
are needed and where and when registration (or getting documents) takes place…[and] involve
opportunities forgone as well as the need for transportation to the registration or documentation site.”
6
This has happened, for instance, before Cambodia’s 2003 elections (Calingaert 2006, 140) and arguably
before El Salvador’s 1994 elections.
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election administrators to register voters, but it is expensive (Robert 2009, 3-4).
Permanent registries are much more common.
Of central importance is the extent to which the state takes the initiative in two
related aspects of voter registration: distributing the identification documents that citizens
need to register and actually registering voters. Registering to vote often requires that a
citizen provide documentation to prove his or her identity, which in turn necessitates
obtaining the required identification. Countries vary widely in the documentation
accepted for registration, with some countries accepting only one or a small number of
forms of ID and other countries accepting many ID forms or witnesses that attest to a
voter’s identity (Carter Center 2013; Schaffer and Wang 2009). The most inclusive
systems make obtaining the necessary identification documents simple and automatically
register documented citizens to vote through various methods of data-sharing between
government agencies (commonly by adding data from the civil registry directly to the
voter registry).7 Such automatic registration eliminates the need for citizens to carry out
the additional step of registering to vote, and is common in Western Europe and Latin
America8 where many countries have a single national ID card which citizens are
required to possess (Robert 2009; Rosenberg 2009). Not surprisingly, countries with
automatic registration typically have very high voter registration rates (Robert 2009, 2;
Rosenberg 2009, 3). Yet while automatic registration eliminates steps in the registration
process, the first step of obtaining an ID card or other necessary documents (such as a

7

In countries with civil registries, a sometimes contentious issue of institutional design, as the case studies
show, “is whether the body responsible for it (often the interior ministry) should be responsible for the
voters list. Some countries give the same institution responsibility for both registries; others choose two
agencies, each with responsibility for one of the lists” (ACE Project n.d.).
8
In Latin America, registration is automatic in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela (Urruty 2007, 472).
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birth certificate) remains; the difficulty of obtaining such documentation varies greatly
across countries (Carter Center 2013).
While some states take responsibility for registering citizens through automatic
registration, in other countries the responsibility to register is placed on the citizen.
When, where, and how a citizen must register in these systems vary greatly, and different
methods can present greater or lesser difficulty.
In some countries the voter registration period may be limited, and the voter rolls
may be closed months prior to election day – before the election campaign and media
coverage reach their peak. In other cases, registration is allowed up to and including
election day – such as in a number of U.S. states that allow election day registration
(EDR). Where EDR occurs at the polling place, it also spares the voter the time and
potential expense needed to travel to a separate registration site. EDR is of particular use
to youth and the residentially mobile who may be inclined to register up to the last
moment before an election. An additional measure related to the timeframe of registration
is provisional registration, whereby young people can be added to the voter registry
within one or two years of turning voting age and are then automatically added to the
active voter roll upon coming of age. Provisional registration is used in a number of
countries, including Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal, as well as a
number of U.S. states (Robert 2009, 15; Rosenberg 2009, 3).
Aside from the registration deadline, the location and operating hours of voter
registration sites affect the ease with which citizens may register. Distant registration
offices and limited hours (for instance, offering registration services only during
weekdays) can present barriers to registration. These obstacles can be minimized where
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election administrators complement their ordinary voter registration procedures with
targeted door-to-door registration of certain populations, such as remote rural
communities (Robert 2009, 4; Rosenberg 2009, 13-14, 21). This is the case, for instance,
in Mexico, where “the government deploys mobile units to register voters in rural areas
and other places with historically low registration rates” (Rosenberg 2009, 5). The
obstacles posed by distant locations and limited hours are also eliminated through mail or
online registration, both of which are becoming more common, at least among high
income countries (Robert 2009, 6-7). When in-person registration is required, a further
impediment can be the need to make multiple visits to a registry office – for instance, one
visit to fill out registration paperwork and a later visit to retrieve a voter registration card.
Once a voter is registered, a change of residence may affect one’s registration
status. In some countries, a change of residence (especially to a different election
precinct) requires re-registering to update one’s residence on the voter rolls. Like first
time registrations, such changes of residence on the voter rolls may be prohibited many
months before election day in order to prevent fraud, and a voter may be required to live
in a jurisdiction for a specified period before being eligible to register. In other countries
where the state more actively registers voters, election authorities share data with other
agencies (such as the postal service) “to learn of address changes without having to rely
on voters to remember to submit the necessary paperwork to election authorities every
time they change residences” (Rosenberg 2009, 16).
Even after having registered, the voter registry may contain inaccuracies that
prevent qualified citizens from voting. Many countries try to minimize this risk of
disenfranchisement by publicizing the provisional voter rolls before election day, either
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by posting them in local public spaces or mailing personalized registration information to
voters, and allowing voters the opportunity to correct any errors (Rosenberg 2009, 20).
Finally, provisions for purging voters from the rolls for not voting vary by country.
Purging voters from the rolls for failing to turn out for two or three consecutive national
elections has the benefit of eliminating “deadwood” (deceased or emigrated voters) from
the voter rolls, but also entails the risk that citizens who vote irregularly will face the
burden of re-registering.

Getting to the Ballot Box
Another component of election administration inclusiveness is the accessibility of
polling places. Where polling places are remote, voters are burdened with time and travel
costs. This obstacle is more severe where public transportation is not available or is
relatively costly. Polling stations may also be relocated at the last minute to confuse
voters, a trick used historically in the United States (Campbell 2005, 7). The availability
of absentee balloting for those who are not in their normal precinct on election day can
reduce the burden of reaching a polling station; absentee voting can be conducted in a
variety of ways, including by mail, in-person at a restricted number of polling stations, or
in-person at any polling station. Some countries make absentee voting available for all
voters, for some subset of voters (such as those hospitalized or serving in the military), or
not at all (see ACE Project 2013b).
Polling place accessibility is determined not only by where polling places are
located, but also by when voting is held. The hours that the polls are open affect
accessibility, as does the day(s) on which voting is held. Convenience is increased when
voting is held on the weekend or election day is a holiday, and when election day falls
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during a time of year when travel is convenient (Katz 1997, 116). Early voting allows
voters to cast a ballot, either in person or by mail, before the official election day, and
thus reduces potential time constraints for voters. Where it is used, the early voting period
may range from several days to several weeks, and like absentee balloting may be
available to all voters or only certain types of eligible voters (ACE Project 2013b).

Casting a Ballot
Once at the polling place, voters may be impeded from casting a ballot by several
factors. Overcrowded polling places may generate long waits and confusion, and some
voters may give up without voting.9 A potentially greater obstacle is that voters may be
required to prove their identity by showing ID at the polls. Countries vary in the
conditions under which voters must show ID, the types of identification papers accepted
to vote, the ease with which citizens can obtain the necessary documents, and the
provisions in place for voters who lack identification documents (Schaffer and Wang
2009). Identification requirements pose little burden on voters where the government or
election officials make significant efforts to ensure eligible voters obtain ID (as in many
European countries) and where witnesses can vouch for the identity of voters lacking ID
(as in Canada, Italy, and Portugal) (Schaffer and Wang 2009, 401-403). Where obtaining
the requisite identification is onerous and where there are few provisions for voters
lacking identification, however, voter ID requirements may impede participation.
In Latin America, most countries require a national ID card to vote, although the
difficulty of obtaining the ID varies, in part due to differences in formal regulations and
state capacity. Partisan manipulation of the distribution of ID cards has also posed
9

For this reason, “international standards advocate no more than 1,000 voters per polling unit” (LopezPintor 2000, 172).
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obstacles for some voters in several Latin American and African countries (Carter Center
2013, 10, 18).
Even duly registered and documented voters may find that their name does not
appear on the voters list when trying to cast a ballot. Erroneous omissions from the voters
list can result from technical problems and administrative inefficiencies, as occurs even
in advanced industrial democracies like the U.S., where paper-based registration in many
jurisdictions results in some registered voters not appearing on the rolls (Pew Center on
the States 2010; Ponoroff 2010). Omissions from the voter rolls can also be an intentional
strategy of electoral manipulation, as partisan election officials may “remove, misspell, or
leave off names of voters who are members of certain demographic groups, such as firsttime voters or those concentrated in geographic areas where support for opposition
candidates is strongest” (Calingaert 2006, 140). Such manipulation of the voter rolls is
thought to be a common (and difficult to verify) practice; for instance, the 1999
presidential election in the Dominican Republic is thought to have been stolen by the
incumbent through the deletion of 100,000-200,000 names from the voter registry (Birch
2011, 36).
A partial remedy for such situations is provisional balloting, which “provide[s] an
opportunity to vote for persons who allege that they have been subject to administrative
error in the compilation of voters lists, or in the marking on these lists of persons who
have already voted” (ACE Project 2013b). Where poll workers erroneously mark
someone on the voter list as having voted, or “a voter claims to have registered to vote at
that voting station yet their name cannot be found on the voters list” (ACE Project
2013b), provisional balloting can prevent disenfranchisement. Yet the availability and
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ease of provisional balloting varies by country, and its use requires safeguards against
multiple voting.

Voter Education
Aside from (and intersecting with) the procedures for registering, obtaining
identification, arriving at the polling place, and casting a ballot is the issue of voter
education. In order to meet the requirements of voter registration and identification, and
to reach one’s polling place at the appropriate day and time equipped with some
familiarity with the voting act, citizens must be informed of the administrative procedures
to follow. Voter education involves disbursing information about when and how to
register, how to find the appropriate polling place and check one’s status on the registry,
what documents to bring to the polling place, how to mark one’s ballot, and so on.10
Modes of voter education range from printed flyers and posters in public spaces to
telephone hotlines, newspaper advertisements, mobile brigades and kiosks, radio and
television ads, websites, direct mailings, and text messaging (ACE Project 2013b; Ellis et
al. 2006, 20-21). Such voter education activities are typically considered the
responsibility of electoral management bodies, although civil society organizations also
often carry out similar activities.

10

Ellis et al. (2006) label these types of activities “information campaigns,” and distinguish them from
“advertising campaigns” which “address the motivational issue as to why electors should participate in the
electoral event” (20). Information campaigns focus on the “how” of voting, while advertising campaigns
emphasize the “why.” Sometimes EMBs conduct both types of campaign, although the motivational
messages are often the domain of civic groups (21). This study is more concerned with information
campaigns that lower barriers to voting, rather than advertising campaigns intended to motivate citizens to
vote.
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Even in longstanding democracies, voters may lack information about registration
and voting procedures11; in newer democracies and countries with low levels of literacy
or access to information technology, the problems are often more severe. Thus the extent
of voter education – including its geographic coverage and duration, its provision in all
major languages within a country, and the fit between the informational content and
delivery and wider cultural norms – can be a significant factor in the ease or difficulty of
voting.

Research Design
Measuring Election Administration Inclusiveness
Because prior research has focused largely on isolating the effects of specific
administrative measures on voter turnout (see Chapter 2), we know little about how
different administrative rules are combined in practice to produce more or less inclusive
election administration regimes. There are no existing datasets that document – much less
quantify – the inclusiveness of election administration practices across countries, and
even information clearinghouses such as International IDEA12 and the ACE Electoral
Knowledge Network (or ACE Project)13 do not compile systematic data on most election
administration practices.
Compounding the problem of the lack of cross-national data are challenges of
measurement and aggregation. As Table 1.1 suggests, a large number of administrative

11

In the U.S., for instance, a large post-election survey in 2008 “found that one in four voters assumes
election officials or the U.S. Postal Service will update his or her voter registration automatically with each
move [i.e. change of residence], which is almost never the case. The same survey found more than half of
the voters asked were unaware they could revise their voter registration information at state motor vehicle
agencies, as mandated by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)” (Pew Center on the States 2010,
7).
12
www.idea.int
13
aceproject.org
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practices affect inclusiveness, and while measuring some of these practices (such as
whether or not early voting is used) is fairly straightforward, measurement of other
practices (such as the quality of voter education) is much more difficult.14 Even more
challenging is the issue of aggregation, as it is not readily apparent how the components
of election administration inclusiveness might be aggregated into a quantitative index in a
theoretically meaningful way.15 The challenge of aggregating and weighting different
features of an electoral process – and whether it is “possible to develop a uniform
weighting scheme that is meaningful and applicable cross-nationally to countries all
around the world” (Carroll and Davis-Roberts 2013, 93) – is noted by scholars and
election observers with regard to determining the overall quality of elections more
generally (see Kelley 2012a, 13). The problem of aggregation is particularly important
because many (perhaps most) cases will likely exhibit complex combinations of scores on
individual components – low barriers to access on some measures, and more restrictive
practices on others.
Given the complexity of the dependent variable and lack of existing measures, it
is difficult to determine the range of values that election administration inclusiveness
takes in the population of cases, which consists of all countries with competitive,
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As Keith Jennings of the National Democratic Institute observed of voter education: “The cumulative
effect of all voter education in an election should be evaluated by the degree to which pertinent information
is reasonably available to all eligible voters in a form they can comprehend, and in a timely fashion (i.e.,
allowing a reasonable time for the audience to make use of the information). The information should
adequately discuss essential facts, procedures, rights and issues. There are no fast and simple methods by
which to make these evaluations” (Jennings 1999, 8).
15
For instance, it is not clear how each component should be weighted – e.g., whether convenient polling
site location should be weighted equally with election day registration. Some work has developed measures
of voter registration restrictiveness; for example, Bowler and Donovan (2008) construct an index based on
ten factors, each one measured dichotomously, which are then aggregated. While useful for their purposes,
such aggregation assumes that each factor – such as whether one must register to vote prior to election day,
or whether there is a cutoff date for receiving an absentee ballot – poses an equal barrier to participation.
Similar aggregation problems plague measurements of other concepts, such as indices of democracy (see
Munck and Verkuilen 2002).
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relatively free elections.16 The most readily available measure, voter turnout, cannot be
used as a direct indicator of election administration inclusiveness, since many other
factors affect voter turnout. Voter registration rates might be a useful indicator of the
restrictiveness of registration laws, but reliable comparative data on registration rates is
lacking.17 Even less comparative data is readily available for such factors as the
accessibility of polling places.
In the absence of systematic comparative data or even reliable indirect measures
of the dependent variable, I rely on coding the inclusiveness of election administration
practices based on the close examination of cases. Drawing on each country’s election
laws, documents from electoral management bodies, election observer reports, and
secondary literature, I gathered data on as many indicators listed in Table 1.1 as possible,
and, given the problems of aggregation noted above, used qualitative assessment to place
cases on an ordinal scale of inclusiveness (high, medium, and low). While factors shown
in the existing literature to pose high barriers to participation, such as registration
requirements and polling locations (see Chapter 2), are given particular consideration,
coding through qualitative assessment allowed for consideration of the totality of
circumstances surrounding a country’s election administration, rather than assigning
scoring weights to each component of the dependent variable a priori.18

16

Electoral authoritarian regimes in which competition is restricted and election results are determined a
priori through fraud or other means may mobilize voters in order to generate high turnout to legitimize the
regime. In these cases, the inclusiveness of election administration is less relevant than it is for democratic
regimes.
17
For instance, International IDEA compiles turnout and registration data on their website for most
countries, but in some cases the number of registered voters in a country exceeds estimates of the country’s
voting age population. This is often a result of outdated or otherwise inaccurate voter registries or census
data. See IDEA’s methodology Web page at http://www.idea.int/vt/methodology.cfm
18
Descriptions of election administration inclusiveness are presented in each case study chapter, and are
summarized in Tables 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, and 7.2. Due to a lack of systematic data, I exlude waiting time
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Method and Case Selection
Because the causes of variation in election administration practices have not been
the focus of systematic study, we lack not only measures of the dependent variable, but
also theories that offer explanations of variation in election administration
inclusiveness.19 Lacking well-developed extant theories, this project undertakes an
inductive approach to theory development, seeking to “inductively identify new
variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths” (George and Bennett 2005,
75) through the careful examination of cases.
Case selection is guided by several criteria. First, while the complete range and
distribution of values of the dependent variable in the population of cases is unknown, it
is possible to select cases with wide variation in the inclusiveness of election
administration practices, both across cases and within cases over time. Such selection of
cases with wide variation on the dependent variable facilitates theory generation
(Seawright and Gerring 2008, 300). Relatedly, selecting cases with extreme values on the
dependent variable is particularly appropriate for theory development (George and
Bennett 2005, 81; Seawright and Gerring 2008, 302; Van Evera 1997, 25), as well as
when dealing with a phenomenon that is difficult to operationalize and precisely measure
(Gerring 2001, 217). Thus, cases selected for this study fall into the high or low
categories of the dependent variable for at least some of the period studied.
Second, cases are selected to exploit several case study methods. Choosing cases
that vary on the dependent variable but are similar on a number of dimensions facilitates

at the polling place (row 14 of Table 1.1) and assistance for voters (row 16 of Table 1.1) from the tables in
the case study chapters, although I discuss those issues in the case narratives where the data permits.
19
Though as discussed in the following chapter, hypotheses can be gleaned from the existing literature.
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controlled comparison using Mill’s method of difference. For this study, cases are
selected that are similar on several potentially relevant variables, such as level of
economic development and electoral system structure. However, given the limitations of
small-n controlled comparison for causal inference (George and Bennett 2005, ch.8),
controlled comparison can only suggest potentially important causal relationships and
frame the analytical problem to be addressed (Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004,
100). Within-case analysis is a necessary complement to controlled comparison, and this
is facilitated by choosing cases that vary on the dependent variable over time. This allows
for congruence tests to determine whether independent and dependent variables co-vary
in expected directions within a case over time (George and Bennett 2005, ch. 9).
Variation within cases over time can also allow for a before-after analysis if the value of
a hypothesized independent variable changes abruptly at a particular point in time. For
example, a change in the structure of a country’s electoral management body or the
inauguration of a new government can provide an opportunity to isolate the effects of that
change within a case.
While all of these methods – controlled comparison, congruence tests, and beforeafter analysis – can generate hypotheses and provide evidence of their plausibility,
perhaps the most effective mode of within-case analysis for causal inference is process
tracing (George and Bennett 2005). Once potential independent variables are identified
through other modes of within-case analysis and controlled comparison, process tracing
can evaluate the causal mechanisms underlying the relationship between these
independent variables and the dependent variable through fine-grained analysis of the
causal chain leading from cause to effect. In this study, process tracing is used to examine
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the process by which hypothesized causal variables led to the adoption of particular laws
and administrative practices bearing on voter access.
Using these criteria, the cases selected for this study fall into the high or low
categories of the dependent variable for at least some of the period studied (providing
wide variation and relatively extreme values on the dependent variable), vary over time in
their election administration practices (providing additional variation on the dependent
variable), and are similar on several potentially relevant variables, such as level of
economic development and political culture.
The cases selected for close examination are Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El
Salvador. All three countries transitioned to a democratic regime with free elections
between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, but they have differed widely in the extent to
which the administration of elections has posed obstacles to voter participation, with
Guatemala and El Salvador initially having low levels of inclusiveness and Nicaragua
having a high level of inclusiveness. After 2000, however, Guatemala and El Salvador
became more inclusive, while Nicaragua’s election administration has become less so
since the mid-2000s.
In Guatemala, administrative features of the electoral process – particularly
difficult voter registration procedures, highly centralized polling locations, insufficient
voter education efforts, and the holding of elections during the rural labor migration
season – posed significant obstacles to participation for many citizens. Yet over time
electoral reforms increased the inclusiveness of the country’s election administration
practices, most notably by decentralizing polling sites to reduce travel time for rural
voters.
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In El Salvador, administrative barriers to voter participation were initially similar
to those in Guatemala, including onerous voter registration and identification
requirements and centralized and inaccessible polling places. Yet like Guatemala, El
Salvador’s electoral administration practices have become more inclusive over time,
though in a different sequence: voter registration processes have become simplified by
automatically adding citizens to the voter rolls once they obtain a national identity card,
while the decentralization of polling places has been implemented gradually after
repeated delays.
In contrast to Guatemala and El Salvador, Nicaragua established fairly inclusive
election administration practices in its early democratic period. The voter registration
process was easy to negotiate, with the state making significant efforts to register voters
and distribute identification documents. Additionally, polling locations tend to be located
close to voters’ residences, so that travel to the polls is minimized. The accessibility of
voter registration and convenient polling locations have been reinforced by other
measures related to voter education and casting a ballot. Yet since the mid-2000s,
obtaining an identity card needed to vote has become more difficult for those not tied to
the governing party, while voter education efforts have diminished.
Thus, emerging from similar processes of democratic transition, Nicaragua
adopted election administration practices that kept barriers to voter participation low,
while El Salvador and Guatemala adopted measures that made voting a costly and timeconsuming activity for many would-be voters. Over time this pattern has begun to
reverse. The empirical focus of this project is to explain this initial variation and
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subsequent dynamics in an effort to shed light on the broader research problem of why
democratic countries vary in the extent to which voting is accessible to all citizens.
As with any research design, there are trade-offs involved in the research strategy
adopted. A first challenge for this study is the problem of accurately estimating the
impact of a large number of variables with a small number of cases. However, this
challenge is partly addressed through process tracing (George and Bennett 2005), or what
Collier, Brady, and Seawright (2004) have called “causal process observations.” This
methodology relies not on correlation across cases, but careful analysis of evidence that
links cause and effect within each case; this methodology thus circumvents the “degrees
of freedom” problem.
A second challenge involves generalizing to a wider population from a small
number of cases. In particular, the cases selected are all post-conflict countries, and the
dynamics of institutional development in these cases may be unique to such settings. In
particular, the destruction of physical infrastructure and the problems of enfranchising
voters who have been displaced by violence and often lack identification documents pose
particularly severe logistical and political challenges for election administration (Lyons
2004, 46; Prather and Herron 2007, 354). Additionally, all three cases are developing
countries, and the findings of this project may not generalize to developed democracies
that face different sets of election administration challenges.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to take as a starting point for theory development
that all democracies – whether rich or poor, post-conflict or not – face similar tasks of
voter registration, polling location, voter identification, voter education efforts, and so on.
Additionally, the identification of cases that exhibit significant variation in election
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administration inclusiveness, despite similarly being post-conflict developing countries,
suggests that differences among cases within these categories may result from general
causal factors at work in other contexts. There are thus no strong a priori grounds for
assuming that the findings in these cases will not have broader applicability; at the same
time, the challenges of generalizability and the importance of clarifying scope conditions
must be kept in mind, as with all research designs.

The Argument
The argument developed through the case studies in the following chapters
focuses on several key explanatory factors that shaped election administration
inclusiveness in the countries studied. The general argument is briefly laid out in this
section; a more empirically grounded statement of the argument is presented in the
concluding chapter.
I argue that historical antecedents powerfully shaped the initial choice of election
administration rules in these new democracies. In particular, where major episodes of
election fraud had occurred under authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes,
democratizing regimes adopted election administration rules that sought to ensure the
rectitude of electoral processes at all costs, resulting in election procedures that limited
voter participation. As memories of these fraudulent practices faded, less restrictive
election administration measures became politically possible. However, institutional
inertia and path dependence caused some election procedures that were instituted under
authoritarian or early democratic regimes to persist long after the initial conditions that
gave rise to those procedures had faded.
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I also argue that the composition of a country’s electoral management body (the
agency charged with administering elections) is an important variable affecting election
administration inclusiveness. I find that a non-partisan electoral management body
(EMB) can be an independent and authoritative force for inclusive electoral reform, for
instance by drafting legislation and lobbying for reform in the legislature, and is also
more likely to develop the bureaucratic capacity that is often necessary to reduce
procedural barriers facing voters. Yet non-partisanship is neither a necessary or sufficient
condition for inclusive electoral procedures; rather, EMBs staffed by partisan appointees
can also carry out inclusive practices under some conditions, such as when the dominant
party on the EMB expects electoral victory in a fair contest or when there is intense
pressure to legitimize elections to an international audience.
The interaction between EMB structure and the political party system is also
critical. I find that where political parties are able to identify their supporters in the
electorate and control the EMB, they can suppress the vote of those who are not their
own partisans, for instance through manipulating the delivery of voter ID cards. Partisan
calculations can also delay the introduction of inclusive election administration measures
if the major parties are uncertain of the electoral consequences of reform. Parties that
cannot identify their likely supporters (typically either catch-all or weakly
institutionalized parties) are less likely to attempt exclusion through election
administration measures, and are less reluctant about making voting easier.
Finally, I consider the effects of international influences, particularly international
election observation and technical and financial aid for elections, as well as the effects of
domestic advocacy for electoral reform from civil society groups. I argue that
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international financial and technical assistance are often necessary for less developed
countries to institute inclusive election administration practices, but such assistance is not
sufficient to ensure inclusiveness. Recommendations from election observers have less
impact: while they overwhelmingly tend to advocate for inclusive practices, they
ultimately have little impact on domestic election reform processes. I find that domestic
civil society groups, including election observers, have minimal influence on election
administration practices despite their persistent efforts in advocating electoral reforms.
Civic groups and public opinion exercise little influence in shaping the rules of the
electoral game; rather, election administration is an elite game dominated by legislators,
party officials, and election administrators.
Thus key influences on election administration practices in the cases under study
include historical experiences with election fraud, partisan interests and the nature of the
party system, EMB institutional design, international political pressures, and international
electoral assistance. The argument presented here is thus, to be sure, far from
parsimonious. Yet this is consistent with other work on election-related phenomena that
identifies a wide range of causal variables, such as research on electoral system reform
(Renwick 2010) and on vote buying (Schaffer 2007, 194). Like these other areas, the case
studies in the following chapters strongly suggest that election administration rules and
practices are subject to multiple historical, institutional, and instrumental influences.

Roadmap
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the
literature on election administration and draws hypotheses from prior work regarding the
influences on election administration inclusiveness. Chapters 3 through 7 present the
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empirical case studies. Chapter 3 analyzes Guatemala’s restrictive election administration
rules from its democratic transition in the 1980s up until the early 2000s. Guatemala’s
electoral reform process that significantly lowered barriers to voting is the subject of
chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses Nicaragua’s election administration during the 1984-1996
period, during which administrative practices were largely inclusive. The erosion of
Nicaragua’s election administration inclusiveness since the mid-2000s is taken up in
chapter 6. Chapter 7 analyzes the case of El Salvador, covering both the country’s early
period of highly restrictive election administration and the long period of electoral reform
that has slowly lowered obstacles to participation. The conclusion in chapter 8 offers a
summary of findings and a discussion of their implications.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDYING ELECTION ADMINISTRATION INCLUSIVENESS

Scholars have long been interested in the choice of electoral systems and the
consequences of those systems for a variety of political phenomena. Large literatures
have addressed the adoption of electoral systems, especially proportional representation
(Ahmed 2010; Benoit 2007; Boix 1999; Calvo 2009; Cusack et al. 2007), and the
consequences of electoral systems for outcomes such as party competition and voter
turnout (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954; Jackman 1987; Norris 2004; Selb 2009; Taagepera
and Shugart 1989). While amassing a large body of knowledge about the origins and
effects of proportional representation and other institutions, the field of comparative
electoral studies has focused overwhelmingly on electoral systems defined as the
institutions for translating votes into seats. Issues of election administration – the
administrative and bureaucratic rules and procedures governing electoral processes –
received little attention before 2000. The story was similar in the field of American
politics, where election administration was often ignored. Whether in comparative or
American politics, most scholars simply did not “think enough about the nitty-gritty of
carrying out elections – about how the registry is prepared, what documents voters must
present, how voters cast their ballots, and how ballots are counted” (Schaffer 2008, 5).
Yet in the wake of the administrative problems surrounding the 2000 U.S.
presidential election, as well as similar experiences in democracies in developing
countries, scholars have paid more attention to the extensive logistical and technical
components of election administration. This has opened up new lines of research in both
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American and comparative politics, while a related literature has developed in
international relations focused on international election monitoring. Yet the study of
election administration to date has focused overwhelmingly on the effects of election
administration variables rather than on the origins of different election administration
practices. This literature has been most developed in the area of American politics, with
scholars focused on the effects of voter registration rules, convenience voting methods,
voter identification laws, and polling place accessibility. The following section briefly
reviews the findings of this literature; subsequent sections review the literature on
comparative election administration and international election monitoring before drawing
together these strands to map the primary influences on election administration identified
by prior research.

Election Administration in the United States
Until the 1990s, the enormous literature on voting in the U.S. paid little attention
to issues of election administration. As early as the 1920s, Merriam and Gosnell (1924)
identified important procedural obstacles to participation in Chicago elections, including
limited polling hours, poor location of polling stations, holding registration and voting on
work days, and the requirement to state one’s age when registering to vote (which
discouraged some women from registering). But subsequently, the only aspect of election
administration to receive sustained scholarly attention was voter registration. The role of
registration laws involving poll taxes and literacy tests in disenfranchising black and poor
white voters in the post-Reconstruction South are well known (Key [1949] 1984; Kousser
1974; Rusk and Stucker 1978). More generally, Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978) found
that restrictive voter registration requirements, such as early deadlines for registration and
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limited registration office hours, depressed voter turnout significantly. A number of
subsequent studies have concluded that restrictive registration laws reduce voter turnout
(Mitchell and Wlezien 1995) and that the elimination of registration burdens through
election-day registration increases turnout (Brians and Grofman 2001; Fenster 1994;
Knack 2001).20
Similarly, liberal registration laws such as “motor voter” provisions have been
found to increase turnout in states that implemented them in the 1970s to early 1990s
(Knack 1995), though the effect of the national motor voter law passed in 1993 appears to
have been minimal (Brown and Wedeking 2006; Martinez and Hill 1999). While some
liberalizing registration reforms such as mail-in registration and prohibitions against
purging people from the voter rolls for failure to vote have not been shown to boost
turnout (Highton 2004, 510; Knack 1995), the evidence is clear that some voter
registration requirements within the U.S. have had substantial effects on voter
participation, even within the limited range of variation found across the 50 states in the
post-Voting Rights Act period.
Scholars have recently devoted more attention to other aspects of election
administration, particularly following the 2000 presidential election. Much of this
literature addresses “convenience voting,” or the variety of modes of casting a ballot that
have become more common since the 1990s.21 Convenience (or non-precinct) voting
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However, election day registration has not altered the composition of the electorate, as the participation
rates of those with lower socioeconomic status are not drastically affected (Brians and Grofman 1999;
2001; Highton 1997).
21
Another strand of literature has focused on voting technology, including issues of ballot design, the
machines used to record and count votes, and technology’s effects on under- and over-voting and the
residual vote rate. See Stewart (2011a) for a review of this literature.
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includes early in-person voting, vote centers, voting by mail, and absentee voting. As
Stein and Vonnahme (2011, 307) explain:
In-person early voting allows voters to ballot at any number of locations days or
weeks before Election Day. Mail-in voting allows voters to request or receive an
unsolicited ballot in the mail that they can return on or before Election Day by
mail. A newer mode of non-precinct voting is the Election Day vote center, which
allows voters to cast their ballots at any number of voting places on Election Day.
Common to all modes of nonprecinct voting is either the opportunity to vote
before Election Day and/or to vote at any number of locations rather than just one
polling place proximate to the voter’s residence. The latter feature of both inperson early voting and vote centers provides voters with places at which to vote
that are more convenient and central to where they work, shop, attend school and
travel. Similarly, in-person early and mail-in voting provides voters with the
added convenience of voting days, or even weeks before Election Day.
Most research on convenience voting has focused on its effects on turnout, and
the conclusions are mixed. There is little evidence that convenience voting methods
substantially increase turnout. Neither early in-person voting or no-excuse absentee
voting have been found to affect turnout (Gronke et al. 2007; 2008, 443; Karp and
Banducci 2001), while voting by mail has been found to increase turnout in low-stimulus
elections, although it has little effect in high profile contests (Karp and Banducci 2000;
Kousser and Mullin 2007; Southwell 2009; Southwell and Burchett 2000). Early and mail
voting also do not reduce the socioeconomic skew in participation, as those who take
advantage of convenience voting methods tend to be partisan voters who would be
motivated to vote in any case (Alvarez et al. 2012; Berinsky 2005; Karp and Banducci
2000; Neeley and Richardson 2001; Stein 1998; Stein and Vonnahme 2008, 488). Most
studies also find no partisan advantage to early voting (Alvarez et al. 2012; Gronke et al.
2008, 444).22
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Meredith and Malhotra (2011) do find evidence, however, that vote by mail and early voting may affect
election outcomes without altering turnout or attracting new voters, as early voters cast their ballots before
receiving late stage campaign information that might alter their voting decisions.
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More noticeable effects on turnout have been linked to the accessibility of polling
places. Gimpel and Schuknecht (2003) found that larger distances between a precinct’s
population center and polling place were associated with lower turnout in several
Maryland counties in 2000, while Haspel and Knotts (2005) found that small differences
in the distance between voters’ residences and polling places affected the likelihood of
voters turning out in Atlanta elections. Dyck and Gimpel (2005) also found that distance
affected turnout and voters’ choice between precinct and mail voting in a Nevada county
in 2002. Similarly, the reduction in the number of polling sites has been found to depress
voter turnout. Brady and McNulty (2011) study the consolidation of polling places and
reassignment of some voters in Los Angeles County in 2003, finding a small but
statistically significant decrease in turnout due to the reduction in polling places, mostly
due to voters needing to search for their new polling place rather than a change in
distance to the polling place. McNulty, Dowling, and Ariotti (2009) conducted a similar
analysis of a local referendum in a New York town that underwent precinct
consolidation, and found that having one’s polling place changed substantially affected
the likelihood of turning out. Finally, Stein and Vonnahme (2008) find evidence that the
use of vote centers – which allow voters to choose a voting location that may be on the
way to work or other daily destinations – boosted turnout in a Colorado county. Thus,
even with a limited range of variation in distance to polling places23 and where public
voter information efforts were substantial, studies find that both distance and the
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The average change in distance to one’s polling place for those affected in Los Angeles County was
about one-sixth of a mile (Brady and McNulty 2011), while the median distance from voters’ residence to
the polls in Atlanta was .69 miles (Haspel and Knotts 2005, 564).
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information costs of finding out where one is assigned to vote have noticeable, if
relatively small, effects on voter turnout.24
Finally, the impact of voter identification requirements on voter participation has
received close scrutiny, reflecting concern that such requirements may disenfranchise
lower income, minority, elderly, and youth voters who lack the necessary documentation.
Different studies have come to different conclusions, but it appears that voter
identification requirements have not had discernible effects on voter turnout at the
aggregate level (see Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz 2007; Erickson and Minnite 2009;
Mycoff, Wagner, and Wilson 2009). Studies have found, however, that Hispanics and
African Americans are disproportionately asked to present ID at the polls (Ansolabehere
2009; Atkeson et al. 2010; Cobb, Greiner, and Quinn 2012), suggesting the importance of
studying not just formal legal requirements but also how voter ID laws are administered.
Thus, while there are many other factors that affect voter turnout, the literature on
participation in the U.S. shows that some factors that shape the convenience or difficulty
of voting – particularly registration laws and the accessibility of polling places – have
noticeable effects on the number of people that participate.

Comparative Election Administration
Election administration has also garnered more attention in comparative politics,
where there is much greater variation in electoral institutions. General analyses have
emphasized the importance of high quality election administration for the legitimacy of
24

These studies carry conflicting implications, however. Haspel and Knotts (2005, 570) conclude that
“[o]ur study suggests that splitting precincts helps increase turnout even if voters incur information costs
due to the change.” Brady and McNulty (2011), in contrast, find that information costs have a greater
impact on turnout than does distance to polling places. The rationale behind election day vote centers also
suggests that convenient location, rather than distance from one’s home, is the relevant factor influencing
turnout.
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new democracies (Elklit and Reynolds 2002) and for stability in post-conflict societies
(Lyons 2004). The empirical focus of much comparative work has been the institutional
design of electoral management bodies (EMBs), the agencies charged with carrying out
the administration of electoral processes. Of particular concern has been the
independence of EMBs from the government and political party influence, which has
received much attention in the election policy community (International IDEA 2006;
López-Pintor 2000).
A fairly strong consensus holds that EMBs that are independent of the executive
branch of government are preferable to government EMBs. As Birch (2008, 308) puts it,
“[a]mong practitioners in the fields of electoral assistance and observation, independent
central electoral commissions have come to be regarded as the hallmark of accountable
electoral administration.” Lehoucq (2002, 31) goes so far as to argue that in early 20th
century Latin America, the independence of electoral bodies was “one of the central
institutional developments that made democratization stick in some places, but not in
others.” Birch (2008) studies the impact of formal EMB independence on voter
confidence in the fairness of elections across 28 countries, finding a surprising negative
correlation between EMB independence and popular confidence. As Birch acknowledges
(312-313), endogeneity and measurement problems may affect the results: independent
EMBs may be introduced in countries with low quality elections, and the formal
independence of EMBs does not necessarily measure their actual independence from
partisan interests.25

25

A policy document makes a similar point: “The formal model [of EMB structure] says very little about
an EMB’s actual independence. In fact, most nondemocratic regimes in today’s world boast an Independent
Model of electoral administration” (IDEA 2012, 9).
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Other studies have focused on the effects of party-based and expert-based EMB
structures. Limiting their analysis to Latin American presidential elections, Hartlyn and
colleagues (2008) devised a measure of EMB professionalism and nonpartisanship and
found that electoral processes are significantly more likely to be found acceptable by
observers where the electoral body is professional and nonpartisan.26 As Hartlyn, McCoy,
and Mustillo (2008) explain, their results suggest “that independent, professional
[electoral] bodies are close to being a sufficient condition for successful elections” (89).
Nonpartisan EMBs are not a necessary condition for successful elections, however;
multiparty EMBs “can bring confidence if all major political parties feel represented,”
although they may “lead to stalemates or to lower technical competence if directors are
chosen for political affiliation rather than skills” (Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo 2008,
90). In contrast, Rosas (2010) finds that nonpartisan EMBs are associated with lower
levels of confidence in the electoral process among Latin American elites in countries at
high levels of democracy.
While research is beginning to come to tentative conclusions about the effects of
EMB structure on election quality, very few studies have addressed the origins of election
administration institutions. In a policy-oriented study, López-Pintor (2000) documents
the widespread proliferation of independent electoral management bodies, although he
does not offer a theoretical explanation for this trend or for variations across countries.
Other studies address the development of electoral management bodies in particular
countries, as Eisenstadt (2004) does for the Mexican case, or electoral reforms to reduce
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In their statistical model, the effect is large: a multiparty EMB improves the odds of an acceptable
election by 37 percentage points over a single-party EMB (from .48 to .85), while a fully independent EMB
improves the odds of an acceptable election by another 13 percentage points (to .98) (Hartlyn et al. 2008,
84).
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fraud more generally, as Lehoucq and Molina (2002) do for Costa Rica. The only
scholarly comparative study of the choice of EMB structure is that of Mozaffar (2002),
who finds that colonial legacies, postcolonial authoritarian regimes, ethnopolitical
cleavages, and resulting political negotiations influence institutional design in Africa. Yet
Mozaffar’s analysis is limited to a relatively small number of cases, and focuses on the
formal legal independence of electoral bodies rather than their partisan independence.
Cross-national studies of the effects of election administration practices on voter
turnout are also scarce. Quantitative studies of turnout generally do not incorporate
election administration variables into their models, with the occasional exception of voter
registration requirements.27 The major qualitative work in the field is Schaffer (2008),
who demonstrates that election reforms ostensibly aimed at eliminating fraud and
misconduct can potentially keep voters from the polls through legal disenfranchisement,
administrative exclusion, or partisan demobilization. Beyond this comparative study,
some individual country studies examine the effects of election administration variables
on voter participation. For instance, Lehoucq and Wall (2004) have found that,
controlling for other factors, turnout in Guatemala is lower in larger municipalities and in
municipalities with higher ratios of registered voters to voting stations, suggesting that
travel distance and waiting time at polling sites depress voter participation. Yet while
country studies often note the importance of election administration for participation, few
studies have addressed such issues comparatively.
Thus the comparative literature suggests the importance of election administration
for overall election quality and possibly for larger outcomes such as democratic

27

Though see Franklin (2002), who finds that voting on a Sunday and postal voting are each associated
with an additional 5-7 points of voter turnout in a sample of 31 countries.
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consolidation, and some evidence suggests that non-partisan electoral management
bodies are associated with better quality elections. Yet less is known about the specific
effects of various EMB institutional arrangements or election administration practices, or
the factors influencing the choice of such institutions.

International Election Monitoring
Another literature at the intersection of comparative politics and international
relations has focused on the growth of international election monitoring as an
international norm since the 1980s. A wide variety of intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations monitor elections,28 and by the early 2000s about 80
percent of elections in “non-established” democracies were monitored (Beaulieu and
Hyde 2009, 406; Kelley 2008, 223). Since the 1990s election observation missions have
increasingly sent long-term observers to monitor all facets of the electoral process. Most
observer missions regularly meet with election officials and political parties, issue
periodic statements during the electoral process, and issue a final report after each
election containing specific recommendations for improvements.
Although studies of election observation have not focused specifically on election
administration inclusiveness, the findings on the relationship between election
observation and electoral quality are relevant. Observers may improve elections through
several mechanisms: by increasing the costs to incumbents of cheating and raising the
benefits of holding clean elections through international verification; by offering
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Prominent international organizations involved in election observation include the Organization of
American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United
Nations, the African Union, and the Commonwealth Secretariat. Important NGOs involved in monitoring
include the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute
(IRI), and the Asian Network for Free Elections.
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recommendations for improvements in the electoral process; and, over the medium or
long term, by socializing domestic actors into norms of electoral conduct through
repeated interaction (Kelley 2012a, 10-11). Thus, observers “issue numerous interim
statements throughout the election period, providing feedback to the election authorities
and sometimes pressuring governments to remedy problems such as incomplete voter
registration lists before election day” (Hyde 2011, 110), and “can expose (and thus enable
election administrators to correct) administrative shortcomings that might otherwise lead
to massive disenfranchisement or some other electoral ill” (Kelley 2012a, 105). Postelection recommendations “may influence domestic actors either because they learn new
norms and behaviors, or because they underscore precisely what the international
community expects from them if they want the international community to endorse their
elections” (Kelley 2012a, 105).
According to Carothers (1997, 20), international election observers have helped
disseminate certain election administration practices:
For more than ten years, observers have stressed to election officials, politicians,
and others in countries attempting democratic transitions that, for elections to gain
international credibility, certain procedures must be followed: ballots must be
counted at the polling stations and the results for each station posted at the site;
measures must be taken to ensure that voters cast only one ballot; voterregistration lists must be posted in public areas before election day; poll workers
must be trained; local political-party observers and domestic monitoring groups
must be allowed to monitor the process; and so forth. In combination with
extensive technical assistance to help election commissions effect such reforms,
these efforts have led to significant improvements in the quality of many
elections. They have also established a much broader recognition of a set of ‘best
practices’ concerning the administration of elections.
Scholars have found some evidence of election observation’s touted effects. In a
natural experiment in Armenia, Hyde (2007) found that the incumbent won a lower
proportion of votes in monitored than in unmonitored precincts, suggesting that observers
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deter ballot stuffing. Using statistical matching, Kelley (2012a, ch. 7) finds that
monitored elections are of higher quality and more likely to result in government
turnover than are unmonitored elections.
Evidence of long-term improvements resulting from election monitoring is scant,
however. In a series of case studies, Kelley (2012a) finds that observers often have
limited influence over election quality over the long term. While recommendations from
observers sometimes inform subsequent electoral reforms, many election problems tend
to persist and new problems often emerge. Improvements also usually take a long time,
“and when progress does occur, the main role of international monitors usually is to
reinforce domestic actors” (Kelley 2012a, 141).
Election observation may also have unintended consequences that lower the
quality of elections, as incumbents strategically alter their manipulation tactics to avoid
condemnation by observers. Scholars suggest that observers are more likely to condemn
election day fraud and blatant manipulation such as ballot stuffing and misuse of
government resources than administrative problems or irregularities occurring before
voting takes place (Hyde 2011, 164-165; Kelley 2012a, 66-67). When confronted with
administrative problems such as inaccurate voter registries, “international observers have
a difficult time distinguishing between intentional manipulation and administrative
incompetence” (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009, 404; see also Simpser and Donno 2012, 503).
Judith Kelley’s exhaustive analysis indeed finds that observers are often “willing to give
countries the benefit of the doubt when the problems might stem from inexperience or
lack of capacity. Administrative problems such as errors in voter lists, complaints about
the conduct of the electoral commission, problems with voter information, logistical
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issues during voting, and so forth were not likely to trigger criticism by monitors”
(Kelley 2012a, 81).
Thus indirect tactics of election manipulation may proliferate as observers make
more blatant forms of cheating more difficult. Such tactics include inaccurate voter rolls
or cumbersome voter registration processes that can be blamed on administrative
incompetence, inadequate voter education efforts in opposition strongholds, tightening
government control over the media, or selective application of the law (Beaulieu and
Hyde 2009, 400; Carothers 1997, 22; Hyde 2011, 179; Simpser 2008). Some studies find
evidence for such a shift in manipulation tactics: Hyde and O’Mahony (2010) find preelection fiscal manipulation to be more likely in countries hosting election monitors,
while Simpser and Donno (2012) find “that high-quality election monitoring missions are
associated with a decrease in the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, and media freedom”
(502). Beaulieu and Hyde (2009) find that election observation is associated with a
greater probability of the political opposition boycotting elections, possibly because of
incumbent strategic manipulation and the danger of participating in a manipulated yet
internationally certified election. Kelley (2012a), in contrast, finds that bad things go
together: the types of irregularities unlikely to be condemned by observers tend to
coincide with more obvious forms of cheating. “That is, safer and riskier forms of
irregularities are complements, not substitutes, as would be expected if politicians were
shifting into safer forms of manipulation to avoid criticism” (Kelley 2012a, 86).
While the issue of strategic manipulation resulting from election observation
remains unsettled, the literature shows that international election observation influences
electoral conduct in monitored countries. The impact of monitoring on election
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administration inclusiveness, however, is less clear – particularly as observer
recommendations may promote either inclusive or restrictive practices.

Explaining Election Administration Practices
As the previous sections show, a large body of scholarship on election
administration has developed in recent years. This literature shows that several facets of
the administration of elections – such as the stringency of voter registration requirements
and the location of polling places – have discernable effects on voter turnout in U.S.
elections; that efforts to clean up elections, such as through the introduction of voter
identification requirements, can have disenfranchising effects; that the structure of
electoral management bodies is related to the perceived legitimacy of electoral processes
among elites and observers; and that international election observation improves the
quality of elections in the short term, while potentially also inducing a shift to more
opaque forms of political manipulation.
Yet despite this extensive literature, very little work has addressed the origins of
different election administration practices. In other words, scholars have largely treated
election administration as an independent rather than dependent variable. This has
important implications for understanding the effects of election administration practices,
where unknown factors may be correlated with both the adoption of particular practices
and with outcomes such as voter turnout.29 It also means that we know little about the
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This is a problem of omitted variable bias. In the U.S. context, Hanmer (2009) notes that previous
research is marked by a “failure to account for the reasons underlying state-to-state variations in election
laws” (26) and argues that “ignoring the reasons why some states are inventive and interested in
encouraging participation – and others are not – has serious implications for the ability to draw conclusions
regarding the effect of the policy being studied” (7). Norris (2004, 173) notes a similar endogeneity
problem facing comparative work, such that permissive administrative practices may be introduced in
countries seeking to increase their low voter turnout – and thereby appear negatively correlated with
turnout in large-n studies.
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origins and evolution of an important subset of electoral institutions that are often pivotal
in struggles for political power.
Despite the focus of prior work on the consequences of election administration, a
number of factors influencing the origins of election administration can be gleaned from
the existing literature and from the wider body of scholarship on electoral systems and
suffrage rights. This section draws out these potential causal factors and distills a number
of hypotheses regarding the origins of election administration practices.

Partisan Interests
Because election administration practices affect voters’ access to the ballot and
potentially influence election outcomes, partisan interests can be expected to play a large
role in the adoption of electoral procedures – as they do in the adoption of other electoral
rules. Indeed, most studies of electoral system choice adopt an office-seeking approach
focused on partisan interests. In this view, “parties prefer electoral rules that maximize
their seat share relative to those of other parties” (Benoit 2007, 378), and ruling parties
prefer to maintain existing electoral rules unless the competitive environment changes
(due to the entry of new parties or changes in voters’ preferences, for example), at which
point they will seek electoral reforms to stay in office or minimize their losses (Benoit
2004; 2007; Boix 1999, 2010; Remmer 2008; Wills-Otero 2009).
The historical record of the U.S. suggests the importance of partisan interests in
shaping not just electoral system choice but also election administration rules. After
outright disenfranchisement and ballot stuffing became untenable in the South following
Reconstruction, a slew of procedural impediments to the vote – including stringent voter
registration laws, literacy tests, and poll taxes – were erected. While racism was central to
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these disenfranchising moves, the partisan interests of the Democratic Party in the South
were also behind laws to eliminate the black and poor white vote (Campbell 2005, 102103; Highton 2004, 509; Kousser 1974). The adoption of voting procedures aimed at
reducing fraud, such as the secret ballot and voter registration, was also in part intended
to disenfranchise some voters for partisan advantage (Campbell 2005, 97-100; Keyssar
2001, 126-127).
Partisan divisions have also been central to more recent election administration
reforms in the U.S. The 1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) that mandated
voter registration services to be offered in motor vehicle and public assistance offices was
passed by a unified Democratic government over Republican opposition (Martinez and
Hill 1999, 296-297), and Democrats have generally supported election day registration
while Republicans have opposed it (Carbó and Wright 2008, 68, 71; Hanmer 2009).30
Similarly, partisan divisions over voter identification requirements and other election
administration procedures have been intense since 2000, with Republicans endorsing
more restrictive rules ostensibly to prevent voter fraud and Democrats supporting more
inclusive rules to ensure access for voters likely to support the party (Hasen 2012). A
similar pattern has been evident in Britain, where Labor has sought “to lower the cost of
voting and thereby increase participation (particularly among key Labour
constituencies)” while Conservatives and Liberal Democrats “have invoked the specter of
fraud in pushing for greater controls on access to voting” (Elmendorf 2006, 432).
These examples highlight the potential for a governing party to craft electoral
procedures to facilitate the participation of its supporters and/or to impede the

30

In the 1990s some states adopted election-day registration with Republican support in order to be exempt
from the provisions of the NVRA.
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participation of opposition voters. The literature also suggests the potential for major
parties to collude in restricting participation to their mutual benefit. As Bowler and
Donovan (2008, 44) explain in reference to the U.S.,
Parties in power may act as cartels to limit the competition they face from
potential rivals who are still out of power and hence restrict participation to a
well-established group of voters….Voters who do not much care about politics
who start to participate may well unsettle the political system, either by giving
effective voice to their previously unarticulated demands or through their
unpredictability. Well-organized political parties, both Democrat and Republican,
may thus have an interest in excluding new voters from the electorate in general.
Critics claim that both major parties in the U.S. “strenuously resist vast increases in the
franchise because they cannot predict the party allegiance of the newcomers, or how they
would vote” (Scher 2011, 174), and Bowler and Donovan (2008, 45-46) find evidence
that “[s]tates with a history of hierarchical, traditional party organizations were more
likely to have longer requirements for registering in advance of elections.”
A similar view holds that incumbent politicians who have been elected under
current rules have individual (rather than partisan) interests in maintaining those rules,
and the interests of incumbency drive the choice of electoral procedures. In a comparative
study of electoral system reform, Bowler, Donovan, and Karp (2006) find that
incumbents are less likely to support electoral reforms than are outsider politicians and
that “[w]inners from government and opposition parties appear quite similar in their
hesitance to endorse electoral system change” (441). In the U.S., former president Carter
has attributed his failure to gain support for national election-day registration in the 1970s
to the fact that incumbents in safe districts did not want unpredictable voters entering the
electorate (Carbó and Wright 2008, 69; see also Hayduck 2005, 28).
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While politicians may have partisan or individual interests in increasing or
limiting access to the ballot through administrative measures, the literature suggests that
whether or not parties seek advantage through election administration depends in part on
the ability of parties to identify their supporters and the supporters of the opposition.
Intentional disenfranchisement through election administration practices for partisan gain
requires accurate knowledge of voter preferences (Schaffer 2008). Thus, the ability of the
dominant Democratic Party to identify Republican and Populist supporters through the
identifiers of race and class made disenfranchisement through election administration a
viable partisan strategy in the post-Reconstruction U.S. South. Campbell (2005, 271)
notes more broadly how party identification patterns may facilitate cheating: “By
fragmenting the electorate into groups with predictable voting behaviors, the parties have
an easier job identifying those who will likely vote for and against them, which make
vote-buying and vote-suppression much easier tasks.”
This is illustrated by negative vote buying (or buying abstention) in nineteenth
century New York, where “[b]uying off the opposition (paying voters US$10-25 to stay
at home), whose members party canvassers identified in the weeks before election day,
worked in a world of stable communities – places where party activists knew every
citizen and therefore could reasonably predict the inclinations of voters” (Lehoucq 2007,
39; see also Schaffer 2007, 187). As Schaffer (2008, 121) suggests, “[w]e might expect
negative vote buying in today’s reforming democracies, then, only in places where parties
can easily identify rival supporters.” The ability to identify rival supporters is also
necessary to effectively carry out other voter suppression tactics for partisan advantage,
such as purging opposition voters from the voter rolls – a practice facilitated historically
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in Costa Rica, for example, by the fact that candidates printed the names of their
supporters in newspaper ads to demonstrate their popularity (Bowman 2003, 267).
Therefore, we might expect less inclusive election administration practices when
a ruling party can single out opposition supporters for exclusion, whether due to
geographic, ethnic, or socioeconomic factors associated with partisan loyalties (Schaffer
2008, 42-44). This suggests that countries with catch-all parties or fluid party systems
marked by low levels of partisan attachments might exhibit more inclusive electoral
procedures, since it would be relatively difficult for ruling parties in such systems to
identify opposition supporters. Additionally, as the literature on electoral systems
suggests (Benoit 2007, 383-384; Bowler et al. 2006, 435), uncertainty about parties’
social bases may be particularly high in transitional settings, when many parties are new
and voter preferences are not widely known.31
However, a contrary hypothesis regarding the effects of party systems can also be
deduced. Restrictive election administration practices often have their largest impact on
citizens of low socioeconomic status (see, e.g., Highton 1997), since those with fewer
resources are least able to overcome the increased costs of voting that arise from
administrative barriers. This suggests that where partisan loyalties correspond to class
cleavages, the relative inclusiveness of election administration practices will depend on
the extent to which the party or parties with lower class constituencies can influence
election-related legislation and the decisions of the electoral body. Where such parties
wield significant influence, we might expect fewer barriers to voter participation – unless

31

Renwick (2010, 11-12, 56-57) suggests that under such circumstances, parties will be unable to predict
the partisan implications of different electoral rules and may choose electoral systems behind a Rawlsian
‘veil of ignorance.’
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there are means of voter exclusion available that can target higher socioeconomic groups
without impeding participation of lower class constituents.
The ability to identify opposition voters may be a necessary condition for efforts
to adopt restrictive election administration practices in order to shape the electorate for
partisan advantage. Yet the literature offers less guidance on when parties will be
motivated to pursue such a strategy. The competitiveness of the electoral environment
may be critical, as ruling parties that perceive themselves to be electorally vulnerable
may resort to voter suppression and other tactics to stay in power (Schaffer 2008, ch. 2).
Yet the effects of competitiveness may be indeterminate: ruling parties may respond to
rising opposition through either electoral manipulation or electoral reform aimed at
increasing legitimacy and defusing protest – both of which were evident during Mexico’s
democratization process, for instance (Schedler 2002, 116). Indeed, the literature on
suffrage and democratization shows that in competitive electoral environments, elite
parties have sometimes supported broadening voting rights in order to win over new
social classes entering the electorate – or at least to not alienate such groups by opposing
their enfranchisement (Collier 1999; Keyssar 2001, 33; Lehoucq and Molina 2002, 250).
Aside from such strategic considerations, the values of political elites may sometimes
trump the pursuit of partisan advantage. Bowler, Donovan, and Karp (2006) find that in
addition to self-interest, values and ideology have effects on politicians’ preferences for
electoral reform, and note that “[a]ttitudes about the proper role of mass participatory
democracy, for example, may well produce a commitment to, or at least positive affect
for, specific types of electoral arrangements that do not necessarily advance a politicians’
own electoral prospects or ability to control policy outcomes” (436).
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In sum, partisan interests are sure to matter for the crafting of election
administration practices, and the ability of parties to identify the opposition’s supporters
may be particularly important. Beyond that, it is unclear when parties (either individually
or in collusion) will pursue strategies of inclusiveness or restrictiveness, or when other
values will take priority over office-seeking.

Electoral Management Body Structure
Related to partisan interests is the institutional structure of electoral management
bodies (EMBs), and in particular the independence or partisanship of election
administrators. While parties can legislate election rules that shape voter access to the
ballot, election administrators often have significant discretion in implementing election
rules and deciding electoral procedures not specified by law.
Merriam and Gosnell (1924) long ago noted the potentially negative
consequences of partisan election boards in the U.S., and observed that “the failure of the
local boards to perform their tasks efficiently had a depressing effect upon the number
voting” (108). Partisanship and decentralization are often blamed for election
administration problems in the U.S. today. As Hasen (2012, 197) puts it, “[t]he core
problems with how American elections are run are no secret: they are partisanship and
localism.” Comparatively, although many observers acknowledge the appropriateness of
multiparty EMBs in some circumstances – especially in post-conflict situations in which
parties are distrustful of each other and seek mutual guarantees (IDEA 2012, 6, 14;
Lopez-Pintor 2000, 63; Lyons 2004) – many analysts suggest the importance of
independent and non-partisan electoral commissions for election quality (e.g., Pastor

51

1999, 18; Reilly 2003, 21). International election observers also often recommend that
countries move towards independent and non-partisan EMBs to improve election quality.
The partisanship of election administrators might affect inclusiveness in several
ways. First, top-level election officials with partisan ties may directly institute measures
that facilitate or impede voting, depending on their party’s interests. Such measures might
include decisions about where to locate polling places, what paperwork to require for
voter registration, or how vigorously to conduct voter education campaigns. Non-partisan
election administrators, in contrast, will have no partisan motives to institute rules that
hinder voter participation. As Schaffer and Wang (2009, 411) note in comparing the
partisan election chief in Indiana and his non-partisan counterpart in Canada, “the Chief
Electoral Officer in Canada has a freer hand and clearer mandate to protect the voting
rights of all citizens, regardless of how they are likely to vote.”
Second, the discretion of election workers at the local level may result in
administrative impediments to voting, a possibility perhaps made more likely if local
workers are partisan appointees. Poll workers play an important role given their
“discretion in deciding who must show identification at the polls, how to handle voters
who cannot be readily located in the voter registration rolls, and how to handle problems
at the polls” (Alvarez and Hall 2006, 496; see also Scher 2011, 14). Thus if an EMB’s
partisan makeup penetrates down to the poll worker level, the potential for manipulation
– including the inappropriate exclusion of voters at the polls – increases.
Finally, independent and non-partisan election commissions may play an active
role in electoral reform. Elmendorf (2006) suggests several mechanisms through which
commissions may influence electoral reform, including shifting public opinion towards
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its proposed reforms, influencing judicial review decisions by providing independent
analysis of election legislation, and gaining endorsements for its proposals from
legislators who fear alienating election administrators. While this policy analysis and
advocacy role of electoral management bodies has been largely overlooked in the
literature, it may be the case that non-partisan EMBs not only prevent restrictive
administrative measures being introduced with partisan intent, but also influence election
administration inclusiveness by affecting election legislation.
A final consideration concerning electoral management bodies is their degree of
centralization, an issue largely neglected in the literature. In the U.S., the highly
decentralized system of election administration is sometimes blamed for a variety of ills,
including administrative procedures that make voting more difficult (e.g., Hayduck 2005,
30; Scher 2011, 92), while Ewald (2009, 129-134) suggests that local control of election
administration has sometimes led to greater inclusion. There is perhaps more consensus
that decentralized authority over election administration produces vested bureaucratic
interests, as evident by the resistance of state and local election officials toward any
efforts at centralization (Ewald 2009, 6; Hasen 2010, 1098; 2012, 125). Such bureaucratic
turf struggles have not been the focus of much research, but could potentially have
important consequences for attempts at electoral reform.
Thus, prior research suggests that non-partisan EMBs may be associated with
more inclusive election administration procedures. But the effects of EMB structure are
only beginning to be studied systematically, and it is unknown whether, and under what
conditions, independent electoral management bodies are more likely to lower barriers to
voting than are partisan electoral bodies.
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The Specter of Election Fraud: Access versus Integrity
Another prominent theme in the literature and in wider contemporary debates
about election administration is the potential trade-off between making voting easier and
preventing electoral fraud. As Schaffer (2008) demonstrates, election administration
measures aimed at ensuring that only eligible voters cast ballots and that they cast them
freely may – either intentionally or not – make it more difficult for eligible citizens to
vote. This “access versus integrity” trade-off (Hasen 2012, 163) is evident in debates over
voter identification and voter registration in the U.S. and discussions of online voting
generally.32 Proponents of voter identification laws and opponents of election day
registration cite concerns about voter fraud, while others emphasize the potential for strict
rules to keep people from the polls. These debates are not new: in early twentieth century
Costa Rica, for example, a requirement to show photo ID at the polls was “repeatedly
postponed…ostensibly because legitimate voters would be deprived of their suffrage
rights because they had not obtained their photographic identification cards” (Lehoucq
2000, 462). The historical record in the U.S. is also replete with efforts to make voting
more difficult that were motivated, or at least justified, by the desire to eliminate election
fraud – such as the introduction of voter registration requirements and lengthy residency
periods to vote within a jurisdiction (Hayduck 2005, 21; Keyssar 2001, 103-104, 122123).33 While the remedies for fraud have been numerous, so too have the types of
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On internet voting in the U.S., Campbell (2005, 286) notes that “[b]y 2000, election officials throughout
the nation were still struggling with the age-old dilemma of making elections more accessible to a wider
populace without opening up new opportunities for cheating.”
33
As Keyssar (2012) explains: “Many of the late 19th- and early 20th-century laws [restricting voting]
operated not by excluding specific classes of citizens but by erecting procedural obstacles that were
justified as measures to prevent fraud or corruption. It was to ‘preserve the purity of the ballot box’ that
legislatures passed laws requiring voters to bring their sealed naturalization papers to the polls or to present
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election fraud that reformers have sought to curb, including double voting, voting by noncitizens, and the importation of voters from outside jurisdictions – a phenomena variously
named colonizing, pipe-laying (Campbell 2005, 19, 23), and pre-electoral residential
registration (Fukumoto and Horiuchi 2011).
Despite the centrality of the ‘access versus integrity’ theme in many election
administration debates, there is little comparative analysis of how these tradeoffs
manifest themselves and how they are resolved in different contexts.34 There are thus few
clear hypotheses offered in the literature regarding how concerns about election fraud
shape election administration inclusiveness. Yet two ideas are suggested by previous
work: a history of election fraud may lead democratizing countries to adopt strict
safeguards against fraud (which may in turn impose procedural barriers to voting), and
parties that are the victims of election fraud will be the likely supporters of strict
safeguards.
The importance of past election fraud is suggested by Lyons (2004, 45), who lists
among the challenges in post-conflict elections “the memories of earlier electoral fraud as
in El Salvador, Liberia and Tajikistan. Where a disputed election was a cause of the
conflict, the character of the post-conflict election will be scrutinized and regarded with
great suspicion” (Lyons 2004, 45). This may apply equally in democratizing states that
have not experienced recent armed conflicts, as transitional regimes may attempt to
inoculate the electoral system against the types of fraud that occurred under authoritarian

written evidence that they had canceled their registration at any previous address or to register annually, in
person, on one of only two Tuesdays.”
34
Noting parallel processes of debating vote fraud and the effects of ballot security measures on
participation in the U.S. and Britain, Elmendorf (2006, 441) suggests “[t]here is much we might learn about
electoral commission impacts on law reform through a comparative study of the politics of ‘access versus
security’ in the United States and the United Kingdom.”
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elections. This is consistent with the more general notion that transitional regimes will
often reject authoritarian-era electoral institutions, as post-communist regimes did in the
case of single-member districts that had been used under communist rule, for instance
(Benoit 2004, 384). Hanmer (2009, 77) suggests the applicability of this hypothesis in the
U.S. by suggesting that election day registration has been less viable in states with a
history of election fraud.
That political parties victimized by election fraud would support strict measures
preventing double voting and participation by ineligible voters (as well as ballot stuffing
and manipulation of the vote tally) is suggested by the historical record in the U.S., as
when Whigs supported registry laws to stop the fraudulent practices of Democrats
(Campbell 2005, 14).
Election Costs and Financial Resources
Because elections are administratively complex undertakings, the ability of
election administrators to reduce barriers to voting are undoubtedly affected by the
availability of financial resources and technical capacity, as well as a country’s physical
infrastructure. After all, state efforts to register voters, conduct voter information
campaigns, and employ a large number of polling places on election day can be costly.
The availability of resources and technical capacity is in turn partly a product of a
country’s level of economic development and the general level of professionalism or
corruption in the civil service.35 Yet even in wealthy countries, efforts to cut costs can
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Regarding the state’s role in voter registration, one source notes that “[s]tate-initiated registration is
bound to cost more than self-initiated registration because the state must make the effort to contact all
citizens….To a certain extent state-initiated registration presupposes a greater capacity on the part of the
electoral administration to locate all citizens. This capacity is likely to exist in an economically advanced
country…” (ACE Project 2013a).
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motivate less inclusive administrative practices, such as reducing the number of polling
places in the U.S. case (McNulty, Dowling, and Ariotti 2009, 436). It is thus the
allocation of resources and trained personnel to election administration that is most
directly relevant.
While inclusive administrative practices may often cost more than less inclusive
practices, in some instances inclusion and cost savings coincide. For instance, a purported
benefit of voting by mail in the U.S. is its cost savings (Southwell 2009, 212; Stewart
2011b). Yet more generally, little is known about the costs of different non-precinct
voting methods in the U.S. or the extent to which cost considerations have influenced
their adoption (Stein and Vonnahme 2011, 309). Nevertheless, it is plausible that election
administration practices will be more inclusive where electoral management bodies have
greater resources, while resource-strapped EMBs will face difficulties conducting
adequate voter education campaigns, carrying out voter registration drives, and holding
voting in easily accessible locations throughout the country.

Civil Society and Public Opinion
Other potential influences on election administration come from civil society
groups and public opinion. Civil society groups may pressure for more inclusive
administrative practices, and several episodes of reform in the U.S. are suggestive of civil
society’s influence. Voter registration reform was carried out by several states in the
1980s, “thanks in part to the energetic lobbying of a broad coalition of progressive and
good-government groups” (Keyssar 2001, 255), while “[i]t could be argued that the quiet
activism of the disabilities rights community was responsible for the accessibility
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requirements that were built into HAVA [the Help America Vote Act]” (Stewart 2011a,
372).
Comparatively, Birch (2011) finds that the strength of civil society and especially
a free media are associated with higher quality elections, as they make electoral
manipulation more costly for political elites. A form of civil society activity that is
particularly likely to influence election administration is domestic election monitoring.
Such monitoring groups have been active in at least 66 countries worldwide and engage
in a range of activities including advocating for electoral reform and offering
recommendations for improving election administration (Lean 2007). Domestic election
monitoring has received little scholarly attention, but given their efforts to ensure fair and
inclusive elections, the presence and strength of such groups (in terms of size, prestige,
mobilizational capacity, and so on) could be an important factor in explaining election
administration practices.
A more diffuse societal influence may be public opinion. Although issues of
electoral system reform and election administration may not ordinarily arouse the
passions of citizens, scholars of electoral system choice suggest that public opinion may
work to constrain the self-interested behavior of elites, if only modestly. As Benoit (2004,
385) explains,
Some self-interest-maximizing institutional changes will be excluded from
consideration as being simply beyond the pale, according to the limits set by
public acceptability, opposition threats to withdraw support for the democratic
institutions, or the simple bounds of political propriety. Yet extensive political
practice shows that considerable and meaningful institutional change may occur
within these broad and vague constraints.
Renwick (2010) also argues that unpopular electoral reforms can entail legitimacy
costs to elites, such that a party perceived by voters to be wantonly acting in its own
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interests when it comes to electoral reform may lose support. Norris (2010, 6) similarly
notes that public opinion and political culture may constrain elites in choosing electoral
systems. In the U.S. context, Hanmer (2009, 28) suggests that the adoption of voter
registration laws may be influenced by “attitudes regarding the value of political
participation, or the ‘taste’ for participation,” while Knack (1995, 798) similarly suggests
that “some underlying and difficult-to-quantify cause, such as a strong ‘participatory
culture’” influences the choice of voter registration rules.
Thus while the literature does not go far in specifying the conditions under which
organized civic groups or diffuse public opinion may exercise influence over electoral
rules, previous work does suggest the importance of being attentive to such societal
influences on the choice of election administration practices.

International Influences
The literature on international election monitoring suggests several points about
the influence of election observers on inclusiveness. First, for any given election, the
presence of election observers may make certain forms of administrative
disenfranchisement (particularly those that occur on election day) less likely, and during
the electoral process observers may advocate for election administration procedures that
affect inclusiveness. It is not clear, however, whether observers generally advocate
inclusive election procedures or lean towards restrictive procedures that safeguard against
fraud – or whether different observer groups offer a mix of (potentially conflicting)
recommendations.
Secondly, because many administrative (as opposed to legal) shortcomings in the
electoral process generally do not lead observers to give negative evaluations of an
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election, the post-election recommendations of observers addressing administrative issues
can be expected to have relatively little impact. While full observer reports, issued long
after election day, often contain more detailed and critical remarks on election
administration than observers’ immediate post-election statements, “by the time the
longer report comes out both the media and the world’s attention have moved on, and
details in the reports frequently escape attention. Thus, the world primarily hears the
statements made shortly after the polling or the overall assessment that is usually
repeated in the executive summary or conclusion of the final report” (Kelley 2012a, 61).
Pressure from observers also eases between elections, and thus long-term
recommendations are often neglected (Kelley 2012a, 177). Given these findings,
international observer advice is likely to play only a modest role, at least absent
significant domestic pressures for electoral reform (Birch 2011, 154; Kelley 2012a, 148149).
A third point on the influence of observers concerns the geopolitical interests of
foreign powers. As Kelley (2012a, 145-147) points out, the influence of observers can be
limited or strengthened depending on the behavior of foreign powers and the host
country’s desire for cooperation with the West. Where foreign powers favor electoral
reform and the country desires good relations with the West, the influence of observers
will be strengthened as the host country seeks to enhance its democratic legitimacy;
where foreign donors have other priorities or where a host country is not dependent on
Western favor, pressures for holding high quality elections will be lessened (see also
Birch 2011, 56-59).
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International influences on elections beyond election monitoring are scarcely
addressed in the literature, but at least one other type of international influence warrants
attention: the extensive technical assistance that international organizations, bilateral
donors, and NGOs offer to election administrators worldwide. Organizations such as the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Center for Electoral
Promotion and Advising (CAPEL) offer financial and technical assistance in carrying out
a wide range of electoral tasks, including voter education and voter registry
modernization. Such assistance may contribute to more inclusive election administration
by enhancing the capacity of the electoral bureaucracy in recipient countries.

Conclusion
Although election administration inclusiveness has not been the object of
systematic investigation, a number of hypotheses regarding the causes of variation in
election administration inclusiveness suggest themselves in the existing literature, as the
above discussion indicates. Table 2.1 below summarizes these hypotheses drawn from
the extant literature. Despite the long list of potential influences on election
administration, however, little is known about the empirical validity or scope conditions
of these hypothesized explanations. The case studies in the following chapters thus pay
close attention to the potential influences on election administration outlined in Table 2.1,
while also being attentive to the possibility that some important causal factors may be at
work that have been overlooked in prior research.
To evaluate these hypotheses, I draw on data gathered during field work in each
case study country in 2011 and 2012. I attempted to interview current and former election
officials, party leaders and legislators from different parties that played roles in drafting
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electoral legislation, members of civil society involved in election observation and
analysis, and knowledgeable academics. In total I conducted over 60 interviews,
including interviews with more than 20 current and former EMB magistrates and staff
members, more than a dozen legislators and political party leaders, over a dozen civil
society leaders, and a number of academics, journalists, and international experts.36 I also
gathered data from archival sources, particularly legislative records and documents from
electoral management bodies. I use this data, along with information drawn from news
sources, election observer reports, and the secondary literature, to identify and assess the
causal factors underlying election administration inclusiveness in the three cases.
It is to the case studies that we now turn.

36

For a complete list of interviews, see the references section.
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Table 2.1 Hypotheses on Election Administration Inclusiveness
H1: Where a ruling party can identify opposition supporters, election
administration inclusiveness will tend to be low, whereas countries with
catch-all parties or fluid party systems marked by low levels of partisan
Partisan
attachments will tend to have more inclusive electoral procedures.
Interests
H2: Parties with strong lower class support (typically populist or leftist
parties) will support inclusive rules.
H3: Partisan EMBs will tend to implement less inclusive measures as
Electoral
partisan election officials attempt to impede the participation of some
Management
parties’ supporters.
Body
H4: Independent, non-partisan EMBs will be associated with inclusive
Structure
rules in part by playing an active role in electoral reform.
H5: A history of election fraud will lead democratizing countries to
adopt strict safeguards against fraud, which may in turn impose
The Specter of
procedural barriers to voting.
Election Fraud
H6: Parties that have been the victims of election fraud will support
strict safeguards that reduce inclusiveness.
Election Costs H7: Countries with more resources will have more inclusive election
and Financial administration.
Resources
H8: Strong civil society, particularly domestic election observation
Civil Society
groups, will increase election administration inclusiveness.
and Public
H9: Public opinion will set limits on the extent to which elites can
Opinion
pursue self-serving election administration rules.
H10: International observers will prevent extremely restrictive measures
in elections that they observe, particularly measures that are highly
visible on election day.
H11: The recommendations of election observers will have little impact
on election administration practices.
International
Influences
H12: When a country seeks good relations with Western democracies,
the influence of election observers will be enhanced and inclusive
election administration practices will be more likely.
H13: Technical and financial assistance will make inclusive measures
more likely by enhancing domestic bureaucratic capacity.
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CHAPTER 3
GUATEMALA: RAISING OBSTACLES TO VOTER PARTICIPATION, 19832003

Guatemala’s Transition to Electoral Democracy
Guatemala has held relatively free and fair elections since the country’s return to
civilian rule in 1985. Prior to that transition, Guatemalan politics was marked by direct
and indirect military rule following the 1954 coup that ended a brief democratic period.
While elections were held regularly throughout the 1960s and 1970s, contestation was
limited by the banning of leftist parties, the parties’ nomination of active military officers
as presidential candidates, and in later years by election fraud. By the early 1980s, in the
context of economic crisis, rigged elections, and massive state violence against a guerrilla
insurgency, the military regime found itself lacking legitimacy both domestically and
internationally. In this context, the military sought a return to civilian rule, and during the
military-led transition a new electoral regime was developed.
The gradual transition began when a military coup was carried out in 1982, before
the fraudulently elected winner of that year’s presidential election took office. The new
government formed a subcommittee on electoral matters tasked with drafting a new
electoral law. The subcommittee worked quickly to set up new electoral machinery,
working with little interference from the military or existing political parties (Interview
19). The subcommittee’s work resulted in a series of laws issued by the government in
March 1983.
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One of these laws (Decreto 30-83) created an independent electoral management
body – the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) – made up of five non-partisan magistrates
to be chosen from candidates (all lawyers) put forward by a nominating committee
consisting of university rectors and law faculty deans. A Law of Political Organizations
(Decreto 32-83) established less restrictive rules for political parties, while a Citizens
Registry Law (Decreto 31-83) created the Citizens Registry (charged with overseeing the
voter lists) under the control of the new TSE. Another law (Decreto 33-83) was to create
a new identity document to replace the old cédula de vecindad; however, this law never
went into effect, as the government gave in to public pressure generated by concerns
about the military regime gathering personal information through the new registration
process (Escobar Armas 1987, 17-18; Gálvez Borrell 2008, 135; Medrano 2005, 42;
Interview 16). Consequently, a new law on voter registration was put into place (Decreto
138-83), and more than 20 years would pass before a new identification document was
finally introduced.37
With this structure in place, elections were held the following year for a national
constituent assembly, with a temporary election law put in place to govern the process
(Decreto 3-84). The constituent assembly was tasked with drafting a new electoral law,
which was promulgated in 1985. The assembly used the 1983 and 1984 electoral laws as
a template when combining the various decrees into a unified Electoral and Political
Parties Law (LEPP, by its Spanish acronym) (Interview 19).38 The 1985 electoral law
established the framework for Guatemala’s electoral regime up to the present. As a law of
37

Decree Law (Decreto) 33-83 gave the TSE’s Citizens Registry oversight over what was to be the new ID
document. Later debates over a new identification document would see fierce battles over whether the TSE
or another agency would oversee the process of issuing ID cards.
38
General elections held in 1985 were governed by a temporary election law, Decreto 47-85. The Electoral
and Political Parties law approved in 1985 went into effect the following year.

65

constitutional rank, any amendments must be approved by a two-thirds vote in Congress
and pass a prior review by the Constitutional Court. The law has been amended a number
of times, but until 2004 the reforms consisted of relatively minor changes.39
The 1983-1985 electoral laws and the establishment of a non-partisan electoral
commission marked a profound departure from the electoral regime that had been in
place previously. The electoral body created by the 1965 constitution – the Registro
Electoral – had been under the executive branch’s control, which facilitated election
fraud. Additionally, contestation had been limited by onerous requirements for the
registration of political parties and the arbitrary application of those requirements, in
addition to an outright ban on leftist parties (Gálvez Borrell 2008; Interview 19).40 Under
the new legislation, the selection of nonpartisan election officials nominated by a
committee of legal experts and approved by at least two-thirds of Congress resulted in a
technocratic and neutral electoral management body.
However, the electoral laws and subsequent regulatory decisions of the TSE also
included provisions that presented significant obstacles to voter participation. In fact,
these two features of the new electoral regime – ensuring fair elections free of fraud and
raising substantial barriers to voter participation – were intimately related. In order to
inoculate the electoral system against fraud, the act of voting was in many ways made
more difficult. These administrative and procedural restrictions ranged from getting
registered to vote, to finding information about the election process, to reaching the
polling station and casting one’s ballot. The following sections document the barriers put
39

See Decretos 74-87, 10-89, and 35-90.
The restrictions on political party registration included requiring a minimum of 50,000 affiliates, all of
whose names needed to be published in the official newspaper. In addition to the legal restrictions, the
electoral body would also arbitrarily reject party registrations when it saw fit to do so in order to limit the
number of parties (Gálvez Borrell 2008, 72-73, 88, 132; Interview 19).

40
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in place, discuss the effects of those barriers on voter participation and electoral politics
more generally, and explain why procedural barriers to participation were put in place as
Guatemala’s electoral system was restructured during the country’s democratic transition.

Election Administration and Procedural Barriers to Voting
Voter Registration
The administrative barriers faced by voters began with voter registration, which
has been described as “a long road of obstacles” (Boneo and Torres-Rivas 2000, 105) and
“unduly bureaucratic” (NDI 1995, 9). Unlike countries that use some form of automatic
registration, voter registration in Guatemala is voter-initiated and requires several steps.
The process for registering required the citizen to go to one of the delegations of the
Citizens Registry located in each municipal capital. The need to travel to the centrally
located registry, often a great distance from one’s residence, created a burden for many
people, especially in rural areas and for those lacking transportation (OAS 1997a, 30;
UNDP 2005, 198).
The process required two trips to the registry on the part of the citizen: a first visit
to fill out the registration form and a second visit (after the registry had checked the
applicant’s information) in order for his or her identity document to be stamped with the
voter registration information (Boneo and Torres-Rivas 2000, 109). When initiating the
process, the citizen would present their identity document and fill out a long form,
requiring extensive information. As an election observer report noted, “if one considers
that the information required during the registration process has already been supplied by
the citizen during the process of inscription in the civil registry after turning 18 years old,
this proceeding constitutes in reality a duplication of the civil registration process” (OAS
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1997a, 31). Thus, rather than automatically adding citizens to the voter rolls from the
information available in the civil registries – which emit the identification documents –
citizens are required to initiate and carry out a separate process to register to vote. Had
plans for a new identification document been carried out in 1983, greater coordination
between the civil registry and voter registry would have resulted.41 Instead, the country
maintained its municipal-based civil registry system, with the issuance of identification
documents controlled by the municipalities, and instituted a separate voter registry.
For the many citizens lacking an identity document, prior trips to the municipal
capital were required in order to first register in the civil registry and obtain a cédula.
Obtaining a cédula in turn required a birth certificate, which could require multiple trips
to the registry office and payment of a fee (Boneo and Torres-Rivas 2000, 106-108;
Sieder et al 2002, 30). Only after obtaining a cédula could a citizen then register to vote.
Traveling to the municipal capital to carry out these transactions could require citizens to
spend an entire day away from their home or farm and pay for transportation in order to
register, while a further financial burden was imposed by requiring citizens to purchase
photographs for their document. These procedures could also alienate indigenous people
who “often wish to avoid taking photographs or signing their names, fearing they will be
manipulated by unscrupulous people” (NDI 1995, 9).42

41

Decreto 31-83 called for coordination and information sharing between the voter registry (Registro de
Ciudadanos) and the civil registry (Registro General de la Población), with the voter registry actually
“supervising” the identification process carried out by the civil registry. While the legislation was not
entirely clear in spelling out the division of responsibilities between the two registries, it is easy to imagine
that a system of automatic voter registration would have resulted had the government not backtracked on
plans to introduce a new identification document.
42
The burdens posed by the registration process are also summarized by López-Pintor and Urrutia (2002,
38), who note that “the requirement that citizens visit registration offices several times partly explains why
large sectors of the population do not register. Costs, such as those of transport and photographs, are also
incurred as part of the registration process. Economic, geographic and cultural factors as well as lack of an
ID card make the process even harder.”
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Another obstacle to voter registration related to the de facto adoption of a
residency requirement in 1987. Whereas for the 1984 and 1985 elections citizens could
register to vote in the jurisdiction in which they were living at the time, after 1987
citizens could only register to vote in the municipality listed on their cédula. For instance,
a person from the municipality of Cobán (in the country’s north) living in Guatemala City
in 1985 could register and vote in Guatemala City; after 1987, the citizen would either
need to obtain a new identity document issued in Guatemala City or return to Cobán to
vote (Conde Rada 2003, 38; Interview 13). No system of absentee voting is in place to
accommodate such circumstances. This change to a voter roll based on vecindad,43 as it is
known, was a decision of the TSE rather than a provision in the electoral law, and was
included in its 1987 regulation (reglamento) of the electoral law. By requiring voters to
hold a cédula from the municipality in which they register to vote (and thereby giving up,
in theory, their cédula from their municipality of origin), the TSE essentially adopted a
quite restrictive residency requirement – since one year of residency was required to
obtain a cédula in a given municipality (Interview 14). Thus, when moving to a new
municipality, the citizen would need to carry out two separate time consuming
proceedings – obtaining a new cédula and registering to vote – or return to their old
municipality to vote (which would also involve voting for local officials in a jurisdiction
in which the citizen no longer lived).44

43

Based on the municipality where the voter has received his or her cédula de vecindad (ID card), rather
than based on the voter’s current residence.
44
The extent to which voters maintain their registration and vote in a municipality in which they no longer
live is not known, but it may be common. One interview respondent admitted to keeping their registration
in Guatemala City despite the fact that they now live in a neighboring municipality, so that they could cast
a vote for the more important post of mayor of the capital city rather than mayor of their town. Besides
such strategic motives, no doubt many voters chose not to re-register after moving to a new municipality in
order to avoid the bureaucratic process involved. In 2003 the TSE returned to residence-based registration,
as discussed in the following chapter.
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These obstacles to voter registration were compounded by the limited
opportunities for voters and political parties to review the preliminary voter register
and rectify errors or omissions (NDI 1991, 44; Boneo and Rivas 2000, 53-54).
Although the voter roll is formally a public document that interested parties may
consult (LEPP, Art. 225), citizens must visit a registry office to do so (the lists are not
posted in public places prior to election day) and the country’s electoral law does not
guarantee the distribution of the voter register to political parties for review (EUEOM
2007, 26; Ramirez Barrios 2002, 35). However, in recent elections the TSE has
distributed the voter register to political parties, while also being criticized for the
minimal information contained in the distributed lists (making it difficult to rectify
errors) (EUEOM 2003, 11; OAS 2005, 11; 2009a, 23-24).
In addition to what citizens must do to register to vote is the issue of when they
must do it. The electoral law requires voter registration to close 90 days prior to election
day (LEPP, Art. 9; Reglamento a la Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos 1987, Art. 6
[hereafter Reglamento 1987]), meaning voters must register before campaigns and civic
education programs reach their most intense stages (OAS 1997a, 31). The 90 day closing
date is relative to the first round of elections; because Guatemala employs a run-off
election for the presidency if no candidate receives a majority in the first round (which
has been the case in every presidential contest since the return to democratic rule), voters
cannot participate in the final election of president without registering some five months
ahead of time. One observer mission to the 1995 elections noted that many citizens try to
register to vote during this period between the closing of registration and election day
(OAS 1997a, 31), and many people apparently also try to register between the first and
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second rounds of presidential elections as well (Prensa Libre 1985d [hereafter PL]). The
author observed firsthand a steady stream of people arriving at a voter registry office in
the department of Baja Verapaz the day before the 2011 general elections, some of whom
hoped to register to vote.
It should be noted that for the 1985 elections, which were held under a temporary
electoral law (Decreto 47-85), the deadline for voter registration was only two months
before election day (Art. 19, 21), and for the 1984 constituent assembly elections the
deadline was an even shorter 30 days (Decreto 3-84, Art. 13 and 15). A reform to the
election law in 1987 pushed the deadline back to three months (Decreto 74-87, Art. 3).45
Another element specific to the 1985 elections was the fact that voting for literates was
compulsory, with nonvoting punished by a small fine. However, the fine applied only to
those people who were registered to vote and failed to turn out (PL 1985a; 1985b). Thus,
not registering was a way to avoid a fine for not voting.
In short, as an OAS observer mission put it, “the registration process in
Guatemala, given the socioeconomic characteristics of the country, is long and costly,
both in terms of time and money” (OAS 2005, 18). And while the voter registration
process has become easier in recent years (as discussed in the following chapter), it
continues be burdensome for potential voters.

Getting to the Ballot Box
In addition to registering to vote, citizens also face the task of getting to their
polling location in order to cast their ballot. Until 2007, this task presented a significant
barrier for many prospective voters in Guatemala. Voting centers were limited to the
45

The electoral law approved in 1985 went into effect the following year, and it did not specify a
registration closing date. However, elections were not held under the new law until after the 1987 reform.
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capitals (cabeceras) of each of the country’s 330 municipalities,46 each of which is
roughly equivalent to a U.S. county; the location of polling sites outside of these capitals
was prohibited, first by the 1984 decree calling for the election of a constituent assembly
(Decreto 3-84, Art. 30) and by the temporary law governing the 1985 elections (Decreto
47-85, Art. 36), and more forcefully in the 1985 electoral law (LEPP, Art. 231).
As a result of this centralization, many voters – mainly those residing in rural
areas – would need to travel long distances to reach their polling site. Each polling site,
known as a voting center (centro de votación), contains a number of voting tables (Juntas
Receptoras de Votos, JRV), ranging from just one or two JRVs to several dozen. While
the electoral law fixes a maximum of 600 voters assigned to each JRV, and in practice
the number has averaged less,47 the important factor is the concentration of JRVs within a
limited number of voting centers. Thus there were 5,142 JRVs in 1985, 5,630 in 1990,
6,348 in 1995, 7,601 in 1999, 48 and 8,885 in 2003 (ASIES 1986, 6, 9; OAS 1997a, 11;
Mirador Electoral 2007a; TSE n.d.[b], 115). However, the number of voting centers was
much more limited: for the 2003 elections, for example, there were roughly 1,245 voting
centers (Lopez-Pintor 2005, 122)49 – a relatively small number for the country’s five
million registered voters, averaging over 4,000 registered voters per voting center.
For those residing in rural areas – about 60% of the population in the mid-1990s
and 52% a decade later (OAS 1997a, 11; 2008a, 44) – traveling to the municipal center to
46

The number of municipalities later increased to 332.
Based on calculations from ASIES 1986 (6, 9), OAS 1997 (11), and Inforpress Centroamericana and
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 1995 (2).
48
Soures vary slightly on the number of JRVs used in the 1999 elections. Mirador Electoral (2007) gives
the figure of 7,601, while Azpuru (2004) gives the almost identical figure of 7,602. OAS (2000, 32) reports
a figure of 7,295, but also notes (p. 17) that their observers visited 3,237 JRVs representing 43 percent of
the total, suggesting a total number close to that given by the other sources.
49
OAS (2005, 15) reports 1,291 voting centers; Prensa Libre (2003) reported 1,262 voting centers for the
first round of voting and 1,331 for the second round; while Ortiz Loaiza et al. (2008, 24) give the figure of
1,295.
47
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vote could pose a substantial burden. Citing an extreme case, Horacio Boneo (2001, 80)
notes that “the inhabitants of the village of Xocolá must travel 160 kilometers to arrive at
their JRV located in the municipal capital of their municipality of Nahualá.” Others have
pointed out examples of villagers traveling 3-4 hours on foot just to reach public
transportation that could bring them to their municipal center (Ramirez Barrios 2002, 56).
While the required travel was less extensive for most voters, the required trip from a rural
village to the municipal capital was a burden for many citizens.
While centralized voting raised barriers for rural voters, the method of assigning
voters to polling stations also posed obstacles for urban voters. Voters were assigned to a
polling station based on their registration number rather than their residence. Thus, a
voter in the capital city might be required to travel not to the nearest voting center, but to
one across town to which he or she had been assigned.50 Likewise, family members might
vote in different parts of the city based on their registration numbers (ASIES 1997, 6162; Boneo 2001, 80). The 1983-1985 election laws included references to ordering the
voter lists by number,51 and the 1985 electoral law maintained this requirement (Art.
224), which was made more explicit in the TSE’s 1987 regulation of the law
(Reglamento Art. 54).
A related issue has been the lack of free public transportation on election day,
posing obstacles especially to lower income urban voters (EUEOM 2007, 59). While the
issue of election day transportation would arise during later debates over electoral reform,
the delays in reform prevented the government from offering free public transport to
50

A similar system was employed in El Salvador, but with voters assigned to voting centers alphabetically
rather than by the order of their registration number (Boneo 2001, 80).
51 Decreto 138-83, Art. 9 indicated that the lists should be “correlatively ordered”; Decreto 3-84, Art. 16
indicated that they must be “in rigorous correlative order according to the registration numbers assigned to
each one; Decreto 47-85, Art. 22 also required the lists be “in rigorous correlative order…”
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facilitate travel to polling sites (Acción Ciudadana et al. 1999, 164). Election day
transportation became an issue in the 1999 elections, as the OAS observer mission noted:
“The most important complaint received by the Mission referred to an allegedly
deliberate stoppage of public transit in the metropolitan district of Guatemala City, with
the intention of preventing certain sectors of the population from going to the polls”
(OAS 2000, 19). As discussed below, the unavailability of public transportation, in the
context of centralized voting and failure to assign urban voters to polling places based on
residence, led to political parties playing a large role in transporting voters to the polls.
A final hurdle getting to the ballot box for many voters prior to 2004 was the fact
elections were held during the labor migration season, when many rural laborers migrate
to different municipalities to work on harvests. Since there is no system for absentee
voting, tens of thousands of migrant workers (and perhaps more) were effectively unable
to vote (Boneo and Torres-Rivas 2000, 115-123).52 The lack of absentee voting
procedures also means that no provisions exist to allow the hospitalized or prisoners
awaiting trial to vote (EUEOM 2007, 23).

Casting a Ballot
Once registered and after traveling to one’s assigned polling place, the actual
process of voting presented further obstacles. Before receiving a ballot, the voter would
need to show his or her identity card to the poll worker, and if the document wasn’t
stamped with the voter registration information, he or she would be asked for a
registration ticket; without the registration stamp in the cédula or a registration ticket, the

52

CRE (1998, 59) gives an estimate of 500,000 migrant workers in the country, although it is not certain
how many would have been working a significant distance from their home municipality to be effectively
unable to vote. This problem was recognized as early as the 1985 elections (see Prensa Libre 1985c).
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voter could not vote – even if their name were on the voters list. A voter would also be
turned away if their name was not on the list, even if the registration number on their
cédula corresponded to the range of registration numbers assigned to that voting table.
Also, if the number of the voter listed on the voter roll did not match the number on their
cédula, even if the names were the same, they could not vote (CAPEL and CEDEP 1986,
39-40, 45-46; TSE 1995, 20).
There were thus multiple ways a voter could be prevented from casting a ballot at
the polling place: not having either a registration stamp on their identity card or a
registration ticket, or having these but not appearing on the voter list, or a mismatch
between their identity document number and the number listed on the voter roll –
situations that would likely be common where voter registration was done manually.
There is little systematic evidence regarding how many voters were affected by such
rules, and it is possible that poll workers sometimes applied the rules leniently. But in
2003, when problems with the voter rolls were particularly severe because of technical
problems resulting from a new method for updating voters’ residences,53 the domestic
election observer group Mirador Electoral estimated that between 44,200 and 57,400
people “turned out to the polls but could not vote” (NDI n.d., 29).54 Similar problems
reappeared in the 2007 elections (EUEOM 2007, 50). Most likely fewer voters were
affected by similar problems in prior elections, but the potential existed in the rules for
minor errors in the voter rolls to result in disenfranchisement of voters, in marked
53

This updating of the voter rolls was part of the process of allowing people to vote in their municipality of
residence and preparing for the decentralization of polling sites, discussed in chapter 4. The main problem
was that after updating their voter registration information in order to vote in the municipality where they
resided, some voters found their names missing from the voter rolls at their new polling site.
54
The EU observer mission reported that “in around 15% of polling stations there were some voters who
were unable to find their names in the voter lists” (EUEOM 2003, 9), but no estimate how many voters
were affected is given. The OAS mission only reported “a large quantity” of complaints of pollworkers not
allowing registered voters to cast a ballot because they did not appear on the voter list (OAS 2005, 66).

75

contrast to Nicaragua’s more permissive rules (see chapter 5). There is also no system of
provisional ballots that could alleviate such problems. Errors in the voter lists have also
contributed to excessively long waits to cast one’s vote (MIOE 2003, 52, 58), another
potential barrier to participation.
An additional obstacle to participation in indigenous areas has been the failure to
staff polling stations with poll workers that speak the local languages.55 With some 22
indigenous languages spoken in the country in addition to Spanish, and an estimated 43
percent of self-identified indigenous people speaking only their native Mayan language
(Moreno 2008, 11), the linguistically unrepresentative makeup of polling station staff has
posed a further barrier to participation for some indigenous peoples. As one observer
noted, the lack of representativeness not only generates distrust in the electoral process,
but also results in cases of voters getting to the voting table after waiting several hours in
line only to find that the poll workers do not speak their language and cannot explain any
problems that might occur with the person’s registration or documentation (Interview 12).
The lack of instructional assistance to voters in indigenous languages has been a
particular problem considering that five different ballots are used for the country’s
concurrent elections (EUEOM 2003, 11).56

55

Even as recently as 2007 – after reforms to the electoral law had required the TSE to take diversity into
account when staffing polling stations and other levels of the electoral bureaucracy (Article 172) – the
indigenous observer mission noted that in 40% of the districts they visited, staff did not speak the local
indigenous language (MIOE 2007, 127-128). Indigenous people and women are especially
underrepresented on municipal and departmental election boards (see Mirador Electoral 2008, 16, 100).
The TSE has generally opted to retain temporary staff at local and departmental levels from one election to
the next, in order to benefit from their experience and training; the trade-off has been failure to make these
levels of the election administration bureaucracy more representative of the population.
56
Voters cast separate ballots for president, congressional representatives for the national district,
congressional representatives for departmental districts, municipal councils, and the Central American
Parliament.
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Voter Education
The obstacles of onerous voter registration procedures, centralized polling
locations, and restrictive procedures for allowing voters to cast a ballot have been
compounded by voter education efforts that have been generally characterized as
insufficient, given Guatemala’s socioeconomic and cultural context. Numerous observers
have noted the insufficiency of efforts by the state to provide voters with information
concerning the registration and voting process (Azpuru 2004; Boneo and Torres-Rivas
2000, 166), an evaluation shared by many interview respondents and even the TSE itself
(CRE 1997, 4-5, 8). The effectiveness of voter education programs has been limited by
their uneven territorial coverage and a lack of a unified pedagogical method (Interview
02), as well as the lateness with which education campaigns are launched and the
challenges of translating voter information into different indigenous languages.
Voter education efforts consist both of general get-out-the-vote campaigns and
(more importantly for our purposes) informational campaigns to instruct voters about the
registration and voting process – such as when and where to register, what documents are
needed, where to vote, how to mark one’s ballot, and so on. They take the form of printed
materials, radio and television spots, and increasingly, internet resources. The TSE has
carried out informational campaigns since its first elections, for instance publishing lists
of voting stations in the capital city with corresponding voter registration numbers in the
country’s largest daily paper and establishing phone lines for voters to call for
information (PL 1985e; 1985f).
Over time, the TSE has devoted increasing resources to voter information efforts,
but at least before the mid-2000s the TSE’s efforts were widely considered insufficient to
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inform the country’s diverse population of the voting process. An observer mission to the
1995 elections noted the efforts of the TSE and the international electoral assistance
organization CAPEL to promote voter registration, but emphasized “the lateness of the
effort …as well as the limited geographical reach of the effort” (NDI 1995, 19). Another
observer team similarly noted that the TSE conducted an intensive voter education
campaign in the days prior to the election, but it did not have the resources to carry out a
long term effort (OAS 1997a, 32-33) – thus the voter education campaign was minimal
prior to the close of voter registration. Evaluations of voter education campaigns have
been more positive since 1999 (e.g., OAS 2000, 10-11), but many remain critical. LópezPintor (2005, 126-127) notes the insufficiency of information provided in indigenous
languages in some areas, while acknowledging improved efforts on the part of election
officials. Mirador Electoral’s evaluation in 2003 was that “[t]he TSE is not effectively
disseminating information to the public on such things as voting places, ballots, and
tables,” suggesting that “[t]he TSE should intensify its informational campaign on how
and where to vote” and noting “the obligation to do so in all of the national languages of
Guatemala” (Mirador Electoral 2003). The National Democratic Institute (n.d., 25)
offered a similar evaluation regarding the inadequate publicity surrounding the updating
of the voter rolls in 2003.
As discussed in the following chapter, efforts to provide voters with necessary
information improved for the 2007 and 2011 elections. But as late as the 2003 elections,
many observers were critical of the lateness with which voter education campaigns began
and the limited reach of the campaigns especially in indigenous areas, noting “the lack of
information in Mayan languages” (MIOE 2003, 43) and asking whether the information
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campaign “was designed for the Guatemalan population with all of its characteristics:
rural, young, multilingual, pluricultural…” (OAS 2005, 16).57 Importantly, given the
early closing date for voter registration, voter information and publicity campaigns were
sometimes launched too late to impact those people not registered to vote – as was the
case in 2003, when the information campaign began on October 1 (OAS 2005, 13), after
voter registration had ended.
Guatemala’s restrictive election administration measures during this period are
summarized in Table 3.1 below. The following section discusses the effects of these
measures.

Table 3.1 Election Administration Inclusiveness, Guatemala 1983-2003
Dimension
Voter Registration
Extent of state
responsibility for
registering voters
Difficulty of
registration process

Ease of access to
ID documents
required for
registration
Registration
closing date
Residency
requirement

Description

Inclusiveness

Juridical Basis*

Voter-initiated, no state
efforts to register citizens

Low

Electoral law

Complex process involving
multiple trips to centralized
registration offices (partially
decentralized after 2001);
cost of providing photograph.
Difficult; obtaining cédula
required birth certificate and
entailed travel to centrally
located offices and financial
cost
30 days (1984); 2 months
(1985); 3 months (1986present)
De facto 1 year (1987-2002),
6 months after 2002; updating
registration required

Low

Administrative
regulation / Electoral
law / Administrative
practice

Low

Administrative
regulation

Medium

Low

Electoral law

Administrative
regulation

Continued on next page

57

The OAS report (2005, 13) also commended the TSE for carrying out an information campaign in 13
non-Spanish languages, but noted that the campaign “didn’t achieve the desired impact among the
indigenous population, which in many localities didn’t learn of the campaign.” See also EUEOM (2003, 9,
11).
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Table 3.1, continued
Dimension
Provisional registration

Description
No provisional registration

Registry consultation

Very limited opportunities to
review and verify registry
data
Voters not purged from the
rolls for failure to vote

Purging of voter rolls
Getting to the Ballot
Box
Accessibility of polling
places
Assignment of voters to
polling places
Convenience voting
measures
Electoral calendar
Casting a Ballot
Voter ID requirement

Provisional or tendered
ballots
Voter Education
State efforts to inform
voters of where and
how to register and
vote

Inclusiveness
Low
Low

Juridical Basis*
Administrative
regulation
Administrative
practice

High

n/a

Polling places centralized in
municipal centers; limited
public transportation
Numerical (not based on
residence)
Not used

Low

Low

Electoral law /
Administrative
practice
Electoral law

Low

Electoral law

Voting held on Sunday
during labor migration season

Low

Electoral law

Cédula required; exact match
between information on ID
and voter rolls required
Not used

Low

Administrative
regulation

Low

Administrative
practice

Limited in territorial and
linguistic coverage (but
increasing over time); limited
duration, beginning late in
electoral cycle

Medium

Administrative
practice

Overall Inclusiveness

Low

* Electoral law refers to those elements based on the electoral law that are not open to
modification by the electoral management body. Administrative regulation refers to those
elements that are officially prescribed in the TSE’s implementing regulations, contained
in its Reglamento a la Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos. Administrative practice
refers to those elements that are not explicitly codified either in the electoral law or the
TSE’s regulations, but are instead matters of bureaucratic performance and administrative
discretion.
The Effects of Procedural Barriers to Voting
These procedural obstacles to voting have had several effects on Guatemalan
electoral politics, particularly the level of voter turnout, the composition of the electorate,
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the quality of the voter rolls, and even the success of particular parties and the patterns of
partisan mobilization.
Voter Registration
The system of voter registration led to a situation of both under- and overregistration: difficult registration procedures kept many eligible citizens from registering,
while the separation of civil and voter registries and ineffective collaboration between the
two resulted in voter rolls bloated with deceased and emigrated persons. While precise
rates of registration are unknown due in part to the unreliability of census data, all
estimates suggest relatively low rates of voter registration: an estimated 27.5 percent of
the voting age population was not registered to vote for the 1985 elections (ASIES 1986,
6, 9), 30-35 percent for the 1990 elections (NDI 1991, 51), and 29.1 percent in 1995
(OAS 1997a, 28-29). The prior step of acquiring an identity document played a role in
under-registration, as an estimated 15 percent of Guatemalans did not possess a cédula in
1995, due in part to the destruction of some civil registry offices during the war (OAS
1997a, 29). While possession of identity documents increased over time, even by the
mid-2000s significant numbers still did not possess identification, with women,
indigenous, and rural residents particularly affected (UNDP 2005, 199).58
Voter registration rates among women, indigenous, and rural citizens were
particularly low. Despite making up 52% of the population, only 40.7% of registered
voters were women in 1995 (Inforpress Centroamericana and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
1995, 2; OAS 1997a, 29, 44), increasing gradually to 44.4 percent in 2003 (Acción
Ciudadana et al. 1999, 27; OAS 2008a, 39). A 2000 survey estimated that voter
58

The UNDP (2005) estimated that 7.3% of rural residents (compared to 4.2% of urban Guatemalans),
8.1% of women (compared to 3.3% of men), and 7.2% of those classified as Maya (compared to 5% of
those classified as ladino/mestizo) lacked identification cards.
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registration rates were 83% for men and 64.3% for women, and 76.4% for ladino/mestizo
compared to 67.8% for indigenous Mayans. Registration rates were also uneven
geographically, with an estimated 79% registration rate in urban areas and 67.8% in rural
areas (UNDP 2005, 199).
As might be expected, the level of voter registration, particularly among women
and indigenous citizens, has increased alongside the gradual improvements in the
accessibility of voter registration since 1999 (see chapter 4). In absolute terms, the voter
roll increased by 10 percent for the 1999 elections (compared to less than 7 percent for
1985 and 1990) (Boneo and Torres-Rivas 2000, 114),59 and has expanded more rapidly
since – by 12% between 1999 and 2003 and by 18% from 2003 to 2007 (OAS 2008a,
36). The number of registered women increased by 24% in 2007 over 2003 (compared to
an increase of 12 percent for men); as a result, women came to account for 46.02% of the
voter rolls in 2007 (OAS 2008a, 38). In 2011, women would make up more than half of
the voter roll for the first time in the country’s history (PL 2011e).
Alongside low rates of voter registration, the voter registry accumulated errors
due to incomplete purging, the failure to update voters’ residences when they moved to a
new municipality, and the inclusion of people who had initiated the registration process
but never completed it by making the final trip to the registry office. Boneo and TorresRivas (2000, 51-55) estimated that about 25 percent of the voter registry suffered from
these types of errors, with roughly 13-14 percent of the voter roll consisting of emigrants
or deceased. Some 10 percent of officially registered voters “were never able to vote
since they had not completed the registration procedures” (López-Pintor and Urrutia
2002, 39). Independent audits of the voter rolls have similarly found extensive problems
59

Sáenz de Tejada (2005, 150) reports a much higher increase of 16 percent between 1985 and 1990.
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with the accuracy of the data (Erazo 2007; NDI n.d., 25). Bloated voter rolls have made
estimates of voter turnout problematic, with analyses suggesting that turnout as a
proportion of registered voters is actually higher than previously thought, but turnout
among all eligible citizens dismally low (Boneo and Torres Rivas 2000; López-Pintor and
Urrutia 2002, 39). The conclusion that has been drawn is that the voter registration
process has been a significant obstacle to voter participation; once citizens get registered,
they tend to turn out on election day (Boneo and Torres Rivas 2000).60

Voter Turnout and the Composition of the Electorate
Besides the impact on voter registration rates, the most frequently noted effect of
restrictive election administration practices has been the low level of voter participation.
Measured turnout rates in Guatemala were among the lowest in the world through the
mid-1990s,61 with abstention concentrated among women, young people, and seasonal
migrant workers (Torres-Rivas and González 2001, 45-46). Before 2011, voter turnout
ranged from a high of over 60 percent of registered voters in the first round of the 1985
transitional elections (ASIES 1986, 6) to under 47 percent in the first round of the 1995
elections (International IDEA 2011).62 Taking into account the relatively low levels of
voter registration among eligible voters, turnout as a proportion of the voting age
population has actually been much lower, below 50 percent even for the first round of
60

While it may be the case that the data is capturing the effects of motivation or interest in politics rather
than procedural obstacles (those citizens motivated to participate get registered, while the unregistered
would likely not vote in any case), the spike in turnout in 2011 after an expansion in voter registration,
particularly among indigenous women, suggests that procedural barriers may have been important in
suppressing women’s participation.
61
Although as discussed above, bloated voter rolls make estimates of turnout difficult.
62
For some elections, the turnout figures vary significantly in different sources. For instance, some sources
give a 69% turnout figure for the first round in 1985 (OAS 1997a, 48), while others give a figure of 61%
(ASIES 1986, 6). While the soures are often not clear on this point, it appears that the lower figures only
include valid votes. Given the large number of null or blank ballots cast, this can result in substantially
different reports of voter turnout.
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presidential elections (when legislative and municipal offices are concurrently elected)
(see Appendix A). While socioeconomic factors and disaffection from political parties
also contribute to low turnout, administrative hurdles have been important as well.
Election observers and analysts have often noted that the restriction of voting to
municipal capitals, burdensome voter registration procedures, scheduling elections during
the migration season, and insufficient voter education efforts have lowered participation
(Azpuru 2004; EUEOM 2003, 59; OAS 1997a, 20; OAS 2000, 42; Spence 2004, 81).
Observing the 1990 elections, NDI (1991, 50) suggested “[t]he lack of transportation and
few voting precincts in rural areas may be partially responsible [for low turnout],
particularly among women. Many men who had made the long walk from their homes to
the polling sites said their wives had stayed home with the children or had gone to the
market rather than vote.”
Examining the issue quantitatively, a UNDP report (2005, 202-203) found a
positive correlation between the proportion of the population living in urban areas and
voter turnout, consistent with the notion that traveling to municipal capitals in rural areas
hindered voter participation. The European Union observer mission to the 2003 elections
similarly found a negative correlation between municipality size (which captures travel
distance to polling stations) and turnout among a small subset of municipalities (EUEOM
2003, 55-56).
More rigorous studies, employing differing methodologies, have come to similar
conclusions. Using a multivariate analysis, Lehoucq and Wall (2004) compare turnout
across Guatemala’s municipalities from 1985-1995 and find that larger size of the
municipality and more voters assigned to each voting station (a measure of voter waiting
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time) are associated with lower turnout. Drawing on surveys and qualitative analysis,
Boneo and Rivas-Torres (2000) concluded that voter registration was a major barrier to
participation, especially among women, with distance to polling sites a secondary but
substantial impediment. Another study of four municipalities relying on survey data
highlights the importance of procedural barriers to participation, particularly the lack of
identification, not knowing how or where to register, and lacking the time or resources to
register, with such obstacles generally affecting low income and indigenous people most
severely (Nevitte, Cruz, and Estok 2007). Thus while the methodologies and emphases
differ, studies of voter turnout in Guatemala have agreed that procedural barriers – from
the complexities of voter registration to the distances travelled to reach one’s polling
station – have been important in keeping turnout low.63
As would be expected from the differences in voter registration rates across social
categories, low turnout has been concentrated among women and rural voters who were
most affected by procedural barriers. Turnout of registered women in 1999 was 47.6
percent, compared to 58.4 percent of men. Given the lower rates of registration for
women, turnout as a proportion of voting age women was estimated at only 33 percent
(Boneo and Torres-Rivas 2000, 74-75). Travel distance to the polls particularly affected
women and elderly voters, while youth are especially affected by registration barriers.
Young citizens vote at lower rates than adults, but young citizens that are registered to
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Effective turnout is even lower if the high proportion of null and blank ballots cast is considered. Such
ballots often exceed 10 percent of all ballots cast (OAS 1997a, 48; TSE n.d.[a], 213; n.d.[b], 36). Many null
and blank ballots may represent protest votes or cases where a voter turns out to vote for their local officials
and chooses to leave their ballots for national offices (often considered less important) blank. However,
lack of knowledge about how to mark one’s ballot (reflecting inadequate voter education efforts) may also
cause many null votes. Boneo and Torres-Rivas (2000, 113) attribute the majority of null and blank votes to
voter confusion when faced with the complexity of marking five separate ballots.
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vote turn out at similar rates as older citizens, suggesting that not being registered keeps
some youth from voting (Boneo and Torres-Rivas 2000, 64, 70, 169).
While administrative obstacles contributed to a heavily male, and perhaps middleaged, electorate, they also gave greater electoral weight to urban areas. From 1985-1999,
municipal-level turnout was negatively associated with the proportion of municipal
residents living in rural areas (Sáenz de Tejada 2005). Partly as a result of higher turnout
in urban areas, the election results in the largest municipalities such as Guatemala City
were often decisive in determining presidential contests (see, e.g., Sáenz de Tejada 2005,
161, 176-177, 196, 235), until the decentralization of polling places changed this pattern
in 2007.
Procedural barriers may also have affected the composition of the electorate
through the practice of acarreo (carriage) – the provision of transportation by political
parties on election day. The practice is widespread, with observers estimating that 15
percent of voters reached their polling station in a political party vehicle for the 1995
elections (OAS 1997a, 47). Observers have frequently expressed concern over the
potential for parties to pressure voters that they transport, as well as the disadvantages for
smaller parties that lack resources to mobilize voters in this way (EUEOM 2003, 56;
OAS 1997a, 20). However, others have emphasized the secrecy of the vote and the
ineffectiveness of acarreo as a means of capturing votes (Escobar A. 2000, 182;
Interview 27). At the margins, the practice may have helped shape the composition of the
electorate by ensuring access for some party supporters while leaving others to find their
own means of reaching their voting center.
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It is difficult to determine whether these effects on the composition of the
electorate had consequences for policy preferences – in other words, whether non-voters
differed from voters in their opinions or preferences. However, one geographically
limited study suggests that such differences existed, finding “non-voters are significantly
more likely than voters to identify economic matters – the lack of job opportunities and
poverty – as the most serious problems facing the country” (Nevitte, Cruz, and Estok
2007). As the 2007 presidential election would also show, greater participation among
rural voters could sway election results and affect campaign strategies (see Chapter 4).
“Certidumbre fue la primera cosa:”64 Procedural Barriers to Protect the Integrity
of the Vote
Why did Guatemala adopt such restrictive election administration rules and
practices? This section examines the motivations behind the choice of administrative
rules and procedures and the constraints on practices such as voter education.

The Origins of Centralized Voting
Several passing references in the literature indicate that polling sites were limited
to municipal capitals as a response to past electoral fraud, which according to the
conventional wisdom tended to occur at polling stations in rural zones. Accordingly,
polling places were centralized to provide election authorities greater control over the
voting process and prevent coercion of rural voters by landlords or local political bosses
(ASIES 1997, 61; Boneo and Torres-Rivas 2000, 131-132; López Pintor and Urrutia
2002, 38; NDI 1995, 9; Nuñez 2008, 14). The idea that centralization was intended to
64

“Certitude was the first thing.” One interview respondent (Interview 19) used this phrase when
discussing the priority given to ensuring the security and transparency of the electoral process when
designing the country’s electoral administration system in 1983.

87

prevent fraud was shared by all of the interview respondents who were asked about the
issue. Former TSE magistrate Hugo Maul Figueroa has noted more broadly that the
country’s electoral law “is concentrated fundamentally in avoiding manipulation and
fraud. Therefore, some writers have defined our electoral law as an anti-fraud electoral
law” (ASIES 1997, 59).
While there were denunciations of election fraud throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
it wasn’t until the elections of 1974 (and then in 1978 and 1982) “that the alteration of
voting results became systematic and global, with the end of modifying the first positions
of the results…” (Gálvez Borrell 2008, 120). These instances of election fraud
contributed – along with the continuing guerilla insurgency, the state’s counterinsurgency
violence, and economic crisis – to delegitimizing the military regime and prompting a
slow transition to constitutional civilian rule. Protests took place against the fraud carried
out in the 1982 elections, and when a coup brought General Ríos Montt to power in
March of that year, before the fraudulently elected president took office, the coup plotters
pointed to electoral fraud and the attendant loss in legitimacy of the country’s political
institutions to justify their actions (Fuentes Destarac 2008, 572; Gálvez Borrell 2008,
110-111). It was during Ríos Montt’s brief rule, with previous election frauds fresh in
mind, when transitional electoral laws were written to construct a new election
administration.
Yet despite the widespread denouncement of fraud in the three elections between
1974 and 1982, and the consensus that the subsequent centralization of polling places was
a direct response to how those frauds were carried out, the existing historiography offers
few details on how those episodes of election fraud occurred. However, the literature is
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suggestive that centralization of vote counting and government control of the electoral
body were key mechanisms for perpetrating fraud (Gálvez Borrell 2008, 72, 109). For
instance, in 1974 the official announcement of election results was interrupted, “feeding
the idea that results were being altered in favor of the government’s candidate… It was
only after a week that the official data appeared, when, we can suppose, the numbers had
already been conveniently manipulated” (Sabino 2008, 141). Based on his interviews
with people involved, Sabino (2008, 142) concludes that vote totals from the provinces
were altered by the government, making reference to the centralized vote count and
control over the diffusion of results as well as open alteration of the vote count in the
capital. Sabino similarly mentions rumors that in the 1982 elections, vote counts had been
changed in the capital to assure victory for the official party’s candidate (299).
At the same time, there is little documented evidence of vote manipulation in rural
areas. However, several interview respondents suggested that landlords and local political
bosses (caciques) would control the vote of their workers (Interview 01) and that ballot
stuffing occurred in rural areas where there was little presence of opposition parties or
election authorities (Interviews 09, 14, 15) and where the process of transporting
materials from rural areas to the capital resulted in lost ballot boxes (urnas perdidas)
(Interview 07). The centralization of voting sites was a means to prevent these types of
manipulation and fraud, by making it easier for parties and civil society to monitor the
election process and also lending more control to (now independent) election authorities
over the transmission of election results (Interviews 09, 19). Yet while many people
emphasize fraud that occurred in rural areas, the person charged with drafting the
transitional electoral laws in 1983 suggested that fraud occurred at all levels – from the
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voting tables in rural areas, to the transport of votes to departmental capitals (when votes
would be diverted to someone’s house to be modified), to the vote tallying at the national
level in Guatemala City. Other problems included voters arriving at their polling site to
find that someone had already voted in their place, or that their name was not on the voter
list. Such fraud was facilitated by the absence of party poll watchers or their exclusion
from voting centers (Interview 19).
Disagreement over the locus of fraud is also evident in the records of the National
Constituent Assembly that drafted the 1985 electoral law.65 Article 231 of the draft bill,
which dealt with the location of voting sites, generated vigorous debate. In the draft bill,
the article read simply “The Municipal Electoral Juntas are obligated to install polling
stations in the respective Municipal capitals.” Assembly members debated whether
centralizing polling places would prevent the types of fraud that had occurred in previous
elections and whether centralization would put an undue burden on voters.
Representative Carlos González Quezada of the centrist National Renewal Party
(PNR), who was on the committee that drafted the bill, opened the discussion by noting
that the purpose of limiting voting sites to municipal capitals was to “maintain the purity
of the suffrage, in view of the sad experiences that we have had, of the location of
[voting] tables in rural areas.” He also noted that the TSE would have control over public
transportation to help ease the burden on voters. In contrast, Representative Scheel
Montes of the center-right UCN party raised the issue of voter exclusion, noting that
some rural areas had larger populations than some municipal cabeceras, and arguing that
with centralization “we wouldn’t be protecting the purity of the electoral suffrage, but
65

This section draws on the debates of the National Constituent Assembly published in Diario de las
Sesiones de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, Tomo II, No. 117, August 28, 1985, and No. 118, August
29, 1985.
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limiting [it].” Scheel suggested amending the article to allow for polling stations “in those
places in which, in the judgment of the corresponding persons, there is a sufficient
turnout of voters to merit the location of [voting] tables.”
Those supporting centralization raised several points. Representative Recinos
Figueroa of the UCN argued that if voting were held in villages, landlords and local
bosses (caciques) would be able to influence the votes of workers and local authorities
would be able to intimidate voters, whereas voting in municipal capitals would help
ensure a free vote. By this logic, centralized voting might be an obstacle to exercising
one’s right to vote, but it would ensure that one’s vote was made freely. Representative
Luis Alfonso Lopez of the rightist Anticommunist Unification Party (PUA), defending
the original text of the article, argued that allowing for polling sites to be placed
anywhere deemed “adequate,” “we’ll know that, as adequate places will be selected, in
the first place, by the incumbent government, those that are precisely the places adequate
to commit fraud…” Here and elsewhere in the legislative debate, the equating of the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal with the government reveals the lack of trust in the
independence of the new electoral authority that prevailed at the time.
Others suggested that centralization would not place an undue burden on voters.
Representatives López (PUA) and Fuentes Sandoval (of the rightist MLN party) pointed
to the recent elections for the constituent assembly, in which voting had been centralized
for the first time, noting the high voter turnout and asking rhetorically whether there had
been discrimination or insurmountable barriers to voting. Some deputies even suggested
that party provision of transport to “their voters” would help alleviate the burden of
distance, and that with public campaign financing allotted based on the number of votes
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parties received, parties would be motivated to mobilize voters and get them to the
polls.66
Representative Scheel Montes (UCN) was more skeptical, asking “If we believe
there is going to be pressure [on voters] in a hamlet or a village, why won’t there be that
pressure in the municipal capital?” Scheel also foreshadowed later criticisms of election
observers by arguing that the political parties offering transportation to the polls would
exercise undue influence on voters. Interestingly then, while some feared that caciques
would pressure voters if polling were conducted in remote rural areas, others expressed
the inverse fear that political parties would pressure voters by controlling transportation if
voting were centralized.
In debating the efficacy of centralization as a means of combating fraud and the
consequences for voter inclusion, the central issues were the locus of prior electoral fraud
and the normative issue of whether ensuring clean elections was worth the price of the
exclusion of some voters. On the locus of prior election frauds, Representative Fuentes
Sandoval (MLN) articulated the rural fraud thesis: in the “elections of 1982 and before,
the electoral authorities always located voting tables in the parcels, in the villages, on the
farms, etc., etc., that history reminds us, that there is where the popular will of the people
was changed.” Representative López (PUA) bolstered the case for centralization by
referring anecdotally to ballot boxes found thrown out “in a street in Alta Verapaz” and
of ballot boxes being stuffed “in a certain departmental capital” – seemingly unaware that
this latter example of fraud occurring in a departmental capital did little to justify limiting
voting sites to such cities.
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As Representative López (PUA) put it: “I ask myself, if the place is distant, what do the political parties
do, they can’t contribute to transport their electors?” Representative González Quezada of the PNR raised
the issue of public campaign funds.
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The rural fraud thesis did not go unchallenged. Representative Castellanos of the
UCN argued “that the majority of fraud is done in the departmental governorships, and
not in the [municipal] capitals, nor in the farms, nor the hamlets.” Representative Scheel
concurred: “Gentlemen, let’s not deceive ourselves any more, we know Guatemala, and
we know that electoral fraud isn’t done at the voting tables, it’s done where they count
the votes, it’s done in the departmental capitals, where they bring the ballot boxes; this,
we have seen in all the stages of our history, and that is the truth, it’s a reality.” Scheel
offered his own anecdote to bolster his case:
Who commits fraud, has to be a well known person, let’s remember that famous
case…of a mayor of Jacaltenango, that for being very honorable and very honest,
carried the ballot box to deliver it personally in the departmental capital, and his
fright that, at arriving at the municipality of Huehuetenango, found that the voting
of the municipality whose votes he was carrying on his back were already tallied
on the blackboard; that is to say, that that isn’t done in the [local] places or
hamlets or villages.
If there was disagreement among the deputies about whether past instances of
electoral fraud occurred at polling places in rural villages, at the vote counting sites in the
departmental capitals, or all of the above, there were also differences among the deputies
in striking a balance between clean elections and voter inclusion. Two members of the
committee that drafted the bill put the issue starkly: Representative González Quezada
(PNR) stated flatly “…we [in the committee] prefer that some citizens don’t participate in
the process, because they are far from the voting station, than that the vote can be
utilized, as an instrument, for fraud,” while Representative Recinos Figueroa (UCN)
noted “it can be said, and it was said [in the committee], that there will be abstention, but
we believe that a minimal abstention is preferable to having a spurious government.”
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Representative Lopez (PUA) similarly articulated the normative issue at stake quite
clearly:
We shouldn’t be romantic, let’s be practical, let’s defend Guatemalan democracy
in the face of abstention; what is more sinful, that in the elections the will of the
people is mocked, or that a certain quantity of citizens don’t show up to vote
because the place is very distant?... I know municipalities, for example, one in
Petén, that’s called Piedras Negras, that to travel from Piedras Negras to Poptún,
it’s two days on the road; however, I ask myself, is it a sufficient argument that,
because a group of citizens of Petén don’t go to vote, we will permit fraud in the
rest of the departments of the Republic?
Others expressed more preoccupation with the barrier that centralization would
represent. For instance, the president of the constituent assembly Roberto Carpio Nicolle
(of the Christian Democratic Party, DCG) noted the great distances that some would have
to travel on foot to reach their voting site, and expressed reticence to centralize voting
centers “supposing that there was always fraud, that there always could be fraud, that in
Guatemala there isn’t going to be democracy.”
But on the heels of three consecutive fraudulent elections, the arguments for
centralizing voting sites ultimately won the day. As the assembly debates show,
legislators understood that centralizing polling stations would be an impediment to some
prospective voters, but most felt that the threat of fraud in far flung voting sites
outweighed this consideration. Opponents of centralization introduced an amendment to
allow for the departmental electoral councils, in agreement with political party
representatives, to place voting sites outside of municipal capitals.67 Ironically, this
proposal was almost identical to the solution ultimately settled on over 20 years later,
after fierce battles between Congress and the TSE. But at the time, the amendment made
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The amendment was introduced by Representatives German Scheel Montes (UCN), Tomás Ayuso
(DCG) and Abel Ordóñez (DCG). Roberto Carpio Nicolle also expressed support for it during the
legislative debate.
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no headway, with Representative Gonzalez Quezada arguing that many parties lacked the
ability to place poll watchers at more polling stations, and suggesting that some parties
would be at an advantage in deciding where to locate the polling stations.
It is worth noting that one deputy in the constituent assembly suggested the need
for Guatemala to experience two or three elections with centralized voting sites in order
to consolidate the (democratic) electoral system, and that the issue of decentralization
could be revisited in the future.68 Today in Guatemala, this is widely considered to have
been appropriate. Despite the later consensus on the need to decentralize voting sites,
many observers hold the opinion that centralization was appropriate at the time it was
adopted and served its purpose. As one respondent put it, using an analogy of a child’s
growth, the country’s electoral system needed to first learn to crawl, then learn to walk,
then to talk – i.e. to hold elections free of fraud, then find ways of including more voters
(Interview 06). In any case, the system set up in the early to mid-1980s did effectively rid
the country of the blatant fraud common in prior periods,69 whether as a result of
centralization or (more importantly) through the establishment of an independent
electoral management body.
There are alternative hypotheses to the claim that the centralization of voting sites
was intended to reduce the chances of election fraud. Perhaps centralization was intended
to impede rural, and especially indigenous, voters from casting ballots, and talk of
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As Representative González Quezada put it: “…if we are legislating under the phantom of the great
electoral frauds, it is preferable that this society holds some three or two more elections, so that we
consolidate democracy in Guatemala, and in the future the road remains open to us for constitutional
reform of this same law…The future is open, if we manage to consolidate the democratic process, we can
do the reform to this law in the next legislative period, or in the incoming , but today the circumstances
oblige us to maintain, in every respect, to put a lock on any possibility of electoral fraud, because only the
purity of the electoral process can consolidate the beginning of democracy in Guatemala.”
69
While large-scale fraud is a thing of the past, reports of vote buying at local levels are still common (see
Carter Center 2003; Mirador Electoral 2003; NDI 1995, 10).
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preventing fraud was a smokescreen for this ulterior motive. Such a motive could have
been based on partisan goals for parties that enjoyed stronger support in urban areas, or
based on general prejudice of predominantly male ladino legislators. Several
considerations give this interpretation plausibility. First is the absence of leftist or ethnic
parties in the constituent assembly that might have had a natural base among the
country’s indigenous campesinos; the elite-dominated parties that crafted the electoral
rules may have been relatively unconcerned with or even hostile to participation among
rural, indigenous, and poor voters. Second, the centralization of polling stations (and
other barriers) would give parties a gate keeping function, ensuring access to their
supporters by providing transportation on election day and helping them to register (see,
e.g., Carter Center 2003), while independent voters or supporters of small parties with
limited resources could potentially be left to their own devices to navigate procedural
obstacles. Finally, several legislators made a reasonable case that the greater risk of fraud
existed at the departmental level where vote counts were tallied rather than at rural voting
stations.
However, there are several reasons to accept the fraud-prevention hypothesis at
face value. First is the tremendous influence that election rigging in the three prior
elections had in the country. These frauds contributed to the “total delegitimation” of the
military regime and the consequent transition to nominally democratic rule (Interview
19). One of the expressed motivating factors for the 1982 coup that initiated the transition
from military rule was the repeated electoral frauds, with the junta referring to “the
fraudulent electoral practices” in its proclamation to the people (Castillo Milla 2006, 6).
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It is therefore reasonable to conclude that ensuring fair elections free of fraud was the
overriding priority of the staff and legislators who crafted the 1983-1985 electoral laws.
Secondly, the fraud-prevention thesis was accepted by all political analysts and
participants interviewed for this project; no respondents, even former guerrillas,
suggested that disenfranchisement for partisan gain was the motivation behind the
centralization of voting sites. Similarly, the 1985 legislative debate on centralization was
free of accusations of partisan motivations, despite opposing views of some of the
deputies. The absence of partisan motives is partly understandable in light of the political
uncertainty at the time: some parties lacked clear social bases and therefore had no
partisan reasons to try to include or exclude particular segments of the population from
the ballot box. One of the strongest parties in the assembly, the UCN, had just recently
formed, and one of the party’s representatives spoke in favor of centralization while two
others were the most vocal opponents of centralization. The UCN had in fact performed
more strongly in more urbanized municipalities than rural areas in the 1984 constituent
assembly elections (Sáenz de Tejada 2005, 121, 127), but that did not prevent some of its
members from advocating less stringent polling centralization.
Older parties had slightly more clearly defined social bases. The largest party in
the assembly, the right wing MLN (which had been in power during parts of the
authoritarian period), had a strong presence in rural areas (Sáenz de Tejada 2005, 126).
Yet one of the party’s representatives was a strong supporter of centralization. The social
base of the Christian Democracy party (DCG) was even clearer. The DCG had a strong
rural organization and had particularly strong support in indigenous communities,
where it performed well in 1984 and in subsequent elections (Sáenz de Tejada 2005,
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124, 126, 160, 162). Of all the parties represented in the constituent assembly, it would
have been the DCG that might have opposed centralizing polling places. And in fact
several DCG representatives supported an amendment to the elections bill to allow
polling places outside of municipal capitals. Yet the party also had strong reason to
safeguard the system against fraud, having been the victim of fraud in the 1974
presidential election. One former assembly deputy (for the PR party) noted that in the
assembly “[t]here was really no talk of anything else but preventing election fraud, it was
a priority subject, since there had been a permanent frustration in the parties, especially in
Christian Democracy, that had suffered those constant election robberies. There was a
desire to stop fraud by all means, particularly against the MLN…that made the law have
that focus” (ASIES 2005, 88).
It is not clear if all DCG deputies opposed polling centralization, as the legislative
records do not contain vote totals for the measure. All that can be concluded is that given
the alignment of forces in the assembly, the measure could not have been approved
without the support of some centrist deputies. Given the available evidence, it appears
that the desire of parties to have a level playing field free of ballot stuffing was the
priority of the day, overcoming potential partisan motives to facilitate or impede the
participation or rural voters.
But if partisan motivations didn’t drive the decision to centralize voting, it is
conceivable that general attitudes towards the political participation of rural citizens,
indigenous peoples, and women did influence legislators. There is certainly an urbancentric culture in the capital city that sees rural sectors as less sophisticated than
cosmopolitan urbanites, and when it comes to elections, rural voters are seen as easily
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manipulated by populist demagogues, unlike the more sophisticated and discerning urban
voter.70 For instance, when electoral reform was debated in later years, an editorial in the
country’s leading newspaper expressed concern that decentralizing polling stations could
“in practice be turned into a form of getting votes from citizens disillusioned by
demagogic attitudes” (PL 2002a). Some people point out the general climate of racism
and machismo that intersected with voting restrictions and hindered the participation of
indigenous, women, and the poor, but without attributing the adoption of election
administration measures to this climate (Interview 23). Ultimately there is no clear
evidence linking the adoption of polling site centralization or other restrictions to
prevailing discriminatory views held by political elites. Perhaps the most that can be said
is that the decision to centralize voting was easier for legislators to take, knowing that
those most affected would be rural, often indigenous, and poor.
Another consideration in the centralization of voting may have been the ongoing
armed conflict between the government and guerrillas. Certainly, ensuring security for
voting would have been difficult in some rural areas where guerrilla forces were active.
Some respondents noted that putting polling stations in villages wasn’t feasible in the
context of armed conflict (Interviews 06, 19). However, these same respondents were
clear that avoiding election fraud was the motivation for centralization: “there was no
other reason for it,” in the words of one respondent (Interview 06). Rather than a
competing explanation, the armed conflict might be thought of as an additional security
consideration for lawmakers who wanted to avoid irregularities and fraud at all costs.
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Such views surfaced occasionally during interviews and in casual conversations in Guatemala City.
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Assignment of Voters to Polling Places
While the installation of voting sites only in municipal capitals was intended to
prevent election fraud, other measures affecting where voters were assigned to vote also
responded to a desire to prevent election irregularities, although other factors also played
a role.
Requiring citizens to vote in the municipality where they received their cédula,
rather than in the municipality of their current residence (which was often different), was
a decision of the TSE rather than a provision in the electoral law, and was included in its
1987 regulation (reglamento) of the law. In the 1984 and 1985 elections, as a new voter
list was drawn up, the voter rolls were based on voters’ current residence. The decision
by the TSE to switch to a more restrictive system was motivated by a desire to avoid
manipulation of the voter rolls and to better organize the registration process. As the
director of the voter registry at the time put it when discussing the change, “this is
something we fixed,” emphasizing the “certainty” (certeza) and “order” (orden) of the
process that this ensured (Interview 16). In particular, limiting voting to the municipality
where one holds an identification document would help prevent the transfer of voters to
different municipalities for strategic electoral purposes (Interview 16) – a problem that is
at the root of many electoral conflicts today, particularly after the switch back to a
residence-based system. In a system with voter lists based on residence, a candidate for
mayor might arrange for supporters from a neighboring municipality to fraudulently
register to vote in his own jurisdiction, and on election day the candidate or his party
would bus in these outside voters – the famous traslado (transfer) of voters.71 Requiring
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In Guatemala, the terms traslado and acarreo are often used to describe this type of voting manipulation,
but the use of these terms is sometimes confused by a failure to distinguish between two different practices.
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an identity document issued in the municipality where one registers to vote would make
this practice more difficult.
Like voting centralization, this measure represented a significant obstacle for
some citizens living far from their place of birth, who (in the absence of any form of
absentee balloting) would need to travel cross-country to vote or go through the process
of obtaining a new identification document. And like centralization, this measure
responded to the overriding objective of assuring clean election processes free of fraud. It
also apparently encountered little opposition: while the measure was a TSE initiative, the
political parties did not oppose it (Interview 16). By the mid-1990s, an initiative was
proposed within the TSE to loosen the requirement by instituting a limited form of
absentee balloting, allowing voters living outside of their cédula municipality to vote for
national offices in the municipality where they were residing (holding a cédula in the new
municipality would still be needed to vote for local offices). The idea was to facilitate the
vote for those living away from their homes, while not complicating (or opening up for
abuse) municipal and district elections (Interview 14). However, the proposal made no
headway within the TSE, and it wouldn’t be until 2001 that the TSE moved back to a
voter roll based on residence (see chapter 4).
Another aspect of voter assignment to polling sites was the division of the voter
lists in urban areas by voters’ registration numbers rather than by residence, so that voters
would not necessarily be assigned to the polling site closest to their home (LEPP, Art.
224 and 230). This method of assigning voters was carried over from the military-era

I use the term traslado to signify the (illegal) registration and voting of people in a municipality in which
they do not reside, and acarreo to signify the traditional practice of parties or candidates providing
transportation for voters to reach their polling site. The first involves voter registration fraud; the second is
perfectly legal, though it raises questions about parties influencing voters in exchange for transportation.
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electoral codes (Interview 19), but it is not clear why it was maintained when the
electoral system was revised in the 1980s. One respondent suggested that the TSE simply
lacked the technical capacity to divide the voter lists cartographically within
municipalities (Interview 24), and this is plausible considering the significant external
technical assistance needed to carry out polling site decentralization after 2004. However,
other respondents suggested that the lack of technical cartographic tools was not the
cause (Interview 16), and that at the very least it should have been possible to divide
large cities into zones and assign voters to a voting center within their zone (if not
necessarily the closest to their home) (Interview 19). Whatever the case may be, it is clear
that this aspect of the voting process did not receive much attention at the time, unlike the
centralization of voting sites, and the issue did not elicit debate among the legislators
approving the electoral law. As a holdover from the previous electoral system, this
method simply seemed the easiest way of ordering the voter lists, while the effects on
voter convenience were apparently not foreseen (Interviews 16, 19). Whereas requiring
citizens to vote in the municipality listed on their identity document was meant to give
“order” to the voting process, one respondent suggested that the sequential division of the
voter lists was simply a case of administrative “disorder” that lacked a logical basis
(Interview 26).

Voter Registration and Casting a Ballot
If the centralization of polling sites is explicable as a means of controlling the
election process and making fraud more difficult, “[t]he reasons and the logic for [the]
administrative complexities” surrounding voter registration “are difficult to explain”
(López-Pintor and Urrutia 2002, 42). This is because to some extent the complexities
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resulted from administrative inefficiencies and inadequate coordination between the voter
and civil registries. Yet to some extent the voter registration obstacles are also explicable
in terms of protecting the system against fraud.
With regard to the closing date of registration, the move from one month to three
months from 1984 to 1987 responded to the need for more time to prepare the voter lists
(Interviews 04, 16, 19). This preparation involves compiling the registration data,
verifying the data and purging the registrations of those ineligible to vote (such as active
police and military personnel, who are not legally allowed to vote), and printing and
distributing the lists to the departmental and municipal election boards and voting
centers. The extension of the closing date also responded in part to concerns of fraud:
according to the director of voter registration at the time, this three month period between
the closing of registration and election day was needed to avoid irregularities with the
voter lists (Interview 16). The 1985 electoral law required the voter roll to be purged and
printed no later than 30 days before elections (art. 225), a measure surely intended to
protect against manipulation of the voter lists (e.g., strategic transfers of registrations
across municipal lines).
Another respondent suggested that extending the closing date to three months was
intended to allow more time to verify the information on the voter register, particularly
given the insecurity of the cédula which citizens used when registering to vote (Interview
19). The insecurity of the cédula – an easily forged paper document – also meant that the
voter registration process involved security checks that resulted in applicants making
multiple trips to the registry office. After receiving a voter registration application, the
voter registry checked the applicant’s information against the municipal civil registry (a
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check against falsified identity documents), and the civil registries were required to notify
the voter registry if they received verification requests for a single person from more than
one voter registry office (a check against multiple voter registrations) (Decreto 138-83,
Art. 5, 12; Reglamento, Art. 2).
Thus several restrictive aspects of the voter registration process – an early closing
date and a long process of multiple trips to the registry – were the result of concerns
about voter registration fraud. But the system put in place was not particularly effective at
preventing such problems. For instance, a lack of communication between the country’s
decentralized civil registries (where citizens report births, deaths, and changes to civil
status) and the TSE’s Citizen’s Registry (which produces the voter roll) posed obstacles
to purging the voter lists. Although the civil registries were obligated to share information
with the Citizen’s Registry, this often didn’t happen in practice, and the problem was
often compounded by family deaths not being reported to the civil registries in the first
place (OAS 1997a, 31; 2005, 17). Furthermore, the TSE historically did not have the
technology available to adequately cross-check information in the registries (OAS 1997a,
32). Until recently, many registration offices lacked computers and entered voter
registrations manually, which slowed down the process of compiling the voter rolls and
was another reason for the TSE to prefer an early registration closing date (Interview 14).
Thus, the decentralized and fragmented registry system resulted in the worst of both
worlds: restrictive voter registration procedures and security checks that relied on
inaccurate civil registries and thus provided imperfect protection against manipulation of
the voter rolls.
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After lengthening the voter registration closing date in 1987, changes were not
considered until recently (Interviews 04, 13, 14). Despite improvements in technology in
registration offices, the TSE has recently proposed not to move the closing date closer to
election day but to end voter registration even earlier – six months before election day.
According to the director of voter registration, the TSE considers the three month period
to be inadequate to purge, print, and distribute the voter rolls (Interview 21). Surprisingly,
despite the recognition that many people try to register after the closing date, and the
widely noted Guatemalan cultural characteristic of doing things at the last minute, the
early closing date has received practically no attention from election observers or civil
society groups as an obstacle to participation. One exception is the study by Boneo and
Torres-Rivas (2000), who suggest shortening the closing date to 30 days and note that no
technical obstacles impede doing so (151).72 Yet this recommendation had little effect. In
general, according to a former TSE magistrate, the TSE has prioritized the integrity of the
voter lists, and has not considered under-registration of eligible voters to be a significant
problem (Interview 13).

Voter Education
In providing voters with the information necessary to participate, two related
factors have been critical: the low priority given to voter education and the resources
available to carry out voter education activities. According to a long-time TSE staff
person, voter education was a lower priority in the past than it is today, as the imperative
of establishing clean elections absorbed the attention of election administrators (Interview
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One respondent suggested that a closing date of two months would be feasible now, but also noted the
challenges involved, since the voter lists are used to determine the number and location of polling sites and
the necessary number of poll workers to be trained (Interview 14).
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22). As a result, the educational efforts of the TSE were aimed at training poll workers
and party poll watchers – actors with a direct impact on election integrity – more than
voter information campaigns (CRE 1997; TSE and CAPEL 1986). Others also note the
“lack of will” in carrying out information campaigns, and suggest that racism and sexism
may play a role as well, as historically there was little interest in educating women and
indigenous about the voting process (Interview 01).
Voter education gained higher priority in the late 1990s with the electoral reform
process, and the funding devoted to voter education increased over time and was
supplemented by international aid. However, funding limitations remained a constraint.
One former TSE magistrate noted that funds had been a constraint in translating and
providing informational materials in all indigenous languages, leading the TSE to focus
only on the 4-5 most common languages (Interview 17). Observers have also pointed to
the lack of resources as an impediment to long-term voter education efforts (OAS 1997a,
32-33). But funding shortages have not been the only problem. The social and cultural
context presents enormous challenges: for instance, the Academy of Mayan Languages
(ALMG) translates TSE educational materials, but there have been problems with the
translations being in a formal style of indigenous languages that people do not
understand. And in the face of such challenges, the TSE has not always been effective at
utilizing low-cost alternatives, such as coordinating with local community radio stations
to disseminate voter information in indigenous languages (Interview 22). Initially a low
priority hampered by funding constraints, voter education has become a much more highprofile concern of the TSE since the late 1990s, and funding constraints have lessened
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considerably in recent years. As discussed in chapter 4, the result has been more intensive
voter information campaigns, although still marked by limitations.

Conclusion
When Guatemalan lawmakers and election administrators crafted the country’s
election administration in the 1980s, the past weighed heavily on their choice of rules and
procedures. After experiencing three consecutive fraudulent elections, they sought above
all else to safeguard Guatemalan elections against fraud in order to secure a democratic
electoral system. To deter ballot stuffing and manipulation of rural voters, voting sites
were limited to municipal capitals. To protect against voter registration fraud after the
failure in 1983 to introduce a more secure identity document, a system of registry checks
was put in place that resulted in a complex process of voter registration. And in the focus
on rooting out election fraud, other issues such as voter education received lower priority.
The result was a complex of administrative rules and procedures that was highly
restrictive for voter access to the ballot box.
Other factors influenced election administration as well, such as financial
constraints and simple administrative holdovers from the previous electoral system
(Table 3.2 below summarizes the evidence for each hypothesis presented in chapter 2).
But concerns about election fraud had the biggest impact on the electoral rules and
procedures discussed in this chapter. The weight of the past influenced the electoral code
in other ways as well: the minimal barriers for forming political parties adopted in 19831985, for instance, responded to the limited contestation that had been permitted under
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the military regime (El Periódico 2011b; Gálvez Borrell 2008, 133-134).73 Thus while
voter access was restricted, electoral competition also became freer and fairer.
The electoral administration set up in the 1980s would prove difficult to reform in
later years. Some technical components of the system would prove susceptible to path
dependence, making change costlier as time went on. Other aspects would be subject to
partisan and inter-institutional battles. During the reform process, the roles of partisan
interests, civil society groups, and international election assistance become more
prominent. It is to that process that we turn in chapter 4.

Table 3.2 Support for Hypotheses, Guatemala 1983-2003
Category
Hypothesis
Support

Partisan
Interests

H1: Where a ruling party can identify
opposition supporters, election
administration inclusiveness will tend
to be low, whereas countries with
catch-all parties or fluid party systems
marked by low levels of partisan
attachments will tend to have more
inclusive electoral procedures.
H2: Parties with strong lower class
support (typically populist or leftist
parties) will support inclusive rules.

H3: Partisan EMBs will tend to
implement less inclusive measures as
partisan election officials attempt to
Electoral
impede the participation of some
Management
parties’ supporters.
Body
H4: Independent, non-partisan EMBs
Structure
will be associated with inclusive rules
in part by playing an active role in
electoral reform.
H5: A history of election fraud will
lead democratizing countries to adopt
strict safeguards against fraud, which
The Specter may in turn impose procedural barriers
of Election
to voting.
Fraud

Inconclusive

Inconclusive

Not
supported

Comments
Low levels of
partisan attachments
coincided with low
inclusiveness, but
partisan interests
played little role in
constructing election
administration rules.
Leftist and populist
parties were small
during the early
democratic period.
The nonpartisan TSE
instituted several
restrictive measures.

Inconclusive

Supported

Most restrictive
election
administration
practices were
adopted because of
concerns about fraud.

Continued on next page
73

The number of signatures required to form a political party was reduced from 50,000 to 4,000.
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Table 3.2, continued
Category

Hypothesis

Support

H6: Parties that have been the victims
of election fraud will support strict
safeguards that reduce inclusiveness.

Election
Costs and
Financial
Resources

Civil Society
and Public
Opinion

International
Influences

H7: Countries with more resources
will have more inclusive election
administration.

H8: Strong civil society, particularly
domestic election observation groups,
will increase election administration
inclusiveness.
H9: Public opinion will set limits on
the extent to which elites can pursue
self-serving election administration
rules.
H10: International observers will
prevent extremely restrictive measures
in elections that they observe,
particularly measures that are highly
visible on election day.
H11: The recommendations of election
observers will have little impact on
election administration practices.

H12: When a country seeks good
relations with Western democracies,
the influence of election observers will
be enhanced and inclusive election
administration practices will be more
likely.
H13: Technical and financial
assistance will make inclusive
measures more likely by enhancing
domestic bureaucratic capacity.
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Inconclusive

Inconclusive

Inconclusive

Not
supported

Not
supported

Supported

Inconclusive

Inconclusive

Comments
At least some
legislators from
victimized parties
opposed restrictive
measures intended to
prevent fraud.
Costs limited voter
education efforts, but
otherwise appear to
have had little
impact.
Organized civil
society was not well
developed for much
of this period.
No evidence of
public opinion
constraints was
uncovered.
Restrictive measures
persisted despite the
presence of
observers.
Restrictive measures
persisted despite
observer
recommendations for
reform.

CHAPTER 4
GUATEMALA: ELECTION ADMINISTRATION REFORM AND IMPROVING
VOTER ACCESS, 2004-2011

After establishing highly restrictive procedural barriers to voting in the 1980s,
Guatemala held several relatively free and fair elections marked by low levels of voter
participation. By the mid-1990s electoral reform was on the agenda, with many proposals
focusing on making voting more accessible. When the country’s civil war came to an end
in 1996 issues of election administration were included in the peace accords, beginning a
long process of electoral reform that was still playing out as of 2011. This chapter
recounts the story of the reform process in Guatemala and explains what made dramatic
changes in election administration inclusiveness possible and why the reforms took the
particular shape that they did, removing some obstacles to voting while leaving others in
place.

Early Attempts at Reform
By the mid-1990s Guatemalan political parties, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
(TSE), and observers on all sides acknowledged the obstacles to voting presented by
centralized polling sites, the manner of assigning voters to voting centers, and the
processes of documentation and voter registration (OAS 1997a, 16, 37). A number of
amendments to the electoral law were introduced in Congress in the mid-1990s to address
these problems.74 One 1993 bill would have located polling stations outside of municipal
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This section draws on compilations of reform initiatives in Catalina Soberanis 1995, OAS 1997 (Annex
X), and Acción Ciudadana et al. 2005.
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capitals,75 while a bill introduced the following year by deputies of various parties would
have allowed for polling stations outside of municipal capitals and mandated legislation
on a new identification document. The TSE, using its power to initiate legislation, also
proposed polling site decentralization and the creation of a new identification card (under
TSE control) the same year, while a collection of civil society groups (the Assembly of
Civil Society) proposed similar measures. Yet another bill would have decentralized
polling stations, provided free public transportation to the polls, and instituted an
absentee voting system.76
Yet despite support from various quarters on the desirability of polling
decentralization and a new identity card, these reforms made no headway. One obstacle
was that most of the proposed amendments to make voting easier were tied up with other,
more controversial measures. Several of the proposals would have allowed non-partisan
civic committees to run candidates for Congress (they are currently limited to fielding
municipal candidates), thus creating more competition for established political parties.
One proposal would have instituted compulsory voting and changed a number of party
registration and campaign finance rules, and was blocked by the Constitutional Court;
another sought to circumvent the constitutional prohibition of presidential candidacies of
those who have participated in a coup, intended to benefit FRG party leader Efraín Rios
Montt.
Another obstacle to reform was disagreement over the form that polling site
decentralization should take. Some proposals from legislators called for drastic
75

Introduced by deputy Vinicio Villar of the Christian Democracy party.
Introduced by deputy Jose Fernando García Bravatti of the FRG party. Absentee voting would have
taken the form of “national tables” at voting centers, where voters registered in other jurisdictions could
have cast ballots for national (but not municipal or departmental) offices. A similar measure was debated
internally within the TSE (Interview 14).
76
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decentralization of polling stations to any population center of 200 or more registered
voters, while the TSE wanted the power to decide where to locate voting centers and
actively opposed the more radical decentralization proposals, noting the logistical
difficulty of establishing voting centers in the country’s 6,000 villages and the need for
cartographic studies to choose appropriate sites. The TSE also opposed the proposed plan
for absentee voting, fearing multiple voting in the context of weak safeguards against
obtaining fake identity cards (TSE n.d.[b], 15).
Another obstacle was the fact that electoral reform was a low priority for the
political parties at the time.77 Additionally, many of the reforms were proposed when a
national election was on the horizon, which made reform less likely (CRE 2004, 21) –
despite the fact that some reforms would not have gone into effect until after the 1995
elections.
Thus the mid-1990s saw a number of failed proposals to increase election
administration inclusiveness. As a number of participants noted, it took the end of the
country’s armed conflict and the resulting peace accords to give electoral reform a new
boost and place it squarely on the political agenda (Interviews 06, 07, 08).

The Electoral Accord and the Commission on Electoral Reform
The Guatemala Peace Accords between the government and the URNG guerrillas
were wide ranging, and one part of the agreements was the Accord on Constitutional
Reforms and the Electoral Regime, signed in December 1996. The sections of the accord
that dealt with the electoral regime put the issue of voter participation front and center,
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For instance, of the 19 parties or alliances participating in national elections in 1995, electoral reform
was mentioned in the platform of only one minor alliance which did not win any seats in Congress
(Inforpress Centroamericana and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 1995, 21-62).
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and recognized “[t]hat the electoral processes suffer from specific shortcomings which
impede the effective enjoyment of the right to vote, and that include citizens’ lack of
reliable documentation, the absence of technically prepared voter lists, difficulty of
access to registration and voting, lack of information and the need for greater
transparency in electoral campaigns” (section II). According to two URNG members,
issues of electoral administration were included in the peace accords with the aim of
opening up and democratizing what they considered to be a discredited political system
(Interviews 08, 10).
To boost voter participation and improve the legitimacy of the electoral process,
the accord addressed a wide range of issues – the majority of them dealing with election
administration inclusiveness – as a minimum agenda for modernizing the electoral
regime. Areas identified for reform were voter documentation, voter registration and the
voter rolls, the voting process (the location of voting centers and the access of migrant
workers to voting), voter information campaigns (carried out in Spanish and Mayan
languages to emphasize the importance of voting and provide information on how to
register and vote), transparency of parties and campaign finance, and strengthening
electoral institutions. On voter documentation, the accord called for replacing the
country’s antiquated and easily falsified paper identity document (cédula de vecindad)
with a more modern general purpose identity card that would also serve as voter
identification. The accord indicated that the TSE would issue the identity document – an
issue that became deeply contentious later – and that the new document should be used
for the next electoral process (in 1999); as it turned out, it would be more than a decade
before distribution of the new ID card would begin.
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Among the most contentious and challenging election administration matters
contained in the accord were voter registration and voting center decentralization. On the
decentralization of voting centers, the implementation of which would be hotly debated
in the following years, the accord stated (section II, par. 12):
It is necessary to facilitate citizens’ access to voting centers. To that end, the
Parties propose that, based on the electoral rolls, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal,
in consultation with political parties, identifies the places in which voting centers
are to be installed in the interior of the municipalities where there are important
population nuclei far from the municipal capital and which are also accessible to
party poll-watchers and electoral observers.
To implement decentralization, corresponding changes in voter registration would
be needed. In particular, voter rolls would need to include voters’ specific places of
residence and not just the municipality in which they resided. The accord also
recommended facilitating voter access to registration centers, particularly in rural areas,
and ensuring that deaths and changes of residence were more fully recorded in the voter
rolls. Partly related to these recommendations were the suggestions on institutional
strengthening, which included modernizing the national registry to “permit the
automation of data and its integration into coordinated networks for the effective crosschecking, maintenance, and updating of electoral rolls” (section II, par. 20), as well as
assuring the TSE had the necessary resources to implement the reforms. With a primary
focus on increasing voter participation but also touching on issues of campaign finance
regulations, the accord set an expansive agenda for reform.
To study and elaborate a proposal for the relevant reforms to the electoral law, the
accord mandated the creation of an Electoral Reform Commission (CRE), to be presided
by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and with participation from all parties with
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representation in Congress (7 parties with one representative each).78 The commission
was to complete its work within six months of being constituted (though its term was
subsequently extended twice) and publish a report with the recommended legal reforms,
and was “to encourage an extensive pluralistic debate on the subject of Guatemala's
electoral regime” (section II, par. 3).
With its agenda based on the electoral accord, the Commission on Electoral
Reform (CRE) began its work on April 1, 1997. The commission’s work was supported
by technical studies elaborated by the TSE with support from the Organization of
American States, including reports on electoral cartography and the issue of migrant
worker voting (CRE 1998). The commission also drew on election laws in other Latin
American countries (Acción Ciudadana et al. 1999, 164). In addition, the CRE issued a
public call for reform proposals, and a wide range of civic groups and individual citizens
presented a total of 24 proposal packages to the commission,79 most containing multiple
recommendations. Many of the proposals reiterated the reforms called for in the electoral
accord, including decentralization of voting sites (recommended by three parties and
proto-parties without representation on the commission, the attorney general’s office, the
political science department of the University of San Carlos, and the village of Guineales,
among others); “domicile voting,” or the assignment of voters to the voting center closest
to their residence (mentioned in three proposals); and a new identity document
(mentioned in four proposals). Some proposals also called for the provision of free public
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The commission’s chair and two members were selected by the TSE (the chair and one member were
active TSE magistrates; another member was a former magistrate). The parties with representation in
Congress at the time were PAN, FRG, FDNG, DCG, UCN, MLN, and UD.
79
This is the number of proposals by outside groups and individuals contained in TSE n.d. (c).
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transportation on election day and voting rights for army and police members and for
Guatemalans living abroad (Acción Ciudadana et al. 2005; TSE n.d.[c]).
Other proposals went beyond the CRE’s minimal agenda, including requirements
for parties to run indigenous candidates in top spots on party lists and allowing civic
committees to run candidates for Congress (Cerigua Weekly Briefs 1998; TSE n.d. [c]).
Thus the already extensive agenda was widened further through the proposals from civil
society.80
The CRE’s work culminated in a 1998 report titled “Guatemala, Peace and
Democracy” and an associated bill introduced in Congress proposing changes to 163
articles of the electoral law.81 The CRE’s president, TSE magistrate Mario Guerra
Roldán, urged Congress to enact the amendments swiftly so that they could be
implemented for the following year’s general election (Cerigua Weekly Briefs 1998).
The election administration measures included in the CRE package included
decentralization of polling sites at the discretion of the TSE; assigning voters in large
cities to the polling station closest to their home; state provision of free transportation on
election day (and prohibiting parties from transporting voters); moving election day from
December to August to facilitate the participation of seasonal migrant workers; and
requiring the TSE to carry out permanent civic and voter education programs (CRE
2004). Changes tightening party registration requirements were also included. The CRE
report also contained recommendations apart from specific legal reforms, including that
80

In one of the more interesting recommendations to the CRE, local photographic businesses protested
plans for the state agency issuing identity cards to provide citizens with their photograph, in contrast to the
prevailing system whereby citizens needed to provide their own photo (TSE n.d. [c]). Photographic
businesses would later protest the same measure when a new civil registry was created (PL, 2008a).
81
The TSE used its initiative power to introduce the bill in Congress. See “Proyecto de Decreto que
Contiene Modificaciones a la Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos,” introduced into Congress Nov. 5,
1998.
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the TSE facilitate voter registration by shortening the process, utilizing mobile
registration units, and extending hours of operation in registration offices (CRE 2004,
185). Other legal reforms proposed by civil society groups, such as allowing civic
committees to run Congressional candidates and party quotas for women and indigenous
people, were largely excluded from the final proposal. According to the CRE’s executive
secretary, these larger measures were excluded in the hopes of passing the other
proposals quickly before the 1999 elections (Interview 06). The final package of
proposed reforms thus “reflect[ed] closely those recommended in the peace accords
themselves” (Cerigua Weekly Briefs 1998).
According to the CRE members interviewed by the author, there had been
consensus among the party representatives and the TSE magistrates within the CRE on
the major issues of voter access, such as polling site decentralization (Interviews 06, 07,
16), as political actors recognized that electoral procedures “suffered from certain
shortcomings and technical weaknesses that were necessary to address with the explicit
objective of stimulating electoral participation” (Torres-Rivas and González 2001, 61).
These reforms were also supported universally by civil society groups, academics, and
the recommendations of international election observers. Yet six years would pass before
Congress approved changes to the electoral law. As legal reforms stalled in Congress, the
TSE pursued administrative measures to lower barriers to participation.

TSE Initiatives to Improve Voter Registration
While changes to the electoral law were delayed, the TSE undertook measures to
facilitate the vote that didn’t require legal reforms. At this time, the issue of increasing
voter participation was high on the agenda, and in the late 1990s a study being carried out
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by Horacio Boneo and Edelberto Torres-Rivas and funded by international organizations
emphasized the problem of voter registration (Boneo and Torres-Rivas 2000; Interview
13). Two TSE measures thus focused on voter registration: the employment of mobile
voter registration units and the switch back to a voter roll based on citizens’ residence
(rather than vecindad). The use of mobile registration brigades began in 1999. These
brigades consist of small teams that visit areas removed from the permanent registry
offices (often in rural areas, but also in commercial centers in cities) for a short period to
carry out voter registration. Today their coverage extends to all of the country’s
departments, with teams generally spending 5 days or more in a community to carry out
registration (Interview 21; Sánchez del Valle 2000, 29; TSE n.d.[d], 828-829). These
brigades, combined with greater publicity from the TSE promoting voter registration,
resulted in significant increases in the voter rolls, particularly in predominantly
indigenous areas (López-Pintor and Urrutia 2002, 39, 41-42). The brigades also serve as a
means for voters to update or check their registration status.
Equally significant was the TSE’s modification of its regulation of the electoral
law in 2001. With this change, citizens could register to vote in the municipality in which
they currently resided, even if they did not obtain their identity document in that
municipality. Citizens already registered would be able to update their information, prior
to the closing of registration, in order to transfer their registration to their municipality of
residence (TSE 2001b). Another modification the following year established a six month
residency requirement to register in a given jurisdiction (TSE 2002), but in practice there
are few controls in place to enforce this.
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This measure returned the voter registration process to what had been in place
prior to 1987, with the goal of facilitating the vote in order to boost participation (PL
2001g). The updating of voters’ registration data was also used to implement domicile
voting, or assigning voters to the voting center nearest their residence (Interview 17).
While expressing tentative support for the measure, some legislators and civil society
observers expressed concern about the potential for voter fraud (PL 2001g), a concern
that is still widespread. Since no documentation of residence in the jurisdiction is
required when registering, this change did indeed open the possibility for voter
registration fraud. If voters lie about their address when registering – a practice thought to
be common – they can register in a different municipality in order to support local
candidates in that town. This voter registration fraud – what Fukumoto and Horiuchi
(2011) call “preelectoral residential registration” (587) – results in the infamous traslado
(transfer) of outside voters to support mayoral candidates, often giving rise to electionrelated conflicts.82 This administrative measure aimed at increasing inclusion thus also
loosened protections against voter fraud; this is particularly unusual given the TSE’s
tendency to prioritize safeguards against fraud, and is a problem the TSE hopes to
address by requiring proof of residence when registering and an earlier closing date for
voter registration to allow more time to detect anomalies on the voter rolls (Interviews
21, 22).
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According to a long time TSE staff member, the true extent to which this practice occurs is unknown
(Interview 22); however, the TSE verified some 50 cases in 17 municipalities following the 2011 elections
(PL 2011h). Presumably it affects mostly municipal elections rather than Congressional contests, and
mayoral candidates (typically incumbents) are thought to orchestrate this type of fraud.
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Reforming the Electoral Law
While the TSE reduced administrative barriers related to voter registration,
electoral reform was taken up in Congress in early 2000 following the general election in
late 1999. Both the TSE and deputies from a range of parties in Congress agreed on the
importance of the reforms in order to increase voter participation and concurred that the
year following an election would be the ideal time to approve the reforms (PL 2000a;
2000b; 2000c.). The TSE magistrates and Congressional deputies agreed that the basis of
discussion should be the CRE report, and all signs indicated that all of the party caucuses
in Congress were disposed to approve electoral reforms that year (PL 2000c; 2000e).
Yet the reform process would follow a torturous path before finally resulting in
wide ranging changes to the electoral law. In October of 2003, all but one of Guatemala’s
political parties subscribed to a Shared National Agenda, an accord promoted by the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Netherlands Institute for
Multiparty Democracy. One of the priorities of the agenda was to reform the electoral
law, which took center stage in the new Congress inaugurated in 2004 (PL 2004a;
2004c). There were many calls – by independent analysts, some Congressional deputies,
and above all the TSE – for further delay of the reforms to take additional proposals into
account (especially those emanating from the TSE) (PL 2004b; 2004d; 2004e; 2004f).83
Ironically, the delays in approving the reforms had led both to a sense of urgency and
also the opinion among many that the reforms had already become dated (PL 2004e).
Despite continuing disagreements over a number of measures in the reform package, the
governing GANA coalition threw its support behind the electoral reforms as a result of a
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Op-eds in the leading paper Prensa Libre were almost unanimously critical of the failure to incorporate
TSE recommendations and stronger regulations of campaign finance in the reforms.

120

“gentlemen’s agreement” with other parties over unrelated pieces of legislation pending
in Congress. This cleared the path for the electoral reform bill that had been debated in
2001 to be approved (unchanged) on April 21, 2004, over the objections of the TSE, with
135 deputies voting for the amendments and only 10 deputies voting against (PL 2004g;
2004h; 2004k).84 Many deputies voting for the bill acknowledged that the amendments
included errors and omissions, and the passage of the reforms was accompanied by a
pledge to approve follow-up changes within 90 days (PL 2004i).
It quickly became apparent that further reforms would not be approved quickly,
and the Congressional Committee on Electoral Matters indicated that proposed
amendments from the TSE and civil society would be considered – thus opening up the
issue of electoral reform to consultation for the third time. The discussion of additional
amendments centered on some of the most contentious issues, such as campaign finance
regulation, implementation of a new identity document, and the participation of women
and indigenous candidates. At this time, the term “second generation reforms” – meaning
the inclusion of themes promoted by the TSE and civil society not treated in the 2004
reforms – gave way in Congress to talk of “harmonizing reforms,” limited to correcting
errors included in the first round of amendments (PL 2004l; 2004p). Finally, on October
19, 2006, some two and a half years after its 90-day term to approve a second round of
electoral reforms had passed, Congress approved the second set of amendments to the
electoral law.
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Thirteen deputies were absent. The gentlemen’s agreement was with the FRG, PAN, and UNE parties.
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Reform and Inclusion: Making the Right to Vote More Accessible
The reforms to the electoral law, coupled with the administrative initiatives of the
TSE, significantly increased Guatemala’s election administration inclusiveness. A
centerpiece of the reforms was the decentralization of polling sites (LEPP, Art. 231). This
led to the creation of new rural electoral jurisdictions (for voting centers outside of
municipal capitals) and a major increase in polling sites: from 8,885 voting tables in
1,262 voting centers for the 2003 elections to 13,756 tables in 2,060 centers for 2007
(EUEOM 2007, 21; OAS 2008a, 54). Decentralization was widely praised by election
observers, and election officials and party leaders held similarly positive evaluations
(e.g., EUEOM 2007; OAS 2008a, 57). It also proved popular with the public, as rural
communities solicited the TSE for voting centers prior to election day (MIOE 2007, 108).
Electoral reform also increased access for urban voters through implementation of
“domicile voting” (LEPP, Art. 224). Domicile voting began on a limited basis with the
updating of voters’ registration information prior to the 2003 elections, as the TSE used
voters’ residence to geo-code their registration; prior to this, a voter’s identity card
contained only the department and municipality in which they were assigned to vote, and
the voters lists contained no codes for residence (since such information did not affect
one’s assignment to a voting center) (Boneo 2001, 81; OAS 2009a, 18-19).85 With the
reforms to the electoral law, urban voters could now avoid travelling across town to reach
their polling station. The reforms also moved up election dates from November to
September, which served to facilitate the vote of migrant workers who work on the major
coffee and sugar harvests from October to February, and also increased the transition
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While civil and voter registries had voters’ addresses on file, these would often be outdated, especially
since voters moving within a municipality would have no incentive to update their voter registration, since
it wouldn’t affect where they would be assigned vote.
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time between the second round of presidential elections and inauguration (which had
been exceedingly short) (ASIES 2005, 45; Núñez Vargas 2008a, 16; Interview 16).
Finally, the reforms explicitly added civic and voter education to the TSE’s
responsibilities, formalizing what the TSE already considered part of its duties. This
corresponded with more extensive voter education efforts. For the 2007 election season,
the TSE carried out voter education campaigns – through radio, television, printed
materials, telephone hotlines, and the web – directed particularly at informing voters
about decentralization, and also “sent approximately 3.5 million personalised telegrams
including full polling centre details, corresponding to each telegram recipient” (EUEOM
2007, 35-36). In 2011, the TSE distributed 7 million mini-telegrams to registered voters
with their voting center information, and employed information kiosks in commercial
centers, text messages, print and online ads, and an extensive campaign of television and
radio spots carried out in Spanish and four Mayan languages (TSE 2011a; 2011b; 2011c).
Election observers acknowledged the improved efforts to inform voters about
where to vote and improved dissemination of information in Mayan languages (EUEOM
2007, 35, 49; MIOE 2007, 78; Mirador Electoral 2008, 116), while also emphasizing that
voter information in indigenous languages still had limited reach (EUEOM 2007, 35;
Jessup, Hayek, and Hällhag 2008, 7; MIOE 2007, 78; Mirador Electoral 2008, 25).
Interviews with members of two of the largest indigenous language groups carried out by
domestic observers in 2007 revealed that most people in these communities did not have
adequate information about the polling decentralization process (Mirador Electoral
2007b, 9). More generally, despite more extensive efforts at informing voters about the
electoral process, the TSE’s information campaigns were again launched late, thus
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hindering their effectiveness (EUEOM 2007, 36; Mirador Electoral 2008, 13). The
informational campaign leading up to the 2011 elections was massive, but dissemination
of information in Mayan languages continued to be slow (PL 2011b; 2011g).
The first elections held after the reforms, in 2007, saw a small increase in voter
turnout. While the increase was slight (2 percentage points), decentralization appeared to
facilitate the rural vote, as turnout in rural areas reached 70 percent, compared to 57
percent for urban areas (EUEOM 2007, 55). The increase in turnout from the prior
elections was larger in predominantly indigenous departments than non-indigenous
(MIOE 2007, 70). In the words of the European Union observer mission, “[t]here can be
no doubt that, together with the growth and greater inclusiveness of the new voter
register, polling station decentralisation significantly contributed to this rise in voter
turnout, especially in rural areas” (EUEOM 2007, 55). The results were more dramatic in
2011. The voter rolls increased by more than 22 percent since 2007 (calculated from
Mirador Electoral 2011, 14), with a 33 percent increase in registration for women – who
for the first time made up more than half the voter rolls at 50.7 percent (PL 2011d; Siglo
21 2011b). Voter turnout reached 69 percent of registered voters (TSE 2012, 151),
matching the historic high of the 1985 elections (but with a more inclusive voter roll).
Despite these significant changes, voter registration was left largely untouched by
the electoral law reforms. For instance, the closing date for registration was unchanged
by the reforms.86 In practice, however, the bureaucratic complexity that voters faced
when registering was reduced, as all voter registry offices were computerized by 2008
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One proposal presented to the congressional committee on electoral matters in 2000 by the union of TSE
employees recommended shortening the registration deadline to two months before election day in order to
facilitate participation (Sindicato 2000). It appears to be the only organization to have recommended this
change in a proposal to Congress.
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and able to complete a voter’s registration in one office visit (Interview 21). Yet the
increases in voter registration rates after 2007 were the result, at least in part, of the
requirement put in place by the UNE government that social welfare recipients be
registered voters. The departments with the highest numbers of welfare recipients through
the program Mi Familia Progresa saw particularly large increases in voter registration
(see Siglo 21 2011b).87
The key part of the legal reforms that would have changed voter registration
practices was the introduction of a new national identity document. The 2004 electoral
law reforms made reference to the new document that would replace the cédula, and the
following year Congress passed the National Registry of Persons Law. This created a
new civil registry (RENAP) which for the first time created a centralized national registry
and introduced a new identity card (DPI) to replace the cédula that had been issued by
municipal registry offices.
Everyone agreed on the need for a new and more secure identity document, but
the contentious issue was implementation. Since 1985 the TSE had advocated the
creation of a new ID that the TSE itself would oversee, and it lobbied strongly on this
point during the reform process; this was also the position of the CRE proposal for
electoral reform and the initial decision of the congressional committee on electoral
matters (PL 2005a; 2005b). The TSE made a strong case, considering the central role of
the ID card in the voting process and the tribunal’s established bureaucratic infrastructure
(with registry offices in every municipality in the country), as well as its independence
and integrity. Moreover, the task of issuing identity cards would have kept the TSE busy
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This was widely considered to be a clientelist scheme on the part of the government to increase its
electoral support.
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during its idle time between elections and likely cost less than setting up a new agency
(Interview 14). Yet Congress ultimately decided to create a new agency in which to vest
the new civil registry, to be overseen by one representative each from the TSE, Congress,
and the executive branch.
Had the TSE been given control over the new civil registry, voter registration
would have become automatic, as the CRE had intended (Interviews 13, 14); since
citizens would register for an ID with the TSE, an additional voter registration process
would have been unnecessary. Nevertheless, automatic voter registration was planned
even with the creation of RENAP. The 2006 amendments to the electoral law aimed
partly to reconcile the electoral and registry laws, and would have renamed the TSE’s
Citizens Registry the “Citizens’ Electoral Registry” and allowed for direct input of civil
registry data into the voter registry – thus eliminating the requirement to carry out two
separate proceedings to register (Núñez Vargas 2008a, 15, 18). But when the draft of the
2006 reforms to the electoral law was reviewed by the Constitutional Court, the court
ruled that the name change was unconstitutional. In short, the court determined that the
civil registry, RENAP, could not carry out activities pertaining to the Citizens’ Registry
(i.e. voter registration), particularly because the civil registry law could not modify the
responsibilities of the Citizen’s Registry which are laid out in the electoral law, a law of
constitutional rank (Interview 21). Therefore, automatic voter registration would
apparently require a constitutional reform (Interview 09).88
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There is some disagreement over this issue. Several interviewees suggested that automatic registration
itself would be unconstitutional, since registration is not obligatory; another interviewee disagreed, noting
that registering to vote is a legal obligation (though there is no penalty for not doing so). The ruling by the
Constitutional Court did not directly address whether automatic registration per se was constitutional, only
that the responsibility for carrying out inscriptions onto the voter rolls could not be removed from the
TSE’s Citizens Registry (see Corte de Constitucionalidad de Guatemala 2006).
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The consequence of the court ruling was to maintain a two-step process for voter
registration: first obtaining an identity card through RENAP, then registering to vote with
the TSE. Other ways to facilitate voter registration were sought, such as placing voter
registration tables in RENAP offices so citizens could complete both steps in one place
(Interviews 02, 17). But as of 2011 there were only eight voter registration stations
located in RENAP offices in the entire country, six of them in the capital city (Interview
21). This measure for facilitating voter registration (akin to the U.S. motor voter system)
has been limited because of distrust between the TSE and RENAP, in particular the
TSE’s concerns about contaminating the voter rolls with potentially unreliable data from
RENAP and fear of tarnishing the TSE’s reputation by offering services in RENAP
offices, considering the inefficiencies and controversies of titanic proportions during the
new civil registry’s first years in operation (Interviews 17, 21, 23). Another obstacle to
collaboration was the lack of clarity in the legislation regarding the relationship between
RENAP and the TSE (Conde Rada 2008, 47, 52-53; Mirador Electoral 2008, 119; Núñez
Vargas 2008a, 39-40), although by 2011 collaboration had improved, with the registries
sharing data for verification purposes and RENAP providing fliers from the TSE
containing information on voter registration (PL 2011a).
Thus while the TSE made the voter registration process easier, a host of problems
with the new civil registry (including long wait times and delays of weeks or months
between soliciting an ID card and receiving it, often with clerical errors on the card)
made the prior step of obtaining an identification document more difficult than before
(PL 2009; 2010a). The service was so inefficient in some places that there were reports of

127

people sleeping outside of RENAP offices in order to sell their spots in the morning to
people who needed to carry out registry transactions (PL 2010f).
Another consequence of non-automatic registration combined with an early
closing date for registration is that young people turning 18 years old between the closing
date of registration and election day cannot vote, since an identity card is needed to
register to vote and cannot be obtained until one turns 18 (Interviews 04, 17). Moreover,
with the long delays in obtaining an identity card due to inefficiencies in RENAP, beating
the registration closing date could be difficult even for those turning 18 several months
prior (Interview 21).89 While RENAP made efforts to distribute ID cards to young people
in order to remedy this problem, there were still some 85,000 ID cards of 18-20 year olds
that had not been picked less than one month before the close of voter registration in
2011 (El Periódico 2011a; Siglo 21 2011a). Thus, while Guatemalans now receive a more
modern and secure identity card, it has been difficult for many people to obtain due to
delays and inefficiencies, and they still must carry out an additional process to register to
vote, with young citizens particularly disadvantaged.
A summary of election administration inclusiveness in Guatemala for the 20042011 period is presented in Table 4.1 below.
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Addressing this problem would require a system of voter pre-registration, so that young citizens could
provisionally register to vote before obtaining an identity card, and finalize their voter registration (with
their ID) after the closing date. However, according to the director of voter registration, such a system is
currently not technically feasible, as registry offices need a citizen’s identification document number in
order to add them to the voter registry (Interview 21).
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Table 4.1 Election Administration Inclusiveness, Guatemala 2004-2011
Dimension
Voter Registration
Extent of state
responsibility for
registering voters
Difficulty of registration
process

Ease of access to ID
documents required for
registration
Registration closing date
Residency requirement

Provisional registration
Registry consultation

Purging of voter rolls
Getting to the Ballot
Box
Accessibility of polling
places
Assignment of voters to
polling places
Convenience voting
measures
Electoral Calendar

Casting a Ballot
Voter ID requirement

Description

Inclusiveness

Voter-initiated, modest state
efforts to facilitate
registration
Fairly simple registration
process completed in one trip
to registry office, with
registration services partially
decentralized
Cédula de vecindad or DPI)
required; obtaining DPI
obstructed by bureaucratic
inefficiencies
3 months
6 months; voter must update
registration, but no
documentation of residence is
required
No provisional registration

Medium

Medium

Low

Medium
Low

Low

Information available through
kiosks and mailed to voters;
voter rolls distributed to
parties
Voters not purged from the
rolls for failure to vote

High

Polling places mostly
decentralized; limited public
transportation
Residential for voters with
updated registry information
Not used

Medium

High

Juridical Basis*
Electoral law /
Administrative
practice
Electoral law /
Administrative
regulation /
Administrative
practice
Administrative
regulation /
Administrative
practice
Electoral law
Administrative
regulation

Administrative
practice
Administrative
practice

n/a

High

Electoral law /
Administrative
practice
Electoral law

Low

Electoral law

Voting held on a Sunday
prior to labor migration
season

High

Electoral law

Cédula (or DPI from 2011
on) required; exact match
between information on ID
and voter rolls required

Low

Administrative
regulation
(Electoral law from
2006)

Continued on next page

129

Table 4.1, continued
Dimension
Provisional or tendered
ballots
Voter Education
State efforts to inform
voters of where and how
to register and vote

Description
Not used (except in 2003)

Moderate territorial and
linguistic coverage, extensive
duration of information
campaigns through diverse
media

Overall Inclusiveness

Inclusiveness
Low

Medium

Juridical Basis*
Administrative
practice
Administrative
practice

Medium

* Electoral law refers to those elements based on the electoral law that are not open to
modification by the electoral management body. Administrative regulation refers to those
elements that are officially prescribed in the TSE’s implementing regulations, contained
in its Reglamento a la Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos. Administrative practice
refers to those elements that are not explicitly codified either in the electoral law or the
TSE’s regulations, but are instead matters of bureaucratic performance and administrative
discretion.
Explaining Electoral Administration Reform
The substantial changes in Guatemala’s electoral administration since the late
1990s raise a number of questions. What made such reforms possible? Why were reforms
on which all major political actors agreed delayed for so long? How did different
variables – partisan interests, EMB structure, concerns over election fraud, and
international electoral assistance – shape the form that electoral administration has taken?
The following sections address these questions.

Delaying Reform
Why did Congress take so long to pass reforms that had been agreed upon by the
major political parties by 1998? A number of factors intervened between the 1998 CRE
report and the 2004-2006 reforms. One of the most important was the scope of the
reforms being considered, which touched on nearly all aspects of the electoral system –
including election administration, campaign finance, and internal party governance. Thus,
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as was the case with many reform proposals in the mid-1990s, election administration
measures were tied up with more contentious issues. The number of reforms being
considered caused confusion among legislators and proved to be a stumbling block to
passage (Interviews 03, 08);90 as a former Congressional deputy admitted, there is little
expertise of technical electoral matters in Congress (Interview 28). The timing of the
reforms made matters worse. When the CRE sent its package of proposals to Congress in
1998, elections were on the horizon for the following year, and there was reluctance to
change the rules of the game shortly before an electoral process (Interview 18). After the
1999 elections, the reforms were taken up by a new Congress with a new party in the
majority. Turnover of TSE magistrates took place in 2002, and a new Congress took
office in 2004 – turnovers which slowed down reforms, according to a former TSE
magistrate (Interview 13). As new deputies entered Congress, they needed time to
become familiar with the electoral reforms, which included issues with which many
legislators were not well versed (Interview 04).
With more than 150 changes to the electoral law being considered, disagreements
over the most conflictive issues – particularly campaign finance and political party
regulations – held up passage of the reforms that everyone agreed on, such as the
decentralization of polling sites (Interviews 06, 08). Matters were made worse when the
governing FRG party inserted a clause in the reform bill that would have sidestepped the
constitutional ban on candidacies of coup makers, allowing their leader Efraín Ríos
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A similar problem confronted constitutional reforms that followed from the Accord on Constitutional
Reforms and the Electoral Regime. While the parties agreed on the reforms contained in the Accord, some
parties and civic organizations hoped to take advantage of the opportunity to add further reforms – which
naturally slowed down the process by expanding the scope of contestation (MINUGUA 1998, 1999).
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Montt to run for president – a measure roundly opposed by everyone but the FRG.91
Other modifications in the committee bill would have infringed on the TSE’s autonomy,
which drew fierce opposition from the TSE, opposition parties, civil society, and even
other Central American electoral bodies (PL 2000g; 2000h; 2000i; 2000j). While
Congress backtracked on the measures that would have infringed on TSE autonomy, and
the Constitutional Court blocked the measure to allow Ríos Montt’s presidential
candidacy, these controversial proposals held up the process long enough to lose the
window of opportunity following the 1999 elections. By 2002, the closeness of upcoming
elections was added to the reasons that opposition parties offered for not supporting
passage (Interview 11; PL 2002b).
Even on issues of consensus, such as decentralizing polling sites, there remained
disagreement over questions of implementation, as had been the case in the mid-1990s.
The CRE proposal had left it in the hands of the TSE to decide the proper locations of
polling stations (CRE 2004, 173-174; TSE 2001a, 161). Congress instead opted for a
rapid and extensive decentralization, mandating a voting center for any population center
(village, hamlet, etc.) containing 500 or more registered voters. The TSE wanted a more
gradual decentralization based on its cartographic studies that had identified locations
that would meet the criteria of security and adequate infrastructure as well as voter access
– both to ensure control over rural voting centers and so as to not exceed the TSE’s
capacity. Rather than a mandate to install polling stations based solely on the number of
registered voters, the TSE wanted to maintain discretion over polling locations, allowing
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This is based on Interview 07 and media coverage at the time. See especially Prensa Libre 2001b, 2001c,
2001d, and 2001e.
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it to place stations in strategic locations where voters from several villages could
converge (Azpuru 2004; EUEOM 2007, 21; TSE 2001a, 161).
The 2004 reforms reflected Congress’ preference for a strict requirement based on
the number of registered voters. This decision can be attributed to the genuine desire of
the political parties to increase participation and facilitate access of their supporters to the
polls, as well as to the legislators’ lack of familiarity with the technical criteria employed
by the TSE (Interviews 13, 16, 25).92 The 2006 amendments to the electoral law returned
discretion to the TSE in locating polling sites after the TSE and Congress reached an
agreement whereby the TSE pledged to establish more rural voting sites for the 2007
elections than it had initially planned in exchange for the authority to decide their
locations and a budget increase in order to carry out the decentralization (Interviews 17,
27).93
These disagreements over particular measures, combined with the procedural
requirement of a two-thirds vote in Congress to reform the electoral law, slowed down
the process. The short post-election window of opportunity to pass reform and the need
for court review of any amendments to the electoral law also explain why Congress chose
to pass error-riddled reforms in 2004 with a promise to immediately work on another
round of changes (Interview 25). As the Carter Center (2004, 17) explains,
With the presidential mandate of just four years, a tradition of non-constructive
opposition and a fatal tendency for party benches to fragment between elections,
only a narrow window of opportunity, not exceeding one year, may exist for
achieving the needed consensus before narrow interest politics take over and
92

The TSE tried to convince legislators on this point. However, as a journalist covering the reform process
notes, meetings between the TSE and legislators on the congressional electoral committee were often
poorly attended by the legislators (Interview 25).
93
The TSE had developed several scenarios for decentralization, with a maximum of some 687 new rural
sites (CEMs), an intermediate scenario of 311, and a minimal scenario of 166 (OAS 2008a, 45). Congress
pushed for the maximum scenario (PL 2006a; 2006b). The pertinent change was to article 231 of the
electoral law.
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preclude agreement. Given these realities, many in the party and legislative
leaderships concluded that reform efforts would more likely bear fruit, and more
expeditiously, if the new Congress simply dusted off the 2001 reform bill and
submits it to a third and final reading.
This option encountered a serious limitation. If the article-by-article discussion
generated substantial modifications, the Constitutional Court would again have to
pass judgment on the legislation’s final version… In order to avoid a
constitutional impasse that could torpedo the legislation entirely, the draft left
pending in 2001 would have to be approved with only minor emendations, and
more substantial corrections left for a later and uncertain date.

The Specter of Election Fraud
What of the concerns of election fraud that had been fundamental to the adoption
of voting restrictions in the 1980s? Unlike during the debates surrounding the drafting of
the 1985 electoral law, the issue of fraud was a secondary (though still important) theme
during the reform process. There was some apprehension within both Congress and the
TSE about the decentralization of polling sites resulting in election fraud (Interviews 07,
08, 14), along with general concerns about decentralization causing disorganization in the
electoral process (Interview 06). But ultimately fears of fraud recurring played a minor
role in the reform process (Interviews 27, 28), only arising periodically during the FRG
government of 1999-2003 when there were concerns of decentralization being
manipulated by the governing party (Interview 11; Azpuru 2004).94 During the
congressional debate over reform, Congressional Deputy Pablo Duarte discussed the
issue of fraud colorfully (Congress of the Republic of Guatemala 2001a):
…the electoral and political parties law was created in that stigma that existed
over the fraudulent electoral processes. I’ll never forget that they used to say the
fraud was committed in the villages, and on the farms the people would go to line
up to vote, and the military commissioner would pass by… handing out election
papers already folded so that they would put them in the ballot box. The person
94

Accusations of the FRG planning to carry out fraud in the 2003 elections were common. See, e.g., NDI
n.d. (7) and Prensa Libre 2001f.
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would ask ‘…who did I vote for?’ And they would answer him: ‘jackass, don’t
you know that the vote is secret?’ But we can no longer keep legislating over the
fears of the past. We can no longer keep legislating over what happened and over
all the blood spilled in this country, fraud, etc…
And indeed, the specter of fraud did not deter legislators from pushing for polling
site decentralization. Rather, concerns about fraud most directly shaped election
administration by preventing the implementation of absentee balloting: when such a
system was considered to facilitate the vote of migrant workers, it was rejected by the
TSE because of such concerns (“Exposición de Motivos…”, 25).95
That the historical experience of election rigging exercised relatively little
influence on the reform process is understandable considering the country’s experience in
the intervening years. By the time the peace accords were signed, Guatemala had held
three national and several municipal elections96 that were largely free of fraud; by the
time the reforms were finally approved, five relatively clean national elections had been
held. Thus by the time reforms were discussed, the threat of traditional-style fraud had
been greatly reduced, and confidence in the TSE had grown (Interviews 06, 09). In
particular, the safeguards in place – such as party poll watchers receiving copies of the
local vote tallies and improved technology (e.g., poll watchers having cell phones to
report problems instantly) – lessened the risks associated with decentralization
(Interviews 14, 27). This does not mean that accusations of fraud are in short supply
around election time – they are still common, though generally focused on local rather
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The absentee system considered would have consisted of “national tables,” discussed above (note 3). The
TSE opted instead to change the date of elections to address the migrant worker issue, and to make
changing one’s residence for voter registration purposes easier.
96
Some municipal elections were not held concurrently with national elections until the late 1990s.
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than national races.97 And the Guatemalan public remains deeply preoccupied with
election fraud, according to public opinion polls (PL 2010b). But among lawmakers and
election administrators, there was confidence that reforms such as decentralization would
not lead back to the dark days of ballot stuffing. Lingering fears of fraud colored
discussions over the form that polling decentralization would take, with many concerned
about the risk of fraud inherent in a drastic decentralization that did not take security
conditions into account (e.g., Castillo Milla 2006, 37); but no one suggested that polling
stations remain centralized in municipal capitals for fear of fraud. But the late 1990s and
early 2000s, low voter participation rather than fraud had become the central problem of
election administration.

Partisan Interests
Just as purely partisan interests played little role in the construction of procedural
obstacles to voting, they also explain little of the reform process that made election
administration more inclusive. During the debates in Congress, no legislators publicly
opposed the inclusionary aspects of reform, although there was disagreement over the
form that polling decentralization would take (with some legislators supporting the TSE
position). There were few differences along ideological lines: for instance, while the
leftist URNG party that emerged from the guerrilla movements supported electoral
reform throughout, other small leftist parties were consistent critics of some nonadministrative elements of the reforms.98
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The most common problems reported involve bloated voter rolls and “preelectoral residential
registration,” or voters falsely swearing to changes of residence when updating their voter registration. See,
e.g., EUEOM 2007 (24-25); MIOE 2007 (77); Mirador Electoral 2008 (19-20); and Prensa Libre 2011f.
98
This draws on legislative records and media coverage at the time. See Congress of the Republic of
Guatemala 2001a; 2001b; and Prensa Libre 2002c.
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Consensus on reform was also longstanding: an election observer mission to the
1999 elections reported (OAS 2000, 13) that all of the candidates and parties interviewed
were
unanimous in expressing their concern over the high rates of voter abstention
recorded in previous elections… they all agreed that such behavior was clearly
inimical to the democratic process, and pointed to the legal difficulties that
citizens face in attempting to register and vote as one of the factors discouraging a
greater voter turnout. All those interviewed were in favor of reforming the
Elections and Political Parties Act.
Such contemporaneous public expressions of support were verified in interviews
with observers and participants in the electoral reform process, all of whom agreed that
the political parties supported polling decentralization and the goal of increasing voter
turnout. While there were differences along party lines that delayed passage of the
electoral reforms, there were few if any differences over administrative inclusion.
What is puzzling is that all parties would support administrative reforms that
would prove to have significant political consequences. Centralization of polling sites had
conferred potential advantages to parties or candidates with the resources to transport
rural voters to the polls. Moreover, national elections had often been decisively
influenced by the vote in urban areas, above all the department of Guatemala (with about
one-fourth of all voters). But in the first elections after reform in 2007, the rural vote was
decisive in electing the center-left Álvaro Colóm president (MIOE 2007, 74; Núñez
Vargas 2008b, 61-62; Sáenz de Tejada 2005, 161, 188, 235). As an observer mission
noted (EUEOM 2007, 59),
all the areas outside the capital responded to the political proposals that were
more focused on rural development (an issue that was repeatedly stressed by
Colóm, and strongly linked to his own personal biography). On the other hand,
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the capital proved more receptive to proposals focusing on the fight against
citizen insecurity (the clear leitmotiv of [Otto] Pérez Molina’s campaign).99
Again in the 2011 runoff election, there was a noticeable difference between the two
candidates in their support in urban versus rural areas (PL 2011i), although this time the
conservative Otto Pérez was able to win. Moreover, increased participation apparently
contributed to a significant drop in the re-election rate of mayors in 2007, as “mayoral
candidates had to be more sensitive to citizens’ needs and interests, particularly those of
women, youth, and indigenous people in rural areas who were voting for the first time”
(USAID 2010). The decentralization of polling sites also reduced (but did not eliminate)
the role of party transportation on election day, and has led parties to increase the
territorial coverage of their campaigning and organizational structures in areas outside of
municipal capitals, while also requiring parties to field larger numbers of party poll
watchers on election day (Blanco 2008, 89; Nuñez Vargas 2008a, 17, 20, 27; OAS 2009a,
10).100
Party support for reform can be explained by a confluence of several factors.
First, before 2007 voting restrictions were not perceived to confer significant advantages
on some parties over others, and most party elites did not foresee the consequences of
reform. Secondly, any advantages that would be lost by larger parties would be
compensated through reduced spending on voter transportation and advantages in fielding
party poll watchers at more polling stations. Finally, the administrative reforms did not
threaten the primary sources of power for party elites: campaign financing and the
dominance of caudillos inside parties.
99

See also Mirador Electoral 2008 (49-50).
These effects were also mentioned by a number of respondents (Interviews 01, 08, 10, 26). This
expansion of parties appears so far to not have contributed to more democratic internal party governance or
party institutionalization, however (Iinterviews 05, 18).
100
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Firstly, as might be expected, smaller and particularly leftist parties wanted to
ensure the access of their likely supporters through election administration reforms
(Interview 07), and at least one leader of the leftist URNG considers decentralization of
polling sites to have helped the party (Interview 08). However, the desire to facilitate
access for potential supporters was not limited to such parties, but was universal across
the political spectrum (Interview 16). The barriers to participation that polling location
and voter registration imposed were not widely perceived to benefit some parties over
others (Interviews 18, 26), with one exception: larger parties with more resources were
advantaged by centralized polling sites because they could afford to provide
transportation to voters on election day (Interviews 12, 28).
That voting barriers did not benefit parties of particular ideological stripes is
understandable in light of the nature of Guatemala’s party system, which is highly fluid
and marked by low levels of partisan attachments in the electorate. Most parties are
clientelistic, catch-all parties centered on a single prominent personality rather than
programmatic organizations with a clearly defined social base (Interview 05; Sánchez
2008). However, modest differences do exist in party support along urban-rural and richpoor lines, as evidenced by the differences between two of the top contenders in the 2007
and 2011 elections, the National Unity of Hope (UNE) and the Patriot Party (PP). These
differences proved decisive in the 2007 elections, but the parties appear to not have
anticipated the effects that increased access to the polls for rural voters would have on
election results (Interview 09). As Núñez Vargas (2008b, 62) puts it, “[w]hat [the 2007]
election teaches is that the model of electoral organization centralized in municipal
capitals also had political effects that hadn’t been perceived with clarity until the moment
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of this reform.” After 2007, parties appeared to have adapted to this reality, devoting
more attention to capturing rural votes.101
Secondly, while larger parties might see their advantage in providing election day
transportation reduced, this would be compensated by their greater ability to field party
poll watchers for a greatly increased number of voting sites. Fielding a sufficient number
of poll watchers has been challenging for smaller parties, and this is seen as an advantage
for larger parties (Interviews 01, 08, 16). More important is that the ‘advantage’ of
providing transport to voters was increasingly seen as a burden by political parties and
candidates. As several people involved in the reform process noted, political parties
hoped to save money on providing transportation to the polls, an expense that represented
a significant proportion of total campaign spending (Interviews 07, 27). Moreover, parties
recognized that there was no guarantee that the voters being transported to the polls
would vote for them, and thus transporting voters wasn’t really worth the money
(Interview 27). Even after decentralization, party transportation is still provided, but its
importance has diminished (Interviews 08, 14) and it is less expensive (Interviews 09, 10,
28). At the same time, more effective means of capturing votes, such as vote-buying, are
still available and thought to be widespread (Interviews 10, 12). Thus decentralization
would shift election day costs from political parties to the TSE, and parties would lose
little political advantage in exchange.
Finally, the reforms that passed through Congress ultimately did not infringe on
the sources of political power of party elites. Most Guatemalan parties are highly
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Besides campaigning, a manifestation of this strategy was the UNE government’s requirement that
recipients of social welfare benefits be registered to vote, as discussed above.
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personalistic, built around a single prominent political figure (or caudillo),102 and election
administration reforms did not threaten these caudillos by dispersing political power
inside parties. The reforms did little to promote more democratic procedures of decision
making within parties, while administrative reforms to facilitate the participation of
women and indigenous as voters did nothing to guarantee their participation as candidates
(Interviews 10, 18). The increased regulations on campaign finance also fell far short of
ensuring transparency or imposing meaningful spending limits. As progressive
Congressional Deputy Nineth Montenegro of the small EG party put it, “it was an
insufficient small reform [reformita insuficiente] that was always going to benefit the big
parties” (Interview 64).
In sum, personalistic catch-all parties did not foresee significant consequences
from making voting easier, while those consequences that were foreseen (reduced costs
of transporting voters and increased numbers of party poll watchers) were anticipated to
benefit larger parties. Thus election administration reforms represented a chance to
increase voter participation without upsetting the balance of electoral power or
threatening the internal control of political parties by caudillos.
However, while purely partisan interests were conducive to reform, the collective
interests of Congress in securing patronage resources did have detrimental consequences
for election administration inclusiveness. Namely, by creating a new civil registry
(RENAP), Congress inadvertently derailed automatic voter registration. Subsequently,
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An observer mission to the 1990 elections noted that most political parties were “relatively new,
personalist electoral vehicles without extensive and permanent organizational structures” (NDI 1990, 15),
and the same organization reported five years later that most parties “have traditionally been personalistic
parties which have been vehicles for the personal ambitions of individual caudillos” (NDI 1995, 7). These
observations are still accurate today; as a 2007 observer mission reported, “[p]arties are identified,
primarily through their leaders’ personalities, as opposed to their proven track record and ideological
underpinnings, or the loyalty of their grassroots support” (EUEOM 2007, 7-8).
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the prospects for easier voter registration through TSE-RENAP collaboration were
limited by RENAP’s inefficiencies, bureaucratic turf struggles, and legal uncertainty over
the relationship between the two bodies.
Congress’ decision to create RENAP is widely attributed to the desire to control
patronage resources, with deputies wanting to “dip their hands in” the “golden goose”
that the new agency represented (Interview 25; also Interviews 03, 14, 16, 17, 24).103 This
patronage takes the form of the distribution of jobs in RENAP and the allocation of
contracts related to the production of identity cards. Sure enough, after the creation of
RENAP some of its officials were investigated for anomalies in the awarding of contracts
(including a $114 million contract awarded to a company tied to a campaign supporter of
president Colóm), and there were media reports of nepotism in RENAP hiring of family
members of Congressional deputies (PL 2008b; 2010c; 2010d; 2010e). The creation of a
centralized registry essentially transferred a source of patronage and rent-seeking from
municipal offices, which had previously controlled the issuance of cédulas (and collected
associated fees), to the central state,104 with detrimental consequences for election
administration inclusiveness.
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Some people offer different interpretations. Manfredo Marroquín plausibly attributes the creation of
RENAP to the desire of Congress to avoid strengthening the TSE by giving it authority over the new civil
registry, preferring instead to create an agency that it could partially control (Interview 02). This is
consistent with an explanation based on patronage, but also points to inter-institutional struggles that may
have influenced the decision to create RENAP. Others attributed the decision to a desire to emulate Peru’s
registry system, in which the electoral authority and civil registry are separate (Interviews 17, 23), rather
than emulate the Mexican or Nicaraguan system in which the electoral authority issues identity cards. This
latter explanation is discussed below.
104
For this reason, and for fear of losing community control over registry documents, municipalities
bitterly resisted the centralization of the civil registry that RENAP entailed.
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EMB Structure: The Supreme Electoral Tribunal
The independence and professionalism of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal have
been more or less constant since its creation, with only some diminishment of its
reputation since 2002 due to the quality of its top leadership. It therefore might be
concluded that the TSE’s independence (which has remained constant) cannot explain
variation in electoral administration inclusiveness over time. But such a conclusion based
on covariation alone would be overly simplistic. Not only has the TSE’s independence
prevented the type of partisan capture that could lead to administrative
disenfranchisement (as has happened in Nicaragua – see chapter 6), but it has allowed for
the formulation of independent initiatives and the development of the technical capacity
necessary to implement polling decentralization and voter registry modernization. As a
result, the TSE has played a key role in promoting more inclusive election administration,
although it has done so cautiously, and at times has resisted changes that would facilitate
voter access in its efforts to balance voter inclusion and election integrity.
The TSE recognized early on the procedural barriers that inhibited voter
participation, and particularly during the 1990s under the leadership of magistrates Mario
Guerra Roldán and Felix Castillo Milla the tribunal worked to prepare the way for more
inclusive practices. As early as 1994 it submitted an initiative to Congress that would
have allowed the tribunal to establish voting centers outside of municipal capitals.105
Once the Commission on Electoral Reform was formed in 1997, the TSE conducted
technical studies on electoral cartography and a new identification card and planned for
the implementation of domicile voting (TSE 1997). The TSE also recognized the
105

TSE, “Proyecto de Reformas a la Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos,” submitted to Congress
December 1, 1994 (in Acción Ciudadana et al. 2005).
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insufficiency of prior voter information campaigns and sought to carry out more
extensive efforts through diverse strategies, and welcomed the inclusion of voter
education among its legal mandates (CRE 1997).
Yet the TSE has also resisted some measures that would increase inclusiveness
and pursued others that would make voting more difficult. The tribunal debated and
ultimately rejected a form of absentee balloting, discussed above, in order to protect
against potential voter fraud. The TSE has also sought an earlier closing date for voter
registration, claiming it needs ample time to prepare the voter lists, particularly to purge
ineligible citizens and to detect illegal registrations (i.e. traslados, or pre-electoral
residential registration) (Interviews 04, 21, 22). According to the director of voter
registration, the timeframe to finalize the voter rolls one month before election day (as
stipulated by law) is tight, which has led the TSE to propose an earlier closing date to
Congress (Interview 21). The tribunal’s stance on voter registration can be attributed to
the jealousy with which the TSE guards the voter rolls, seeing it as a fundamental
safeguard of the electoral process and eager to ensure the accuracy and integrity of its
contents (Interview 23).
The TSE has also vacillated between inclusive and exclusive administrative
measures. A prominent example is the voter registry for the 2003 elections, when many
voters who had updated their information in order to vote closer to their residence found
that their names did not appear (or appeared incorrectly) on the voters list for the voting
table to which they were assigned. As the extent of these technical problems with the
voters lists became clear leading up to the election, the TSE adopted a measure to ensure
that duly registered voters (as verified by the registration stamp on their ID card or a
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voter registration receipt) would not be disenfranchised. Registered voters who did not
appear on the voters list at the table to which they were assigned were able to cast a
tendered ballot at another table in the same voting center, where the voter’s name and
information (registration number, ID number, etc.) would be added to a blank voters list
(padrón en blanco). Despite the inadequate dissemination of information to voters
regarding this measure (which was decided on less than two weeks before election day)
and insufficient training of poll workers on its use, this TSE decision allowed some of the
people whose information did not appear correctly on the voter rolls to cast their ballots
(EUEOM 2003, 9, 11; OAS 2005, 12, 66).
But in the second round of the presidential voting, the TSE did not use the blank
voter lists, despite the fact that the OAS observer mission, domestic observers, and both
campaigns in the runoff urged the TSE to use the measure again (OAS 2005, 59, 61). The
TSE argued that the measure had been abused during the first round and suggested that
the number of people that would be affected in the second round wouldn’t be sufficient to
alter the election results (OAS 2005, 69). As the EU observer mission put it, “[d]espite
pressures from domestic and international observation missions and other social actors,
the TSE did not change its decision and insisted that voters had to vote where
registered[,] feeling confident that voters would not be disenfranchised” (EUEOM 2003,
12). A TSE magistrate at the time recalled that the magistrates felt that the problems that
had given rise to the use of the blank voter roll in the first round had been corrected by
the runoff vote, so its use was not needed, while making it a permanent feature would
have opened the election process to manipulation (Interview 17).
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There have also been limitations in the areas in which the TSE has been more
proactive, such as voter education. While the tribunal has devoted more attention and
resources to informing voters of when, where, and how to vote, the effectiveness of such
programs has been limited. One reason is the conceptualization and focus of publicity
campaigns, which include text messages and online consulting of vote center locations –
in other words, programs designed by (and for) people with resources such as internet
access (Interview 13).106 Another challenges is the availability of funding, particularly the
timing of when funds are available. Because the TSE’s budget for electoral years tends to
be approved late, and international financial support tends to come after the convocation
of an electoral process, voter information campaigns generally begin not long before the
close of voter registration, if not after (Interview 22).107 A new challenge is the overlap of
responsibilities between TSE departments, with a new Institute for Civic-Electoral
Formation with uncertain responsibilities in relation to the Unit for Civic-Electoral
Training and Education (now relegated largely to training TSE staff, poll workers, and
party poll watchers) and the communications department (which handles TV and radio
spots). With such a division of responsibilities, there is not always consistency across the
departments in the approach to voter education (Interview 22).
In sum, the TSE has at times been proactive in making election administration
more inclusive, but it has generally done so cautiously. Some see the TSE as a
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This is reflective of a more general pattern of assigning more resources to election administration in
larger urban areas. For instance, the European Union mission to the 2007 elections “verified the existence
of a significant imbalance in terms of the equipment and technological resources available in different
delegations. This imbalance, was especially visible between the rural and mountainous regions of the
country’s interior, compared to the capital and its District” (EUEOM 2007, 18). In 2011, the budget per
registered voter for the central departmental electoral junta was about 15 times higher than the per capita
budgets of other departments (Mirador Electoral 2011, 14-15).
107
The director of voter registration attributed the late launch of voter information campaigns to general
administrative inefficiency and slowness in preparing the campaigns themselves and contracting publicity
firms (Interview 21).
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conservative institution, aiming to avoid fraud above all other goals (ASIES 2005, 9798), and a number of observers (including at least one former magistrate) consider the
TSE magistrates to be overly cautious – noting how magistrates are lawyers who tend to
strictly interpret their powers, lack managerial experience or electoral expertise, and seek
to fulfill their duties during their term without attracting controversy (Interviews 02, 07,
14). Cautiousness has led to consideration of restrictive measures like an earlier closing
date for voter registration, while resource constraints and shortcomings in
conceptualization have hampered voter education activities. Yet on balance, the TSE’s
independence and the accumulated experience of its staff contributed to its ability and
willingness to pursue polling decentralization, streamlined voter registration procedures,
and other measures to facilitate voter participation.

Civil Society
Unlike the period when the electoral system was designed, the electoral reform
process took place in a context of an active civil society. When the CRE and later the
congressional committee on electoral matters invited civil society proposals for electoral
reform, numerous civic and academic groups submitted formal proposals.108
Additionally, many groups published reports on electoral issues offering
recommendations for reform. And from 1999 onward civil society included a particularly
relevant form of civic activity: domestic election observation. Dozens of local
organizations participated in election observation through a number of national efforts.
The largest, Mirador Electoral, was first active in 2003 with support from the U.S.-based
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and is composed of several prominent NGOs and
108

Sixteen proposals were submitted to the congressional committee in 2000; 24 were submitted to the
CRE.
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academic institutions.109 It fields thousands of observers throughout the country and
receives ample media coverage. Other observer efforts of varying sizes are regularly
carried out by the Human Rights Ombudsman’s office, organizations of indigenous
peoples led by Organismo Naleb’, the University of San Carlos, and the business peak
association CACIF. Monitoring groups offer recommendations on all types of electoral
matters, including administrative inclusiveness, both through post-election reports and
through direct contacts with the TSE.
What role did such civil society advocacy have on the reform process, and on
election administration more generally? On the surface, it may appear that legislators and
election administrators were influenced by the advocacy of domestic election observers
and other civic groups. These groups had access to policymakers through both the CRE
and the congressional committee on electoral matters, and by all accounts the TSE is
generally receptive to election observer recommendations (Interviews 02, 04, 12). Civic
groups consistently advocated more inclusive administrative practices,110 and during the
reform process civic groups criticized what they perceived to be a focus on avoiding
election fraud, noting that the problem of fraud “has already been surpassed by the work
of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal” and recommending that the reforms focus on
promoting citizen participation and the strengthening of political parties (PL 2001a). And
indeed, some of the reforms that were proposed by civic groups were subsequently
109

Mirador’s member groups in 2003 were Acción Ciudadana [Citizen Action], Latin American Faculty of
Social Sciences (FLACSO), Central American Institute of Political Studies (INCEP), and the Human
Rights Legal Action Center (CALDH). In 2007, members were Acción Ciudadana, FLACSO, INCEP,
DOSES (Association for Sociocultural Development, Organization, Services, and Studies), and CECMA
(Center for Mayan Cultural Studies).
110
One exception is Mirador Electoral’s (2008, 118) proposal to drop citizens from the voter roll if they do
not vote in two consecutive elections, a measure also recommended by Conde Rada (2008, 52) and IFES
(2004, 9). The purpose of this proposal is to address the problem of incomplete purging of deceased and
emigrated citizens from the voter rolls; however, such a measure would also mean that some voters would
have to re-register if they abstained from two consecutive elections.
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implemented. Yet closer analysis reveals that civil society advocacy had little direct
effect on election administration inclusiveness or the reform process.
Recommendations from civil society groups at best only added legitimacy to
reforms that were already on track to be implemented, rather than resulting in particular
measures being adopted (Interview 07). This is evident from a comparison of proposals
from civic groups with the reforms proposed by the TSE and those approved in Congress.
While civic groups consistently supported polling decentralization and introduction of a
new identification card, these measures were already on the political agenda by the mid1990s. Other reforms that civil society groups promoted which were not already part of
the agenda – including campaign finance regulations and internal party rules (including
gender and ethnic quotas) – were either not included or watered down in the bill passed in
Congress.
Civil society leaders agree that their influence has been limited. When asked what
Mirador Electoral’s impact had been on electoral administration, one of its directors
noted that Mirador has put some issues on the public agenda (such as campaign finance
and access to media time), but beyond that Mirador’s efforts had little effect on legal
reforms (Interview 02). A director of the indigenous observer missions similarly noted
that their efforts had little impact on legal reforms (Interview 12). Although Congress
invited input on electoral reform from civil society, civic organizations criticized
Congress’ reluctance to fully consider their proposals (ASIES 2004, 24; PL 2001a); the
executive secretary of the CRE suggested that Congress invited input from civil society
for appearances only, since the CRE had already solicited reform proposals from civic
groups (Interview 06).
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While civil society organizations had little impact on Congress, relations between
domestic election observers and the TSE have been more collaborative. During election
processes, observers provide the TSE with concrete information on electoral issues111 and
maintain close contact with the TSE magistrates – providing the electoral body with allies
in their struggles against the political parties and Congress (Interviews 02, 12).112 This is
in contrast to the relative absence of bilateral relations between observers and political
parties (Interview 02). Thus at the national level, TSE magistrates are receptive to
observer recommendations (Interviews 04, 12), while at the local level relations between
observers and election officials can be collaborative or antagonistic (Carter Center 2003).
Yet the close collaboration between observers and the TSE doesn’t appear to have had
much impact on election administration inclusiveness. One notable success was the
inclusion of provisions for disabled voters in poll worker instruction manuals at the
behest of civic groups (OAS 2005, 33). Beyond that, the most important observer
recommendations that directly address TSE behavior in regard to inclusiveness involve
voter education activities, and observers have consistently called for more extensive voter
education efforts (MIOE 2003, 133; 2007, 78, 130-131; Mirador Electoral 2003; 2007b,
4; 2007c; 2008, 118). But improvements in voter education activities have been slow, and
are partly due to the electoral reforms that made civic education part of the TSE’s
mandate. A reasonable assessment would be that pressure from observer groups has
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One of the most important areas in this regard is the information compiled by Mirador Electoral/Acción
Ciudadana on campaign spending that exceeds legal limits (Interview 02). Observers also provide the TSE
with information on conditions in the countryside with which the magistrates might otherwise be unfamiliar
(Interview 12).
112
An indication of this relationship is the fact that observer groups often voice their strongest criticisms to
the TSE in private (Interview 12).
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played at best a modest role in pushing the TSE to slowly expand its voter education
activities.
Some notable impacts of civil society groups deserve mention. Civic groups have
on occasion carried out their own voter education activities (Carter Center 2003; OAS
2005, 26-33) and helped citizens obtain identity cards and register to vote (OAS 2005,
30, 32). Domestic election observers have also helped guarantee the integrity of the
electoral process, and have built civic networks mobilizing women, youth, and
indigenous peoples. Thus, through their activities they have directly helped some citizens
navigate electoral procedures and had other positive effects. Yet in terms of legal reforms
and administrative regulations, civil society has had little impact on the shape of electoral
administration.

International Influences
International actors are largely absent from the account of electoral reform given
above, but Guatemala received ample assistance for election administration from the late
1990s onward. International involvement has taken several forms: international election
observation, rhetorical support for electoral reform, financial and technical electoral
assistance, support for domestic election observation groups, and learning from the
experiences of other countries.
International actors offered consistent rhetorical support for electoral reform and
for making voting more accessible. The UN mission in Guatemala following the peace
accords exhorted Congress to approve reforms to the electoral law (Minugua 1999; 2000;
2002), and the U.S. ambassador similarly expressed the U.S.’s support for the reforms
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(PL 2000d).113 International election observers also consistently recommended reforms to
make voting more accessible, including polling decentralization, improved voter
registration procedures, and free transportation for voters on election day.114 These
recommendations are routinely delivered to the TSE during and after electoral processes,
and the preliminary statements of international observers receive extensive attention in
the Guatemalan media.
International actors have also provided financial and technical assistance for
election administration. Bilateral aid has come from a number of countries,115 often being
channeled through international bodies like the Organization of American States (OAS)
and the Center for Electoral Promotion and Advising (CAPEL). While the TSE has
received international support since 1985, external assistance expanded drastically with
the formation of the CRE in 1997, when the OAS took a lead role in providing technical
support for electoral cartography studies, voter registry modernization, and civic
education (Azpuru 2004; Jessup, Hayek, and Hällhag 2008, 13; OAS 2008a), providing
$7 million from 1997 to 2004 for the establishment of cartography and education and
training units within the TSE (PL 2004o). Other organizations such as the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the United
Nations also provided technical assistance to the TSE and the congressional committee
on electoral matters (Azpuru 2004; CRE 2004, 5, 8; PL 2000f).
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In addition to general support for reform, international actors tended to support the TSE position on the
decentralization of polling sites, as was the case with the European Union (PL 2004j).
114
Of dozens of observer recommendations regarding election administration inclusiveness, the author
found only two that called for more restrictive measures: in order to improve the quality of the voter rolls,
the European Union’s mission to the 2007 elections suggested an earlier closing date and a longer
residency requirement for voter registration (EUEOM 2007, 61-62). See Appendix B.
115
Primarily the U.S., Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Japan, and Mexico.
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International assistance has been devoted to both long-term institutional
strengthening and short-term support for election processes. The international community
supplied $9 million for the 2003 elections (supplementing the TSE’s budget of $14
million) to support the updating of the voter rolls, equipment purchases, and domestic
election observation groups (EUEOM 2003, 12-13).116 In preparation of the 2007
elections, in which polling sites would be decentralized for the first time, international
support poured in. A program funded by Sweden, Norway, the U.S. and Britain, titled
“Modernization of the Guatemalan Electoral Regime 2005-2007,” focused on long term
institutional strengthening as well as immediate logistical support for 2007 elections. The
program was implemented by the OAS and CAPEL and focused on improving the voter
rolls and promoting voter registration (e.g., helping to digitize the registration process),
technical support for polling decentralization, and support for information and training
programs (Jessup, Hayek, and Hällhag 2008; OAS 2008a). Total funding was $4.6
million (Jessup, Hayek, and Hällhag 2008, 15),117 while USAID provided another $2
million for the 2007 elections for a variety of purposes, including technical assistance
related to decentralization and voter information campaigns (USAID n.d.).
Another form of international involvement has been support for domestic election
observers. Donor countries have funded domestic observation efforts, with the National
Democratic Institute playing a leading role in coordination and advising (NDI n.d.;
2004). Finally, another mode of international influence on domestic election
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According to López-Pintor (n.d., 124-125), “[o]f the $9 million, $3.5 million flowed through the
Organization of American States (OAS) for technical assistance on voter lists, and the remaining $5.5
million was provided directly to the national electoral agency.”
117
The OAS provided $409,000 for upgrading the voter registry system and $685,000 towards
decentralization and contracting personnel for registration brigades, while CAPEL provided $404,000 for
the TSE’s voter information campaigns (Jessup, Hayek, and Hällhag 2008, 20, 22).
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administration comes in the form of learning from other nations. Electoral management
bodies increasingly share experiences and best practices, and such “transgovernmental
relations” (Keohane and Nye 1977) are institutionalized in the Tikal Protocol for Central
American electoral bodies. Through biannual conferences and periodic visits to other
countries, election authorities are able to address common concerns and learn how things
are done in neighboring states. Such cross-border learning applies not only to election
authorities but also domestic election monitors, who learn observation techniques from
observer groups in neighboring countries (Canton and Nevitte 1998, 45; NDI n.d., 10).
What impact have these international influences had on the shape of election
administration? The effects have been variable across types of involvement. Election
observation missions, whatever their positive impacts in deterring fraud and increasing
confidence in election results, played little role in identifying areas in need of reform.
According to former TSE magistrates, election authorities were already aware of the
problem areas that international observers pointed out, although observer reports did
provide the TSE with external legitimation in its dealings with Congress (Interviews 14,
15). The lack of follow through on international observer recommendations has even
garnered media coverage (PL 2011c). More influential has been international support for
domestic election observation efforts, which was critical in the establishment of Mirador
Electoral, the country’s largest observer group. Yet as discussed above, domestic
observers had little impact on the legal and administrative reforms that made election
administration more inclusive.
Cross-national learning and emulation had a larger impact on the shape of reform.
While the TSE drew lessons from other electoral bodies on issues such as party finance
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oversight and voting abroad (Interviews 3, 4, 23), it was the civil registry reform that was
most affected by the models available in other countries. Both the TSE and Congress
used international models to bolster their competing proposals for civil registry reform. In
2004 the TSE convoked (with the OAS) a regional conference on civil registries and
identity documents, which resulted in international expert proposals – delivered to the
congressional committee on electoral matters – that the TSE be the state entity to issue
the new identity cards (PL 2004m). Similarly, members of the congressional committee
traveled to a number of other countries to learn about their civil registry systems, and a
member of the committee said that the system in place in Peru was influential in deciding
to create RENAP (Interview 27).118 When the congressional committee indicated its
preference for the creation of a new state agency, it pointed to other nations – especially
Peru – in justifying its decision (PL 2004n). While other motives almost certainly
influenced the decision in Congress to create RENAP, the availability of a well
functioning model to emulate allowed Congress to more easily justify that decision.
Learning from other nations’ experiences was thus a double-edged sword, used by
different institutions to support competing proposals.
International influence on election administration is most clearly seen in the area
of financial and technical assistance. This assistance has been especially critical in
carrying out polling decentralization, updating the voter registration system, and in voter
education campaigns. According to the former coordinator of OAS assistance to the TSE,
the extent of reform would have been impossible in the same timeframe without the
assistance provided by the international community (Interview 06). A former TSE
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An NDI staff member also mentioned the example of El Salvador (where the civil registry is separate
from the electoral agency) being influential in Guatemala (Interview 23).
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magistrate also emphasized that polling decentralization and advances in voter
registration (e.g., mobile brigades) and voter education would not have been possible
without international support, noting that the government would likely not have supplied
the necessary funding (Interview 17). An evaluation by Sweden’s international
development agency also concluded that OAS support contributed to the successful
decentralization of polling sites (Jessup, Hayek, and Hällhag 2008, 21); a less critical
OAS report likewise concluded that the organization’s technical assistance to Guatemala
helped ensure the success of decentralization and also improved the quality of the voter
registry and helped increase the number of citizens registered to vote (OAS 2008a, 16,
103).
International financial assistance has also been essential for carrying out a
mundane task of voter education: printing informational materials. External financing has
been critical for producing everything from informational brochures and posters aimed at
voters to instructional manuals for poll workers (Interview 03; Jessup, Hayek, and
Hällhag 2008, 23-24). According to the director of the TSE’s Unit for Civic-Electoral
Training and Education (UCADE), which produces most of these printed materials, the
unit’s job would be practically impossible without international support (Interview 20).
In sum, international flows of ideas and (more importantly) resources contributed
significantly to greater election administration inclusiveness. However, this impact did
not occur through the imposition of particular priorities or models; rather, by all accounts
international assistance facilitated reforms that were determined domestically. As Azpuru
(2004) puts it,
donors overall seem to have followed the suggestions and needs presented by the
recipient institutions, instead of trying to impose models. To a large extent this is
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probably due to the fact that differently from other post-conflict societies,
Guatemala’s electoral system was designed and implemented by Guatemalans
themselves long before the Peace Accords were signed.119
While the shape of electoral reform was determined by domestic actors and interests, the
resources provided by the international community made more inclusive election
administration possible by funding polling decentralization, voter registry modernization,
and voter education activities.

Conclusion
A confluence of factors came together to produce the Guatemalan electoral
reforms. Political parties across the spectrum supported administrative reforms that were
expected to have little effect on the parties’ electoral competitiveness or party leaders’
positions, while reducing the costs of voter mobilization. The Supreme Electoral
Tribunal, independent of partisan interests and seeking to boost the legitimacy of the
electoral regime, sought to improve voter access while maintaining the integrity of the
election process that it had ensured since the mid-1980s. International actors played a
crucial role in providing the financing and technical expertise to implement electoral
reform, although it was domestic actors that set the reform agenda. Civil society also
pushed for reform, but ultimately had little impact; electoral reform was an elite affair,
driven by technocrats and politicians, rather than the result of popular pressures. Table
4.2 below summarizes the influence of different variables on election administration
inclusiveness during this period.
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Another indication of this comes from a long time TSE staffer, who noted with reference to voter
education activities that international funding was not accompanied by suggestions regarding the content of
voter education materials (Interview 22).
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The complex reform process resulted in an election administration system that
presented fewer obstacles to voters wishing to exercise their suffrage, with important (if
limited) consequences for campaigning methods and electoral outcomes.

Table 4.2 Support for Hypotheses, Guatemala 2004-2011
Category

Partisan
Interests

Hypothesis
H1: Where a ruling party can identify
opposition supporters, election
administration inclusiveness will tend
to be low, whereas countries with
catch-all parties or fluid party systems
marked by low levels of partisan
attachments will tend to have more
inclusive electoral procedures.
H2: Parties with strong lower class
support (typically populist or leftist
parties) will support inclusive rules.

H3: Partisan EMBs will tend to
implement less inclusive measures as
partisan election officials attempt to
impede the participation of some
Electoral
Management parties’ supporters.
Body
Structure
H4: Independent, non-partisan EMBs
will be associated with inclusive rules
in part by playing an active role in
electoral reform.
H5: A history of election fraud will
lead democratizing countries to adopt
strict safeguards against fraud, which
The Specter may in turn impose procedural barriers
to voting.
of Election
Fraud
H6: Parties that have been the victims
of election fraud will support strict
safeguards that reduce inclusiveness.
Election
Costs and
Financial
Resources

H7: Countries with more resources
will have more inclusive election
administration.

Continued on next page
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Support

Supported

Comments
Lack of identifiable
social base of parties
facilitated reform, as
parties had no
electoral interest in
opposing
inclusiveness.

URNG and other
leftist parties
supported reforms;
Supported
URNG pushed
reforms through peace
process.
Nonpartisan TSE took
initiative in making
voter registration more
Inconclusive
accessible, but resisted
other inclusive
measures.
Nonpartisan TSE
played a leading role
Supported
in reform process.
Fears of fraud partly
allayed over time, but
Inconclusive still influence voter
registration procedures
Parties victimized by
earlier fraud no longer
Inconclusive
significant political
actors.
Financial constraints
hindered voter
Inconclusive education, but
otherwise had little
impact.

Table 4.2, continued
Category
Civil
Society and
Public
Opinion

International
Influences

Hypothesis

H8: Strong civil society, particularly
domestic election observation groups,
will increase election administration
inclusiveness.
H9: Public opinion will set limits on
the extent to which elites can pursue
self-serving election administration
rules.
H10: International observers will
prevent extremely restrictive measures
in elections that they observe,
particularly measures that are highly
visible on election day.
H11: The recommendations of election
observers will have little impact on
election administration practices.
H12: When a country seeks good
relations with Western democracies,
the influence of election observers will
be enhanced and inclusive election
administration practices will be more
likely.
H13: Technical and financial
assistance will make inclusive
measures more likely by enhancing
domestic bureaucratic capacity.
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Support

Comments

Not
supported

Civil society endorsed
inclusive reforms, but
had little impact.

Not
supported

No evidence of public
opinion influence on
reform process.

Observation coincided
with increasing
inclusiveness, but
Inconclusive
some observer calls
for inclusive measures
were rejected.
Reform agenda largely
Supported determined
domestically.
Little international
political pressure on
Guatemala after the
Inconclusive
peace accords.

Supported

Financial and
technical assistance
made implementation
of reforms possible.

CHAPTER 5
NICARAGUA: BRINING THE BALLOT TO THE PEOPLE THROUGH A
PARTISAN ELECTORAL BODY

In the 1980s Nicaragua established an inclusive and competent election
administration system, carrying out two elections free of significant irregularities and
significantly more accessible to voters than in neighboring El Salvador or Guatemala. It
did so in difficult circumstances similar to those found in its neighboring countries: a
context of armed conflict, political polarization, economic crisis, and generalized poverty
and illiteracy. This chapter examines the origins of Nicaragua’s inclusive election
administration and the beginnings of its unraveling in the mid-1990s.

Background
From 1937 to 1979 Nicaragua was under the rule of the Somoza family, first
under Anastasio Somoza García and subsequently under his sons Luis Somoza Debayle
and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The Somozas at times ruled directly, at other times
indirectly through puppet presidents, and enjoyed the firm backing of the United States.
While elections were held periodically,120 they lacked even the limited competitiveness
found in Guatemala or El Salvador; most Nicaraguan elites were co-opted by the regime
and presented no challenge to the Somozas’ rule. Opposition to the regime grew in the
1970s in response to massive corruption and the diversion of foreign relief aid following
a devastating 1972 earthquake. A guerrilla insurgency that had been active since the
1960s grew in strength, and ultimately led the uprising that toppled Somoza in 1979.
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Elections were held in 1946, 1951, 1957, 1963, 1967, and 1974 (Vanden and Prevost 1993, 71).
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The overthrow of Somoza by the leftist Sandinista Front of National Liberation
(FSLN) initiated a revolutionary regime under Sandinista rule, followed by U.S. efforts to
force the Sandinistas from power throughout the 1980s. As the Reagan administration
organized and funded the counterrevolutionary forces – the Contras – and waged
economic warfare against Nicaragua, the Sandinistas sought economic and diplomatic
support from other countries, including ultimately the Soviet Union but also democratic
countries in Europe and Latin America. These pressures necessitated the holding of free
elections to shore up the revolutionary regime’s legitimacy both at home and abroad. As
a result, liberal democratic institutions were grafted onto the Sandinistas’ vision of a
participatory socialist democracy.121
To administer elections, a new Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) was established,
and new electoral laws were approved prior to the 1984 and 1990 elections. The electoral
laws passed in 1984 and 1988 were similar, and established the framework for the
Sandinista regime’s electoral system. The 1984 law was passed by the Sandinistadominated Council of State, with input from opposition parties with representation on the
Council. As the Sandinista government sought to consolidate domestic and international
legitimacy through elections, it was willing to negotiate the rules of the game with the
opposition parties to ensure their participation.122 As a result of such negotiations, the
electoral law was amended before the 1984 elections to take opposition concerns into
account, including expanding the Supreme Electoral Council from three magistrates –
who were thought to be Sandinista supporters – to five (Envío 1984a, 1984b; IHRLG121

The literature on the revolution and the Sandinistas is immense. For useful analyses of the Sandinistas’
ideology and the interplay between participatory and liberal democracy in revolutionary Nicaragua, see
Gilbert 1988 and Vanden and Prevost 1993.
122
Ultimately one of the principal opposition coalitions withdrew from the elections, with U.S.
encouragement, in the face of a certain Sandinista victory.

161

WOLA 1984, 20; LASA 1984, 11-12).123 Other opposition concerns revolved around
issues such as the campaign period, access to state media, and reducing the number of
votes needed for representation in the legislature, rather than election administration
measures (IHRLG-WOLA 1984, 18-19).
A new electoral law was drawn up in 1988 in anticipation of elections in 1990,
and negotiations with (and concessions to) the opposition over the contents of the law
were even more extensive than in 1984. A number of opposition demands were included
in reforms to the law in 1989, although the government refused opposition demands to
change the composition of the CSE – which was composed of two Sandinistas, one
representative of the opposition UNO coalition, one representative of the opposition party
that had obtained the most votes in the previous elections, and one neutral member.124
The composition of the top level of the CSE was of particular importance because the
CSE magistrates named two of the three members of the regional electoral councils
(which in turn named the poll workers), so that partisan control at the top could result in
partisan control throughout the administrative structure of the CSE. As a result, the FSLN
effectively held two of three spots on the regional election councils and the local polling
boards (Carter Center 1990; LASA 1990, 13).
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The additional members “would be chosen by the Supreme Court from a list of nominees submitted by
the National Political Parties Assembly (ANPP), which [was] made up of one member from each legal
party and one representative of the government junta” (Envío 1984b).
124
Specifically, the president presented slates of candidates to the National Assembly for each CSE
magistrate position. Two slates were made up of Sandinistas, one was composed of candidates from the
opposition UNO coalition, another from the opposition party that had received the most votes in the 1984
elections (the Conservative Democratic Party), and one slate made up of non-partisan notables (LASA
1990, 10, note 24; ONUVEN 1989b, 6-7).
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The 1984 and 1990 Elections
Despite opposition criticisms over the CSE’s composition, Nicaragua’s electoral
commission proved to be quite competent, and was instrumental in establishing a system
of election administration that facilitated voter participation. Procedures for voter
registration, locating polling stations, and casting a ballot were designed to minimize
barriers for voters, while the CSE also conducted extensive voter education campaigns.

Voter Registration
For the first elections of the post-Somoza period in 1984, it was necessary to draw
up voter lists from scratch. Voter registration was made mandatory because it was to also
serve as a census, although voting itself was not compulsory (LASA 1984, 14). Lacking
permanent registry offices, the CSE held registration during four consecutive Sundays,
with the process taking place at the (decentralized) locations to be used as polling stations
on election day. Prospective voters were required to show some form of identification
(such as a birth certificate or driver’s license) or, lacking identification, present two
witnesses from the same precinct to verify their identity (Ley Electoral 1984, Art. 70;
1988, Art. 37).125 Voters would immediately receive a registration card (libreta cívica)
which would also serve as voter identification on election day,126 and “[a]t the end of
each of the four registration days, lists of the new registrants were posted for a 10-day
period. Both individual citizens and political parties were invited to inspect the lists and
to file complaints about persons who had registered improperly or who did not live within
the precinct” (LASA 1984, 14; see Ley Electoral 1984, Art. 75-76). Thus, while
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At the time, Nicaragua lacked a unified national identity card.
The information on the libreta cívica included the location of the polling station, which in any case was
the same location where the voter had registered (Ley Electoral 1984, Art. 81; 1988, Art. 43).
126
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registration was only held on four days, the decentralized locations and immediate
delivery of registration cards to voters eliminated the need to make multiple trips to far
away registration offices, as in Guatemala and El Salvador.
Combined with a publicity campaign promoting registration through the media
and Sandinista-linked mass organizations, the voter registration drive produced
impressive results: “In just four days, a total of 1,560,580 persons registered, representing
93.7 percent of the estimated voting-age population…The overall results surprised even
Sandinista government leaders, who had expected only about 1.2 million persons to
register” (LASA 1984, 14).
For the next elections in 1990, an ad-hoc system of registration was again carried
out over four Sundays, with various forms of ID or witnesses used for registration
purposes.127 Voters immediately received their registration cards upon registering, and
lists of registered voters were displayed on the doors of polling stations so that interested
parties could review them and solicit the CSE to correct errors (IIDH-CAPEL 1990, 2223; Ley Electoral 1988, Art. 42; ONUVEN 1989a, 6; 1990c, 6, 12). The CSE also
distributed the voter lists to the opposition parties so they could review and request
corrections (Carter Center 1990b). The voter registration drive was again accompanied by
“an intensive and effective publicity campaign to encourage registration” (ONUVEN
1989, 7), and the process was again widely praised. As the United Nations observer
mission noted: “The voter registration process involved a major effort, which was
particularly impressive given the lack of financial resources and the inadequacies of
transport and communication systems. The huge effort made by CSE and the regional
127

An ad hoc voter registration was necessary in 1990 due to the lack of a reliable civil registry or census
(CSE 1991, 12), along with significant population shifts during the six intervening years of civil conflict
since the voter registry had been created in 1984.
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electoral councils to train staff involved in the voter registration process was also
remarkable” (ONUVEN 1989a, 27). While estimates of registration coverage are
uncertain, the Carter Center reported an 89 percent registration rate (Carter Center
1990a), while the anti-Sandinista newspaper La Prensa reported a survey finding of 95
percent of eligible Nicaraguans registered to vote (ONUVEN 1989a, 11).
Despite its successes, there were several limits to the accessibility of voter
registration. The most severe shortcoming occurred in several locales (particularly the
northern Atlantic region) where poor security conditions prevented registration sites from
opening during the October 1989 registration drive. The opposition claimed that the CSE
was attempting to keep opposition supporters from registering (ONUVEN 1990a, 5),
while international observer reports generally accepted the government’s claims that
security conditions did not permit the opening of voter registration sites in areas of
Contra activity. In any case, special arrangements were made to open many of the sites in
the months leading up to the election, as well as to register demobilized Contras (Carter
Center 1990a; ONUVEN 1990a, 31, 4; 1990b, 3).
Another limitation on accessibility was the early deadline for registration for both
the 1984 and 1990 elections. For instance, for the 1990 elections the ad hoc registration
process was carried out over four Sundays in October, ending October 22, 1989 prior to
the February 25, 1990 elections – resulting in a registration closing date four months
prior to the election. However, for both elections, those turning legal voting age (16 years
old in Nicaragua) between the last day of voter registration and election day were allowed
(and required) to register to vote (Ley Electoral 1984, Art. 66; 1988, Art. 34). The dates
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for registration were not fixed in the electoral law, leaving it to the CSE to decide when
to carry out voter registration (Ley Electoral 1984, Art. 7; 1988, Art. 4).128
Finally, citizens needed to register in the precinct where they permanently
resided, even if they were temporarily absent – although exceptions were made for those
serving in the armed forces and election officials and poll watchers working in other
jurisdictions (Ley Electoral 1984, Art. 68; 1988, Art. 35). For some citizens, this may
have been an obstacle to registration, although there seemed to have been no reports of
disenfranchisement as a result of this requirement. Prior to the 1990 elections, voter
registration was also permitted in Nicaraguan consulates abroad (Ley Electoral 1988, Art.
35), while voting itself only took place in the country.

Getting to the Ballot Box
While the voter registration process was commended by observers (and drew few
criticisms from the otherwise intransigent opposition coalitions), the decentralization of
polling sites was also praised by observers. In contrast to Guatemala and El Salvador,
polling stations were not limited to municipal capitals. Another key difference was that in
Nicaragua most precincts were made up of just one polling station (Junta Receptora de
Votos); thus rather than concentrating dozens or hundreds of polling stations in large
voting centers, voting stations were dispersed to ensure maximum accessibility.
As one observer mission reported of the 1984 elections: “There were nearly 4,000
polling sites established for the elections. In large cities, polling sites were located at
intervals of three or four blocks. In rural areas, voters seldom had to travel more than
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The 1988 election law, however, seemed to assume that registration would be carried out several months
before election day, since the deadline for soliciting a replacement registration card was 30 days before the
election (Art. 49); no such deadline was specified in the 1984 electoral law.
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three or four kilometers. The number and placement of the polling sites marked a
commendable attempt to encourage voter participation” (IHRLG and WOLA 1984, 38).
In 1990, the number of polling stations increased to 4,394 (CSE 1991, 4; ONUVEN
1989a, 4), with over 46 percent of them located in rural areas (CSE 1991, 5).129
There was wide discretion for the CSE to choose polling sites; the electoral law
was mostly silent on the issue, simply referring to “a sufficient number” of sites to be
established by the CSE (Ley Electoral 1988, Art. 24; see also Ley Electoral 1984, Art.
64; IFES 1993, 11). The CSE could therefore use its own criteria in establishing where
voting would take place, and it explicitly used the criteria of voter accessibility in order to
facilitate participation, aiming to keep travel for rural voters to a maximum of 5
kilometers and for urban voters to just 300 meters, although these goals could not always
be met (CSE 1991, 4; ONUVEN 1989a, 29, note 1; Interviews 43, 46). Importantly, this
decentralization did not endanger the integrity of the electoral process by facilitating
fraud, as was feared in Guatemala and El Salvador. In fact, on this point inclusive
election administration may have served to protect election integrity, as the United
Nations observer mission (ONUVEN 1989a, 6) noted:
The boundaries of each area [JRV] are drawn with a view to ensuring that the
number of voters in each does not exceed 400, and that the boards are located at a
reasonable distance from voters’ homes. The geographical distribution of JRVs
and the fact that both the President and the first member are local residents,
facilitates detection of fraudulent registrations, since JRV members and the
representatives of political parties – where the latter are themselves local – are
acquainted with the local population. This decentralized system of ‘local control’
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Slightly different numbers of polling places are reported in other sources: 4,383 in one observer report
(Carter Center 1990a) and 4,391 in another (IIDH-CAPEL 1990, 40). The CSE’s method of classifying
urban and rural areas actually underestimated the number of rural polling places, as all municipal centers
(cabeceras) and locations with more than 1,000 residents were considered urban (IFES 1993, 14).
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makes it difficult to carry out fraudulent registrations systematically and on a
large scale.130
Casting a Ballot
In addition to voter registration and polling locations, the voting process itself
also posed minimal barriers to participation. While voter identification was required, the
registration card to be used as ID had been given to voters just months prior, immediately
upon registering. This system avoided problems resulting from delayed delivery of ID
cards, which has been a significant problem in Guatemala and even more so in El
Salvador, and would become a tremendously contentious issue in Nicaragua in the years
to come. In 1984 and 1990, however, there were no reported problems of registered
voters lacking identification. With the ad hoc inscriptions on the voter rolls tied directly
to the delivery of registration cards, there were also no problems with voters’ names not
appearing on the voter rolls – another method of disenfranchisement that would become
an issue after 2000.
The biggest concern related to the casting of ballots was the potential for long
lines of voters. With separate ballots for each election (presidential, congressional, and
municipal) in 1990, there were concerns about the time that would be required for the
voting, especially because misestimates of the population residing in some areas initially
led to many more than the legally prescribed limit of 400 voters assigned to some polling
stations (JRVs) (IIDH-CAPEL 1990, 40; ONUVEN 1989a, 10). The CSE took steps to
add additional tables to existing JRVs in order to avoid delays during the voting (IIDHCAPEL 1990, 40, 48), and with the exception of the late opening of some JRVs, the
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This point is reiterated in a subsequent ONUVEN report (1990c, 6) and also noted by García Laguardia
(1995, 43), and has been a prominent theme in discussions of decentralizing polling locations in El
Salvador (see chapter 7).
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voting process proceeded smoothly and quickly despite a large turnout of 86 percent of
registered voters (Carter Center 1990a).

Voter Education
Inclusive voter registration, polling locations, and voting procedures were
complemented by voter information campaigns. In 1984, the CSE carried out an
extensive voter education campaign prior to election day explaining the mechanics of the
voting process through television, radio, and newspaper ads (IHRLG and WOLA 1984,
38), while on election day the CSE “preempted all programming on all of the country’s
radio stations. The message ‘Your vote is secret, your vote decides’ was broadcast
continuously, alternating with popular music and explanations of voting procedures”
(LASA 1984, 16).
The CSE again carried out a significant voter education campaign leading up to
the 1990 elections, with a Publicity and Civic Education division devoted to the task. The
first stage of the information campaign explained the procedures for registering, while a
later stage encouraged voter participation, explained the necessary steps to vote, and
emphasized the secrecy of the vote. The campaign was carried out through diverse media,
including radio spots, newspaper ads, flyers, and posters, as well as a frequently run three
minute television advertisement explaining how to vote (CSE 1991, 17; IIDH-CAPEL
1990, 35, 40). The electoral law for both elections put the media at the disposal of the
CSE during the 72 hours before election day to disseminate information on “the
procedures to exercise the right of suffrage” (Ley Electoral 1984, Art. 41; 1988, Art.
119), and also required the CSE to publicize sample ballots to familiarize voters with
them (Ley Electoral 1984, Art. 97; 1988, Art. 133). Funding for the 1989-1990
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information campaign was provided by Canada, Norway, and Sweden, and technical
assistance came from the Center for Electoral Promotion and Advising (CAPEL). The
UN observer mission evaluated the campaign positively (ONUVEN 1990a, 6).

Legal Reforms: The Citizen Identification Law and 1995 Electoral Law
Between the 1990 and 1996 national elections, Nicaragua’s electoral system was
overhauled by constitutional reforms and two pieces of legislation. Changes began with
the civil registry and citizen identification system. Until the early 1990s Nicaragua did
not have a centralized national civil registry, and the CSE had employed an ad hoc
system of voter registration for the 1984 and 1990 elections. In 1989, opposition parties
had advocated the introduction of a photo ID card for use in the 1990 elections. Lacking
time to construct a new civil registry and ID system before the elections, the government
pledged to do so following the elections. But after the turnover in power in 1990, when
the FSLN was defeated, the issue became less of a priority; the National Assembly did
not pass the Citizen Identification Law until 1993, and did not approve the use of the new
ID card as voter identification until the electoral law was reformed in December 1995
(Butler et al. 1996).
With the new legislation, the ad hoc system of voter registration gave way to a
permanent registry system, based on a new identity card produced and distributed by the
CSE. With the CSE managing the civil registry and documentation process, voter
registration would be automatic – those citizens registering and receiving an ID card
would automatically be added to the voter registry.
The other significant legal reform was the drafting of a new electoral law. In 1995
Nicaragua’s constitution was amended amidst intense conflict between the executive and
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legislative branches, and after the conflict subsided the National Assembly finally passed
a new electoral law consistent with the constitutional changes (including a presidential
run-off and the direct election of mayors). The political paralysis had caused the new
electoral law to be approved less than one year before national elections were to be held,
and entailed a number of substantial changes to electoral administration, including new
rules for the composition of the CSE, changes to the territorial structure of the electoral
system, and (related to the citizen identification law) a new system of voter identification
and registration.
One of the most significant and contentious elements in the new electoral law was
the composition of the Supreme Electoral Council. Despite the heavy Sandinista
influence in the CSE during the 1984 and 1990 elections, international observers were
unanimous in their praise of the CSE’s impartiality and competence (IHRLG-WOLA
1984, 21; IIDH-CAPEL 1990; LASA 1984, 13; ONUVEN 1989b, 9, 16-17; 1990b, 3,
10).131 Despite its partisan composition, almost all of the decisions of the CSE
magistrates had been unanimous (ONUVEN 1989a, 2; 1989b, 10; 1990a, 5), and the
council was highly regarded among the public (Envío 1996a).
But after the FSLN loss in the 1990 elections, non-Sandinista political forces
sought to reduce Sandinista influence in the CSE. As CSE president Mariano Fiallos
(himself a Sandinista) put it, some in the National Assembly viewed the CSE staff as
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With only one magistrate, the UNO coalition participating in the 1990 elections criticized the makeup of
the CSE, since the FSLN controlled the executive that nominated magistrates and the National Assembly
that selected them (IIDH-CAPEL 1990, 45-46). UNO and the U.S. government claimed that the FSLN in
fact controlled four of the five CSE magistrates (LASA 1990, 10, note 24), a charge that observers
dismissed. As the United Nations mission reported, UNO’s criticisms of the CSE were “characterized by
their virulence and inflexibility,” and “specific complaints regarding its activities tend to focus on minor
incidents to which the electoral authority has usually responded rapidly with effective solutions.
Nevertheless, repeated evidence of the electoral authority’s impartiality has not altered the coalition’s
public stance of challenging the composition of the CSE” (ONUVEN 1989a, 5).
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“contaminated with Sandinismo” (Envío 1996c). Yet the assembly’s plan to reduce
Sandinista control of the CSE did not entail making the electoral body non-partisan, but
rather further politicizing it in a new way.
The new electoral law limited the power of the CSE magistrates to name the staff
of the departmental and regional electoral councils, requiring that the personnel be
chosen from lists provided by political parties (Butler et al. 1996; Walker 1997, 308). In
turn, the departmental electoral councils would name the polling station staff. This
threatened to de-professionalize the CSE’s administrative structures shortly before an
electoral process; furthermore, three new CSE magistrates with no electoral experience
had been named in June 1995 (Envío 1996e).
At the same time, the new electoral law converted the country’s nine regional
zones used for election administration into 17 departmental zones, “implying both greater
cost and inexperienced personnel in an election year” (Butler et al. 1996). This
administrative and territorial restructuring of the CSE came at a time when the council
was frantically trying to distribute new identification cards to voters and compile the new
voter registry. The reforms, along with the failure of the government to assign the CSE an
adequate budget to finish issuing ID cards, led the highly regarded CSE president Fiallos,
who had headed the CSE since its creation, to resign.132

The Cédula and Voter Registration
Approaching the 1996 elections, the CSE faced the monumental task of
registering voters and distributing ID cards. Whereas the opposition UNO coalition had
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Fiallos initially rescinded his resignation when the president submitted a package of electoral reforms to
the National Assembly incorporating the CSE’s demands. Several weeks later, when it was apparent that
the changes would not be approved by the Assembly, Fiallos resigned permanently (Envío 1996a; 1996b).
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tried to push the Sandinista government to introduce a new ID card before the 1990
elections, the UNO government gave little priority to the creation of the new civil registry
after the election. Delays in approving the civil registry legislation, reconciling the
electoral law to use the new ID cards for voting,133 and approving an adequate budget to
implement the changes all hampered the process. Ultimately the CSE began the
registration process on its own initiative and drawing on its own operating budget, and it
wasn’t until 1996 that the government secured $12 million in foreign funding for the
project (Butler et al. 1996; Envío 1996b).
In its design, the new registration process was easy enough for citizens, who
could use any form of identification or present two witnesses to verify their identity, in
addition to providing a birth certificate. The person’s photograph for the ID card would
be taken at the time of registration, rather than requiring the voter to provide their own
photo. The applicant’s information would then be checked against the municipal civil
registry and the person would return to pick up the ID card when it was ready. The initial
ID card was free of charge for citizens (Butler et al. 1996).
But the problems lay in the poor quality of the civil registries and the complexity
of the internal CSE handling of ID applications. The CSE decided not to start a new civil
registry from scratch, but to compile and computerize the country’s existing municipal
registries in a central registry office. All ID applications were then sent to the central
registry in Managua to be checked against the registry data (IFES 1993, 16, 23). This
decision was taken to ensure greater protection against false inscriptions (Interview 43),
but it “meant endless checking, rechecking, and hiring of district judges and lawyers to
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This delay prevented the CSE from using the new ID cards for the 1994 regional elections on the
Atlantic Coast, necessitating another ad-hoc registration for those elections (Envío 1996b).
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do the legal paperwork required to simultaneously create an accurate Civil Registry and a
computerized electoral roll” (Butler et al. 1996).
The biggest challenge for many citizens was the lack of a birth certificate, as
some 40-45 percent of the population had never been registered at birth. To obtain an ID,
these citizens were required to visit the municipal registrar to receive a document
indicating that they lacked a birth certificate, and then visit a local judge with two
witnesses to request a legal statement that would allow a birth certificate to be issued.
Both steps cost money, as both the registrars and judges charged for their services (IFES
1993, 24, 26). The CSE, reportedly unwilling to “‘clash’ with the municipalities” over the
fees being charged, established a costly parallel system for identification where a
registrar, judge, and other staff would work at the municipal level and provide a one-stop
service for citizens (IFES 1993, 26-27).
Moreover, many citizens discovered during the registration process that their legal
names were different from the names they used (Butler et al. 1996; Envío 1996b). As the
news magazine Envío (1996b) reported:
Upon registering for their documents, thousands of puzzled and often disgruntled
people have discovered that their parents never acknowledged them, that their last
name wasn’t what they always thought it was, etc… One extreme case was that of
a municipality in which one thousand of its three thousand inhabitants had been
registered with the registrar’s surname. Untangling this maze has further
complicated an already complex process and caused major delays.134
With elections approaching in November, it was clear that the CSE would be
unable to distribute ID cards (cédulas) to all voters in time, despite its best efforts.135 “By
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When discussing these problems in testimony before the National Assembly, CSE president Mariano
Fiallos noted that his domestic worker discovered during the registration process that her legal name was
different from the name that she went by (Asamblea Nacional 1995a).
135
While the long delays in processing ID applications led to concerns about possible partisan bias in
excluding voters, the OAS observer mission “conducted a rapid investigation into some of these cases, but
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the July 22 closing date for requesting a card before the elections, the CSE had received
2,060,000 requests, but the tedious processing…meant that only 1,008,798 cards were
ready by August 22, the cutoff date for fabricating them” (Butler et al. 1996). As a result,
the CSE decided to implement a mixed voter registration system for the 1996 elections,
issuing supplementary documents, to be used as voter ID for that year’s election only, to
those voters who registered but whose cédulas would not be ready in time.
The next challenge was distributing cédulas and supplementary documents in
time for the election. The CSE carried out a massive distribution campaign (entrega
masiva), which involved sending undelivered ID cards to the corresponding polling
stations and opening all of the country’s polling places on a staggered basis so that
citizens could pick up their cards (OAS 1997b, 29). The plan included publicity efforts,
such as announcing where voters could retrieve their documents through loudspeakers
mounted on circulating vehicles. The process was not without problems, as some voters
arrived to pick up their document only to find that it had not yet arrived. The entrega
masiva ended on September 26, and by that time about 75% of the ID cards produced had
been delivered (Carter Center 1996, 19).
At the same time, the CSE carried out a door-to-door delivery campaign which
began in May and continued after the end of the entrega masiva campaign (Butler et al.
1996; Carter Center 1996, 18-19; OAS 1997b, 29). The CSE received support from the
government, as “President Chamorro called on her cabinet to lend its full support to the
Electoral Council to ensure that the voter documents and the election materials could be
delivered in time, and the Ministry of Education lent teachers and students to help deliver
found no reasons for the delay other than problems with the checking processes” (OAS 1997b, 29). In later
years, however, partisan bias in the distribution of ID cards would result in voter disenfranchisement (see
chapter 6).
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the voter documents until Oct. 19” (Carter Center 1996, 19). Last minute efforts to
distribute voter cards involved further door-to-door visits, and in some places “the
operation was accompanied by the music of high-school and municipal bands, who
paraded through the streets of the main towns carrying posters and banners urging the
people to participate in the October 20 elections” (OAS 1997b, 30). Despite these efforts,
however, “some undetermined number of voters did not receive documents and thus were
prohibited by law from voting” (Carter Center 1996, 19), particularly since CSE workers
delivering ID cards found that many voters had changed their residence since requesting
their card (Envío 1996d).
Due to the problems encountered during the documentation process (cedulación),
the CSE carried out what would become a regular feature of Nicaraguan electoral
processes: voter verification. Beginning in June, over 2,400 verification offices were
opened so that voters could check their data on the preliminary voters list and correct any
errors that appeared (IFES 1996b, 13). According to the Carter Center (1996, 19), over 70
percent of voters participated, although there were organizational problems such that “a
large number of citizens went to the wrong polling stations to check their records. When
the staffs could not find these people on their lists, they automatically added them, so that
when the Data Processing Department received the change, it took those citizens off the
lists of the correct polling station and transferred them to the one to which they had
happened to go to check their records” (OAS 1997b, 25). In subsequent electoral
processes, the CSE would continue to open polling stations for several weekends before
the close of voter registration to allow voters to verify their information and their voting
location.
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Finally, the CSE carried out an ad-hoc registration process in 26 municipalities in
former conflict zones where former army and contra soldiers were still roaming the
countryside, and security conditions (along with financial and logistical obstacles) did not
allow for ongoing registration. This process was the same as the ad-hoc registration
carried out for the previous two elections, and despite some logistical problems (such as
outdated census data) and concerns voiced by some political actors and the U.S. that
former supporters of the Contras would be disenfranchised, international observers and
political parties ultimately evaluated the process positively. The CSE carried out a houseto-house campaign encouraging registration and opened registration sites on additional
weekends with international donor assistance (Butler et al. 1996; Carter Center 1996, 18;
NDI 1996; OAS 1997b, 18, 31-33). Ultimately, an estimated 90-100 percent of the voting
age population in the affected municipalities registered (NDI 1996, 1).
The results of this mixed registration process were the registration of over 2.4
million Nicaraguans, with about 41 percent receiving a cédula, 44 percent receiving
supplemental documents, and almost 15 percent (about 352,000) receiving a libreta
cívica from the ad-hoc registration (Carter Center 1996, 17; OAS 1997b, 24-25). While
there remained a number of errors and duplications in the registry data, and some voting
credentials had not been picked up by election day, the manner in which voter
registration had been conducted was ultimately quite inclusive, involving local
registration sites, the use of witnesses for citizens lacking identification, the opening of
thousands of local offices for voters to verify their information, and door-to-door delivery
of ID cards.
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Of the ad-hoc registration carried out in 26 municipalities, an observer report
compared the process favorably to that in El Salvador: “in contrast to Nicaragua, which
sets up thousands of polling places so citizens can register and vote relatively close to
home, the process in El Salvador is totally centralized in the cities and electoral rolls are
ordered alphabetically rather than by polling place…[I]f El Salvador had adopted the ad
hoc registration in former war zones as Nicaragua did, many more people would have
been able to vote” (Envío 1996f).
Of the registration system more generally, news magazine Envío (1996d)
characterized the CSE’s registration efforts as “Herculean.” As the OAS observer mission
(OAS 1997b, 31) summarized,
95 percent of the total voting documents had been distributed. If account is taken
of the fact that a considerable proportion of the undistributed documents were for
voters who were out of the country, ill, in prison, or dead or who refused them –
some people would not accept substitute documents – then the actual percentage
of voters without documents by election day was minimal. It can therefore be said
that the CSE made a genuine effort to distribute voting documents to the entire
population, and that this effort met with success.

Article 41
As the CSE encountered problems carrying out the registration and
documentation process, there were concerns about the accuracy of the voter rolls that
would result. Concerned about the potential for omissions from the voter rolls, the
National Assembly included measures in the 1995 electoral law that would allow any
voter with a valid identity card (cédula) to vote at the polling station pertaining to the
address listed on the card, even if the person’s name did not appear on the voter roll (Ley
Electoral 1995, Arts. 41 and 122).136 Similarly, voters could cast ballots even if there
136

Article 122 of the 1995 electoral law later became Article 116 in the 2000 law.
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were minor differences between their name as it appeared on the voter rolls and on their
ID card (Ley Electoral 1995, Art. 122), thus giving significant discretion to poll workers.
In supporting the measures, deputies referred vaguely to the possibility of
computer errors or other unspecified problems that would result in voters being omitted
from the voter rolls (Asamblea Nacional 1995b, 579, 581). Although no similar problems
had occurred in previous elections when ad hoc registration had been used, deputies in
the Assembly were concerned about the accuracy of the new voter registry and wanted to
avoid potential problems (Interviews 38, 43) – perhaps worried about partisan
manipulation of the voter rolls as well as technical problems. Although the Assembly
debates over this measure showed few hints of partisanship, the debates over the citizen
identification law passed two years earlier evidenced profound distrust of the potential
politicization of the documentation and registration process (see Asamblea Nacional
1992, 172-173, 175, 178-179, 260, 265).
One deputy also suggested in later debate that the committee drafting the electoral
law was concerned that voters might have errors on their ID card, but because they would
be known in their precinct – a presumption made plausible by the country’s system of
highly decentralized polling stations – it was reasonable to allow them to vote even if
there were inconsistencies between their ID card and the voter list (Asamblea Nacional
1995c, 1161). This was thus a case of one inclusive administrative practice – the
decentralization of polling locations – alleviating concerns about another inclusive
measure that might otherwise be vulnerable to manipulation.
The CSE opposed Article 41 and its provision to allow voters not appearing on
the voter list to cast a ballot, fearing that it might give rise to multiple voting (Envío
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1996b; OAS 1997b, 55; Interview 43), but the Assembly was not persuaded: the motion
to include the provision in Article 41 passed 65 votes to 0, with no abstentions (Asamblea
Nacional 1995b, 582). Political parties’ concerns about technical problems and perhaps
partisan manipulation of the voter lists led the Assembly to include an administrative
measure in the electoral law that would help voters avoid being disenfranchised due to
problems with the voter rolls. While the measure has been controversial since its
passage,137 it has also helped ensure that errors in the voter rolls do not prevent registered
citizens from voting, as has happened in El Salvador and Guatemala.

The 1996 Elections
With its mixed voter registration system and a new electoral law passed just the
year before, Nicaragua headed into a general election in 1996. As discussed above, the
voter registration drive had achieved commendable results. The CSE also carried out a
voter information campaign, while NGOs carried out their own campaigns to promote
participation and to explain the electoral process (Butler et al. 1996). While voter
education efforts were criticized for being insufficient given the complexity of the voter
registration system (IRI 1997, 2, 15; OAS 1997b, 37) and for the saturation of
information on printed materials (IFES 1996a, 6), the OAS concluded “that in some
stages of the election process, such as the ad hoc registration, the civic-education
campaign was generally effective” (OAS 1997b, 37).138

137

Already during the 1996 electoral process, the OAS observer mission found that while many party
representatives expressed support for Article 41, “[s]ome opposed it…saying that it could contribute to
widespread fraud. For others, such situations could be averted by establishing strict control measures, such
as punching the identification card at the time of voting” (OAS 1997b, 18).
138
Another observer mission concluded that the publicity campaign encouraging people to register any
changes of residence before the deadline in order to vote at the nearest polling place had “acceptable
results” (IFES 1997, 8).
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But trouble arrived with election day and the subsequent vote count, which saw a
number of irregularities, including ballot boxes found abandoned in ditches, accusations
of fraud, and ultimately the nullification of 12 percent of the votes. At least in hindsight,
the irregularities were not surprising, considering the recent restructuring of the CSE, the
complexities of administering six different elections (for the presidency, departmental
and national assembly members, mayors, municipal councils, and the Central American
Parliament) with the participation of over 20 parties, as well as the doubling of polling
places since 1990 due to population growth, postwar repatriation, and expansion of the
voter rolls.
An initial problem in the days leading up to the election was the shifting of
polling sites. Over 200 polling stations ended up with more than 400 voters, and therefore
had to be re-divided to comply with legal requirements (OAS 1997b, 27). “This process,
however, caused various upheavals. In the first place, the process of subdividing and
relocating polling stations continued up to the day before the elections... In the second
place, many of the stations that had been divided up were a considerable distance apart,
which led to delays and transportation problems, both for the voters and for the poll
workers assigned to them” (OAS 1997b, 36-37). The problems were particularly severe
in Managua, where “[a] majority of voters did not know until some 24 hours before
election day where they were supposed to go vote” and where the departmental election
council president “decided 48 hours before election day to change the location of many of
the JRVs whose presidents were not from his party” (Envío 1996e). This and other
methods allowed the Liberal party to disproportionately staff polling stations when the
assigned pollworkers did not show up for duty (Envío 1996e). Thus, while the ample
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number of polling stations – 8,955 (IFES 1996a, 3) – was designed to facilitate
participation, both logistical disorganization and partisan manipulation at the
departmental level of the CSE caused confusion for many voters.
A more extensive obstacle confronting voters on election day was the late opening
of polling stations and long lines. Some polling stations also closed before everyone
waiting in line was able to vote, although the CSE had instructed voting sites to remain
open the full 11 hours even if they opened late (Carter Center 1996, 26-27; OAS 1997b,
53). While the late opening of polling stations is common in Nicaragua (and Guatemala
and El Salvador), the problem was more severe than usual in 1996, with many stations
opening hours late due largely to the late arrival of voting materials.
As Envío (1996e) reported, “[t]hese generalized delays and irregularities were
notably different than the order and punctuality of the 1984 and 1990 elections.” The
procedural hurdles that voters faced in the form of shifting polling places and long waits
resulted, to some extent, from the 1995 electoral reforms that had further politicized the
CSE and restructured the election administration bureaucracy. By staffing departmental
election councils with partisan appointees, the reforms reduced the technical capacity of
the electoral machinery immediately before a complex electoral process, and many
problems resulted from incapable departmental council members and poorly trained poll
workers (Envío 1996e; IFES 1996a, 3-4). The reforms also provided greater potential for
manipulation, and some have blamed the problems during the 1996 election on the fact
that the departmental electoral councils in the three most problematic departments where
fraud may have occurred were all headed by affiliates of the Constitutional Liberal Party
(PLC) (Envío 1996e). It is worth noting that the instances of fraud that may have
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occurred resulted not from overly inclusive voting practices, but from anomalies during
the vote count and transmission of results and the mishandling of ballots and tally sheets,
exacerbated by the exhaustion of poll workers (Carter Center 1996, 31-32).

Table 5.1 Election Administration Inclusiveness, Nicaragua 1984-1996
Dimension
Voter Registration
Extent of state
responsibility for
registering voters
Difficulty of
registration process

Ease of access to ID
documents required
for registration

Registration closing
date
Residency
requirement
Provisional
registration

Registry consultation

Purging of voter rolls

Description

Inclusiveness

Voter-initiated, state efforts to
distribute voter cards (19841990); automatic (after 1993)
Decentralized locations;
completed in one step prior to
1993, two or more steps after
1993; no cost
Multiple documents or
witnesses accepted (19841990); birth certificate (which
many people lacked) required
after 1993
4 months (1989); 90 days
after 1993

Medium/High

High/Medium

Juridical Basis*
Electoral law /
Administrative
practice
Electoral law /
Administrative
practice139

High/Low

Electoral law /
Citizen
identification law

Low/Medium

No residency requirement

High

Administrative
practice / Citizen
identification law
Electoral law140

No provisional registration
(though those turning 18
between close of registration
and election day could
register)
Voter lists posted at local
polling places and distributed
to parties; verification
exercise held in 1996
Voters not purged from the
rolls for failure to vote

Low

Electoral law

High

Electoral law /
Administrative
practice

High

n/a

Continued on next page

139

The electoral law stipulated that the locales to be used for registration and voting would be the same,
but the CSE had discretion in deciding on those locales (Ley Electoral 1984, Art. 65; 1988, Art. 24 passim
and Art. 136; see also IFES 1993, 11).
140
The electoral law required voters to register “where they habitually reside,” but did not define habitual
residence or establish a minimum period of residence in an area to register to vote in that jurisdiction (Ley
Electoral 1984, Art. 58; 1988, Art. 35).

183

Table 5.1, continued
Dimension
Getting to the Ballot
Box
Accessibility of
polling places
Assignment of voters
to polling places
Convenience voting
measures
Electoral Calendar
Casting a Ballot
Voter ID requirement

Provisional or
tendered ballots
Voter Education
State efforts to
inform voters of
where and how to
register and vote

Description

Inclusiveness

Juridical Basis*

Highly decentralized polling
places
Residential

High

Not used

Low

Administrative
practice
Administrative
practice
Electoral law

Voting held on Sunday

High

Electoral law

High141

Electoral law

Low/High

Electoral law

Voter card required, and voter
card delivered to voter upon
registration (1984-1990);
several ID forms accepted in
1996
Available only after 1995

Extensive voter education
efforts through diverse media

Overall
Inclusiveness

High

High

Administrative
practice / Electoral
law

High

* Electoral Law refers to those elements based on the electoral law that are not open to
modification by the electoral management body. Administrative Practice refers to those
elements that are not explicitly codified in the electoral law, but are instead matters of
bureaucratic performance and administrative discretion.

Explaining Inclusive Election Administration
The contrasts between the inclusiveness of Nicaragua’s election administration in
the 1980s to mid-1990s (summarized in Table 5.1 above) and that of El Salvador and
Guatemala are significant. Whereas the latter two countries concentrated polling stations
in urban areas, Nicaragua utilized a system of extensive decentralization to minimize
voters’ travel to the polls. Whereas voter registration processes in El Salvador and

141

Although only one form of ID was accepted at the polls in 1984 and 1990, obtaining the ID entailed no
additional burden for voters.
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Guatemala were onerous and costly for many voters, in Nicaragua the CSE went to great
lengths to facilitate registration and deliver voter cards. When a permanent voter registry
was created in the mid-1990s, it was accompanied by rules to allow any voter with a
valid ID card to vote in their jurisdiction, even if their name did not appear on the voter
lists. And the three general elections held during this period were accompanied by
extensive voter education campaigns to inform voters of where and how to register and
vote. What accounts for Nicaragua’s inclusive election administration during this period?
This section examines the influence of several variables, and shows that the
origins of Nicaragua’s election administration inclusiveness lie in 1) the different nature
of election fraud practiced in pre-democratic Nicaragua compared to Guatemala, and the
lesser preoccupation with fraud in Nicaragua in the 1980s; 2) international pressures that
prompted a strong desire for high voter turnout; 3) the governing party’s confidence that
it would be victorious in clean and high turnout elections; and 4) international technical
and financial assistance that helped Nicaragua implement inclusive election
administration measures.

The Specter of Election Fraud
Like Guatemala and El Salvador in the 1970s, Nicaragua had its share of
fraudulent election practices under the Somoza regime. Ballot box stuffing, multiple
voting, translucent ballots that violated the secrecy of the vote, and censorship and
intimidation were all common (Walker 2003, 140).
Yet these past fraudulent practices did not impact the shape of election
administration in the post-Somoza period, as had occurred in Guatemala. The explanation
for this difference lies partly in the different nature of those frauds, itself a product of the
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different roles that elections played in the different regimes. Whereas instances of
election fraud in Guatemala had been traumatic events in which presumptive victors in
presidential contests had been robbed, in Nicaragua election fraud under the Somozas
was simply part of the regime’s corrupt business as usual. These different expectations of
and reactions to fraud can be understood by reference to the different role that elections
played in the two countries. In Guatemala, while elections were not free – civil liberties
were not fully respected and leftist parties were proscribed – and the military retained
extensive powers beyond the reach of civilian authorities, elections did exhibit an
important degree of competition between officially allowed parties. Within this system of
limited competition, it was expected that elections would be conducted fairly. In
Nicaragua, by contrast, electoral competition was a façade, with the understanding that
the Somozas would rule directly or through puppets. Nicaragua’s Conservative Party
played the role of official opposition to Somoza’s Liberals, and the Somozas co-opted
Conservative party leaders with patronage positions in the government and National
Assembly (Walker 2003, 30-31, 140-141). As Walker (2003, 28) puts it, “[w]henever
possible, the Conservative leadership was bought off,” including a pact “in which the
Conservative chiefs agreed to put up a candidate to lose in the rigged election of 1951 in
return for personal benefits and minority participation in the government.” Rather than
competitive elections being hijacked on election day or during the vote count, elections
under the Somozas were rigged throughout the process, and were understood to be
facades to provide the Somozas with some veneer of legitimacy, rather than real contests
for power in which the outcome was uncertain.
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Thus when a new electoral system was established in the 1980s, the legacy of
fraudulent elections did not weigh heavily on the minds of legislators and election
administrators.142 The FSLN, after all, had never experienced having an election victory
stolen through fraud, as had parties in Guatemala and El Salvador. The Sandinistas also
had little to fear from wholesale election fraud, as they held majority control of the
electoral management body. There was thus no inclination to centralize voting sites to
avoid ballot stuffing or voter manipulation in rural areas, or (at least initially) to utilize
stringent record checking to prevent potentially fraudulent voter registrations. When
asked whether the extensive decentralization of polling places (voto domiciliario) caused
concern about the possibility of election fraud, a CSE magistrate at the time said this was
not a preoccupation, and noted the safeguards in place such as the presence of party poll
watchers (Interview 46). As discussed in the following chapter, however, this changed
after the 1996 elections. The long term consequences of the irregularities in that contest
would be ominous, as FSLN leaders drew lessons from that election that they would not
forget when they would again come to control the country’s electoral machinery.

International Influences: Geopolitical Pressures
A strong force for inclusive administrative practices was international pressure on
the Sandinista regime, primarily from the United States. The Reagan administration
criticized the regime through the early 1980s for not holding elections, which “seriously
eroded international support for the Sandinista government, particularly among the West
142

Restrictions on competition under Somoza apparently did influence subsequent regulations of political
party registration, as was the case in Guatemala (see Chapter 3, conclusion). When an IFES technical
mission recommended tightening party registration requirements, it noted: “This might be problematic,
however, because during the Somoza years basically only two parties existed, Liberal and Conservative.
According to [CSE executive secretary] Dr. Zelaya, the right to easily form political parties is therefore
considered particularly important in Nicaragua” (IFES 1993, 35).
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Europeans on whom the government depend[ed] for most of its foreign economic
assistance, as well as among key members of the Democratic Party in the United States”
(LASA 1984, 29). As a result of this pressure, the Nicaraguan regime held elections in
1984 rather than the following year, as originally planned. The effect of the elections on
international audiences was paramount: as Vice President Sergio Ramírez wrote in his
memoir of the revolution, “the elections of 1984 were for the United States, as well as for
us, part of the mechanism of war. Carrying them out in regal [form], we sought the
legitimacy that they, impeding them, wanted to take away” (Ramírez 2007, 152). As both
the FSLN and the opposition understood, “foreign sympathy – especially from the
Western democracies – was the real object of the electoral contest” (Gilbert 1988,
121).143
This meant that Sandinista leaders wanted a high voter turnout to legitimize the
elections internationally – not only with the U.S. but also with Nicaragua’s allies – and to
demonstrate and enhance their domestic support (Interview 37). As one of the few
observation missions to the 1984 elections reported, “Sandinista officials had stressed the
need for a high turnout, to demonstrate the validity of the electoral process and to ‘send a
message to Washington.’ ‘Turnout is the most important thing,’ Comandante Jaime
Wheelock told our delegation the day before the election. ‘It doesn’t matter how the vote
is divided’” (LASA 1984, 17). With Reagan just re-elected and his administration’s war
against Nicaragua expected to intensify, the Sandinistas “hoped that a competitive
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As Gilbert (1988) goes on to say, “the party hoped to gain international political legitimacy by holding
Western-style elections. The revolution was increasingly criticized from abroad for its curtailment of
political pluralism under the 1982 emergency law. Especially in the wake of the October 1983 American
invasion of Grenada (with its implicit threat that US forces might also be used in Central America), the
Sandinista leadership was anxious to shore up its sagging support in Western Europe and Latin America”
(122).
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election with heavy turnout would help to shield Nicaragua against this anticipated
onslaught” (LASA 1984, 29).
This pressure intensified up to the 1990 elections, as the U.S. continued the contra
war and economic embargo throughout the decade. International scrutiny was intense, as
the 1990 elections were the most heavily observed elections in history up to that time.
The Sandinistas again advanced the date of the elections, as a “shield” against potential
aggression from the Bush administration, as one former Sandinista leader put it
(Interview 44). Pressure from the U.S. and other countries also resulted in the
government making significant concessions to opposition demands, including permitting
foreign campaign donations (LASA 1990, 4-6). International scrutiny and U.S. backing
of the opposition coalition competing against the incumbent Sandinistas would have
greatly magnified the political costs of any administrative measure that could have been
interpreted as an attempt to suppress the opposition vote.
The Sandinistas thus hoped for high turnout that would legitimate the electoral
process and their rule. This desire for high turnout could only exercise such influence on
electoral rules, however, in the absence of countervailing partisan motives. As discussed
below, the fact that the Sandinistas fully expected to win both the 1984 and 1990
elections allowed the desire for high turnout to take precedence.

Election Costs and International Assistance
International influences on Nicaragua’s election administration were not limited
to geopolitical pressures. Nicaragua also received large numbers of international election
observers and technical and financial assistance in setting up its electoral machinery.
Prior to the 1984 elections, Scandinavian countries donated $1.65 million for Nicaragua’s
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elections, representing a small portion of the $25 million cost of the elections (IHRLGWOLA 1984, 17; LASA 1984, 29). Technical support also came from Swedish experts
(IHRLG-WOLA 1984, 18).
Aid greatly increased for the 1990 elections, with a total of $9 million provided to
the CSE, $4.8 million of it in goods and services and the rest in finance (CSE 1991, 30).
Assistance included technical support from CAPEL in training party poll watchers and
assistance from the electoral commissions of Costa Rica and Venezuela, while Germany
and Spain donated computer equipment to prepare voter lists (CSE 1991, 8, 12, 31;
ONUVEN 1989a, 11). Financing from Canada, Norway, and Sweden helped overcome
shortfalls in funding for the printing of voter education materials (CSE 1991, 17). Also
boosting the CSE’s budget was a provision in the agreement allowing foreign campaign
donations mandating that half of foreign funds would go to the CSE to cover election
costs (ONUVEN 1989b, 5). After 1990, Canada provided computer equipment and
technical assistance for generating precinct maps, while European donors provided
several million dollars for the civil registry project (IFES 1993, 33-34; 1994a, Appendix
3; Interview 43).
For the 1996 elections, the U.S. provided over $6 million to CAPEL for technical
support to the CSE (Envío 1996e), while the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES) also provided technical support (Butler et al. 1996; IFES 1996a). Foreign
donations covered more than half of the 1996 election costs (McCoy 1998, 61), and
helped compensate for the fact that the executive branch “dragged its feet in giving the
CSE the corresponding funds for both the ID cards and the organization of the elections,”
in contrast to the government’s complete support for the CSE in prior elections (Envío
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1996e). As an experienced observer put it, the elections “could not have been held
without international assistance” (McCoy 1998, 61).
According to the CSE’s executive secretary at the time and later president,
international assistance was critical in establishing decentralized voting (voto
domiciliario), which otherwise would have been impossible to fully implement
(Interview 43). A CSE magistrate during this period also noted that technical support
from Sweden and Canada was instrumental in developing electoral cartography, among
other things (Interview 46).
Foreign funding also made the introduction of the new identity card and
civil/voter registry possible. Almost all of the costs associated with this process were
covered by foreign donations (Envío 1996b; 1996d). Especially important was support
from Spain, which provided most of the materials, equipment, and training (Interviews
38, 43). This support was critical in overcoming domestic resource constraints, and
combined with the dedication of the CSE made it possible to overcome or circumvent the
many challenges of constructing a permanent registry in a poor post-conflict country.144
Nevertheless, foreign donations were limited, so that the CSE only had a few computers
and printers with which to produce cédulas, while reliance on intermittent and
uncoordinated foreign assistance hindered long-range planning for the civil registry
project (IFES 1993).
In addition to financial and technical assistance from the international community,
Nicaragua also received international election monitors, with over four hundred observers
present for the 1984 elections (IHRLG-WOLA 1984, 41) and over 2,500 observers in

144

As a mission of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems noted, the CSE’s civil registry
project was “hindered mostly by lack of resources and not lack of ability” (IFES 1993, 38).
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1990 (ONUVEN 1990c, 7). International observer delegations offered advice throughout
the 1990 electoral process, to which Nicaraguan election officials were receptive
(McConnell 2000, 130; IIDH-CAPEL 1990, 39). Observers had the most evident impact
on administrative inclusiveness in 1996, however. When it became evident that voter
cards would not be distributed in time for that year’s election, the OAS mission helped
devise the plan for issuing supplementary voter cards (OAS 1997b, 29). Additionally, the
ad hoc registration carried out in 26 municipalities was originally planned for two
weekends, but the OAS and other observer organizations suggested extending the process
when it seemed that there were still many unregistered after the first two weekends, a
suggestion that the CSE heeded (OAS 1997b, 32). Other suggestions were rejected,
however, as when the head of the OAS observer mission “suggested that the remaining
[voter ID] documents be distributed at the voting tables on election Sunday itself, an idea
overruled by the parties, which set a final deadline of noon on Saturday” (Envío 1996f).
International assistance thus made many inclusive administrative practices
possible, although without other external pressures and internal political conditions, such
assistance would not have guaranteed inclusive election administration. Financial and
technical assistance from the international community was thus a necessary but not
sufficient condition for producing Nicaragua’s inclusive election administration.

Partisan Interests
Hoping to gain international legitimacy with high voter turnout, and supplied with
the international assistance to put inclusive election administration measures in place, the
FSLN government could construct an inclusive system of election administration. This
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was facilitated by the fact that the FSLN expected to win both the 1984 and 1990
elections.
In 1984, both the Sandinistas and the opposition fully expected the FSLN to win
fair elections (Gilbert 1988, 121). As opposition leader Arturo Cruz commented, “In fair
and free elections, the Sandinistas would possibly win, given that they enjoy considerable
popular support” (Envío 1984a). As one respondent recalled, “there was no doubt” that
the FSLN would win in 1984 (Interview 46). Consequently, the FSLN had nothing to fear
from high turnout among all segments of voters, confident as the party was in its victory
and hoping for high turnout. Thus the FSLN first aimed to achieve a high rate of voter
registration. As Envío (1984b) reported before the elections, “a high number of voters in
November will indicate acceptance of the elections. In this context, Sandinista leaders
considered registration the ‘first electoral victory,’ not only because of the large turnout
but also because of the organizational efforts that made the success possible.” Given the
desire for high turnout, it was also not surprising that election observers reported that on
election day some polling stations stayed open later than prescribed, with “FSLN
supporters going into neighborhoods to inform people who had not voted that they could
still vote” (IHRLG-WOLA 1984, 43).
Leading up to the 1990 elections, the FSLN again expected to be victorious, and
opinion polls consistently showed the party leading the opposition UNO coalition. Yet
UNO, which pulled off a surprising victory, also expected to win. These expectations on
both sides had beneficial consequences, as both wanted a clean and fair process, which
they believed would give them the victory (McConnell 2000, 119).
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Expecting victory and seeking legitimacy, the FSLN was willing to negotiate and
compromise with opposition parties over the electoral law in 1983-1984 and again in
1988-1989. Prior to the 1984 elections, opposition demands for the most part did not
involve election administration measures.145 But in 1989-1990, opposition demands
included introduction of a new identity card, limiting polling stations to 400 voters,
delivering the voter rolls to political parties at least 60 days before the election, and
adjustments to the registration periods. The government met almost all of these demands
(Carter Center 1990; ONUVEN 1989a, 6-7).146 Thus, for instance, the CSE had initially
planned two 3-day registration periods, 45 days apart; the opposition demanded four
Sunday registrations, which “complicated the registration process and added significantly
to its cost” (ONUVEN 1989a, 7), but was nevertheless carried out.
Importantly, at least one inclusive measure – the decentralization of polling
stations – did not stand to benefit the FSLN electorally. The party enjoyed greater support
in urban areas, and as the decade wore on rural sectors grew increasingly alienated from
the party (Orquist 1992, 16-18; Interview 44). As Orquist (1992, 18) notes, “[b]y 1984,
the rural vote for the Conservative Democratic Party indicated that the countryside was
one of the weakest areas for the FSLN.” While over 65 percent of the national vote went
to the FSLN, the party garnered 68 percent of the urban vote, and abstention was higher
in the countryside than in urban areas in 1984, likely a result of the withdrawal of the
main opposition coalition and the greater opposition to the FSLN in the countryside
145

Two contentious issues worth noting were the voting age and voting rights of members of the armed
forces. The FSLN insisted on a voting age of 16 and voting rights for the military, which the opposition
viewed as an attempt to include more FSLN supporters in the electorate (IHRLG-WOLA 1984, 21; LASA
1984, 11-12).
146
UNO also wanted to permit voting for Nicaraguans living abroad, no doubt expecting high levels of
support from Nicaraguans that had left the country during the revolution. Ultimately only registration
abroad was allowed, with those registering needing to be in-country on election day to vote.
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(Castro 1992, 131-132). By the time of the 1990 elections, there were greater signs of
FSLN weakness in rural areas, although the party still expected to win nationally
(Interview 44). Government policies had driven some rural Nicaraguans to join the
Contra forces and many more to lose any goodwill they held towards the Sandinistas.
Post-election surveys showed the FSLN winning below 30 percent of the vote in rural
areas (Orquist 1992, 18).
Therefore, the FSLN’s partisan electoral interest might have been expected to lead
to administrative measures to boost urban turnout and depress rural turnout. But
countervailing partisan interests prevailed: the FSLN expected to win free and fair
elections handily, and hoped to maximize voter turnout to legitimize their rule. An
additional countervailing factor was ideological: the Sandinistas had attempted to
construct a participatory form of socialist democracy during the 1980s. While this vision
of participatory democracy, with its focus on mass organizations with ties to the partystate, was generally seen as an alternative to liberal electoral democracy (Gilbert 1988,
34-35), it was only natural that when the Sandinistas grafted competitive elections onto
their revolutionary model, they would establish an election administration system that
prioritized the participation of voters and sought to eliminate barriers to the ballot.

EMB Structure: The Supreme Electoral Council
For the most part, the Supreme Electoral Council was a force for inclusive
election administration. In the 1980s, the CSE and its president, Mariano Fiallos, played a
central role in designing the system of electoral administration. According to a member
of the FSLN’s national directorate and a CSE magistrate, the CSE was given carte
blanche by the government to design many electoral procedures, including voter
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registration, the location of polling places, and voter education campaigns (Interviews 44,
46). The CSE had the good fortune to be headed by a president with technical preparation
for the job. According to a knowledgeable Nicaraguan academic, Fiallos had studied
elections and political parties as part of his academic work, and his and the CSE’s
recommendations to the National Assembly held great sway (Interview 37).
Enjoying a great deal of discretion in designing election administration
procedures, the CSE’s initiative and hard work made the decentralization of polling
stations possible. The CSE established an electoral cartography division, and utilized
census maps and topographical photographs to devise a preliminary cartography. The
council then organized field visits to update data on population centers and potential
locales for polling places (CSE 1991, 4; Interview 43), and again in the early 1990s sent
cartographers out to the field to update precinct maps in order to distribute new polling
places, limit each precinct to 300-350 voters, and minimize travel distances for voters
(IFES 1993, 14). While international assistance was essential to the successful
implementation of polling site decentralization, the competence and initiative of the CSE
were equally critical in carrying out this technically demanding task.
Thus the CSE was a case of a nominally partisan electoral management body that
acted in a neutral manner to implement inclusive administrative practices. As Booth
(1998, 192) puts it, “[a]lthough a majority of its magistrates and staff originally came
from the FSLN, the CSE won a strong reputation for technical competence and
nonpartisanship during the 1984 and 1990 elections” (see also McConnell 2000). LópezPintor (1998, 53) similarly notes that the CSE “acted with high standards of neutrality
and technical competence” and draws the lesson that “an electoral authority can be party-
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based and still operate neutrally and independently.” Part of the explanation no doubt lies
in the fact that the CSE was staffed by militants of a party that expected to win inclusive
and fair elections and held a participatory ideology that prioritized inclusion. Another
factor undoubtedly was the rectitude of the top CSE leadership.
The CSE’s strong reputation and competence also helped ensure the functioning
of automatic voter registration in the mid-1990s. There was debate over which institution
would be responsible for compiling and maintaining a new civil registry and distributing
ID cards, with the executive branch advocating that the Interior Ministry be tasked with
the responsibility, and the CSE arguing that the registry should be overseen by the
electoral body. The confidence that the CSE enjoyed at the time, along with the weakness
of the Chamorro administration in imposing its will on the legislature, contributed to the
registry and identification process being entrusted to the CSE (Interview 43). While
automatic voter registration would still have been possible had another government
agency been assigned the responsibility of maintaining the civil registry, assigning the
task to the CSE assured that registration would be automatic. It also meant that the
institution responsible for getting ID cards in the hands of voters before the 1996 election
would be motivated to ensure that all eligible citizens were able to vote.
Yet this began to change after the 1995 electoral reforms, which aimed at
reducing Sandinista influence in the CSE by mandating that all three members of
departmental councils be named from party lists. As Booth (1998, 192) explains:
This reform replaced many FSLN sympathizers on the CSE staff with
sympathizers of other parties – exactly what most of the mutually suspicious
political parties intended. However, this change also transformed the CSE staff
from a highly experienced and disciplined technical bureaucracy into one
penetrated by competing partisans, and it brought in thousands of inexperienced
departmental and local JRV personnel at the last minute.
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The reforms were passed over the public opposition of the CSE leadership, which
recommended to the legislature that CSE magistrates be prohibited from engaging in
partisan activities (IFES 1994a, 16). The immediate result of the reforms was an electoral
body with diminished capacity, as many departmental election councils and poll workers
lacked experience and were insufficiently trained (McCoy 1998, 61; Walker 1997, 308).
The consequences in the longer term would be more detrimental, as the following chapter
discusses.

Civil Society
As was the case in Guatemala in its early years of democratic elections, civil
society played no role in the establishment of Nicaragua’s election administration. In the
1980s, the most prominent civic and mass organizations were tied to the FSLN, and
exercised limited autonomy from the party (see, e.g., Gilbert 1988, 72-76). There were no
civic groups with a focus on electoral issues until 1996, when the group Ethics and
Transparency (Ética y Transparencia, or ET) formed with support from the National
Democratic Institute to observe the elections that year. ET would become a major actor in
domestic election observation in the years ahead. However, when the framework of
Nicaragua’s election administration was constructed in the 1980s and reformed in the
mid-1990s, organized civil society played little role in the choice of electoral procedures.
As elsewhere, crafting the rules of election administration in Nicaragua was an elite game
played by partisans and administrators.
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Conclusion
Nicaragua’s election administration practices during the country’s democratic
transition were significantly more inclusive than practices in Guatemala and El Salvador.
A number of factors shaped the country’s election administration (see Table 5.2 below).
International political pressures increased the importance of high voter turnout to
legitimize the electoral process, while the governing party expected to win the 1984 and
1990 elections and thus sought to facilitate participation even among rural voters who
tended to support the opposition. Headed partly by Sandinistas, the party-based Supreme
Electoral Council worked to facilitate participation, and its work was supported by
international financial and technical assistance. Unlike in Guatemala, the history of
fraudulent elections in Nicaragua under the personalist Somoza regime did not cast a
shadow on the new electoral rules, so that concerns about electoral integrity did not
crowd out a focus on voter inclusion. By the mid-1990s the country’s election
administration system was being reformed; it would go through even more drastic
changes in the years to come.

Table 5.2 Support for Hypotheses, Nicaragua 1984-1996
Category
Hypothesis
Support

Partisan
Interests

H1: Where a ruling party can identify
opposition supporters, election
administration inclusiveness will tend
to be low, whereas countries with
catch-all parties or fluid party systems
marked by low levels of partisan
attachments will tend to have more
inclusive electoral procedures.
H2: Parties with strong lower class
support (typically populist or leftist
parties) will support inclusive rules.

Continued on next page
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Not
supported

Supported

Comments
Although the FSLN
was weak in rural
areas, no attempt to
impede the rural vote
was made in the
context of the party’s
expectation of victory.
Leftist party put
inclusive practices in
place.

Table 5.2, continued
Category

Electoral
Management
Body
Structure

The Specter of
Election Fraud

Election Costs
and Financial
Resources

Civil Society
and Public
Opinion

International
Influences

Hypothesis

Support

H3: Partisan EMBs will tend to
implement less inclusive measures as
partisan election officials attempt to
impede the participation of some
parties’ supporters.
H4: Independent, non-partisan EMBs
will be associated with inclusive rules
in part by playing an active role in
electoral reform.
H5: A history of election fraud will
lead democratizing countries to adopt
strict safeguards against fraud, which
may in turn impose procedural
barriers to voting.
H6: Parties that have been the victims
of election fraud will support strict
safeguards that reduce inclusiveness.

H7: Countries with more resources
will have more inclusive election
administration.
H8: Strong civil society, particularly
domestic election observation groups,
will increase election administration
inclusiveness.
H9: Public opinion will set limits on
the extent to which elites can pursue
self-serving election administration
rules.
H10: International observers will
prevent extremely restrictive measures
in elections that they observe,
particularly measures that are highly
visible on election day.

H11: The recommendations of
election observers will have little
impact on election administration
practices.

Continued on next page
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Not
supported

Inconclusive

Comments
Party-based EMB
implemented highly
inclusive measures.

EMB was partisan
throughout the period.

Although election
fraud occurred under
Inconclusive Somoza, the nature of
electoral competition
differed.
The evidence is
consistent with this
hypothesis, as the
Inconclusive
FSLN had not been
the victim of fraud
under Somoza.
High inclusiveness
Not
achieved despite
supported
severe economic
hardship.
Organized civil
society independent of
Inconclusive
the state was weak.
No evidence of public
Not
opinion influence on
supported
election
administration.
The evidence is partly
consistent with this
hypothesis, as
Inconclusive inclusiveness
coincided with heavy
observer presence in
1990 and 1996.
Some
recommendations
Inconclusive
were heeded while
others were rejected.

Table 5.2, continued
Category

Hypothesis

Support

H12: When a country seeks good
relations with Western democracies,
the influence of election observers will
be enhanced and inclusive election
administration practices will be more
likely.
H13: Technical and financial
assistance will make inclusive
measures more likely by enhancing
domestic bureaucratic capacity.
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Supported

Supported

Comments
Geopolitical pressures
contributed to
inclusiveness.

International financing
was essential for
several inclusive
practices.

CHAPTER 6
NICARAGUA: THE CHANGING SHAPE OF PARTISAN ELECTORAL
ADMINISTRATION AND SELECTIVE DISENFRANCHISEMENT

During the 2000s, Nicaragua saw a slow erosion of its election administration
inclusiveness. Many inclusive features of election administration, including highly
decentralized polling places, have remained in place, and national elections in 2001 and
2006 were carried out in a relatively inclusive manner. But beginning in the mid-2000s,
the administrative conduct of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) regarding such
matters as the issuance of ID cards and the provision of information to voters has made
voting more difficult for many voters – particularly those not affiliated with the ruling
party. This chapter documents and explains this trend of declining election administration
inclusiveness in a country that had been praised for its open and inclusive election
system.

Background: The Pact and the 2000 Electoral Reform
A new electoral law was approved in 2000, continuing a pattern of approving a
new election law shortly before each national election. The new law had its roots in a
political pact between the country’s two strongest political parties, the Sandinista Front
(FSLN) and the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC), or more specifically between the
parties’ leaders, former president Daniel Ortega and then-president Arnoldo Alemán. The
pact effectively divided positions in state institutions between the two parties, and the
electoral reforms that accompanied the pact sought to benefit the two parties and their
leaders and exclude potential challengers.
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One effect of the new law was to make the formation of new political parties
more difficult by imposing strict registration requirements. At the same time, nonparty
candidacies were eliminated. As the Carter Center (2000a) put it, the reforms “raised the
requirements for party registration, making Nicaragua’s law one of the most stringent in
Latin America,” while “[t]he broad effect of the January 2000 reforms was to reduce the
number of political parties able to compete in elections.” Since 2000 Nicaragua’s party
system has been characterized as a cartel system and a two-and-a-half party system,147
with the major forces being the FSLN and the Liberals, and the latter camp divided
between shifting party labels. While a few smaller parties have remained active, the
FSLN and the Liberals have remained the dominant forces in Nicaragua’s party politics.
The electoral reforms also entailed changes to the Supreme Electoral Council
(CSE) that would prove important for voter inclusion. The number of CSE magistrates
was increased from five to seven, and municipal electoral councils were established, with
the top two positions on the councils to be divided between the top two parties (as with
the departmental councils and polling stations) (Envío 1999). The Ortega-Alemán pact
also included the early dismissal of the sitting CSE magistrates, a move sought by the
FSLN. As the news magazine Envío (1998) reported,
…Ortega supporters within the FSLN have been insisting for over a year that all
Supreme Electoral Council magistrates must be changed. They indiscriminately
accuse all five of being accomplices in what they continue to insist was an
electoral fraud that supposedly wrested victory from the FSLN at the ballot box in
the October 1996 elections.
While Nicaragua’s prior electoral reforms in 1995 had aimed to reduce Sandinista
influence in the CSE by politicizing the appointment of departmental electoral councils
147

As Anderson and Dodd (2005) put it, Nicaragua came “to resemble the ‘two and a half party systems’
that occasionally arise in established democracies,” with 30 percent of survey respondents identifying as
Sandinistas, 27 percent as Liberals, 7 percent Conservative, and 23 percent independent (224).
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and poll workers, the 2000 reform politicized the CSE even further, dividing up the
council between the top two parties (the FSLN and the PLC) and creating municipal
electoral councils that would also be staffed by partisan appointees – thus expanding the
patronage positions available to the parties. While “some Nicaraguans took comfort in
the fact that two rival parties…share control of the CSE, such that one may act to check
the partisan behavior of the other...others expressed concern that the two parties had
allied to disadvantage third parties” (Carter Center 2000a).
With this bipartisan structure of election administration, Nicaragua held relatively
efficient and inclusive national elections in 2001 and 2006. Yet by the mid-2000s partisan
disputes and jockeying for advantage within the CSE were hampering the council’s
effectiveness. By 2008 election administration inclusiveness eroded as the CSE’s
bipartisanship gave way to de facto single party control. The following sections describe
this erosion of inclusiveness and explain how it resulted from a combination of electoral
management body structure, political party characteristics, and a permissive international
environment.

The Erosion of Election Administration Inclusiveness
One of the most inclusive features of Nicaragua’s election administration in the
1980s and 1990s was the extensive decentralization of polling places. This administrative
feature remains in place, with only slight modification, and is widely considered one of
the strengths of the country’s electoral system. The number and location of polling places
have not been without problems, however. For instance, in order to reduce costs, the CSE
reduced the number of polling stations for the 2000 municipal elections compared to
1996 despite a significant increase in the number of voters, creating confusion for some
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voters about their voting site (Carter Center 2000b, 4; IPADE 2000, 18-19). Since 2001
there has been a slight tendency towards installing additional voting tables within existing
voting centers rather than distribute them in other locations (Carter Center 2001b, 2; IRI
2002, 27).148 Nevertheless, the system of polling locations continues to be quite
accessible for voters.
Other elements of election administration, however, have come to pose
significant burdens on prospective voters. The most significant barriers have been
related to ID cards and the voter registry, and more recently the provision of voter
education.

Voter Registration and ID Distribution
Despite few legal changes, the administration of voter registration and the
distribution of ID cards has gone from inclusive (if not technically efficient) to restrictive.
After significant efforts in 1996 to distribute ID cards (cédulas) to voters, voter
registration continued to be fairly accessible through the 2001 elections. The CSE made
extensive efforts to distribute ID cards, including a “backpack” delivery plan (plan
mochilero) in the final month before election day, involving almost 1,300 citizens
delivering ID cards door-to-door in rural areas and at delivery points in cities (Carter
Center 2001b, 2; 2002, 14; OAS 2002, 5-6). In both the 2001 national elections and the
2002 regional elections on the Atlantic Coast, election observers positively evaluated the
CSE’s efforts in registering voters (Carter Center 2001b, 2; OAS 2002, 5-6, 27).

148

The average number of voting tables (JRVs) for each voting center inched up from 2.3 in the 2001
election to 2.6 in the 2006 election and 3.0 in 2011 (OAS 2002, 20; 2008b, 51) [the figure for 2011 is
calculated from unpublished data obtained by the author from the Institute for Development and
Democracy (IPADE)].
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Nevertheless, the CSE’s inability to fully process cédula applications in time for
each election continued, requiring the issuance of more easily manufactured substitute ID
cards, valid only for voting purposes in a single election, to hundreds of thousands of
voters for whom the council could not produce cédulas in a timely manner (Carter Center
2007, 30; IPADE 2006, 16; OAS 2008b, 49).149 More troubling was the number of ID
cards not delivered by election day, often exceeding 100,000 (Carter Center 2000b, 5;
2002, 17; EUEOM 2006, 32; IPADE 2000, 19; 2004, 21; OAS 2008b, 20). However, it is
not clear how many people were disenfranchised as a result, as many undelivered cards
pertained to people who had emigrated or were deceased (OAS 2002, 6).
After the 2001 elections the CSE’s efforts to facilitate registration and distribute
ID cards began to diminish. Some barriers persisted from previous years. First, civil
registry procedures remained antiquated, with births and deaths recorded by hand and
manually copied from municipal registries to the central registry. The resulting errors
make obtaining an ID card more difficult (EUEOM 2006, 30). Second, applications for
cédulas are not accepted within 90 days of an election, and cédulas are not to be
manufactured within 60 days (Ley 152, Art. 37).150 This early closing date has meant the
deadline for registration is prior to the official start of election campaigns.
Other serious obstacles to voter registration were new. One has been the closing
of municipal registry offices between election periods, ostensibly due to budget
restrictions. This requires those applying for and picking up an ID card to travel to an
149

For the 2000 municipal elections, about 15 percent of voters received a substitute document rather than a
permanent cédula (Carter Center 2000a); this figure dropped significantly in subsequent elections, to below
three percent in 2008 (Carter Center 2002, 17; 2007, 31; IPADE 2009, 21).
150
For the 2006 elections the National Assembly, at the president’s initiative, approved a 15 day extension
of the deadline to apply for a cédula, while maintaining the deadline for producing cédulas (EUEOM 2006,
32; OAS 2008b, 20, 47). The CSE opposed this extension because of its impacts on logistical preparations
for the elections (IPADE 2006, 14).
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office in the departmental capital, which poses a major barrier in time and cost (Carter
Center 2007, 20; IPADE 2009, 20; IPADE and NDI 2006, 5; OAS 2008b, 19). The
closing of municipal offices also results in bottlenecks in producing ID cards as the CSE
receives a wave of applications before each election.151
Additionally, the CSE stopped making efforts to deliver ID cards to voters’ homes
or notify voters when their cards were ready to be picked up at the registry office
(EUEOM 2006, 31). As an observer mission reported of the 2006 elections, “[a]
significant number of the ID cards, numbering in the thousands, were not picked up by
citizens, in part because many citizens did not know whether their ID card had arrived,
and did not have the time and resources to make speculative trips to the municipal
election office to find out” (EUEOM 2006, 32).152 The burden on voters to make multiple
trips to registry offices in the hopes of retrieving one’s ID card, common in Guatemala
and El Salvador, was now evident in Nicaragua.
The growing difficulties of obtaining an ID card, and thereby being registered to
vote, were documented in 2006 by the Nicaraguan NGO Ethics and Transparency in a
study tracking over 500 citizens as they applied for an ID. The study found an average
wait time of 155 days to receive a card after applying, and 11 percent of the sample did
not receive a card by election day despite applying months in advance (Ethics and
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The early registration closing date might be ameliorated by the fact that voter registration is automatic
upon obtaining a national ID card, which is needed for a variety of purposes besides voting; thus many ID
card applications would likely be submitted in between electoral periods, since citizens need an ID aside
from its use for voting. However, the closing of municipal registry offices between electoral periods gives
incentive to citizens to wait until an electoral period (when local offices are open) to apply for an ID.
152
The EU mission elaborated: “The CSE did not issue guidelines to the municipal offices on how to
manage and expedite the distribution process, so a variety of practices were seen across the country. Simple
and helpful measures, such as publicly displaying the list of ID cards that had arrived, reading out the list of
names on local radio and TV stations…or delivering that list to all the political parties, were not commonly
adopted. …Distribution was often disorganised, with municipal offices not keeping proper records of which
cards had been delivered, or which of the remaining cards dated from previous years” (EUEOM 2006, 33).
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Transparency 2007, 19, 22). The study noted that obtaining voter credentials had become
more time consuming in Nicaragua than in Guatemala or El Salvador (Ethics and
Transparency 2007, 26).
By 2006 the slow delivery of cédulas caused suspicions that the two parties in
control of the CSE, the FSLN and PLC, were “engaged in a parallel distribution of voting
documents to their supporters to the detriment of parties lacking representation on the
CSE” (Carter Center 2007, 21; see also EUEOM 2006, 6; OAS 2008b, 20, 73). These
suspicions were allayed somewhat when an independent survey found no partisan pattern
among those lacking cédulas (Carter Center 2007, 21) and when the CSE published a full
list of the cédulas that were ready to be picked up (OAS 2008b, 19).153 But accusations of
politicized ID card delivery grew as the FSLN came to dominate the Supreme Electoral
Council by 2008.
Leading up to the 2008 municipal elections, observers received complaints that
the FSLN-controlled CSE was only distributing cédulas to the party’s supporters, and
polls done among those trying to retrieve their ID card in the final days before the
election showed that they were overwhelmingly opposition supporters (IPADE 2009, 2021; Ethics and Transparency 2008, 3-4; n.d. 4, fn. 9). Similar reports were received by
observers to the 2010 regional elections on the Atlantic Coast (EUEEM 2010, 11).
In 2011 the problem was worse: in two-thirds of municipalities monitored by
domestic observers, delivery of ID cards was conducted by political parties (in almost all
cases, the FSLN) rather than the CSE (IPADE 2011a, 2; see also EUEOM 2011, 6, 19).
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The OAS observer mission concluded that partisan manipulation of ID card delivery “was isolated…and
had a marginal influence on the electoral results” (OAS 2008b, 20). The EU observer mission reported
“[t]he overall impression was that of a distribution process in the hands of the FSLN and PLC party
machines, but not always efficiently benefitting these parties” (EUEOM 2006, 33).
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Municipal registry offices didn’t open until six weeks or less before the registration
deadline, and the distribution of cédulas at party offices continued even after municipal
CSE offices opened (IPADE 2011b, 4, 6). Estimates of the number of people
disenfranchised through limited access to ID cards ranged from tens to hundreds of
thousands (EUEOM 2011, 19; Ethics and Transparency 2011b, 3). One observer mission
reported that “young people were the most commonly affected, and while those without
identity cards were not always members of opposition parties, they were always
unaffiliated to the FSLN” (EUEOM 2011, 19). As opposition supporters and independent
voters struggled to obtain the ID necessary to vote, the CSE distributed newly designed
cédulas free of charge to government employees, made up largely of FSLN partisans;154
ordinary citizens were charged approximately $10 for the new ID (Ethics and
Transparency 2011a, 1; 2011b, 2, Interviews 31, 33), in violation of the citizen
identification law, which requires that cédulas be issued free of charge (Ley 152, Art.
53).155 The failure to process and deliver ID cards caused violent conflicts in a number of
municipalities as citizens protested and in some cases seized local CSE offices
demanding their cédulas (El Nuevo Diario 2011b [herafter END]; La Prensa 2011b).
One ID card problem has been so severe that even FSLN governments have had
to take some measures to address it: the fact that most Nicaraguans have not renewed
their cédulas, which were only to be valid for 10 years. The looming expiration of
cédulas has posed the challenge of renewing millions of ID cards, and as elections have
approached, the solution has been to postpone the challenge by extending the validity of
154

After taking office in 2007, the Sandinista government replaced thousands of non-Sandinista public
sector workers with employees loyal to the party (Rogers 2012a).
155
See also La Prensa 2011a. Funds for introducing a new cédula with more advanced safeguards were
donated by Spain in 2005, but the CSE delayed implementation until 2011, when it decided to begin
phasing in the new cédulas with state employees (see La Prensa 2010a.).
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the ID card: first in 2005 (Ley 549), again in 2009 (Ley 674), and yet again in late 2012.
The most recent extension was an FSLN initiative that responded to the fact that less than
15 percent of Nicaraguans had obtained a new ID, for which the CSE was charging $10,
while the expiration of existing cédulas was only weeks away (END 2012c). These
extensions, which have prevented mass disenfranchisement, have been necessary in the
face of the enormous challenge of renewing all of the country’s ID cards. But other
obstacles to obtaining ID cards have not been addressed. Bills introduced in the
Assembly by opposition deputies have sought to make cédulas more easily obtainable by
reducing or eliminating their cost and ensuring municipal registry offices remain open
permanently, but have not passed the Sandinista-controlled legislature.156
It is worth noting that these voter registration obstacles have not coincided with
efforts to clean up the voter registry. With deaths and emigrations often unreported, the
voter rolls have consistently been inflated (Carter Center 2000b, 4; 2002, 12; EUEOM
2001, 19) – recently by an estimated 20 percent (EUEOM 2011, 6, 18) – and audits have
found high rates of inaccuracies in the registry data.157 However, a 2012 reform will
require voters to be purged from the rolls if they do not vote in two consecutive national
elections or any intervening local elections (Ley 790). This may help clean the rolls of
deadwood, although at the cost of potentially impeding the participation of some voters.
Civil society groups opposed the reform (Asamblea Nacional 2012), and as of July 2012
the measure was being challenged in the courts (END 2012a).
156

These include bills introduced in 2008 and 2010 by non-Sandinista deputies, accessed through the
National Assembly’s website (www.asamblea.gob.ni).
157
Registry audits in 2006 found that the registry information was incorrect in about 35 percent of cases
(Ethics and Transparency 2006a, 20; 2006b, 20). A separate audit in the Atlantic Coast regions found
problems of a similar magnitude (IPADE and NDI 2006). Such inaccuracies highlight the importance of the
CSE’s verification days when voters can easily update their information in the voter registry, and of Article
41 allowing voters to cast a ballot in the precinct listed on their ID card even if their name does not appear
on the voter roll (Carter Center 2007, 22; Ethics and Transparency 2006a, 22).
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Article 41 and “Ratón Loco”
Related to the voter registry is one of the most uniquely inclusive aspects of
Nicaraguan election administration: the provision that voters not appearing on the voter
rolls can still cast a ballot if their ID card indicates that they live within the polling
station’s jurisdiction. This provision was maintained in the 2000 electoral law (Arts. 41
and 116), and it is common for a small handful of voters to make use of this provision at
each polling station of 400 voters. Although the provision raises some concerns about
double voting, most observers support the measure and note that problems with double
voting generally involve the complicity of poll workers rather than arising from the legal
provision itself (Interviews 40, 45, 47).158
While generally applied properly (Carter Center 2007, 32-33; IPADE 2000, 9;
2006, 36),159 there have been efforts by the CSE in recent years to circumvent Article 41.
In the 2004 municipal elections, its application was inconsistent following mixed signals
from CSE magistrates, some of whom had indicated before the election that the measure
would not be applied (END 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; IPADE 2004, 19-20).
According to many observers, 2004 was the beginning of efforts by some actors
within the CSE to play a game of ratón loco (“crazy mouse”), whereby either those with
access to the voter lists would relocate some voters to different polling places, or poll
158

This provision could lead to double voting if a voter changes his or her address on the voter registry
(which does not require obtaining a new cédula), and then votes at both the new polling place and the old
polling place listed on the person’s cédula. As a safeguard against this, polling places check voters’ names
against a list of voters who have requested a change of residence. In theory, only voters not appearing on
this list can cast a ballot. In 2006 observers found that only 0.33 percent of voters could not vote at a
polling place because they appeared on the change-of-residence list (IPADE 2006, 36); in this event, these
voters are supposed to be directed to the correct polling place.
159
The incorrect application of this provision at times favors inclusion, allowing people to vote even when
the address on their ID does not correspond to the polling station’s jurisdiction (running the risk of allowing
double voting) (see IPADE 2006, 36). At other times misapplication favors exclusion, as when voters not
appearing on the voter roll but possessing a valid ID are turned away by poll workers.
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workers would redirect voters to different polling places on election day. The result
would be that voters would tire of being sent from one polling place to another and would
eventually give up without voting. The Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) accused the
Sandinistas and the CSE of conducting ratón loco after its poor showing in 2004,
claiming that tens of thousands had been prevented from voting as a result (La Prensa
2004).160 There is in fact little hard evidence that this practice happens on a significant
scale, and Article 41 to some extent protects voters against this form of
disenfranchisement.161 But renewed signals from the Sandinista magistrates on the CSE
that Article 41 would not be applied in the 2006 regional and general elections generated
intense controversy. The PLC protested, accusing the FSLN of planning to carry out
ratón loco to disenfranchise Liberal voters (Carter Center 2007, 17; La Prensa 2006a;
2006b; 2006c).162 The CSE ultimately agreed to apply the provision, and some observers
estimated that as many as 15 percent of voters in the Atlantic Coast regional elections
made use of the provision to cast their ballots (Carter Center 2007, 18; NDI 2006f, 1).
Nevertheless, in the 2006 general election and subsequent elections observers reported
that the application of Article 41 was inconsistent across polling places (EUEOM 2006,
56-57; 2011, 31).163
Thus while Article 41 is a very inclusive legal measure, its implementation by the
CSE and poll workers seems to have become less consistent in recent years. In 2012,
160

Observers reported that many voters’ names did not appear on the voter lists on election day (IPADE
2004, 13-14), although the reasons were not clear.
161
Article 41 only prevents this form of disenfranchisement when a voter is assigned to vote in the precinct
that corresponds to the address listed on his or her cédula. For those that have moved to a new precinct and
updated their voter registration, but have not obtained a new cédula listing their new address, Article 41
does not apply.
162
To pressure the CSE to apply Article 41 in the 2006 elections, PLC magistrates on the CSE refused to
attend meetings in order to prevent a quorum, threatening to cripple the electoral body (OAS 2008b, 22).
163
On accusations that the CSE did not fully apply Article 41 in the 2008 municipal elections, see La
Prensa 2008 and El Nuevo Diario 2008.
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President Daniel Ortega introduced reforms to the electoral law that included the
elimination of this provision in Article 41. The package of reforms passed the Sandinistacontrolled legislature, although the Assembly postponed the modification to Article 41
until 2016. Surprisingly, given the past controversies over this provision, its elimination
seems to have garnered little attention from opposition parties, which focused their
criticisms on other provisions in the reforms.164 This revision to Article 41 may raise
barriers to voting for those who, whether through intentional disenfranchisement or
technical problems with the voter registry, do not appear on their precinct’s voters list on
election day.

Voter Education
Alongside growing registry-related obstacles to voting has been a steep decline in
the provision of election-related information to voters by the CSE. Observers to the 2006
election characterized voter education activities as limited, as the CSE “only carried out
one short media campaign” publicizing the need for voters to pick up their cédulas; nongovernmental organizations helped pick up the slack by carrying out their own voter
information activities (EUEOM 2006, 48; see also OAS 2008b, 62). By 2011, voter
education activities had ceased entirely: no efforts were made to inform voters about how
to obtain a cédula or the mechanics of voting (IPADE 2011a, 6), despite the introduction
of a new ballot format that year. While the CSE continued to carry out a registration
verification exercise prior to each election, opening polling stations for voters to confirm
164

Some of the reforms eliminated antiquated provisions in the law, while other provisions included
stronger safeguards for parties to monitor the electoral process, drastic increases in the size of municipal
councils, and 50 percent women’s quotas for party candidate lists. Most of the opposition deputies voted
for the bill, indicating that although the reforms were “cosmetic” and insufficient to guarantee fair
elections, they did contain positive elements. Two deputies claimed the reforms were intended to mollify
international criticisms (Asamblea Nacional 2012; Navas Corea 2012; Salina Maldonado 2012).
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or update their registration information, efforts to publicize the verification event
declined; by 2011 the CSE did nothing to publicize registry verification or any other
aspects of the electoral process (OAS 2008b, 18; Hagamos Democracia 2011, 14; IPADE
2009, 108; 2011b, 9). Not surprisingly, participation in the verification exercise has
declined over the years (IPADE 2006, 21; 2009, 23; OAS 2002, 5).
In 2011 the CSE not only eliminated its own voter education activities; it also
attempted to prohibit any individual or organization from disseminating information on
polling places or voter registry data under threat of prosecution. To justify this limitation
on civic education by political parties and non-governmental organizations, the CSE
proffered the dubious claim that the voter registry was the CSE’s intellectual property
(EUEOM 2011, 18-19; Hagamos Democracia 2011, 12, 20; IPADE 2011b, 15). The CSE
also made it more difficult for individuals to access information online by making
confirmation of one’s registration through the CSE website more difficult (Interviews 31,
32, 33; La Prensa 2011c; 2011f). As a result of all of this, it has become more difficult for
many prospective voters to find out their voter registration status, the location of their
polling place, and the type of ballot they will use to cast their vote.

Nicaragua’s New Election Administration
Through partisan distribution of ID cards, the elimination of public voter
education, and less reliable protection of voting rights in the face of voter registry errors,
Nicaragua’s election administration has become significantly less inclusive than it had
been in the country’s early democratic years. Voters also confronted inconveniences such
as the chronically late opening, and occasionally the early closing, of polling stations
(Carter Center 2002, 21; Consorcio Cívico Electoral n.d., 20, 36; IPADE 2000, 8, 13;
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2004, 16; 2006, 34, 56; OAS 2002, 14). By 2008, then, many voters – particularly those
without ties to the governing FSLN party – faced substantial obstacles to casting a vote.
These obstacles are summarized in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1 Election Administration Inclusiveness, Nicaragua 2006-2012
Dimension
Voter Registration
Extent of state
responsibility for
registering voters
Difficulty of
registration process

Ease of access to ID
documents required
for registration
Registration closing
date
Residency
requirement
Provisional
registration

Registry consultation

Purging of voter rolls

Description

Inclusiveness

Juridical Basis*

Automatic registration upon
obtaining ID card

High

Electoral law

Offices centralized in nonelection periods; process
obstructed by election officials;
no cost before 2010, but
monetary cost for some new ID
cards since 2010
Birth certificate required, often
entailing fees and
administrative barriers
90 days

Low

Administrative
practice / Citizen
identification law

Low

Citizen
identification law

Medium

Citizen
identification law
Electoral law166

No residency requirement165
No provisional registration
(though those turning 16
between close of registration
and election day may register)
Voter lists posted at local
polling places; verification
exercise held before elections;
publicity of voter rolls
diminished over time
Voters not purged from the rolls
for failure to vote; 2012 reform
would institute purging

Low

High /
Medium

High

Electoral law

Electoral law /
Administrative
practice

Electoral law

Continued on next page
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There is no residency requirement for most of the country, but to vote for regional councils in the
autonomous Atlantic Coast regions, there is a three month residency requirement for those born in, or with
at least one parent from, the Atlantic regions, and a one year residency requirement for everyone else (Ley
no. 28, Art. 22).
166
The electoral law (2000, Art. 43) sets a cutoff date for changes of residence 90 days before an election,
the same deadline as registering. There is no minimal residency period to change one’s residence on the
voter registry.
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Table 6.1, continued
Dimension
Getting to the Ballot
Box
Accessibility of
polling places
Assignment of voters
to polling places
Convenience voting
measures
Electoral Calendar
Casting a Ballot
Voter ID requirement
Provisional or
tendered ballots

Voter Education
State efforts to
inform voters of
where and how to
register and vote

Description

Inclusiveness

Highly decentralized polling
places
Residential

High

Not used

Low

Administrative
practice
Electoral law /
Administrative
practice167
Electoral law

Voting held on Sunday

High

Electoral law

High168

Electoral law

High

Electoral law

Low

Administrative
practice

National ID or voter card
required
Yes (anyone with ID pertaining
to the precinct may cast valid
ballot)

No voter education after 2006

Overall
Inclusiveness

High

Juridical Basis*

Medium

* Electoral Law refers to those elements based on the electoral law that are not open to
modification by the electoral management body. Administrative Practice refers to those
elements that are not explicitly codified in the electoral law, but are instead matters of
bureaucratic performance and administrative discretion.
Less inclusiveness has not been the only change in the country’s election
administration. Voter suppression has gone hand in hand with other forms of electoral
manipulation, as the 2008 municipal elections were marked by a range of fraudulent
practices on the part of the CSE and poll workers.169 The 2011 presidential and legislative
167

The electoral law vaguely alludes to the assignment of voters to precincts by requiring that the voter lists
“respect the residence and circumscription of the elector” (Art. 32).
168
Although access to a national ID card is obstructed for many citizens, this represents an obstacle at the
stage of voter registration rather than casting a ballot.
169
Irregularities included the revocation of two opposition parties’ registration on questionable grounds, the
denial of accreditation to experienced domestic observer groups, the failure to invite international
observers, the ejection of many opposition party poll watchers from polling stations on election day, the
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elections were again marred by irregularities and a lack of transparency, as well as the
unconstitutional candidacy of the incumbent president, who won handily (see EUEOM
2011).
Despite the pathologies of the bipartisan system of control over the electoral
management body, as late as 2006 the Carter Center (2007, 39) reported that “[i]n a
country where the election system strives to bring the ballot box into close proximity with
the voters, a veteran CSE administration with internal scaffolding dating from the 1980s
demonstrated the organizational and logistical capacity necessary to make both the
Atlantic Coast and the national elections happen in one year with minimal problems.”
Two years later the quality of Nicaragua’s election administration had deteriorated, both
in terms of inclusiveness and in safeguarding the integrity of the vote. As former CSE
president Rosa Marina Zelaya noted, after the advances in electoral cartography and
decentralized voting (voto domiciliario) that the CSE had achieved in the 1980s and
1990s, the country should be in the “big leagues” by now by implementing such
measures as voting by mail and voting abroad (Interview 43). Instead, the conduct of the
country’s sixth national election since the Sandinista Revolution was worse than the first
had been in 1984. The following section turns to explaining this trajectory.

Explaining the Erosion of Inclusiveness
Why has Nicaragua’s election administration, long recognized as being highly
inclusive, become more restrictive in recent years? Why has this change coincided with
the return to power of the FSLN, the party that had originally constructed the country’s
inclusive election system? The changing nature of partisan control over the electoral
failure to post results for many polling stations, and the alteration of vote tallies (Ethics and Transparency
n.d., 2, 7; IPADE 2009).
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machinery is central to an explanation, as is the nature of party identification and the
more permissive international environment facing the governing party.

Partisan Interests and EMB Structure
Nicaraguan opposition parties, civil society groups, and international election
monitors readily identify the main factor underlying the erosion of election
administration inclusiveness: the partisanship of the CSE. Yet this explanation raises
important questions, and closer analysis reveals nuances in the relationship between
partisan election administration and inclusiveness.
A partisan electoral body had coincided with inclusiveness during the 1980s and
1990s, and even for a time after 2000 when control over the CSE became bipartisan. The
bipartisan division of the CSE extended from the top magistrates – chosen for their
partisan loyalties170 – to the lowest levels. This bipartisan structure had detrimental
effects on the CSE’s administrative competence and operational coherence. Not only
were the national magistrates and positions on departmental and municipal councils
divided between Liberals and Sandinistas, but technical staff positions were as well
(Carter Center 2002, 11). One observer mission reported “numerous cases of relatively
long serving staff being replaced by less qualified political appointees” (EUEOM 2001,
19).171 Tensions between Sandinistas and Liberals hampered cooperation between
different levels of the CSE’s organizational structure and between operational divisions

170

As an EU mission noted, the CSE magistrates at the time included “the former FSLN campaign
manager, the former chief national party agents of both the FSLN and the PLC, and two former PLC
Interior Ministers” (EUEOM 2006, 23, note 17).
171
Electoral reform in 1995 had begun to fill the CSE with more partisan appointees, especially at the
departmental level. As this happened, CSE president Rosa Marina Zelaya “preserved the professional staff
by putting them in charge of the ID card process and urged them to provide all possible technical and
logistical support to the new CSE offices” (Butler et al. 1996). The 2000 electoral reform extended the
politicization of the CSE even further.
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(Carter Center 2002, 15; EUEOM 2006, 23-24), and in 2006 resulted in conflicts so
severe that CSE magistrates failed to meet the necessary quorum to make decisions for
months (Carter Center 2007, 16-17). Yet it is important not to overstate the decline in
bureaucratic capacity that has occurred. As observers to the 2011 elections noted, the
CSE has high organizational capacity (EUEOM 2011, 5), and while some lower level
staff lack adequate training, division directors within the CSE have extensive experience
in their positions.172
Administrative inclusiveness declined as bipartisan control of the CSE gave way
to single party dominance. In fact, several interviewees viewed the bipartisan control of
the CSE as adequately effective and blamed current election administration problems on
the control exercised by the governing party (Interviews 34, 36, 38). By 2006, the balance
between the FSLN and the PLC was tilting towards the Sandinistas, with the party
holding 4 of 7 magistrate positions (EUEOM 2006, 23) as the one “neutral” magistrate
aligned himself with the FSLN (Interview 35). The FSLN had also come to control more
directorates of the operational divisions within the CSE by 2006 (EUEOM 2006, 23; see
also Carter Center 2007, 16). According to two non-Sandinistas, the FSLN was more
attentive to gaining control of lower level technical positions, while the PLC was
preoccupied with controlling its share of top positions (Interviews 47, 48).
Schisms among the Liberals contributed to FSLN control of the CSE after 2006.
In that year’s presidential election, PLC dissidents left the party and formed the
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN). The split among the Liberals allowed FSLN leader
Daniel Ortega to win the presidency with 38 percent of the vote, while the ALN

172

This is the view of the former director of the civil registry (see El Nuevo Diario 2010 and La Prensa
2010b). This view was also shared by another neutral observer (Interview 36).
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candidate came in second – meaning the new party would share control over the CSE
with the Sandinistas, leaving the PLC with little representation on the council. Yet the
new party, which experienced its own internal schisms after the election, lacked the
organizational capacity that the PLC had possessed, and was an ineffective counterweight
to the FSLN (Ethics and Transparency n.d., 3).
By 2010 observers reported that “political alliances and a divided opposition gave
the ruling party a de facto control over the electoral administration” and that “CSE
structures from top to bottom have come into the FSLN influence” (EUEOM 2010, 2, 5).
Single party control was equally evident in the 2011 general election, when the third
spots of the three-member departmental and municipal election councils, which are
supposed to be divided among the parties not represented in the first two positions, were
distributed disproportionately to small parties aligned with the FSLN (Ethics and
Transparency 2011c, 3; EUEOM 2011, 5; Hagamos Democracia 2011; IPADE 2011b).
Even poll workers supposedly representing opposition parties were in some cases
actually from the FSLN or allied parties (EUEOM 2011, 15-16).
The result of single party control over the electoral council has been a decline in
inclusiveness enacted through administrative measures, such as the politicized
distribution of ID cards. The puzzle is that the FSLN is the same party (at least in name)
that established the inclusive system of election administration in the 1980s. What has
changed to make the party want to restrict access to the vote?
First, there has been a change in the strategic calculations and ideology of the
FSLN, as two conditions that contributed to the FSLN’s inclusive and transparent
election administration practices in the 1984 and 1990 elections – the party’s confidence
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in victory and its participatory ideology – eroded after 1990. The party’s unexpected loss
in 1990 and awareness of its consistent “ceiling” (techo) of electoral support of about 3540 percent afterward have apparently had a strong impact on the party’s leadership.
Several respondents noted that Daniel Ortega and the FSLN fear losing elections despite
their favorable standings in the polls, a lesson learned from the 1990 election when the
FSLN lost despite leading in the pre-election polls – a phenomena referred to locally as
the “gueguense effect” (Interview 42; see also Nicaragua Dispatch 2011). According to
some, this uncertainty about election outcomes contributes to electoral manipulation
(Interview 42). Exacerbating this uncertainty is Ortega’s perception that he was cheated
out of victory through fraud in the 1996 election (Interview 44; see also Zúñiga 2012).
Perceiving a firm upper limit on the party’s popular support, distrustful of polls showing
the party leading all contenders comfortably, and with lingering resentments against
Liberal electoral misconduct, the FSLN has employed a wide range of manipulative
tactics – including administrative barriers to participation – to increase its chances of
maintaining power. According to many observers, further motivation for electoral
manipulation in 2011 was provided by the FSLN’s desire to win not just the presidency
but a supermajority in the National Assembly (see, e.g., La Prensa 2011d).
The party is also no longer the revolutionary organization espousing a
participatory ideology that it was in the 1980s. Rather, since the 1990s the party has
become the personal vehicle of Daniel Ortega and those closest to him, especially his
wife Rosario Murillo (Colburn and Cruz 2012; Martí i Puig 2010). Whatever role the
FSLN’s commitment to broad popular participation played in the construction of
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inclusive election administration during the revolutionary period, that commitment
seemed abandoned in favor of a less ideological brand of populism.
Second, while these shifts in ideology and calculations of the party’s electoral
prospects have provided motive for electoral manipulation, an essential enabling
condition is the FSLN’s ability to identify its supporters, in contrast to parties in
Guatemala that have more ambiguous social bases. As a result, the FSLN can ensure
access to ID cards for its supporters while impeding access for opposition supporters and
independent voters. The FSLN is able to identify supporters not so much through indirect
indicators of partisan preference such as social class or ethnicity, but through its highly
developed organizational structure that allows the party to identify partisan preferences at
the individual level. As one analyst reported, the FSLN “knows all of Nicaragua block by
block” (Interview 36), allowing the party (through the CSE) to impede access to ID cards
of non-Sandinistas. Another observer noted the FSLN’s superior organizational capacity,
and reported that the party “knows the neighborhood” (conoce el barrio) – in other
words, the party’s block captains know the political affiliations of everyone in the
neighborhood (Interview 37).
This fine-grained disenfranchisement is facilitated by the party’s control of the
CSE’s local administrative structures and mayors’ offices (Interview 36), as well as the
party-linked Citizens Power Councils (CPCs). The latter are citizen groups created by the
Sandinista government in 2007, and there are thousands of CPCs organized at the
neighborhood level, with coordinating bodies ascending up to sub-municipal, municipal,
departmental, and national levels. Those participating in the CPCs – an estimated 4.6 to
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6.9 percent of Nicaraguans in 2009 (CEAP 2009, 7) – are overwhelmingly Sandinistas,173
and the councils are closely tied to FSLN party structures. According to one study of
CPCs, one role they serve is as quasi-party organizations that aim to extend and
strengthen the social base of the FSLN, and during the 2008 municipal elections CPCs
campaigned on the FSLN’s behalf (CEAP 2009, 30, 48).
This well organized party machine that extends downward to the neighborhood
level allows the FSLN to identify its supporters and opposition voters. A more indirect
method of identifying and disenfranchising opposition supporters is geographic – for
instance, identifying municipalities that are opposition strongholds and impeding access
to ID cards in those areas. In 2011 there were accusations that severe obstacles to
obtaining an ID card were concentrated in areas where the FSLN’s electoral support was
weak. As the newspaper La Prensa reported, in eight of the nine municipalities where
disturbances occurred over the CSE’s failure to deliver cédulas, the FSLN had received
fewer votes than other parties in the 2006 election (La Prensa 2011e). However, in only
six of the municipalities was the FSLN’s 2006 performance below its municipal average,
and only in two was its performance more than one standard deviation below its
average.174 In other words, it is not clear that geographic location has been used to target
opposition voters with administrative barriers – although geography has been used for
other forms of manipulation, such as gerrymandering and annulling votes from precincts
in opposition strongholds. Regardless, the FSLN’s ability to single out opposition
supporters and independent voters – through its highly developed organizational capacity
and perhaps secondarily through the geographic distribution of partisan support – and the
173

A 2009 study found that 81 percent of CPC members identified themselves as Sandinistas, while 15
identified as independents and 3.6 percent identified with oppositions parties (CEAP 2009, 8, 41).
174
Based on author’s calculations using municipal-level results of the 2006 presidential election.
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party’s control over the CSE have resulted in manipulation of the distribution of ID cards
(and therefore voter registration) to the benefit of the ruling party.
Third, another factor contributing to declining inclusiveness – particularly the
disappearance of official voter education efforts – is the fact that the FSLN has a more
motivated and mobilized base than other parties and is able to use its resource advantage
to provide its supporters with voter education. Many people see the decline of voter
education as an intentional effort to reduce turnout, which would mostly affect nonSandinista voters who are less motivated to turn out. An official of the MRS party
claimed the CSE wanted lower turnout in 2011 because the FSLN knows its militants will
turn out, while independents and other parties’ supporters would be demobilized by the
absence of voter education and get-out-the-vote publicity campaigns (Interview 49).
Several non-partisans shared this view (Interviews 35, 37), and it finds support in survey
data showing that FSLN supporters are more disposed to vote than are other Nicaraguans
(Colburn and Cruz 2012, 112). Also, according to a leading domestic election observer,
the FSLN is able to use its resource advantage over other parties to provide its supporters
with voter education, and so weakening the provision of voter education by the CSE
serves the party’s interest (Interview 34). Essentially, the provision of voter education has
been privatized to the ruling party, rather than carried out by the electoral commission.
Yet while lower turnout may benefit the FSLN electorally, it also raises questions
about the legitimacy of elections, which the Sandinistas sought to gain through high
turnout in 1984 and 1990. Legitimacy is perhaps of greater concern to the FSLN now that
its ceiling of support seems to have increased in recent years and the party firmly controls
all branches and levels of government, while the opposition is as weak and divided as
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ever. The news magazine Envío (2012) noted the tension between turnout and legitimacy
in its analysis of the 2012 municipal elections:
The FSLN benefits from the abstention of opposition voters because its hard-core
voters always turn out in droves, but this time abstention could fall below the
acceptable limit. The governing party is so sure of winning massively that it
would prefer a sizable turnout to provide some legitimacy and mask the
population’s growing lack of confidence in the electoral path.
To sum up, at the heart of less inclusive election administration lies the
dominance of the electoral management body by a governing party that has not been
confident in its ability to win fair elections, has shed its participatory ideology of years
past, and is able to use its organizational capacity and resources to identify and mobilize
its supporters. Despite the pathologies entailed by the bipartisan cartel party model of
election administration that prevailed between 2000 and 2006, inclusive practices were
not starkly affected, as the dominant parties checked the actions of the other and neither
was threatened by high turnout (considering their jointly dominant position in the
country’s party system). Single party dominance has had more pernicious effects,
facilitated by a more permissive international environment (discussed below).

Resources and Election Costs
Having argued that a combination of partisan interests and partisan electoral
management account for the decline in Nicaragua’s election administration inclusiveness,
it is worth considering an alternative explanation: the limited resources of the electoral
commission and the country’s general poverty. As the Carter Center (2001a, 3-4)
explained in 2001:
Underdevelopment continues to pose challenges to election processes in
Nicaragua, especially on the Atlantic Coast and in the mountains. The country is
suffering from drought and high unemployment rates, and many people have
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inadequate caloric intake. This contributes to migration which complicates
issuance of national identity cards and voter registration. Although Nicaragua’s
infrastructure has improved in many respects, substantial deficits remain, and
these complicate the logistics of election organization, including distribution of
materials and ballots as well as transmission of the results after the polls close.
The suggestion that poverty is responsible for restrictive election administration
gains plausibility when considering that Nicaragua is the second poorest country in the
hemisphere, and as noted above, budget shortfalls are the reason given by the CSE why
municipal registry offices are closed between electoral periods (see OAS 2008b, 13, 52),
resulting in one of the biggest obstacles to voter registration.
Yet budget constraints and the challenges of poverty and inadequate infrastructure
are insufficient explanations of Nicaragua’s increasingly restrictive election
administration. Most obviously, the country’s severe economic constraints in the 1980s
and early 1990s – when the economy was reeling from the aftermath of the revolution,
the Contra War and U.S. trade embargo, and mismanagement – did not prevent election
administration from being more inclusive than it has been since 2006, when the economy
has been growing.175 Additional evidence casts doubt on the importance of budget
limitations. For instance, according to former national and departmental directors of
registration, when the CSE faced the possibility of closing municipal offices between
electoral periods, mayoral offices agreed to fund CSE staff to continue ID card
processing at the municipal level (Interviews 38, 48).176 Yet the CSE (according to one
source, specifically the Liberal magistrates) decided against the plan, fearing that mayors
175

The Nicaraguan economy contracted sharply during the insurrection against Somoza in 1978-1979. The
country enjoyed modest growth in 1980 and 1981, but per capita GDP growth was negative for most of the
remaining decade. By the late 1980s the country was experiencing hyperinflation and economic collapse
(Arana 1997, 82; Spalding 1987; Walker 2003, 96). In contrast, per capita national income has been rising,
albeit slowly, since the early 2000s (World Bank 2013).
176
According to Alberto Dávila, this plan was proposed by the departmental registry directors (Interview
38).
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would exercise partisan influence in the distribution of ID cards if they funded the CSE’s
identification operations (Interviews 38, 48). Thus, it was not only budget limitations but
also concerns about political advantage that led to municipal registry offices being
closed.
Other respondents routinely attributed shortcomings in ID card processing, the
closing of municipal CSE offices, and the disappearance of voter education to a “lack of
will” rather than to budget constraints. Domestic election observation leaders noted that
the allocation of the CSE’s budget is heavily skewed towards funding the salaries of top
managerial levels (especially the seven magistrates) rather than funding core operations
like ID card processing and voter education (Interviews 33, 40). Several people
emphasized that the CSE could find funding if it had the will to do so, and that poor
allocation of the budget and corruption within the CSE are impediments to electoral
operations (Interviews 30, 36, 45, 48). A 2006 observer mission similarly noted an
imbalance in CSE funding, reporting that
At central levels, the CSE commissioners are very well-resourced, and some
central departments have adequate resources (items such as computing systems
are in part provided by international cooperation). However, a very large part of
the CSE’s budget goes [to] salaries, and little [to] infrastructure. …resources at
local levels are scant, with many CEMs [municipal electoral councils] having no
computers and no photocopiers, working with typewriters or by hand, and having
no filing system. This makes it more difficult for them to be transparent, for
example, in distributing lists of ID cards that have arrived (EUEOM 2006, 27).
That the misallocation of resources rather than budget shortfalls account for
inadequate election administration is also supported by reports of embezzlement within
the CSE (END 2011a; Ethics and Transparency 2011b, 2).177 In short, while limited
resources certainly affect the quality of election administration, the causal significance of
177

CSE president Roberto Rivas is thought to have amassed a large personal fortune during his tenure (see
Nicaragua Dispatch 2012b).
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this factor is cast in doubt by Nicaragua’s greater inclusiveness during prior periods of
more severe economic hardship, the disproportionate share of CSE resources devoted to
the salaries of high level political appointees, the possible embezzlement of CSE funds,
and the unwillingness to accept funding from municipal governments to facilitate voter
identification and registration.

International Influences
International pressures and financial and technical assistance contributed
significantly to Nicaragua’s inclusive election administration in the 1980s and 1990s.
Since 2000 the international community has had limited influence despite consistent
engagement by international election observers.
International observers have had a strong presence in Nicaragua, with all national
elections since 2001 monitored by the Carter Center, the European Union, and the
Organization of American States. Observers have recommended measures to make
election administration more inclusive, including improved distribution of ID cards and
permanent opening of municipal registry offices, streamlining the civil registration
process, free issuance of birth certificates, and improving voter education. Observers
have also often endorsed the use of Article 41 to prevent disenfranchisement (Carter
Center 2006; NDI 2006b, 1), although some EU observer missions have called for the
elimination of this measure contingent on improvements in the civil and voter registries
(EUEOM 2006, 71; 2010, 27). The EU has also suggested reducing the number of polling
places “[i]n order to rationalize costs and procedures” (EUEOM 2006, 71); in contrast,
the International Republican Institute has recommended distributing polling places more
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widely (IRI 2002, 15). Beyond these specific proposals have been persistent calls from
observers to eliminate or reduce partisan control over the CSE.
Besides election observation, the international community has also supplied
financial and technical assistance. Some assistance has come in the form of financing and
advising CSE training sessions related to voter registration (OAS 2008b, 56). In 2001, the
U.S. provided funding for a complementary registration plan, which “responded in part to
pressure coming from the U.S. Congress in favor of a special effort to guarantee voting
documents to 33 outlying municipalities” where former Contra fighters were
concentrated (Carter Center 2002, 14). Other assistance has supported civil society
activities, including the Movement for Nicaragua’s voter registration drives and public
information campaigns (NDI 2006d, 3; 2006e, 3; OAS 2008b, 60) and voter registry
audits carried out by Ethics and Transparency and the Institute for Development and
Democracy (NDI 2006f, 2). Another area of assistance has been aimed at opposition
party poll watchers, trained by the National Democratic Institute and the International
Republican Institute (NDI 2001, 3; WOLA 2006).
Considering the decline in administrative inclusiveness and overall election
quality in recent years, international involvement has clearly had limited effect. Most of
the recommendations from election observers – including improving access to ID cards,
increasing voter education, and cleaning up the voter rolls – have gone unheeded. As the
EU mission to the 2011 elections noted, “[t]he legal framework retains the same flaws
which were highlighted by the European Union Election Observation Missions in 2001
and 2006, whose recommendations have not been used as the basis of any reforms”
(EUEOM 2011, 9). This accords with the conclusion of Kelley (2012a), who notes that
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“the persistent mistrust and political bias in the Nicaraguan election apparatus has
relegated international monitors to serve as validators of election outcomes, rather than as
catalysts for reforms” (252).
International financing and technical assistance has also clearly not been
sufficient to ensure inclusive election administration. While foreign resources have
certainly helped domestic civic groups carry out their work, they have not been sufficient
to prompt election authorities to perform their duties more effectively. For instance, as
the EU mission noted of the 2006 elections, “[t]he CSE was very slow to respond to the
public concern about the delayed delivery of ID cards, and failed to launch a public
information campaign or to carry out a special delivery drive until the last weekend
before the elections, despite having special funds provided by the International
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) for this purpose” (EUEOM 2006, 33, emphasis
added).
If international pressure was influential in prompting inclusive election
administration in the 1984 and 1990 elections, what has changed in recent years? One
shift has been less U.S. interest in Nicaragua following the Sandinista defeat in 1990 and
the end of the Cold War. There has been intermittent pressure from the U.S. Congress
related to electoral conduct, especially regarding voter registration among former
Contras, and public pronouncements from embassy officials in Nicaragua indicating
America’s preference for an Ortega defeat (Carter Center 2007, 19). In recent years the
erosion of election quality in Nicaragua has prompted criticism from the United States,
and the U.S. cancelled $62 million in aid following the 2008 municipal elections and
another $3 million following the 2011 elections. European donors have also expressed
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dissatisfaction and have cut aid to Nicaragua in response to deteriorating election quality
(CNN 2009; Nicaragua Dispatch 2012a; Rogers 2012b).
Although these foreign aid cuts are significant, they pale in comparison to the
economic and military war waged by the U.S. against the Sandinista government in the
1980s. American and European pressures have also been offset by the flow of money
from the Hugo Chávez government in Venezuela to its ally Ortega. Quickly after the U.S.
cut aid in 2009, Chávez offered $50 million to help compensate for the loss (CNN 2009).
The U.S. aid cut after the 2011 elections was “equivalent to what Ortega gets every two
days from Chavez, who provided his Sandinista comrade with $557 million in 2011 and
more than $2 billion over the past five years” (Rogers 2012b). While U.S. and European
donors have cut hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, Venezuela has more than made up
the difference, with the additional advantage that Venezuelan aid flows directly to Ortega
without entering the government budget and without oversight (Colburn and Cruz 2012,
115; Rogers 2011).
According to one respondent working at the U.S. embassy, the availability of
funds from Venezuela has made reductions in U.S. aid ineffective (Interview 45). With
only moderate pressure from American and European donors and flush with money from
a foreign patron uninterested in promoting electoral democracy, the FSLN government
has not been pressured to administer inclusive and fair elections as it had been during the
revolutionary years. As a result, electoral manipulation, including voter suppression, has
become less costly.
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Civil Society
Like international election observation, domestic observation and other civic
mobilization efforts have had limited impact on Nicaragua’s election administration.
Large scale domestic election observer efforts began in 1996, with Ethics and
Transparency mobilizing thousands of observers (NDI 1997). Since then, civic and thinktank groups like the Institute for Development and Democracy (IPADE) and Hagamos
Democracia (Let’s Make Democracy) have taken on election observation,178 while civic
groups Movement for Nicaragua and others have engaged in other election-related
activities. At times these groups have directly facilitated voter participation, as when
Movement for Nicaragua assisted several thousand Nicaraguans in obtaining birth
certificates and completing the voter registration process in 2006 (Carter Center 2007, 21;
NDI 2006a, 4). Civic groups have also conducted publicity efforts to promote
participation (EUEOM 2006, 55; NDI 2006c, 4; Interviews 31, 32, 33, 39), while IPADE
and Ethics and Transparency have conducted audits of the voter registry that have been
referenced by political parties in their calls for improving the registry and applying
Article 41 of the electoral law (NDI 2006c, 4). Many of these activities have been
supported by external financing and technical assistance (see e.g., NDI 2006e, 3; 2006d,
3; OAS 2008b, 60).
Civic groups have also actively proposed electoral measures and pressured for
their adoption. They have firmly supported Article 41 (Carter Center 2007, 17; END
2006; Ethics and Transparency 2006a, 27), seeing the measure as necessary given the low
quality of the voter rolls and considering it better to not disenfranchise eligible voters
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Domestic election observation has had extensive coverage, including about 16,000 observers covering
almost all polling stations in 2006 (OAS 2008b, 61).
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than to add another safeguard against double voting by eliminating the article (Interviews
34, 35). Civil society groups raised the only objections to Article 41’s revision in 2012
(Asamblea Nacional 2012). Civic groups have also called for the CSE to keep municipal
offices open between election periods to allow citizens access to registration (IPADE
2011a, 7; IPADE and NDI 2006, 20), greater ease of access to ID cards more generally
(Ethics and Transparency 2011d, 3), more extensive voter education efforts (EUEOM
2006, 48; IPADE 2000, 21; 2006, 21; 2011, 8; IPADE and NDI 2006, 20), cleaning up
the voter registry (IPADE 2000, 21; 2006, 58), and for depoliticizing the CSE (Ethics and
Transparency 2011d, 3; OAS 2008b, 14).
In 2006 an umbrella organization, the Electoral Reform Promotion Group (Grupo
Promotor de Reformas Electorales, GPRE), was formed. It brings together 14
organizations, including IPADE and Ethics and Transparency, and the group’s proposals
have been wide ranging, addressing political party and campaign finance regulations,
reapportionment, gender quotas, and various measures to depoliticize the CSE (GPRE
2008; 2010).
Despite the extensive efforts of civic groups, their influence has been limited. The
GPRE has presented its proposals to legislators in the hopes that they will use them as a
basis to reform the electoral law, and while the legislators express agreement with the
proposals, no action follows (Interviews 30, 33). When the electoral law was reformed in
2012, the National Assembly invited input from civil society groups, and in response the
GPRE commented on each specific measure in the proposed reform and submitted its
own separate proposal. Yet as was the case during Guatemala’s electoral reform, the
proposals from civil society were largely rejected.
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According to all accounts, relations between civil society and the CSE – which
had been cooperative in the past – have soured since the 2006 elections (Interviews 32,
33, 35, 38). An EU observer report in that year noted that “the relations between the
domestic observer groups and the CSE were rather tense, as the CSE has always
perceived them rather as challengers than as legitimate stakeholders” (EUEOM 2006,
55).
With the limited openness of the CSE and ruling party in recent years, civil
society’s calls for more inclusive election administration practices have fallen on deaf
ears. One exception is a small administrative measure that seems to have resulted from
civil society pressure: a 15-day extension of the deadline for ID card applications prior to
the 2006 election. This measure was proposed by President Enrique Bolaños and passed
unanimously in the National Assembly following pressure from civic groups, especially
Movement for Nicaragua, which mobilized protests outside CSE headquarters (NDI
2006b, 1).179 Yet civic groups were not united in support of this measure: domestic
observer groups joined the CSE in warning “that this move would slow a very tight
election calendar, potentially creating further difficulties” (Carter Center 2007, 25). On
issues where all civic groups have endorsed inclusive election administration practices,
their efforts have been rebuffed. As in Guatemala, crafting the rules and practices of
Nicaragua’s election administration has been an elite game dominated by politicians and
election administrators, with minimal influence exercised by civil society.
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The deadline was extended by 15 days again prior to the 2012 municipal elections, although it is unclear
if this extension responded to outside pressure (see El Nuevo Diario 2012b).
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Conclusion
The erosion of election administration inclusiveness in Nicaragua after 2000 has
been marked by the politicization of the distribution of ID cards and the disappearance of
voter education efforts. The proximate cause of this trend has been the dominance of the
CSE by the FSLN, a party that has not been confident of its ability to win fair electoral
contests, has shed its revolutionary ideology, and has been able to exploit its
organizational capacity and strong partisan identification to identify its supporters and
single them out for ID cards and partisan voter information campaigns. These features of
partisan identification and organization are marked contrasts with Guatemala and, to a
lesser extent, El Salvador. These domestic variables are not sufficiently counteracted by
international pressure, as financial aid from Venezuela has compensated for the loss of
democracy-conditioned aid from U.S. and European donors. Domestic civil society
groups have also been unable to constrain the electoral practices of the governing party
and the partisan-controlled CSE. Table 6.2 below summarizes the ability of the
hypotheses to explain the pattern of election administration inclusiveness during this
period.
Nicaragua’s experience shows that the pathologies of partisan election
administration can be severe, but they do not result automatically from the partisan
composition of the electoral management body. Rather the effects of partisan election
administration are mediated by patterns of party identification, by strategic calculations
of electoral outcomes, and by pressures from foreign powers.
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Table 6.2 Support for Hypotheses, Nicaragua 2006-2011
Category
Hypothesis
Support
H1: Where a ruling party can identify
opposition supporters, election
administration inclusiveness will tend
to be low, whereas countries with
catch-all parties or fluid party systems
Partisan
marked by low levels of partisan
Interests
attachments will tend to have more
inclusive electoral procedures.
H2: Parties with strong lower class
support (typically populist or leftist
parties) will support inclusive rules.
H3: Partisan EMBs will tend to
implement less inclusive measures as
partisan election officials attempt to
Electoral
impede the participation of some
Management
parties’ supporters.
Body
H4: Independent, non-partisan EMBs
Structure
will be associated with inclusive rules
in part by playing an active role in
electoral reform.
H5: A history of election fraud will
lead democratizing countries to adopt
strict safeguards against fraud, which
may in turn impose procedural barriers
to voting.
The Specter
H6: Parties that have been the victims
of Election
of election fraud will support strict
Fraud
safeguards that reduce inclusiveness.

Election
Costs and
Financial
Resources

Civil
Society and
Public
Opinion

H7: Countries with more resources
will have more inclusive election
administration.
H8: Strong civil society, particularly
domestic election observation groups,
will increase election administration
inclusiveness.
H9: Public opinion will set limits on
the extent to which elites can pursue
self-serving election administration
rules.

Continued on next page
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Supported

Not
supported

Supported

Comments
FSLN’s ability to
identify its supporters
facilitated restrictive
measures aimed at
opposition voters.

Populist FSLN
instituted restrictive
measures.
Single party control of
the CSE largely
responsible for decline
in inclusiveness.

Inconclusive

Inconclusive

FSLN claimed it was
defrauded in 1996
elections, but lower
Inconclusive inclusiveness since
2006 has not been
designed to prevent
fraud.
Evidence suggests that
lack of funding is not
Not
supported
a primary cause of
lower inclusiveness.
Civil society has had
little influence despite
Not
extensive advocacy
supported
and election
observation efforts.
No evidence of public
Not
opinion influence on
supported
election
administration.

Table 6.2, continued
Category

International
Influences

Hypothesis

Support

H10: International observers will
prevent extremely restrictive measures
in elections that they observe,
particularly measures that are highly
visible on election day.
H11: The recommendations of election
observers will have little impact on
election administration practices.
H12: When a country seeks good
relations with Western democracies,
the influence of election observers will
be enhanced and inclusive election
administration practices will be more
likely.
H13: Technical and financial
assistance will make inclusive
measures more likely by enhancing
domestic bureaucratic capacity.
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Not
supported

Supported

Supported

Comments
Highly restrictive
measures leading up to
and on election day
occurred during
observed elections.
Observer
recommendations
largely neglected.
U.S. and European
pressure in response to
election quality offset
by aid from
Venezuela.

Assistance was
insufficient to ensure
Inconclusive inclusiveness, though
such aid has declined
over time.

CHAPTER 7
EL SALVADOR: FROM VOTER EXCLUSION TO HALTING REFORM

During its transition to democracy, El Salvador adopted administrative barriers to
voting similar to those in Guatemala, such as centralized voting sites, the assignment of
voters to polling places based on alphabetical order rather than proximity, and onerous
voter registration requirements. And like Guatemala, El Salvador’s administrative
practices have become more inclusive over time. However, this growing inclusiveness
has differed from the Guatemalan case: voter registration has become simplified, while
polling decentralization has not been fully implemented.
Why did the country adopt such restrictive practices during its early years of
democratic transition, and why has it lowered barriers to participation in recent years?
This chapter shows that El Salvador’s restrictive administrative measures were adopted in
the country’s pre-democratic period in response to the security conditions during the
country’s civil war and the desire to eradicate the election fraud that had been common in
prior elections. These restrictions continued long after these initial conditions had
changed due to both institutional inertia and partisan calculations about the likely effects
of expanding the electorate through more inclusive election procedures. Ultimately,
pressure from the left, civil society, and international election observers and experts led
to halting reforms, while calculations of partisan interests dictated the sequence and
shape of reform. Voter registration reform was less contentious because it was expected
to provide greater protection against electoral manipulation without adversely affecting
partisan interests, while making polling stations more accessible was repeatedly delayed
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because the perceived risks to partisan interests, particularly on the right, were greater,
while the benefits for deterring election fraud were more limited.
Because this chapter covers a longer period than the previous case study chapters,
there is greater alternation between descriptive and explanatory material in the hopes of
making the narrative easy to follow. The first section provides brief background on El
Salvador’s democratic transition, while the second section overviews the establishment of
restrictive election administration practices in the 1980s and the third section discusses
the continuation of restrictive practices through the 1994 general election. I then offer
analysis to explain the initial adoption of election administration practices during this
transition period in the fourth section. Section five describes the election administration
reforms undertaken since 1994, while the sixth section offers explanations for those
reforms. The final section assesses the influence of the hypothesized causal factors laid
out in Chapter 2.

Background
El Salvador’s full transition to democracy is commonly marked by the 1994
elections, the country’s first post-war elections that included the participation of the
FMLN guerillas-turned-political party. The country’s military regimes had held periodic
elections, with those of the 1970s marked by blatant fraud. Elections in the early-mid
1980s were held under conditions of civil war and severe human rights abuses on the part
of the military and paramilitary death squads. The conditions for democratic elections
improved in the late 1980s, and a turnover of civilian parties took place when the right
wing ARENA (Republican Nationalist Alliance) party won the 1989 presidential
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election, defeating the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). That election also saw the first
participation of leftist parties under the Democratic Convergence coalition.
By the beginning of the 1990s the government and FMLN guerrillas were
engaged in peace talks. During these negotiations, the FMLN sought constitutional and
electoral reforms, and in 1991 the government and FMLN agreed to replace the electoral
management body – the Central Elections Council (CCE) – with a Supreme Electoral
Tribunal (TSE). The CCE had been composed of one representative of each branch of
government until 1983, when it became partisan-based with three magistrates nominated
by the top parties in the previous presidential election and approved by the legislative
assembly.180 After a 1991 constitutional reform that replaced the CCE with the TSE, two
additional non-partisan magistrates were added, to be named from lists put forward by the
Supreme Court and chosen by two-thirds vote in the assembly.
Since the TSE’s creation, it has been pervaded by partisanship at all levels, with
staff in the technical directorates, departmental and municipal election councils, and
polling stations appointed by a party quota system (Baloyra 1998, 21; EUEOM 2009a;
IFES 1994b, 10). Despite the legal requirement that they be non-partisan, observers
sometimes note the partisan behavior of the Court-nominated magistrates (CIS 2004;
2006, 9) and the political influence in the composition of the court itself (ArtigaGonzález 2008a, 529). Conservative parties (ARENA, PCN, and PDC) have held
majority control of the TSE for most of its history. In addition to holding a plurality or
majority of magistrate positions,181 prior to the 2009 elections four of the TSE’s seven
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This was later briefly expanded to four magistrates named by the top four parties (IFES 1994b, 10).
Of the 2004-2009 period a European Union observer mission reported that “[t]he TSE’s partisan nature
led to the formation of a bloc, uniting the ARENA and PCN representatives with a Magistrate from the
Supreme Court of Justice. Their majority position allowed them to wield control over the electoral process
181
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technical directorates were headed by partisans of the governing ARENA party (EUEOM
2009a).
The 1992 peace accords also created an electoral sub-commission within the
National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ). This sub-commission,
with representation of all political parties, drafted a new electoral code, which was
unanimously approved by the legislative assembly (IFES 1994b, 9; Spence and Vickers
1994, 9). The electoral code increased party participation in the administration of all
aspects of the electoral process, including a multiparty oversight body, the Junta de
Vigilancia (JVE), to monitor the work of the TSE (Spence and Vickers 1994, 9).
However, with its budget set by the TSE and with the strongest political parties already
controlling the TSE, the JVE has had little influence (Baloyra 1998, 21; Spence and
Vickers 1994, 24).

Establishing Restrictive Election Procedures: 1982-1991
While El Salvador’s 1994 elections are often treated as the “founding” democratic
elections, the origins of many features of the country’s election administration lie in the
1982-1991 period. Thus while the country’s elections during this period (particularly
1982-1989) have been variously characterized as “demonstration elections” and
“electoral authoritarianism” (Montgomery 1995, 156-157, 185), they merit brief
discussion here to identify the origins of several administrative practices that lasted long
into the democratic period.
Prior to 1985, there was no system for voter registration: the voter rolls were
taken directly from the civil registries, so anyone with an ID card (cédula) was supposed
during this mandate. This situation left the FMLN selected Magistrate and the second Magistrate
designated by the Supreme Court of Justice in a minority” (EUEOM 2009a).
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to be added to the voter list (Baloyra 1993, 8-11). Given the unreliability of the cédula,
and following serious problems with the quality of the voter lists in the elections of 1982
and 1984, a separate electoral registry was constructed beginning in 1985,182 and in 1988
a new voter ID card (the carnet electoral) was used for the first time (Baloyra 1993, 8-9;
Consorcio 2000, 22; IFES 1994b, Annex II). This introduced an extra step for citizens to
register to vote. The process involved a citizen presenting an ID or two witnesses at a
registration office, with the applicant’s information then sent to the central CCE office to
be verified and, if approved, a voter card would be issued (Freedom House 1989, 39; NDI
1989, 11-12).
After allowing the delivery of voter cards up until election day in previous
elections, a cutoff date of 30 days before the election was set by an amendment to the
electoral code pushed by the ARENA party.183 Other parties “charged that this reform
would deprive many otherwise qualified citizens of exercising their right to vote” (NDI
1989, 8; see also Freedom House 1989, 39). But ARENA justified the measure to prevent
manipulation of the voter rolls and ID cards, as an observer report explains:
ARENA representatives argued that this reform is necessary to prevent the fraud
that had been committed in the March 1988 elections when Salvadorans were
allowed to receive their voting cards up to one day before the event. According to
ARENA, PDC functionaries then working in the CCE printed large numbers of
bogus voting cards in the final hectic days of the campaign while the agency’s
attention was focused on other last minute administrative details. The earlier
deadline for voting card delivery would presumably reduce the opportunity for
such activity by allowing a more thorough scrutiny of the process… In defending
this reform, ARENA members insisted that ‘it is better to maintain the quality,
than the quantity of voting cards’ (NDI 1989, 7-8).
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This was based on a 1983 constitutional reform (Consorcio 2000, 22).
Decreto 170, Jan. 25, 1989, amending Art. 40 of the 1988 Electoral Code. ARENA wanted a 45-day
cutoff, but agreed to a shorter 30-day cutoff for the 1989 elections at the behest of the PDC party (IHRLG
1989, 60-61). Another reform in 1990 allowed carnets to be delivered up to eight days before the election
(WOLA 1991, 7).
183

242

The elections of 1989 and 1991 were marked by administrative problems in
processing registration applications and delivering voter cards, along with accusations
between political parties “about local functionaries preventing people from registering by
misplacing forms or not accepting valid ID, or removing names from the CCE database”
(NDI 1989, 12). As a result, several hundred thousand people had registered prior to the
1989 and 1991 elections but did not receive their voter cards in time to vote (Baloyra
1993, 15; Freedom House 1989, 40; NDI 1989, 13-14). In 1991, close to 30 percent of
those who registered were expected to not receive their voter card in time for the election,
and on election day there were inconsistencies between voter cards and the voter lists,
including many registered voters’ names not appearing on the lists (IFES 1994b, Annex
II; Montgomery 1995, 222-223; 1998, 118-119).
The 1980s also saw the centralization of polling stations in municipal centers,
with most municipalities having just one voting center. Additionally, in the larger urban
municipalities that had more than one voting center, voters were assigned to a polling
place alphabetically, rather than to the site closest to their residence (Freedom House
1989, 40-41). Thus voters in both rural and urban areas often had to travel significant
distances to reach their voting station.

The 1994 “Elections of the Century”
After the end of the country’s civil war in 1992, El Salvador headed into what
were dubbed the “elections of the century.” The elections were the first in which the
FMLN participated, and presidential, legislative, and municipal elections were all held
concurrently – which only occurs once every 15 years in El Salvador’s election calendar.
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The country headed into the elections with a new electoral management body and
electoral law, but with restrictive election administration practices still in place.

Voter Registration
The most significant impediment to participation was voter registration.
Underlying voter registration was a decentralized civil registry system run by
municipalities, as in Guatemala. Despite the mechanisms put in place in the 1980s,
registry data was unreliable due to uneven record keeping practices, the destruction of
registry offices during the war, and the displacement or emigration of large numbers of
Salvadorans (IFES 1994b, 11; Spence and Vickers 1994, 15).
To register to vote, citizens would apply at a registration center in their municipal
center, bringing a birth certificate or ID card, or lacking those, two witnesses. The
citizen’s application would then be sent to the TSE office in San Salvador to be checked
against the TSE’s archives of birth certificates. Even if the citizen had applied with a
birth certificate, the application would be “rejected unless the central computer data base
also ha[d] a copy of that birth certificate” (Spence and Vickers 1994, 15); in this case, the
applicant would need to provide a copy or “request that the mayoral office where she/he
was born send a copy of the birth certificate to the Tribunal” (IFES 1994b, 12). The latter
was made difficult by some mayors who failed to deliver copies of birth certificates to the
TSE or charged exorbitant fees (Lehoucq 1995, 181; Montgomery 2000, 149). If the
application was approved, the applicant would be added to the voter registry and a
notification card (ficha) sent to the office where the person applied. The citizen would
then be required to return to the registry office to have a picture taken and the voter ID
card (carnet electoral) issued. However, the registry offices did not notify voters when
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their applications had been approved, and the processing of applications took weeks or
months. “[A]s a result, people often had to return to the town hall three, four, or five
times looking for their fichas. Many tired of fruitless journeys and simply never came
back” (Montgomery 2000, 148; see also Spence and Vickers 1994, 15).
As Montgomery (1998, 126) summarizes: “[i]n a country with 60 percent
illiteracy, the TSE devised a Byzantine voter registration process that would have cowed
even a well-educated voter.” Stahler-Sholk (1994, 24-25) similarly notes that “[t]he TSE
set up extremely slow, cumbersome mechanisms for registering eligible voters and giving
out voter registration cards. Because of the time and expense involved in making
numerous trips to TSE offices to register, and then to see if the voting card was ready,
these procedures tended, disproportionately, to disenfranchise the poor.”
Compounding the obstacles posed by the application process was the slow
delivery of voter ID cards. UN surveys in mid-1993 found over 700,000 Salvadorans
(nearly 30 percent of voting age citizens) unregistered and lacking voter cards (Córdova
Macías 1996, 39; IFES 1994b, 12; Montgomery 2000, 162, note 29). The problems with
registration and pressure from the international community led the TSE to carry out a
registration plan, with financing from the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), consisting of “a
publicity campaign, mobile registration units, extension of the local Tribunal office
hours, and an extension of the deadline for handing out the carnets” (IFES 1994b, 12).184
Another plan to facilitate voter registration came from the UN observer mission directly,
and involved well-publicized one-day events (mega-jornadas) in each department to
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The deadline for distributing carnets had been 90 days prior to the election, and was extended to 60 days
in the face of a major backlog (Decreto 755, transitory amendment to Art. 30 of Electoral Code).
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register voters. As Montgomery (2000, 149) explains, “ONUSAL officials assumed
responsibility for the logistical support for voter registration, including traveling to
municipalities in order to find individual birth certificates required for registration, a task
originally intended for the TSE and mayoral offices.”
With these efforts, delivery of voter ID cards improved over time (Córdova
Macías 1996, 39-40). Yet when the registry closed on January 19, 1994, only 2.17
million of the 2.7 million registered voters had their voter ID cards. Of the remaining
registrants, many had approved applications, for which ID cards needed to be produced
and distributed. For some 75,000-80,000 citizens, however, the registration application
had not been approved due to birth certificates not being on file, leaving them unable to
vote. Some 300,000 voter ID cards were not retrieved by election day (IFES 1994b, 13;
Lehoucq 1995, 181). Many of these cards may have been duplicates or belonged to
people who had left the country since registering,185 but others would have been unable to
vote without their ID card. In total, estimates of voter registration coverage were
generally 80-85 percent of eligible voters (Córdova Macías 1996, 40; IFES 1994, 13;
Montgomery 1998, 128), but “[a]bsent a centralized register of citizens and with the last
census dating to 1974, an unbiased estimate may be impossible” (Baloyra 1998, 22). Of
those registered, tens of thousands (and potentially many more) were unable to vote
because they did not receive their voter card.186
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The TSE estimated that the effective voter register (excluding deceased, emigrants, and duplicates) was
2.2 million voters, and the UN observer mission estimated that 300,000-400,000 people on the voter
register were deceased (IFES 1994b, 13).
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The electoral law was revised to allow the distribution of voter ID cards between the first and second
rounds of voting for the presidential election, resulting in 10,000 new additions for voters whose birth
certificates had been found (IFES 1994b, 3, 13).
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Other problems with the voter registry occurred on election day, when many
voters arrived at their polling table to find that their names were not on the voters list or
the number of their ID card did not match the numbers of their polling table. The UN
observer mission estimated 25,000 voters were disenfranchised due to these problems;
other estimates were 87,000 voters or more (IFES 1994, 2; Lehoucq 1995, 181; Spence et
al. 1997). There were also some cases of voters being unable to vote because someone
had already used their name to vote (IFES 1994, 2) – either cases of voter impersonation
fraud or sloppy record keeping by poll workers.

Getting to the Ballot Box
In the 1994 elections and afterwards El Salvador continued to employ a system of
polling locations and assignment of voters to polling sites that imposed barriers to
participation similar to those in Guatemala. Voting centers were concentrated in
municipal centers, with about 80 percent of municipalities having only one voting center
(Consorcio 2000, 74). Voting centers frequently contained dozens or hundreds of
individual polling tables, with voters required to find the table to which they were
assigned. For instance, in the 1994 elections only 350 voting centers were used in the
entire country, containing 6,970 polling tables (IFES 1994, 11).187 While this increased to
384 voting centers in 1999, the number of voting centers decreased in the next two
elections to 376 and 363, respectively, even as the number of voters and polling tables
increased (TSE-ES 1999, 11, 17; 2000, 49; 2003, 25). Voters also continued to be
assigned to voting centers alphabetically rather than by distance from residence. This
meant that many urban voters had to travel across town to vote, and often family
187

An additional 35 voting centers were added for the second round of presidential voting (IFES 1994b, 3).
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members would be assigned to different voting locations (Spence, Lanchin, and Thale
2001, 6; Ulloa et al. 2000, 31).
Polling site location and alphabetical voter assignment presented two obstacles for
voters: transportation and overcrowding. The limited number of voting sites necessitated
long travel for some voters, which was compounded by the limited public transportation
available (IFES 1994, 2; Manca 1997). One consequence of distant voting centers, as in
Guatemala, was the use of transportation by political parties to mobilize their supporters,
“with an advantage to those who have more resources” (Spence and Vickers 1994, 25).
The limited number of voting centers also resulted in overcrowding, particularly in large
urban areas, “making it very difficult for citizens to locate (and access) their JRV and
names on the electoral registry” (IFES 1994, 2). Overcrowding and the lack of TSE staff
to orient voters or signs displaying the voter lists resulted in confusion and long lines at
many voting centers in 1994, and as a consequence some voters left without voting (IFES
1994, 20, 22-23; Lehoucq 1995, 181).

Table 7.1 Election Administration Inclusiveness, El Salvador 1994-2000
Dimension
Voter Registration
Extent of state
responsibility for
registering voters
Difficulty of
registration process
Ease of access to ID
documents required for
registration
Registration closing
date
Residency requirement
Provisional registration

Description

Inclusiveness

Juridical Basis*

Voter-initiated, inconsistent
state efforts to register
citizens
Complex process involving
multiple trips to centralized
offices
Multiple ID forms or
witnesses accepted, but
central registry must have
birth certificate on file
60-120 days

Low

Electoral law /
Administrative practice

Low

Administrative practice

Medium

Electoral law /
Administrative practice

Medium /
Low
High
Low

Electoral law

No residency requirement
No provisional registration

Continued on next page
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Electoral law
Administrative practice

Table 7.1, continued
Dimension
Registry consultation

Purging of voter rolls
Getting to the Ballot
Box
Accessibility of polling
places

Assignment of voters to
polling places
Convenience voting
measures
Electoral calendar
Casting a Ballot
Voter ID requirement

Provisional or tendered
ballots
Voter Education
State efforts to inform
voters of where and
how to register and
vote

Description
Voter lists distributed to
political parties and posted
in public places
Voters not purged from the
rolls for failure to vote

Inclusiveness
High

High

n/a

Polling places centralized
in municipal centers;
limited public
transportation
Alphabetical (not based on
residence)
Not used

Low

Administrative practice

Low
Low

Administrative practice
/ Electoral law
Electoral law

Voting held on Sunday

High

Administrative practice

Carnét required; many
registered voters did not
receive carnét by election
day
Not used

Low

Electoral law /
Administrative practice

Low

Administrative practice

Medium

Administrative practice

Modest voter education
campaigns, increasing in
scope over time

Overall Inclusiveness

Juridical Basis*
Electoral law

Low

* Electoral law refers to those elements based on the electoral law that are not open to
modification by the electoral management body. Administrative practice refers to those
elements that are not explicitly codified in the electoral law, but are instead matters of
bureaucratic performance and administrative discretion.

Explaining the Origins of Restrictive Election Administration Practices
A number of restrictive election administration measures were adopted in the
1980s, including an additional step for voter registration, an early cutoff date for
distributing voter cards, and centralized voting centers to which voters were assigned
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alphabetically. Many of these measures lasted through the 1990s (see Table 7.1 above).
Why were these measures adopted, and why did they persist through the 1994 elections?
As suggested above, the desire to prevent election fraud was a central motive
behind the voter registration rules put in place in the 1980s. The cédula and the local civil
registries on which it was based were unreliable, and many local registries had been
destroyed by guerrillas. The issuance of cédulas was also under the authority of mayors,
many of whom were from the PCN and ARENA parties; thus the governing Christian
Democrats, who had been victims of election fraud in the 1970s, had reason to oppose
basing the voter lists on ID cards distributed by their opponents. At the same time, the
other parties “feared being victimized by the very tactics that they had masterminded in
the past” (Baloyra 1993, 8), and in fact ARENA leaders believed they had been cheated
out of victory in the 1984 presidential election (WOLA 1991, 4). Indeed, this period was
marked by mutual accusations of fraud,188 and a proposal in 1984 from ARENA to
require only a cédula to vote, without any use of voter lists, drew opposition from the
Christian Democrats, “alleging that this opened the door to large-scale fraud” (Baloyra
1993, 12).
The requirement for voters to obtain a carnet and the cumbersome system of
verifying voters’ data were thus intended to ensure greater control over the registry and
prevent fraud (Artiga-González 2004, 200-201; Consorcio 2000, 12; WOLA 1991, 7).
During this checking process many registration applications were rejected due to minor
discrepancies between the name on the application and the name in the municipal
records, which apparently was caused in part by a computer program used by the CCE to
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For one episode, see Montgomery (1995, 197).
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prevent multiple registrations (IHRLG 1989, 62). The early cutoff date for distributing
voter cards was also, it appears, an attempt to prevent manipulation of the voter rolls.
If voter registration procedures were aimed at preventing fraud, was the
centralization of voting sites also an attempt to prevent misconduct, as in Guatemala?
Here the connection between fraud prevention and restrictive administrative practices is
less clear. Baloyra (1993, 9) suggests that concentrating polling sites may have been
intended to cause long lines for voters and thereby make multiple voting more difficult.
He more broadly suggests a link between restrictive practices and the goal of preventing
fraud and the intimidation of rural voters:
The electoral system established in El Salvador during the 1980s was designed to
avoid fraud, not to maximize popular participation.... Those who had been in the
democratic opposition of the late 1960s and the 1970s had bitter recollections of
the outcomes of the 1972 and 1977 elections. Those who were willing and able to
test the waters again in the early 1980s, specifically the Christian Democratic
(PDC) and Democratic Action (AD) parties, worried about tamaleo (ballot
stuffing) attempts and girded themselves to counteract the onslaught of clientele
voting and intimidation by rightist jefes civiles and military officers in rural areas
(Baloyra 1993, 8).189
A later election observer report noted that centralization was in part meant to
ensure the secrecy of the vote (EUEOM 2009a). Others suggest a different motive for the
centralization of polling sites: the desire to generate large crowds of voters that would
give the appearance of massive participation, thus legitimizing the elections in the media
(Consorcio 2000, 73; ISD 2009; 2011a, 2).
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Baloyra (1993) also argues that “[t]he only way in which these very intense and distrustful adversaries
would accept the outcome of elections as binding was if the elections could be considered relatively
foolproof” (8) and that “the determined official effort to prevent electoral fraud resulted in ‘a very
complicated system which in the final instance (made) it very difficult for the electorate to actually vote’”
(12). He does not always connect this preoccupation with preventing fraud with specific administrative
measures, however.

251

An explanation that enjoys more support, however, is that the centralization of
voting sites was intended to ensure security in the context of guerrilla insurgency.
Baloyra (1993, 9) notes that the measure was “[s]upposedly to facilitate protection by the
Armed Force,” and other sources cite security reasons as well (EUEOM 2009a; UN 2009,
4). That centralization was due to security concerns was the only explanation offered by
interview respondents, including those of different political persuasions (Interviews 51,
54, 63). Security concerns also played a role in Guatemala and Nicaragua, where free
elections preceded the termination of civil conflict. But security could be expected to play
a larger role in El Salvador, given the fact that the FMLN guerrillas were a more
formidable military force capable of holding significant territory than were the URNG
guerrillas in Guatemala or the Contra forces in Nicaragua.
In fact, the FMLN was able to prevent voting in many parts of the country in the
early 1980s: in 1984, voting was not held in 58 municipalities where the FMLN presence
was strongest, including two in which guerrillas destroyed the ballot boxes (CIDAI 1984,
212-213; see also Ratliff and Perry 1984, 12-13). More generally, the state was unable to
ensure security in many areas, as the FMLN executed a number of local officials and
issued death threats to many others that were elected in areas they controlled, causing at
least 50 mayors to resign in the late 1980s (IHRLG 1989, 112). Recognizing the problem,
the electoral code allowed the CCE to not install voting sites in some municipalities,
instead locating polling stations for citizens in those areas in nearby municipalities
(Electoral Code 1988, Art. 278; IHRLG 1989, 49).
In such a context, it almost certainly would have been impossible to guarantee the
government’s control over polling in all corners of the country, making it necessary to
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concentrate voting in more easily secured areas. While it is difficult to know the exact
mix of motivations, since the centralization of voting sites was not specified in the
electoral code but rather a decision of the CCE and later the TSE (thus leaving no
legislative record), it appears that security was the primary reason for centralizing voting
centers, with the goal of preventing various types of manipulation (ballot stuffing,
coercion of rural voters) perhaps a secondary motive.
Aside from polling centralization was the alphabetical assignment of voters to
voting centers in the larger municipalities. As in Guatemala, there appears to have been
no substantive reason for adopting this method in El Salvador. As the current president of
the TSE explained, this method was administratively simpler for those conducting the
elections (Interview 55), and was apparently adopted for this reason. In a context of lessthan-free elections held during civil conflict and administered by an election council with
low technical capacity, and where the method of assigning voters to polling sites was
only relevant in the few municipalities with more than one voting center, the CCE opted
to shift the burden onto urban voters to reach their polling site rather than undertake the
work necessary to assign voters geographically.
For the 1994 elections, the immense obstacles to participation presented by the
voter registration system resulted from several factors, although it is difficult to assign
relative weight to each. First was simple inertia, as the complicated registration process
was largely a holdover from previous elections, which in turn were driven by a desire to
prevent fraud. The complicated system of verifying each application against birth
certificate archives as well as an early closing date to allow time for parties to review the
rolls – the peace accords called for the rolls to be published at least 20 days in advance of
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the election – reflected the continuing distrust between the parties and concerns about
election rigging. New registration procedures were considered at the time, as a 1992 UN
mission “presented recommendations on the feasibility of introducing a personal identity
document which would also be valid for the 1994 elections” (UN 1992, 16), and a nongovernmental group presented a proposal to conduct an ad-hoc registration (Martel 2010,
16-17). Ultimately it was decided that there was not enough time or money to introduce a
new ID card by 1994, a decision some attribute to the partisan calculation of existing
parties whose supporters were already registered (Interview 63). At the same time, a
recommendation from the UN electoral mission also encouraged maintaining the existing
registry, as Montgomery (2000, 144) reports: “The idea of developing a new voterregistration list, as suggested by the August 1992 [UN] mission and as had been done
with great success in Nicaragua in 1990, vanished. Horacio Boneo, the head of the UN
Electoral Division office in New York, decided to recommend cleansing and adding to
the existing roll. This decision would haunt ONUSAL and the entire electoral process.”
Secondly, partisanship affected how voter registration procedures were carried
out. Because of the decentralization of civil registries in local government offices, mayors
could obstruct voter registration in attempts to exclude opposition supporters from the
electorate, even if not directed to do so by their political party. Mayors of the governing
ARENA party in particular were accused of obstructing citizen efforts to obtain birth
certificates and voting cards, and this may have cost the FMLN several tightly contested
local races (Lehoucq 1995, 181; Montgomery 1995, 265; 2000, 149-150). Stahler-Sholk
(1994, 29) argues that the more burdensome postwar registration requirements in El
Salvador compared to Nicaragua reflect the fact that “registration took place in a context
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where those voters who were already registered were unrepresentative of the population
as a whole, in the sense that they had participated in elections of the past that had
excluded the FMLN. Obstructing registration was a way of keeping the pool of voters
similar to those who had returned ARENA majorities in the last two elections.” This
sentiment was widespread on the left, while ARENA’s presidential candidate denied it
(Montgomery 1995, 250). The UN observer mission, in contrast, concluded that “the
failure to register would appear to be due more to lethargy on the part of the citizens and
technical inefficiency on the part of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal than to a deliberate
effort to exclude certain sectors of the population for political reasons” (UN 1993, 3). A
UNDP survey on voter registration also “found that the large majority of those affected
by the deficiency of the system…could not be identified as members of any party”
(Manca 1997). While the evidence regarding partisan manipulation is unclear, at the very
least some of the bottlenecks in the processing of voter registration applications appeared
to result from some mayors failing to send applicants’ birth certificates to the TSE so that
their registration could be processed.
Finally, some of the registration obstacles resulted from TSE incompetence and
logistical difficulties, as the UN concluded. The TSE had been created only two years
prior to the elections, and was administering a general election in difficult post-war
circumstances in which civil registries had been destroyed and over one-fourth of the
population had been displaced (Spence, Lanchin, and Thale 2001, 2). The TSE’s partisan,
rather than technocratic, staffing likely didn’t help in this regard.
Like the voter registration system, the system of location polling places used in
1994 was a holdover from previous elections. Despite the fact that security concerns had
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disappeared with the end of the war, the decentralization of polling locations seems not to
have been considered for the 1994 elections, although as election day approached the
necessity for such a reform was recognized. Short on time and resources, and with its
hands full with voter registration, the TSE stuck with the established method of
concentrating polling sites and assigning voters alphabetically.

Election Administration after 1994: Halting Steps toward Greater Access
Many of the procedural hurdles facing voters in 1994 persisted in subsequent
elections. But some administrative measures undertaken by the TSE after 1994 sought to
improve voter access, while major legal reforms would come after 2000.

Administrative Measures to Increase Voter Access
Voter registration requirements were largely unchanged until 2003, and again in
the 1997 elections the number of voter cards retrieved by voters fell well short of the
number of new registration applications (TSE-ES 1997, 11-12).190 However, with the
support of the international community (UN 1997, 2), the TSE made extra effort to
register voters and deliver voter cards for the 1997 elections, carrying out
“megajornadas” on the weekends to promote registration, conducting house to house
visits, sending telegrams to voters, and extending registration office hours (TSE-ES 1997,
11-12). However, these efforts seemed to have declined in the three subsequent elections,
as TSE post-election reports of those elections make no mention of such registration
activities. Another restrictive aspect of voter registration was the early closing date, with
new applications ending 120 days before election day (Electoral Code, Art. 31). This
190

The TSE reports that 325,119 registrants had not been delivered their voter card, but the number of these
that had emigrated or were deceased is unknown (TSE-ES 1997, 12). By the 2000 elections, the number
dropped to 234,003 (Consorcio 2000, 14, note 4), and by 2003 to 50,000 (CIS 2003).
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meant that voter registration closed two to three months before the legal start of the
campaign season. Also, following the March 1997 elections, voter registration services
did not resume until the beginning of 1998 (TSE-ES 1999, 18). Thus the TSE had taken
steps in 1997 to facilitate voter registration, but significant barriers to registration
remained.
Greater efforts were also made to ensure the availability of public transportation
on election day. While the electoral code (Art. 347) required that the government ensure
the functioning of public transportation on election day, the TSE began to contract buses
to provide free transportation for voters by 1999 (TSE-ES 1999, 29). This was limited to
major urban areas, but covered areas accounting for just over half of voters by 2003
(TSE-ES 2003, 32) and had expanded further by 2004 (TSE-ES 2004, 63-65).191 In
December 2003 an amendment to the electoral code required the TSE to contract free
public transportation “to the extent of its economic possibilities” and “with the objective
of facilitating citizen participation in the respective electoral event” (Art. 347, amended
by Decreto 228). Nevertheless, many voters continued to depend on political parties for
transportation to distant voting centers, with the attendant concerns about pressure placed
on voters to vote for the party providing the ride (CIS 2003, 2004; OAS 2009b, 30).192
The scope of the TSE’s voter information campaigns gradually expanded after
1994. In that year, the TSE had carried out a campaign to inform voters about registration
requirements and the voting process, which was complemented by a more extensive
campaign by civic groups with USAID funding (IFES 1994, 17). However, observers
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The number of bus routes used increased from 40 in 2003 to 65 in 2004 and 76 in 2006 (TSE-ES 2003,
33-34; 2004, 63-65; 2006, 81-85).
192
The TSE has actually subsidized party transport of voters in rural areas, with little oversight of how the
funds are used (EUEOM 2009a, note 25).
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evaluated the voter education efforts to be inadequate (IFES 1994, 28-29), and on
election day, observers noted that many less educated voters did not understand the
registry process and had difficulty finding their names on the voter lists (IFES 1994, 2,
23).193 Many domestic political actors recognized improvements in voter education for
the 1997 elections (IFES 1997, 20-21, 25, 50), when the TSE had employed cultural
activities that “sought to motivate voter registration and documentation through distinct
demonstrations of art such as music [and] theater” (TSE-ES 1997, 34). But the reach of
such activities was limited to 12 sites, four of them in San Salvador (TSE-ES 1997, 34).
By 2000, voter information efforts came to include new methods for voters to
check their registration status and voting location, such as information kiosks installed in
commercials centers and parks, a telephone hotline, and website (TSE-ES 2000, 38). In
2003 mobile kiosk units were added to the repertoire, and the number of voters
consulting information kiosks more than doubled (TSE-ES 2003, 56-57). Efforts
intensified in 2004 with the first use of a new voter ID document and registry system (see
below), with 1.5 million telegrams containing voter registration information sent to
residents in urban areas, television and radio ads, billboards, and for the first time,
inclusion of sign language in all TSE television spots (TSE-ES 2004, 43, 74). The
number of voters taking advantage of registration verification methods continued to
increase (TSE-ES 2004, 53). The TSE continued to use these different tools in its
extensive information campaigns in subsequent elections (TSE-ES 2006, 40, 85; 2009,
40), allowing voters a number of ways to check their registration status before the closing
of the electoral register, confirm their voting location, and find out about public
193

Many voters also marked ballots incorrectly by marking each party running in a coalition, thus
nullifying their vote (Montgomery 1995, 266). This may be a reflection of the inadequacy of voter
information campaigns prior to election day.
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transportation routes on election day.194 The 2009 observer mission from the European
Union, one of the most critical election observer organizations, called the TSE’s voter
education campaign “massive and well designed” (EUEOM 2009b, 6). Voter information
efforts in 2012 were also evaluated positively, and involved house-to-house visits in
many urban areas to inform voters where they were assigned to vote (ISD 2011a, 13 note
18; Interviews 51, 58).195
These efforts have not always been without problems, however, including
telegrams not received in time, a slow website to check voter information, and mobile
units visiting outlying areas during inconvenient hours (CIS 2004). On election day 2003,
for instance, some observers noted that TSE information centers were run by partisans of
ARENA and the FMLN with no oversight, and voters were sometimes given the wrong
information about where to vote (CIS 2003). Currently, one shortcoming is that it is only
possible to check one’s voter registration status during electoral periods; even the website
used to consult one’s registry information is not available between elections (Interviews
55, 58). On the whole, however, voter education campaigns have over time become more
extensive and have used a wide variety of media to inform voters.
Finally, the act of casting a ballot has become more accessible for some voters,
although improvements in election day procedures have been halting. After 1994, many
voters continued to find upon arriving at their polling station that their name was not on
the local voter roll or that there were inconsistencies between the data on the voter roll
and on their ID card (CIS 2000; 2003; Ramos 1997). There have been cases of such
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Prior to the 2006 elections, the TSE received over one million citizen consultations (TSE-ES 2006, 65,
86); prior to the 2009 elections, this increased to over 1.4 million (TSE-ES 2009, 40).
195
Informing voters of where they were assigned to vote was critical in 2012, as residential voting was
expanded and many people would be voting at new locations (see below).
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problems even after the creation of a new electoral registry and identity card (Martel
2010, 31-32; NDI 2009, 3; OAS 2009b, 16), although this problem has diminished
considerably in recent elections, and today cases of registered voters not appearing on the
voter list are isolated (Interviews 53, 54, 55, 59).
The TSE has also taken greater steps to orient voters in crowded voting centers.196
These efforts have been of limited reach, however, and observers have noted the
insufficient presence of staff to direct voters at overcrowded voting centers (CIS 2000;
2003; 2004; OAS 2009c, 21, 23; 2008c, 10).197 Other election day obstacles to
participation have been posed by the widespread late opening of polling stations (CIS
2003; 2006, 26; 2009, 30; EUEOM 2009b, 11; OAS 2008c, 6; 2009c, 21) and some cases
of people finding that someone had already voted in their place (CIS 2004).198 Finally, a
noteworthy advance undertaken by the TSE has been the introduction of Braille ballots
for blind voters, used since 2000 (TSE-ES 2000, 31; 2003, 60; 2006, 80).

Legal Reforms
While the administrative measures taken by the TSE after the 1994 elections
tended towards more inclusiveness, the most important changes to El Salvador’s election
administration have come from a series of legal reforms. The need for electoral reform
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These efforts have included posting more signs in voting centers to direct voters (TSE-ES 1997, 24, 29;
2000, 47) and agreements with the Scouts Association to provide youth volunteers to work as election day
orienters (TSE-ES 2004, 45-51; 2006, 80).
197
One observer group describes this challenge that voters face: “Observers noted voters going from table
to table asking where to vote, and being sent around in circles. After an extensive search for their names on
the voting registries of several tables, many frustrated voters gave up and left the voting centers without
voting” (CIS 2003). Likewise the following year: “In three municipalities, voters were observed leaving the
voting center without voting, reportedly due to their inability to locate their JRV. This frustration and
confusion felt by many voters on the day of the elections is amplified for individuals who are unable to
read” (CIS 2004).
198
In some cases, observers noted that pollworkers allowed such voters to cast their ballots, in violation of
the electoral code (CIS 2004).
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was already evident in 1994, when the top two presidential contenders agreed to pursue
reform after the elections – including the introduction of a new identity and voting
document, a more professional TSE, and residential voting. The major political parties
publicly supported these reforms (Baloyra 1998, 33; IFES 1994, 4, 26), and the need for a
new registry system and accessible polling locations were widely recognized by all
political actors and civil society groups (IFES 1997). In 1995, a presidential commission
with representation of the political parties was formed to study and make
recommendations on electoral reforms. But despite regular amendments to the electoral
code prior to electoral processes,199 the key reforms were slow in coming. This section
takes a closer look at the processes behind the two biggest election administration
reforms: voter registration and identification, and residential voting.

The New Civil Registry and Unique Identity Document
One of the most important electoral reforms has been the introduction of a new
voter identity document and associated creation of a new civil and electoral registry. The
reform replaced the voter ID card (carnet) and personal ID card (cédula) with a single
identity card. As the partisan TSE had shown leading up to the 1994 elections that it
lacked the capacity to adequately document citizens, the legislature opted to create a new
agency, the National Registry of Natural Persons (RNPN), to manage the national civil
registry and distribute ID cards (Mena and Rodríguez 2005, 68).200
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The Electoral Code has seen some 200 amendments since 1994, most of which have been minor changes
made in pre-election periods. For analysis of the reforms until 2007, see Artiga-González 2008b.
200
Despite being an independent agency, the RNPN’s executive staff is named by the president, political
parties, the TSE, and other government bodies (Decreto 552, Art. 5). Its director has traditionally been from
the ARENA party (CIS 2006, 9, 22).
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Legally established in 1995, the RNPN was slow to begin operations; but the
distribution of the new Unique Identity Document (Documento Único de Identidad, or
DUI) began in late 2001, and was first used as voter ID in 2004 (Artiga-González 2008,
19). The significance of the DUI for inclusiveness is that voter registration became
automatic: when a citizen applies for an ID card – which is needed for a wide range of
daily transactions – his or her information is automatically sent to the TSE to be added to
the electoral registry.201
The process of obtaining a DUI consists of a visit to a registry office, most of
which are located in departmental capitals, with a recently-issued birth certificate from
the municipal office where one was born;202 the ID card is given to the voter that day,
eliminating the waiting period involved with the carnet. First time registrations are free,
but renewals, replacements, and modifications cost $10.31 (EUEOM 2009a; Mena and
Rodríguez 2005, 73; RNPN 2011). When a person moves to a new residence, they are
supposed to obtain a new DUI with their updated address; since this implies paying the
modification fee, many people choose not to do so (Interviews 51, 54, 55). As there is no
way to update one’s residence for voting purposes apart from modifying one’s DUI, this
presents a challenge in assigning voters to polling stations, and also means some voters
travel to a municipality where they no longer reside to vote.
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Among the responsibilities of the RNPN listed in its organic law are “to proportion to the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal all the information necessary for the inscription of persons in the electoral registry”
(Decreto 552, Art. 2).
202
Amendments to the law regulating DUIs in 2010 removed the requirement to present a birth certificate
for DUI renewals if the certificate is already in the RNPN’s database (Decreto 314, amending Decreto
581). However, as of July 2012 the RNPN’s website still listed the birth certificate as a requisite for
applying for DUI renewals, and an interview respondent suggested it is still required (Interview 58).
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Thus the process of acquiring a DUI can present some obstacles, given the travel
and potential costs involved.203 According to one observer mission, political parties
sometimes “provide individuals with both transport and the required fee” (EUEOM
2009c, 8). But more official steps have been taken to ensure inclusiveness as well. While
most DUIs were set to expire before the 2009 general election,204 the legislative assembly
extended their validity through 2009 so that citizens would not be faced with the costs of
renewal in order to vote (EUEOM 2009a). When most of the country’s DUIs expired in
2010, the state issued free renewals in the country’s 32 poorest municipalities. The
assembly also approved free renewals in December 2011 and January 2012 with the
March 2012 elections on the horizon (FUSADES 2011, 13). Other measures have been
taken to facilitate first time registrations of young people.205
The result has been an inclusive voter registry, with an estimated 95 percent of
eligible Salvadorans having a DUI and thus being registered to vote (UN 2009, 7).206 At
the same time, the DUI includes better safeguards than did the carnet and cédula, making
it more difficult to forge (CIS 2004; EUEOM 2009a; 2009c, 7-8), although many
concerns remain over the lack of control at the municipal level over the issuing of birth
certificates, which can result in falsely obtained DUIs (EUEOM 2009b, 6; Interview 53).
The construction of a new electoral registry based on the DUI also allowed the deceased
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Young people in particular are less likely to have a DUI than older Salvadorans and are more likely to
give lack of identification as a reason for not voting. In focus groups, young people have reported some of
the logistical difficulties of obtaining a DUI, such as traveling to one’s departmental capital and the cost of
replacements when one’s DUI is stolen (Nevitte 2009, 110, 113-114).
204
DUIs were valid for five years, and are now valid for eight.
205
Recognizing that many young Salvadorans turning 18 by election day had not applied for their DUI in
part due to lack of a birth certificate, the Legislative Assembly in 2011 passed a temporary measure
waiving the requirement for a birth certificate for first time registrations if a record of the birth certificate
was on file with the RNPN. It also provided an extra week before the closing of new registrations, changing
the closing date to 173 days before election day (Decreto 826).
206
This compares to a high estimate of voter registration coverage of 78.6% in 1990 (UN 2009, 7).
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and emigrated on the old registry to be purged – although the registry quickly became
bloated again due to the emigration of registered voters and a lack of standardization in
municipal reporting of deaths to the central registry.207 Finally, the DUI also made
possible the use of photographic voter lists on election day, which not only helps prevent
voter impersonation but can also help prevent illiterate voters from being told (falsely) by
unscrupulous poll workers or party poll watchers that they are not on the voter list (Mena
and Rodríguez 2005, 69; see also Peña 2003, 8).

Closing Date: The Low Profile Reform
While the introduction of the new identity card and electoral register was a highly
visible reform, a registration-related reform to the electoral code in 2007 went almost
unnoticed by the media. The closing date for new inscriptions in the electoral registry
was extended from 100 days to 180 days before the election.208 On top of that, a stringent
residency requirement was added, prohibiting changes of municipal residence on the
voter registry in the year prior to election day.209 This reform was introduced by the
ARENA party, with the stated purpose of preventing pre-electoral registration fraud (the
illegal movement of voters across jurisdictions, or traslados); as an ARENA official put
it, “We are looking to have clean and transparent elections” (EDH 2007m). A non-
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The electoral registry for the 2004 elections included 3.31 million people, down from 3.53 million
previously (Artiga-González 2008, 21, note 16), reflecting not a less inclusive registry but a less bloated
one. But by 2009, it was estimated that the electoral registry of 4.2 million exceeded the number of voting
age Salvadorans residing in the country by 500,000-750,000 (EUEOM 2009b, 6; OAS 2009b, 7, 31).
208
The closing date had been 120 days, and was reduced to 90 days with the introduction of the DUI and
new electoral registry. In 2005 the closing date was increased to 100 days at the prompting of the TSE, for
the purpose of allowing more time for voters to consult the provisional voter rolls and correct any errors (El
Diario de Hoy 2005 [herafter EDH]; TSE-ES 2006, 16).
209
Decreto 502 (Dec. 6, 2007), amending Article 30 of the Electoral Code. After the end of new
inscriptions, obvious errors in the registry can be corrected up until 120 days before the election. Prior to
this reform, the electoral code made no distinction between the cutoff date for changes of residence and the
cutoff for new voter registration applications.
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partisan advisor to the legislative committee on electoral reforms also indicated the
reform was aimed at eliminating this type of fraud (Interview 57), and it was
accompanied by stiff penalties for registration fraud added to the penal code.210 At least
initially, an FMLN official expressed opposition, saying that it would deny the right to
vote (EDH 2007m).211 At the same time, the FMLN has accused ARENA of
orchestrating the movements of voters across municipal lines that the measure sought to
prevent (EDH 2008a).
Ultimately the reform passed, with the FMLN voting against the bill.212 However,
the bill also contained a number of other reforms to the electoral code, and according to
several people involved, there was consensus across parties on the earlier registration
closing dates (Interviews 55, 57, 61). As the FMLN’s head of electoral issues indicated,
the party was in agreement with the earlier closing date but wanted to see enforcement of
penalties for falsifying residence for electoral purposes, as well as mechanisms for
allowing voters to change their voting residence with the TSE without needing to obtain a
new DUI (Interview 61).
The FMLN’s magistrate on the TSE characterized the earlier cutoff for residency
changes as useful and indicated that it diminishes the traslado problem. Interestingly, this
is not because it allows more time for election officials to verify voters’ residences to
detect illegal registrations – the TSE in fact has no mechanism for verifying the veracity
of voters’ residency (Interview 55; UN 2009, 22). Rather, according to the magistrate, the
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A 4-6 year prison term was specified for those who falsely change their residence on their registration,
and 7-10 years for public officials involved in the practice (TSE-ES 2009, 11).
211
The motivations for the reform expressed in the bill itself included “eliminate any legal loophole that
results in improper practices such as the transfer of voters…” (Decreto 502).
212
A report on the bill’s vote indicates that the parties on the right voted in favor, while parties on the left
(presumably the FMLN and CD) voted against (Observatorio Legislativo de FUSADES 2007, 9-10).
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early cutoff for residency changes occurs before political parties select their mayoral
candidates, and it is these candidates that sometimes organize and pay for the illegal
shifting of voters across jurisdictions (Interview 55).
The 180 day closing date for new registrations most affects young people who are
not yet registered. While those people who will turn 18 years old by election day can preregister before the closing date – a measure that apparently originated with the president
of the RNPN (EDH 2003e),213 and has been supported by all political parties (Interview
57) – few do so. For example, of 58,000 Salvadorans coming of age in the six months
prior to the 2012 elections, only 14,000 had applied for their DUI (and thus for voter
registration) before the closing date (FUSADES 2011, 13, note 21).214 A UN report noted
the obstacle posed by the early closing date: “To motivate a citizen to appear before state
agencies months before an election, to carry out a transaction whose necessity they don’t
understand, when the electoral campaign hasn’t even begun, is not an easy task, in El
Salvador or in any part of the world (UN 2009, 10; see also Martel 2010, 19). The early
cutoff for residency changes can result in another problem: those who change their
residence from one municipality to another on their DUI during the year between the
residency cutoff date and election day may encounter problems trying to vote, when the
municipality on their ID card doesn’t match the municipality where they are registered to
vote. There have been isolated cases of people being denied the vote because of this (JVE
2009, 40).
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Such pre-registration had also been permitted before the introduction of the DUI, however (Decreto 853,
Oct. 17, 1996, modifying Article 31 of the Electoral Code).
214
This was despite a TSE publicity campaign promoting registration aimed at this youth population (see El
Diario de Hoy 2011a).
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Residential Voting
The other major election administration reform in El Salvador has been the
gradual implementation of residential voting. The term residential voting as used in El
Salvador refers to both decentralizing polling sites and assigning voters to the voting
center nearest their residence (or another center in the same municipality that the voter
chooses). Whereas in Guatemala the assignment of voters to voting centers was reformed
prior to the decentralization of voting sites outside of municipal capitals, in El Salvador
the two have always been considered as one issue.215
The desirability of residential voting has been recognized by major political actors
and international observers since the 1994 elections. It was one of the priorities agreed to
by the top two presidential candidates in that year’s election, while four UN missions to
study electoral reforms in the 1990s proposed a variety of ways of implementing it. Plans
for residential voting in the mid-1990s included a proposal sent to the Legislative
Assembly in September 1995 from a special presidential commission, which was revised
by the Assembly’s electoral committee by August 1996 but not passed as the upcoming
1997 elections made major electoral reforms impossible (CIS 2009, 32; ISD 2009).
Several studies were also conducted by the TSE, including a plan for an electoral census
that would have re-registered all voters and served to collect cartographic information for
residential voting. However, this plan and others didn’t get off the ground (ISD 2009; UN
1997, 14-17).
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The terminology used in each country can cause confusion, as in El Salvador the centralization of, and
alphabetical assignment of voters to, voting centers is referred to as voto domiciliario (domicile voting), in
the sense that “domicile” signifies one’s municipality and not one’s specific address (see UN 2009, 12).
The same term in Guatemala generally signifies the assignment of voters to the nearest voting center, and
in Nicaragua it signifies both decentralization and voter assignment based on residence. The often
inconsistent usage of the terms within each country adds to the confusion.
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El Salvador came closer to realizing residential voting with a plan developed by
the TSE in 1998-1999 to begin residential voting in 120 municipalities for the 2000
elections, based on recommendations from the last UN electoral mission. The plan
involved an enlistment of voters over a three week period at 730 locations which would
later serve as voting centers. Some 341,000 voters were enlisted to participate at a cost of
over $2 million. But this plan was scrapped by the TSE magistrates that took office in
August 1999, with little explanation (Consorcio 2000, 77; Cuéllar 2009, 975; ISD 2009;
UN 2009, 9). The TSE magistrates from the conservative parties were in favor of
rejecting the plan altogether, while the FMLN magistrate in the TSE wanted to press
ahead (Consorcio 2000, 77-78; Martel 2010, 26); ultimately the opposition of the two
conservative magistrates was sufficient to block implementation (UN 2009, 9, note
15).216
In 2001 the Legislative Assembly approved, with the support of all parties, a law
mandating the implementation of residential voting beginning in 2003 (Decreto 293). The
following year, however, the assembly postponed implementation until 2004 (Decreto
834), and then in 2003 postponed it once again until 2006 (Decreto 133). Finally, the
assembly determined in 2005 that residential voting would only be carried out through a
small pilot program in 2006, and gradually expanded thereafter at the discretion of the
TSE (Decreto 842).
The 2002 bill postponing residential voting until 2004 was sponsored by 3
ARENA and 3 FMLN deputies,217 and passed with a large majority of 73 votes (of 84
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One consequence of this decision was that many voters who changed their residence during the
enlistment found on election day that they did not appear on the voters list (Consorcio 2000, 78).
217
Schafik Handal, Walter Durán, and Irma Segunda Amaya Echeverría from the FMLN; Hermes Alcides
Flores Molina, Gerardo Antonio Suvillaga García, and Mariella Peña Pinto from ARENA.
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deputies).218 The 2003 decision to postpone residential voting came from the conservative
ARENA and PCN parties, and was more contentious. The conservative magistrates on
the TSE argued that the tribunal was unprepared technically to carry out residential
voting; the other magistrates disagreed. ARENA deputies on the Legislative Assembly’s
electoral commission pointed to the lack of unanimity among the TSE magistrates as the
reason to delay implementation, while the FMLN opposed the postponement and accused
ARENA and PCN of basing their positions on political calculations (EDH 2003a; 2003b;
2003c; 2003d). The measure passed with a bare majority of 43 votes.
After these delays, a very small residential voting pilot plan was carried out in
2006 that covered approximately 40,000 voters in 7 low population municipalities,
involving 24 voting centers – up from 7 voting centers previously used in these
municipalities (OAS 2008c, 3; TSE-ES n.d.[a], 1; 2009, 69). The plan involved
subdividing each municipality into voting sectors, each corresponding to one voting
center. Unlike in Guatemala, there was no attempt by the Assembly to mandate a polling
place in each population center of a given size; rather, the TSE was free to choose
appropriate locations (UN 2009, 15). The program appeared to boost turnout: average
turnout in the seven municipalities was some 13 percentage points higher than the
national average (CIS 2006, 23), and increased significantly in each municipality
(between 7.5 and 18.8 points) compared to the previous legislative and municipal
elections in 2003 (TSE-ES 2006, 76).
The following year, an interparty commission was formed to discuss a range of
electoral reforms, with residential voting being one of the most prominent. The key
218

Data on Assembly votes prior to 2007 come from a public information request with the Legislative
Assembly. Only the number of votes in favor of bills is available; the number of votes against or
abstentions is not available, nor are the names or party affiliations of those voting in favor.
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debate centered on how far to extend residential voting for the 2009 elections. Most
parties wanted it extended to most or all of the country, while ARENA advocated a more
gradual approach. The ARENA magistrate on the TSE took the position that technical
obstacles and financial limitations could not be overcome to extend it nationally; the
FMLN magistrate disagreed on both counts (EDH 2007c). The FMLN hoped to push
through a bill to require the TSE to extend residential voting nationally, but this prospect
faded when the PCN and PDC parties withdrew their support from this position (EDH
200d; 2007e; 2007j).
The interparty subcommission working on the issue ultimately proposed
residential voting be extended to half of the country’s 262 municipalities, with ARENA
being the only one of the six parties that opposed this position, citing technical
considerations (EDH 2007k; 2007l). President Saca of the ARENA party noted that his
party had always supported residential voting, “but in order,” and even suggested that
ARENA would win more local elections in greater San Salvador with residential voting
(EDH 2007h; 2008b). The interparty commission’s recommendation came to naught,
however, and the TSE was left to determine the extent to which residential voting would
be used in 2009.
Thus in 2009, residential voting was expanded to a total of only 23 municipalities,
involving 73 voting centers and covering 4.65 percent of the country’s voters. In the
department of Cuscatlán where residential voting was implemented, the number of voting
centers increased fourfold. Turnout in the affected areas again surpassed national average
turnout levels significantly (EUEOM 2009; ISD 2009; TSE-ES n.d.[a], 2).
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Debate then resumed over how far to extend residential voting for the 2012
elections. This debate centered on the TSE’s capacity to implement it nationwide. After
the 2009 elections, the EU observer mission reported that the TSE had the technical
capacity to do so (EUEOM 2009c, 6). A UN mission also analyzed the prospects for
extending residential voting to the entire country, and the TSE adopted its
recommendations, which involved creating a catalogue of voting centers from which
citizens would choose their voting center (within their municipality) when renewing their
DUI – most of which were set to expire in 2010 (UN 2009, 18-24). The plan would have
covered the entire country and had a low cost by exploiting the renewal process for ID
cards (UN 2009, 22), and the UN also offered technical and financial support to
implement the program (La Prensa Gráfica 2009c; hereafter LPG). When the TSE failed
to get the catalogue of voting centers prepared in time, it sought ways to systematize
voters’ addresses for the purpose of assigning voting centers (EDH 2009d; 2009e).
At this point costs became a decisive factor. The TSE’s new plan to extend
residential voting to the entire country would cost $12-14 million, but president Funes of
the FMLN indicated that he had other priorities for his budget and would not fully fund
the TSE plan. Funes and the president of the TSE, also from the FMLN, briefly clashed
over the issue (EDH 2009c; 2010; LPG 2009d). After the conflict over funding, and with
the TSE’s technical preparations proceeding slowly, a more limited (though still
extensive) expansion was planned for 2012. Residential voting was extended to 185
municipalities covering 47.3 percent of registered voters (TSE-ES n.d.[b], 2-3). Whereas
the country had 399 voting centers in 2006 (TSE-ES 2006, 42) and 460 in 2009 (TSE-ES
2009, 51), the number jumped to 1,148 in 2012 (EDH 2012).
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Table 7.2 Election Administration Inclusiveness, El Salvador 2004-2012
Dimension
Voter Registration
Extent of state
responsibility for
registering voters
Difficulty of
registration process
Ease of access to ID
documents required for
registration
Registration closing
date
Residency requirement

Provisional registration

Registry consultation

Purging of voter rolls
Getting to the Ballot
Box
Accessibility of polling
places

Assignment of voters to
polling places
Convenience voting
measures
Electoral calendar
Casting a Ballot
Voter ID requirement
Provisional or tendered
ballots

Description

Inclusiveness

Automatic registration upon
obtaining ID card

High

One trip to centralized
office; free first-time ID,
$10.31 for renewals
Birth certificate required,
which some people lack

Medium

Medium

Juridical Basis*
Electoral law

Administrative
practice / Registry
law
Registry law

90-180 days

Low

Electoral law

1 year (since 2007); voter
must obtain new ID card
listing new address
No provisional registration
(though those turning 18
between close of
registration and election
day may register)
Voter lists distributed to
political parties and posted
in public places; website
limited to electoral periods
Voters not purged from the
rolls for failure to vote

Low

Electoral law

Low

Administrative
practice

High

Electoral law /
Administrative
practice

High

n/a

Largely decentralized by
2012; moderately
accessible public
transportation
Mostly residential by 2012

Low /
Medium

Electoral law /
administrative
practice

Low /
Medium

Electoral law /
Administrative
practice
Electoral law

Voting held on Sunday

High

Administrative
practice

DUI required (no additional
burden beyond registration)
Not used

High

Electoral law

Low

Electoral law

Not used

Continued on next page
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Table 7.2, continued
Dimension
Voter Education
State efforts to inform
voters of where and how
to register and vote

Description

Inclusiveness

Extensive information
campaigns through
diverse media

Overall Inclusiveness

High

Juridical Basis*
Administrative
practice

Medium

* Electoral law refers to those elements based on the electoral law that are not open to
modification by the electoral management body. Registry law refers to the laws
regulating the National Registry of Natural Persons (RNPN) and the issuance of identity
cards (DUIs). Administrative practice refers to those elements that are not explicitly
codified in the electoral law, but are instead matters of bureaucratic performance and
administrative discretion.

Explaining El Salvador’s Election Administration Reforms
El Salvador undertook major election administration reforms from the mid-1990s
onward that increased inclusiveness, particularly the streamlining of voter registration
and the gradual implementation of a more accessible system of polling locations. These
measures are summarized in Table 7.2 above. This section discusses the factors that
contributed to the substance and timing of these reforms.

Explaining Voter Registration Reform
That voter registration reform preceded the decentralization of voting sites in El
Salvador is understandable in the light of the extreme lack of confidence in the electoral
registry in the 1980s and 1990s. A UN electoral mission to the country in the 1990s noted
that the lack of confidence in the registry was “a constant theme in Salvadoran politicalelectoral debate and the motivation of the better part of the [electoral reform] projects
under discussion,” and reported that the main interest of instituting a new identity card
was not its all-purpose usefulness but the opportunity it offered to purge the voter rolls;
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making polling sites more accessible was considered an objective secondary to purging
the electoral registry (UN 1997, 9).
Voter registration problems had been so severe that they threatened the legitimacy
of election outcomes. And while some thought that the left was disadvantaged the most
by registration obstacles, there was general concern among all political actors of
registration fraud and the unreliability of the voter rolls (see, e.g., UN 1997, 11). Thus the
previous system was neither accessible to citizens nor particularly secure against
manipulation, and it was a highly politicized issue given priority over other electoral
matters. Thus the process of registration reform began the year after the 1994 elections
(although years would pass before changes were implemented), and addressed both
accessibility and security. The reforms enjoyed widespread support: when the DUI was
introduced to replace the carnet as voter identification, all parties supported the measure
(EDH 2003c). And according to numerous respondents, there was consensus among
political parties to make voter registration automatic (Interviews 51, 54, 55, 57). It
appears that no political parties felt threatened by these reforms, and the UN electoral
mission at the time suggested that the new civil registry and ID card would not benefit
some parties over others (UN 1997, 31).
Despite agreement on the major changes, there were partisan differences over
whether to subsidize ID cards, with ARENA opposed to the free first-time distribution of
cards and other parties in favor. In typical fashion, some attributed partisan motives to
ARENA’s stance: “Only ARENA would give its sympathizers the 90 colones so that they
can go vote,” said one opposition politician (EDH 2001). When the issue arose again in
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2009, it was ARENA advocating free renewals of DUIs and the governing FMLN
reluctant to devote the necessary funds (LPG 2009b).

Explaining the Course of Residential Voting
After residential voting had been endorsed by the major political forces in 1994,
what delayed its introduction for so long? Publicly, all parties have consistently
supported residential voting, and decisions to delay it have always involved technical or
economic justifications (Interview 57; Martel 2010, 29). And in fact, residential voting
has been a major technical challenge for the TSE. One such challenge has been the fact
that residence information in the electoral registry is often imprecise, due to the lack of
uniformity in the country’s address system, multiple names used for a given location, illdefined borders between municipalities, and citizens who give the wrong address to
authorities (partly a legacy of the war and military regime). This presents problems in
assigning voters to polling stations (FUSADES 2011, 10-11; UN 2009, 13; Interviews 55,
60). Another challenge has been determining what installations would be adequate for
voting centers outside of municipal centers (UN 2009, 14). Yet another challenge was
funding, given the costs of developing the necessary electoral cartography and
conducting voting in more polling places on election day.
So in 2007, for example, when the extension of residential voting was being
debated, ARENA and others could point to technical challenges such as the fact that
some 16 percent of identity cards did not include an exact address (EDH 2007i; see also
UN 2009, 14). They could also point to a report of two Panamanian technical advisers
who in 2007 recommended a gradual extension of residential voting and an overhaul of
the system for coding voters’ addresses (EDH 2007f). But as TSE magistrate Eduardo
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Urquilla noted, these challenges were not insurmountable (EDH 2007i). One member of
the centrist CD party accused the ARENA and PDC parties of using the
recommendations from the Panamanian advisors to cover their political motives for not
wanting to extend residential voting (EDH 2007g).
Indeed, while these technical challenges are significant, they do not account for
why residential voting was delayed for so long. In fact, much technical preparation and
financial investment were wasted by decisions to delay residential voting. According to
one respondent from the FMLN, the necessary cartography and funding was available in
2000, and the decision to abandon the residential voting plan that the TSE had been
developing was the result of a lack of “political will” (Interview 58). Again in 2003 when
the assembly postponed residential voting, the TSE was prepared with the logistical plan
and already had the funding to implement it for the 2004 election (Interview 60; TSE-ES
2004, 24).219 According to one TSE magistrate at the time, when the parties realized how
prepared the TSE was to implement residential voting on a large scale, they were nervous
about how it would affect them electorally. Ultimately two magistrates on the TSE – one
from ARENA, another from the Supreme Court – opposed going ahead with the plan
(Interview 60), and an ARENA-backed bill postponing implementation passed through
the Assembly. Other respondents agreed that although the cost of residential voting was a
consideration, it was not what caused the repeated postponements of implementing
residential voting (Interviews 53, 55); in fact, funding constraints were more important
after 2009 than when residential voting was delayed during the mid-2000s (Interview 59).
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The TSE in fact returned excess funds after the elections (Interview 60; see also El Diario de Hoy
2003c; 2009a).
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Instead of technical or financial impediments, almost everyone agrees that
electoral calculations delayed residential voting. Despite all parties’ public statements of
support, according to many sources the major impediment has been uncertainty about
who would benefit electorally from the reform. For some, this fear was generalized
among the major political parties (Interviews 51, 52, 59). For others, it was conservative
parties that feared the consequences of residential voting, as the prevailing idea at the
time was that it would benefit the left. This view was commonly expressed by those from
the FMLN (Interviews 53, 55, 58, 61, 63), but it came from other sources as well. An
official with the CD party and a former TSE magistrate indicated that the decision in
1999 to abandon residential voting plans came from ARENA, and that the 2003 decision
to postpone residential voting (which was also backed by ARENA) was ultimately
political rather than based on technical considerations (Interview 60). A non-partisan
advisor to the Legislative Assembly’s committee on electoral and constitutional reform
also reported that parties on the right were privately reluctant about the possible electoral
consequences of residential voting, and that the technical capacity to carry out residential
voting existed long before it actually was implemented (Interview 57). Other sources also
suggest that reluctance about residential voting came primarily from the right (Dalton
2010; ISD 2011a, 5-6, note 10). Only one respondent – a deputy from the ARENA party
– indicated that partisan electoral concerns played no role in delaying residential voting
(Interview 54).
The fact that the implementation of residential voting was delayed for so long
while the Legislative Assembly and Presidency were controlled by the right offers some
indication that reluctance by these parties was critical (the FMLN never had enough seats
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in the Assembly to pass legislation on its own; see Holiday 2010, 4). More direct
evidence comes from the parties’ positions at key decision points. As noted above, all
parties supported the initial bill mandating residential voting and the first postponement
of implementation for one year. In 2003, however, it was the conservative ARENA and
PCN parties that pushed for the postponement of residential voting. The decision in 2005
to implement residential voting gradually was endorsed by all parties, with the bill
receiving 80 votes in the Assembly; the bill itself was sponsored by deputies from the
ARENA, PCN, and PDC parties. But according to the FMLN’s secretary of electoral
matters, ARENA had wanted to derogate the existing residential voting bills altogether,
and it was the FMLN’s magistrate on the TSE that intervened to secure an agreement on
gradual implementation (Interview 61).220
The basis for the idea that residential voting would benefit the left was that low
income voters would most benefit, and this would supposedly redound to the left’s
advantage. The social bases of the FMLN and ARENA parties didn’t bear this out,
however. While both parties are sometimes characterized as catch-all parties (ArtigaGonzález 2004, 80-83; Ulloa et al. 2000, 40-41), the FMLN has been stronger in urban
than rural areas (Artiga-González 2004, 76; Colindres 1997, 19; Spence, Lanchin, and
Thale 2001, 5; Ulloa et al. 1997, 139), and does better among more educated and higher
socioeconomic status voters (Artiga-González 2004, 82; Nevitte 2009, 117). ARENA, on
the other hand, is stronger in rural areas (Ulloa et al. 1997, 138-139).221 ARENA’s rural
and lower-income base suggests that the party would stand to benefit from
decentralization of polling locations, a point noted by an ARENA deputy and another
220

I was unable to find corroborating evidence on this point.
In 2009, only 57.6 percent of ARENA sympathizers lived in urban areas, compared to 72.8 percent of
FMLN sympathizers (Nevitte 2009, 118).
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analyst (Interviews 52, 54). However, the dual nature of residential voting, including not
just decentralization to rural areas but also residence-based assignment of voters to
polling stations, meant that it would facilitate the participation of urban voters as well.
In any case, the uncertainty about the electoral consequences of residential voting
not only caused its delay, but also led to the Assembly’s decision to implement
residential voting through small pilot programs rather than all at once (Interviews 52, 53,
55, 58). The small pilot programs allowed the parties to gauge the effects of residential
voting without risking significant electoral outcomes.222 One of the lessons of the pilot
programs was that residential voting didn’t seem to favor any particular parties over
others (Dalton 2010; ISD 2011a, 5; Interviews 53, 55, 58, 59). After 2006, it also
appeared to have limited impact on voter turnout.223 As a result, reluctance about
extending residential voting has dissipated, although partisan conflict continues over
controlling its implementation (Interview 60).

Assessing the Hypothesized Influences on Election Administration
While several of the above sections identify the key causal factors influencing
election administration inclusiveness in El Salvador, this section assesses the influence of
several independent variables related to the hypotheses presented in chapter 2. It begins
with brief discussion of two factors emphasized above (concerns about preventing
election fraud and partisan interests in shaping the electorate) before assessing the impact
of the electoral management body, civil society, and international factors.
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On a related note, residential voting may also allow parties to gauge their support at the sub-municipal
level (Interview 54) and thereby cater their campaign themes on a local level (FUSADES 2011, 5).
Apparently, however, residential voting has not resulted in a shift in campaign strategies (Interviews 52,
54), as has occurred in Guatemala.
223
Turnout rates in the 2009 presidential election in most municipalities where residential voting was
introduced was actually lower than turnout in the previous presidential election in 2004 (TSE-ES 2009, 88).
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The Specter of Election Fraud
In El Salvador, election fraud occurred in the 1972, 1974, and 1977 elections,
marked by ballot stuffing, intimidation of voters, and altered vote counts (Montgomery
1995, 64, 67, 71-71). And as in Guatemala, these frauds played a significant role in the
restrictive election administration measures adopted in the 1980s and 1990s, although
concerns about recurrent fraud shaped voter registration policies more than the location
of polling sites.
Since the 1980s, mutual accusations of fraud have been common, particularly
involving registration fraud and accusations that people are shipped in from neighboring
municipalities (or from neighboring countries) by local candidates to vote on election day
(CIS 2000, 2003; 2009, 12; EUEOM 2009b, 2; OAS 2009b, 18, 22).224 Perceptions of
fraud are also widespread in the public, with pre-election polls showing up to half of
respondents believing there would be fraud and less than one-third believing the elections
would be clean (Artiga-González 2004, 49; Ulloa et al. 2000, 34).
Ironically, some of the restrictive procedures adopted in the 1980s which made
voter participation more difficult also made voter fraud more likely. The overcrowding of
voting centers that accompanied the concentration of polling locations not only led some
voters to give up the search for their voting table in frustration, but also “overwhelmed
the JRVs, causing many procedural errors to take place and creating opportunities for
fraud” (CIS 2004). Moreover, the partisan staffing of the electoral body at all levels often
224

Several interview respondents suggested that the “traslados” problem is relatively isolated (Interviews
54, 56, 58), and certainly detection and prosecution of the problem is rare: a 2009 electoral mission from
the UN indicated that it received no reports of people being prosecuted or sanctioned for falsifying their
residence (UN 2009, 12). The introduction of the DUI, the costs of changing one’s residence in the registry,
and an early closing date for residence changes have no doubt made this form of manipulation difficult.
Other sources suggest the practice of traslados is routine, and one mayor even admitted to a journalist that
he paid five dollars per person to change their address on the registry for electoral purposes (Arauz 2006).
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results in poorly trained poll workers and supervisors, which results in both inadequate
protections against fraud – poll workers who do not check voters’ fingers for indelible
ink, for instance (CIS 2004) – and obstacles to voter participation, such as poor
orientation of voters at polling places.
Concerns about fraud have led to restrictive rules more recently as well,
particularly the early closing dates for registration and residency changes aimed at
preventing the transfer of voters across municipalities. Yet oddly, this is not accompanied
by other measures such as requiring proof of residence when registering (Consorcio
2000, 73; EUEOM 2009b, 6) or any efforts in the year between the closing date and
election day to detect fraudulent registrations (Interview 55; UN 2009, 22). The latter is
due in part to the ambiguity of responsibilities between the TSE (which administers the
electoral register) and the RNPN (which administers the civil register), leaving it unclear
which agency is responsible for checking the veracity of residence changes (Arauz 2006).
Thus some of the measures aimed at deterring election fraud have turned out to be quite
ineffective safeguards while at the same time limiting voter access; other measures that
may be more effective have tended to shift the burden onto voters rather than election
administrators to achieve the desired goal.
At the same time that restrictive measures have often coincided with opportunities
for voter fraud, inclusive measures intended to facilitate voter participation can also help
prevent fraud. The introduction of the DUI, for instance, allowed for better (but still
imperfect) control over the issuance of identity cards and the use of photographic voter
lists (thus making double voting or voter impersonation more difficult),225 and also made
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While cases of voter impersonation and the use of fake ID cards have been reported by observers, such
irregularities are thought to be isolated (OAS 2009b, 21; NDI 2009, 4).
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voter registration automatic, eliminating a major hurdle for potential voters. Similarly,
residential voting is widely thought to not only lower barriers to voter participation, but
also provide greater protection against pre-electoral registration fraud, as citizens voting
in their own communities can recognize when outsiders attempt to vote in jurisdictions
where they do not live (TSE-ES n.d.[c]).226

Partisan Interests
As discussed above, partisan interests have at times played a central role in
shaping election administration inclusiveness in El Salvador. In the past, a prevalent
hypothesis was that the ARENA party hoped to benefit from low turnout, particularly
among low income voters and those who had not participated in the early-mid 1980s.
According to this view, poorer people and those who were unregistered would tend to
support the leftist opposition (Freedom House 1989, 48-49; Montgomery 2000, 158). The
extent to which this helps explain the complicated registration procedures used from the
late 1980s through the 1990s is unclear. But it should be noted that ARENA, along with
all other parties, supported the replacement of the carnet with the unified ID card and the
associated automatic voter registration. If any parties had hoped to benefit from
restrictive voter registration practices, by 1995 (when the RNPN law was passed) and
certainly by 2004 (when the use of the DUI as voter identification began) it seems they
were willing to give up such an advantage in exchange for a more reliable registry and
national ID card. ARENA advocated early cutoff dates for registration and residency
changes, but such measures drew little opposition from the FMLN. The left and the right
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This is a commonly expressed idea (see, e.g., El Diario de Hoy 2008c; 2011b). The UN (2009, 8, note
11) notes that the benefit of voters detecting outsiders at their polling stations as a result of residential
voting only applies to small rural areas.
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have shifted positions on other registration-related measures, such as whether or not to
subsidize ID cards.
The evidence of partisan interests shaping residential voting is clearer, as
discussed above. The greatest resistance to making polling places more accessible came
from the right, although at times there seems to have been reluctance on the left as well.
The contrast with Guatemala, where there was no partisan opposition to decentralizing
voting sites, can be understood as a consequence of differences in the two countries’
party systems. In contrast to Guatemala’s personalist and ephemeral parties, El
Salvador’s major parties are highly institutionalized, and levels of party identification are
higher.227 These parties have a core vote (voto duro), and residential voting presented the
prospect of drawing new voters into the electorate that were not part of the party’s core
base.228 While the right, which was already in power, had more to fear from
unpredictable new voters entering the electorate, the left also couldn’t be certain that it
would benefit from higher turnout. These partisan calculations appear to have been
crucial in postponing residential voting and determining the nature of its implementation.

EMB Structure: The Supreme Electoral Tribunal
The partisan composition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, born of the distrust
between the main protagonists of the peace accords, has frequently been blamed for a
number of ills. Critics argue that election officials function more as party representatives
than neutral administrators (EUEOM 2009b, 3-5; OAS 2008c, 6). While one magistrate
nominated by the Supreme Court estimated that over 95 percent of decisions taken by the
227

For three years for which data are available (2006, 2008, and 2010), party identification levels were
31%, 41%, and 34%, respectively (LAPOP n.d.).
228
For a similar analysis, see the comments of an anonymous political analyst quoted in El Diario de Hoy
2007i.
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TSE magistrates are unanimous (Interview 59), at least on one crucial issue – residential
voting – the positions of TSE magistrates have often coincided with the positions taken
by their political parties. In cases such as this, the lack of a non-partisan electoral body
that could act as an independent force is a notable contrast to Guatemala, where the
electoral tribunal has been an important agent in prompting electoral law reforms. In El
Salvador the TSE lacks the authority to introduce legislation in the Assembly (ArtigaGonzález 2008a, 558), and although it submits proposals to the Assembly’s electoral
committee, there is little institutionalized collaboration between the TSE and the
committee (Interviews 57, 59) – perhaps because the large parties prefer to deal with the
TSE through their magistrates.
The composition of the TSE not only hampers its ability to be an independent
advocate for reform, it has also generated distrust over the implementation of reforms like
residential voting. While at least some parties were concerned about the electoral
consequences of residential voting in general, parties have also been preoccupied with the
potential for partisan implementation – namely, that decisions about where to place
voting centers would be based on the support that parties enjoy in a particular locale
rather than on objective criteria. These concerns are still evident in the preoccupation
over which party controls the TSE divisions responsible for putting residential voting into
practice (Interview 60). These concerns, which have contributed to the long delay in
making polling places more accessible to voters, would likely be less prevalent if the
electoral body were non-partisan.
The partisan composition of the TSE also has implications for its technical
capacity. At the top level, the magistrates named by political parties are not required to be
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specialists in electoral matters (Artiga-González 2008a, 558, note 33), while the directors
and staff of the operational divisions are partisan appointees who may or may not be
qualified. This certainly played a role in the voter registration problems in years past, and
has contributed to the slow progress in implementing residential voting – though in this
case technical capacity seems to have been secondary to partisan motivations. At lower
levels, observers have repeatedly documented the poor training of poll workers, who are
named by political parties and are not always qualified. Many do not receive training
from the TSE, but instead are trained by political parties or not at all (CIS 2004;
Colindres 1997, 87; Consorcio 2000, 20; OAS 2009b, 24). According to the TSE, for
instance, only half of poll workers attended the TSE’s training sessions prior to the 1999
elections (TSE-ES 1999, 15). Additionally, the sale of poll worker credentials between
parties is thought to be common (CIS 2009, 31), with obvious consequences for the
capacity and suitability of some people working the voting booths. Aside from the myriad
problems that poor training can cause with vote counting, preventing voter fraud, and the
handling of election materials, it can also make voting more difficult if poll workers are
not trained to direct voters to the appropriate voting table, open polling tables late due to
confusion over procedures, or lack a clear understanding of the conditions under which a
prospective voter can be turned away.229
The TSE has improved its technical capacity over the years, and has been
proactive in areas such as voter education. It is no longer the “cauldron[ ] of
incompetence” (Montgomery 2000, 142) that it was characterized to be in its first years.
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More important in the latter case is ambiguity in the electoral code regarding how exact the match must
be between the voter’s identification card and the voter list, although since the move to automatic
registration the problem of inconsistencies between ID cards and the voter lists has diminished
significantly.
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But its partisan composition has over the years obstructed more inclusive election
administration in several ways: by depriving the country of an independent authoritative
force for electoral reform, by magnifying partisan uncertainties over residential voting,
and by producing a corps of lower level staff that is not as professional or capable as it
might be.

Civil Society
Election-related civil society groups have included individual organizations as
well as umbrella groups uniting diverse organizations. In the 1990s, the Consortium of
Civic Education NGOs of El Salvador predominated in monitoring elections and
advocating reforms. In recent years, individual organizations such as the Independent
Movement for Electoral Reform (MIRE) and umbrella groups such as the Coalition for
Political and Electoral Reform (CREE) have emerged, while Central American
University’s Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) has undertaken election monitoring.
Civil society groups have frequently criticized restrictive election administration features
and advocated for reforms such as residential voting (e.g., Consorcio 2000, 2001; ISD
2011b; Martel 2010).230
As was the case in Guatemala’s reform process, Salvadoran civic groups are
formally consulted on electoral issues. Civic groups submit proposals to the Legislative
Assembly and are often granted an audience in the Assembly’s electoral reform
committee, and at least in recent years have enjoyed good relations with the TSE
(Interviews 50, 52, 55, 57). Yet these proposals are rarely taken into consideration when
230

For instance, in 2010 three nongovernmental groups endorsed TSE president Eugenio Chicas’ plan to
extend residential voting to the entire country for the 2012 elections, and proposed making voter
registration procedures simpler for citizens (such as simplifying forms and increasing the number of
locations where DUIs are distributed) (Martel 2010, 30-31, 36-37).
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electoral reforms are drafted, according to an advisor to the electoral reform committee
and others (Interviews 57, 60; Martel 2010, 16, 20). As one respondent noted, the civil
society groups working on electoral issues in El Salvador are small and have little
capacity to mobilize large numbers of people, and as a result their impact has been “very
limited” (Interview 60). Despite the advocacy efforts of civil society groups, election
administration in El Salvador, as elsewhere, has been an elite affair played primarily by
the major political parties.

International Influences
What of the role of international election observers, technical and financial
assistance, and other forms of democracy promotion? El Salvador has seen wide variation
in the presence of international election observers, with the 1994 elections being heavily
observed, with over 2,500 observers including the massive 900-plus member UN mission
(IFES 1994, 18; TSE-ES 1994, 31). Since then international election observers have only
had a large presence in the 2009 elections that saw the presidential victory of the FMLN.
El Salvador has also received observer delegations from other electoral commissions in
the region, and Salvadoran election officials have participated as observers in other
countries.
The largest impact of election observation certainly occurred in the 1994
elections, when the UN’s observer mission (ONUSAL) exceeded its mandate in the face
of massive problems with voter registration and directly assisted with surveys to identify
bottlenecks in the registration process (the results of which prompted additional voter
registration efforts by the TSE) and provided direct support in registering voters, with
financial support from UNDP and USAID (Baloyra 1998, 19; Manca 1997; Montgomery
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1995, 247, 251). Beyond that direct activity, however, “international observation had a
limited impact on the way in which Salvadorean electoral officials chose to discharge
their duties,” according to one analyst closely involved (Montgomery 2000, 142).
Since then the impacts of election observation on longer term structural reforms
have been limited, but not negligible. Observer reports have overwhelming endorsed
more inclusive election administration measures, including residential voting, simplifying
voter registration procedures, and improving voter education efforts (see Appendix B).
And observer organizations have enjoyed close relations with the TSE and seen their
recommendations taken up on the agenda of the Legislative Assembly’s electoral reform
committee (CIS 2004; Interview 53, 62). The slowness with which reforms such as
residential voting have been implemented points to the limited influence of such
recommendations, however, and according to an advisor to the electoral committee, the
decisions taken by the parties are not strongly affected by observer recommendations
(Interview 57). Kelley (2012a, 225-226) likewise concludes that the country largely
neglected observer recommendations as the international community focused on
consolidating the peace process and did not pressure particularly hard for electoral
improvements. But the intermittent pressure that observers have applied, along with
consistent pressure from domestic civil society groups, have at least made it more
difficult for political parties to indefinitely delay reforms that are seen as indispensable
for a modern democracy.
This form of international influence – living up to international standards of
election administration – is worth noting. Studies of residential voting, TSE publications,
and media reports have frequently made reference to the fact that El Salvador is the only
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country in the region without residential voting, and there is a clear sense of being behind
other countries in the modernization of election administration as a result (FUSADES
2011, 1; Martel 2010, 5, 22; TSE-ES n.d.[c]; UN 2009, 8, note 12). Some TSE
magistrates, in advocating a more rapid extension of residential voting, have pointed out
in the media that countries less developed than El Salvador have long had residential
voting (EDH 2007g; 2008c; 2009a; 2009b). It’s not clear that this gap between domestic
practice and international standards exercised much influence in prompting residential
voting or other reforms, but the fact that it has been invoked in debates points to a
potential influence on election administration practices.
Aside from election observation, El Salvador has also received significant
international financial and technical support for election administration. Funds came from
a variety of donors to support all aspects of the 1994 electoral process, totaling $20
million, $7 million of which was for ONUSAL (Baloyra 1998, 19; TSE-ES 1994, 2324).231 Since 1994, international financial support has especially aimed at supporting the
introduction of the new ID card and registry, audits of the electoral registry performed by
the OAS, and technical assistance on residential voting provided by Panama’s electoral
tribunal and the UN (TSE-ES 2009, 9; 2004, 73; 2006, 14; UN 2009). Especially in the
case of residential voting, El Salvador has looked to the experiences of other countries,
such as Panama and Costa Rica, for models (EDH 2007a; 2007b).
International funding has at times directly facilitated the access of voters to the
ballot box, as in 1994 when more public transportation was made available in the second
round of voting with assistance from USAID and UNDP (Montgomery 2000, 154-155).
231

UNDP and bilateral donors provided funds for materials and transportation, while USAID provided $1
million to CAPEL for technical assistance to the TSE, involving the training of poll workers and assistance
with voter registration drives (Baloyra 1998, 19; IFES 1994b, 18).
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More important, however, has been technical assistance in implementing reforms. Such
assistance has been critical in putting residential voting into practice (Interview 55). But
as in Guatemala and Nicaragua, this assistance has been a necessary but insufficient
condition for enacting reforms to facilitate voter participation. Domestic politics have
largely determined the nature and pace of reforms, while international technical
assistance has helped put them into practice.

Conclusion
El Salvador’s election administration has slowly shifted from large scale barriers
to voting to more inclusive practices. A number of factors contributed both to the
establishment of the country’s election administration practices and to their evolution
over time; Table 7.3 below summarizes how well the hypotheses account for the El
Salvador case.
El Salvador’s restrictive administrative measures were adopted in the country’s
pre-democratic period in response to the security conditions during the country’s civil
war and the desire to eradicate the election fraud that had been common in prior
elections. These restrictions continued long after these initial conditions had changed due
to both institutional inertia and partisan calculations about the likely effects of expanding
the electorate. Ultimately, intermittent pressure from the left, reinforced by pressure from
domestic civil society and international election observers and experts, led to halting
reforms. However, calculations of partisan interests dictated the sequence and shape of
reform.
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Table 7.3 Support for Hypotheses, El Salvador
Category
Hypothesis

Partisan
Interests

Electoral
Management
Body
Structure

H1: Where a ruling party can identify
opposition supporters, election
administration inclusiveness will tend
to be low, whereas countries with
catch-all parties or fluid party systems
marked by low levels of partisan
attachments will tend to have more
inclusive electoral procedures.
H2: Parties with strong lower class
support (typically populist or leftist
parties) will support inclusive rules.

H3: Partisan EMBs will tend to
implement less inclusive measures as
partisan election officials attempt to
impede the participation of some
parties’ supporters.

H4: Independent, non-partisan EMBs
will be associated with inclusive rules
in part by playing an active role in
electoral reform.
H5: A history of election fraud will
lead democratizing countries to adopt
strict safeguards against fraud, which
may in turn impose procedural barriers
to voting.

The Specter
of Election
Fraud

Election
Costs and
Financial
Resources

H6: Parties that have been the victims
of election fraud will support strict
safeguards that reduce inclusiveness.

H7: Countries with more resources
will have more inclusive election
administration.

Continued on next page
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Support

Supported

Inconclusive

Inconclusive

Supported

Supported

Supported

Inconclusive

Comments
Modest ability of
parties to identify
their supporters and
concern about
consequences of
expanding the
electorate contributed
to delaying reform.
Leftist FMLN
generally supported
inclusive measures,
but right wing
ARENA had stronger
lower class base.
Partisan EMB
implemented
restrictive measures
in 1994, but
subsequently
undertook efforts
towards greater
inclusiveness.
Partisanship within
TSE impeded its
ability to play
proactive role in
reform.
System of voter
registration and
possibly
centralization of
polling places
influenced by
concerns about fraud.
ARENA and PDC
parties supported
restrictive measures
after alleged fraud
against them in 1970s
and 1980s.
Cost often cited as a
constraint on
residential voting, but
its significance not
always supported by
the evidence.

Table 7.3, continued
Category

Civil
Society and
Public
Opinion

International
Influences

Hypothesis

Support

H8: Strong civil society, particularly
domestic election observation groups,
will increase election administration
inclusiveness.

H9: Public opinion will set limits on
the extent to which elites can pursue
self-serving election administration
rules.
H10: International observers will
prevent extremely restrictive measures
in elections that they observe,
particularly measures that are highly
visible on election day.
H11: The recommendations of election
observers will have little impact on
election administration practices.
H12: When a country seeks good
relations with Western democracies,
the influence of election observers will
be enhanced and inclusive election
administration practices will be more
likely.
H13: Technical and financial
assistance will make inclusive
measures more likely by enhancing
domestic bureaucratic capacity.
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Not
supported

Not
supported

Not
supported

Supported

Comments
Civil society
advocacy has had
little impact on
legislation or
administrative
practices.
No evidence of
public opinion
influence on election
administration.
Observation did not
prevent highly
restrictive practices
in 1994, though
observers were
influential.
Recommendations
had little impact on
reform processes.

Inconclusive

Supported

International support
was critical in
implementing
reforms.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

Countries holding competitive elections vary significantly in the extent to which
the administrative conduct of elections – the voter registration process, the location of
polling places, the manner in which voters cast ballots, and so on – facilitates or impedes
voter participation. Some countries strive to bring the ballot box to the people,
minimizing the procedural hurdles that citizens confront in exercising their right to vote.
In other countries the administrative barriers to participation can be so onerous as to call
into question the legitimacy of the election results.
This study has put forward the concept of election administration inclusiveness to
encapsulate the various features of electoral administration that bear on voter access to
the ballot. It has also described the many facets of election administration that have made
voting easier and more difficult in three Central American countries since their transitions
to electoral democracy, and investigated the reasons why those election administration
practices were put in place. This chapter summarizes the study’s main findings,
beginning with a brief synopsis of each case followed by discussion of each causal factor
outlined in chapter 2. The chapter concludes with a discussion of future avenues for
research that are suggested by this study’s findings.

Case Summaries
Guatemala
Chapter 3 documented and explained the origins of Guatemala’s highly restrictive
election administration practices, which posed significant obstacles to participation for
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many voters, particularly women and indigenous citizens in rural areas. In particular,
onerous voter registration procedures and the strict prohibition against locating polling
stations outside of municipal centers required many voters to negotiate significant
procedural and logistical obstacles to voting. These procedural barriers were the
consequence of efforts to overcome the country’s history of election fraud in the 1970s
and early 1980s. In order to inoculate the electoral system against several types of fraud,
the act of voting was in many ways made more difficult. In order to deter ballot stuffing
and manipulation of rural voters by landlords or political bosses, polling places were
limited to municipal centers where election officials and party poll watchers could
exercise greater oversight. To protect against voter registration fraud, a system of registry
checks was put in place that resulted in a complex process of voter registration. And in
the focus on rooting out election fraud, other tasks such as informing voters of procedural
requisites through voter education campaigns received low priority from election
officials. While other factors influenced election administration as well, such as financial
constraints, the evidence suggests that it was concerns about election fraud – and not
partisan or class interests in excluding certain segments of voters – that had the biggest
impact on electoral procedures.
Chapter 4 examined the process of electoral reform in Guatemala that resulted in
the elimination or reduction of several procedural barriers to participation that were put in
place in the early years of electoral democracy. These reforms included the
decentralization of polling stations to facilitate the vote of rural citizens and significant
improvements in the provision of voter education. I argued that a confluence of factors
came together to produce these reforms. Of particular importance was the nature of the
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party system, consisting of weakly institutionalized personalist parties that lacked clearly
identifiable constituencies that competing parties might hope to exclude from the
electorate. As a result, although leftist guerrillas pushed for inclusive election
administration reforms to be included in the country’s peace agreements, political parties
across the spectrum supported administrative reforms that were expected to have little
effect on the parties’ electoral competitiveness or on party leaders’ positions, while (in
the case of polling place decentralization) reducing their costs of voter mobilization.
While partisan interests did not prevent electoral reform, the non-partisan
Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) actively sought to boost the legitimacy of the electoral
regime by cautiously increasing voter access while maintaining the integrity of the
election process that it had safeguarded since the mid-1980s. As time went on,
confidence in the TSE and in the electoral process grew and concerns about election
fraud abated somewhat, making polling decentralization possible. International actors
also played a crucial role in providing the financing and technical expertise to implement
electoral reform, although it was domestic actors that set the reform agenda.
While several factors facilitated reform, some events impeded the trend toward
greater inclusiveness. This was the case when Congress, apparently motivated by the
desire to control patronage resources and wary of strengthening the TSE, created a new
civil registry agency rather than giving authority over the civil registry to the electoral
tribunal. This decision inadvertently derailed the possibility for automatic voter
registration. Thus, while Guatemala’s election administration became significantly more
inclusive from the mid-1990s onward, some attempts at increasing voter access were
frustrated.
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Nicaragua
Chapter 5 addressed the puzzle of why Nicaragua exceeded its Central American
neighbors in inclusiveness despite having a partisan electoral management body and
facing severe economic crisis. Nicaragua’s election administration practices from the
mid-1980s to 2000 included voter registration processes that were relatively easy to
negotiate (with significant efforts by the state to register voters and distribute voter ID
cards), highly decentralized polling locations that minimized travel to the polls, and
significant voter education efforts. These practices were later complemented by other
measures not present in El Salvador and Guatemala, such as allowing ballots from
registered voters whose names did not appear on the voter rolls on election day.
Several crucial differences from the other cases help explain this outcome. First,
the election fraud that marked the pre-democratic period in Nicaragua was of a different
type than that which occurred in Guatemala and El Salvador, which in turn was a product
of the different authoritarian regime types across the three countries (personalist in
Nicaragua and military in Guatemala and El Salvador). As a result, the overriding
preoccupation of those designing the electoral system after the fall of the Somoza regime
was not preventing ballot stuffing or double voting, but ensuring high voter turnout. The
goal of high turnout was driven especially by international political pressures, as the
revolutionary regime sought high-turnout elections to appease its European supporters,
mollify or fend off hostility from the U.S., and consolidate political legitimacy at home.
Importantly, the governing FSLN party did not feel threatened by inclusive measures that
would facilitate voter turnout, as it was confident it would win fair elections with massive
participation. The party could thus afford to facilitate the vote even of rural sectors,
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where the party’s support was weak. Aside from international pressures, the technical and
financial assistance offered by international actors was a necessary but not sufficient
condition to implement many inclusive election administration measures.
Chapter 6 documented the slow erosion of inclusiveness in Nicaragua’s election
administration after 2000. This erosion has been marked by the politicization of the
distribution of ID cards which are needed to vote, as well as the disappearance of voter
education efforts on the part of the electoral management body. I argued that the
proximate cause of this change has been the dominance of one political party in the
electoral management body. However, the puzzle is that the party in control of the
electoral machinery now, the FSLN, is the same party (in name) that created the inclusive
system in the 1980s. This raised the question of what has changed to make this party now
want to restrict access to the vote. I argued that the explanation lies in the party’s
expectations of electoral competitiveness, the nature of partisan identification and party
organization, and the lessening of external pressures. I argued that the FSLN is no longer
confident of its ability to win in fair electoral contests, despite arguably being objectively
stronger than it was in 1990. Equally important is strong partisan identification and the
FSLN’s organizational capacity that allows the party to identify its supporters and thus
single them out for ID cards and partisan voter information campaigns. These features of
partisan identification and organization are marked contrasts with the other cases,
especially Guatemala. Finally, these domestic variables are not sufficiently counteracted
by international pressure, as U.S. interest has waned and financial aid from new actors
(mainly Venezuela) has compensated for the loss of democracy-conditioned aid from
U.S. and European donors.
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The Nicaragua case shows that the pathologies of partisan election administration
can be severe, but they do not result automatically from the partisan composition of the
electoral management body. Rather, the case shows that the effects of partisan election
administration are mediated by patterns of party identification, by expectations of
electoral competitiveness, and by pressures from foreign powers.

El Salvador
Chapter 7 examined the slow transformation of El Salvador’s election
administration from large scale exclusion to more inclusive practices. In the 1980s
election administration practices were put in place that presented severe barriers to voter
participation, such as onerous voter registration processes, the centralization of polling
locations, and the assignment of voters to municipal polling locations in alphabetical
order rather than according to residence. Following the transitional 1994 elections, El
Salvador undertook a slow process of electoral reform that instituted automatic voter
registration and gradually put in place a system of residential voting, whereby polling
places were decentralized and voters were assigned to polling sites based on residence.
El Salvador’s restrictive administrative measures were initially adopted in the
1980s in response to the security conditions during the country’s civil war and the desire
to eradicate the election fraud that had been common in the elections of the 1970s. I
argued that these restrictions continued long after these initial conditions had changed
due to both institutional inertia and partisan calculations about the likely effects of
expanding the electorate. Ultimately, intermittent pressure from the left, reinforced by
persistent pressure from domestic civil society and international election observers and
experts, led to halting reforms. However, it was calculations of partisan interests that
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dictated the sequence and shape of reform, especially in the case of residential voting.
While the technical and financial challenges of implementing residential voting were
significant, uncertainty about the electoral consequences led the major parties (and at
times, especially the conservative ARENA party) to delay the reform and then carry it out
through small pilot programs to gauge its effects. The partisan control of the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal also played a part, exacerbating parties’ uncertainties over the
implementation of residential voting. Only once it appeared to have no impact on election
outcomes was residential voting rapidly expanded. In contrast, voter registration reform
was less contentious because it was expected to provide greater protection against
electoral manipulation without adversely affecting partisan interests. This, in combination
with the severity of voter registry problems in the 1980s to mid-1990s, helps explain why
El Salvador took on voter registration reform before residential voting, while the reverse
was true in Guatemala.

The Hypotheses Evaluated
With the preceding case summaries as background, this section offers a more
systematic evaluation of the influence of the hypothesized causal factors outlined in
chapter 2: partisan interests, EMB structure, the specter of election fraud, domestic civil
society, and international influences.232 A summary of these findings is presented in
Table 8.1 below.

232

The impact of election costs and financial resources is discussed briefly in the context of international
influences.
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Partisan Interests
Given the potential for election administration rules to shape the electorate and
thereby influence election results, the natural place to seek explanations of those rules is
in the interests of the major political parties. Indeed, the case studies revealed such
partisan interests at work at certain times. In recent years in Nicaragua, the governing
party has manipulated the distribution of ID cards and eliminated voter education in order
to depress turnout of opposition supporters. Some evidence suggested that the governing
party in El Salvador in earlier years also manipulated voter registration to its benefit.
But when will partisan interests play a predominant role in choosing election
administration practices? When should we expect parties to use restrictive measures for
their own electoral advantage? One condition suggested by the case studies is the
knowledge of voter preferences. Such knowledge has enabled the FSLN in Nicaragua to
restrict access of voters who are not supporters of the party. It was argued that the lack of
knowledge of voters’ sympathies facilitated inclusive reform in Guatemala, as parties –
and more importantly in the Guatemalan context, party leaders – had no reason to expect
that greater access (and resultant higher levels of participation) would affect their
electoral prospects. El Salvador might be thought of as an intermediate case in which
parties are more institutionalized and partisan identification is stronger than in
Guatemala, but the major parties do not have the capacity to single out opposition
supporters to the extent that the FSLN does in Nicaragua. Thus while parties have not
singled out opposition supporters to target for voter suppression, uncertainty about each
party’s social base and how those bases would be affected by residential voting delayed
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reform, as the ARENA and FMLN parties were fearful that expansion of the electorate
might benefit the other party.
Thus some knowledge of voter preferences – either direct individual-level
knowledge or indirect group-level correlations – appears to be a necessary condition for
the intentional use of administrative measures to disenfranchise voters (or voter
suppression). This is not surprising, and is consistent with other forms of manipulation
such as vote buying and gerrymandering, which require information about voter
preferences (Katz 1997, 173; Lehoucq 2007, 39; Schaffer 2008, 121). But it carries an
interesting implication (Hypothesis 1): party systems characterized by low levels of party
identification and personalist or catch-all parties that are not linked to social cleavages
may be more conducive to election administration inclusiveness than institutionalized
parties with clear social bases. The case study evidence was largely consistent with this
hypothesis.
A second, and related, consideration regarding partisan motives relates to the
social base of individual parties. It was suggested in chapter 2 that parties with strong
lower class support (typically populist or leftist parties) would tend to support inclusive
rules, while parties with upper class support might tend to favor administrative
restrictions that would burden poorer voters more than well-to-do voters (Hypothesis 2).
The evidence from the case studies is partly consistent with this hypothesis. In Nicaragua,
the leftist FSLN put inclusive measures in place in the 1980s, but recently has used
restrictive practices to exclude opposition supporters. The party’s individual-level
knowledge of voter preferences allows it to target administrative barriers at individual
voters rather than putting in place blunt measures that have disproportionate impacts on
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entire segments of voters (such as low income, young, or geographically segregated
groups). In El Salvador, the leftist FMLN generally endorsed lowering barriers to voting,
while the right-wing ARENA was more reluctant about instituting residential voting. Yet
here class cleavages did not neatly coincide with partisan divisions, as the leftist FMLN
has a strong middle-class base and the right-wing ARENA party has strong support
among low-income rural voters. In Guatemala the absence of a strong left was associated
with restrictive election administration measures, and the leftist URNG pushed for
inclusive practices in the country’s peace accords. But this push from the left was not
decisive, as the URNG and allied parties were too small to push reforms through the
legislature. Ultimately the country’s moderate and conservative parties, most of which
lack an identifiable or stable social base, also supported inclusive reforms such as polling
decentralization and voter registration reform.
A final condition bearing on the importance of partisan interests for election
administration is the competitiveness of elections. As discussed in chapter 2, higher
levels of competitiveness may be more likely to result in electoral manipulation,
including disenfranchisement through restrictive administrative measures. This is
consistent with the evidence from the case studies. In Nicaragua in the 1984 and 1990
elections, the governing party’s confidence in victory coincided with inclusiveness, while
in recent years the same party has had motives to manipulate electoral rules in part
because of the party’s perception of competitiveness (including the party’s traditionally
firm upper limit of support).233 In El Salvador, elections have been highly competitive
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The concept of “competitiveness” in this context should be thought of as both subjective and relative. It
is subjective in the sense that the perceptions of the closeness of an electoral contest among party leaders
matter more than the objective closeness of a race. For instance, while the FSLN lost the 1990 presidential
election in Nicaragua, party leaders and political observers strongly expected the FSLN to win handily.

302

between the two largest parties, which have therefore been very attentive to the potential
electoral effects of election administration reforms. In Guatemala, in contrast, parties tend
to be so fluid and short-lived that electoral competition has not resulted in efforts by
governing parties to restrict the participation of opposition supporters.

EMB Structure
Intersecting with partisan interests is the issue of partisan control of the electoral
machinery. One hypothesis raised in chapter 2 was that nonpartisan electoral
management bodies (EMBs) tend to adopt more inclusive measures than partisan EMBs
(Hypothesis 3). This gained only partial support from the case studies. Simple bivariate
analysis across the three cases shows that in the early democratic period, nonpartisan
electoral administration coincided with restrictive practices in Guatemala, while partisan
electoral administration coincided with restrictive practices in El Salvador and inclusive
practices in Nicaragua. In later periods, Guatemala’s nonpartisan EMB was associated
with more inclusive practices, while the partisan EMBs in the other two cases were again
associated with both restrictive (Nicaragua) and more inclusive (El Salvador) practices.
Such simple comparisons show that nonpartisan election administration is neither a
necessary or sufficient condition for inclusive electoral procedures.
Yet within-case analysis revealed greater support for the hypothesis linking
nonpartisan EMBs to inclusiveness than the correlational analysis would suggest. If we
consider whether partisanship and inclusiveness were causally linked, we find that in
Guatemela during its early democratic period, restrictions resulted only partly from the
Competitiveness is also relative to the objectives sought by parties. In the Nicaraguan case, in the 2011
general election the FSLN could be confident in winning the presidency and a majority in the Assembly,
but given its apparent objective of securing a supermajority in the Assembly to unilaterally amend the
Constitution, the election might ex ante be considered competitive relative to the goals of the party.
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nonpartisan EMB’s administrative decisions; major restrictions (especially the
centralization of polling places) were included in the country’s electoral law and
therefore outside the authority of the EMB. In El Salvador during its democratic
transition, partisanship in the EMB contributed to restrictions, although it was not the
only cause. We find the clearest causal link in Nicaragua after 2006, where election
administration restrictions have resulted directly from the behavior of the single-partydominated EMB.
The case studies also supported the hypothesis that independent, nonpartisan
EMBs will be associated with inclusive rules in part by playing an active role in electoral
reform (Hypothesis 4). A significant finding was that where non-partisan electoral
management bodies do contribute to inclusiveness, they often do so not just by neutrally
applying electoral rules but through lobbying for legal reforms and developing
bureaucratic capacity. The central role of an independent EMB in the electoral reform
process was most evident in Guatemala, where the Supreme Electoral Tribunal actively
shaped the reform agenda and influenced Congress by providing information to
legislators and publicly opposing some Congressional decisions. This contrasts with El
Salvador, where even though there were no legal impediments to implementing
residential voting, the party-based TSE did not push ahead and put the reform into
practice, instead deferring to the Legislative Assembly to decide on the pace and scope of
implementation. The El Salvador case also suggested that partisanship can inhibit the
development of bureaucratic capacity within the EMB. This is consistent with the
suggestion of Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo (2008, 90) that EMB partisanship can
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potentially lead to “lower technical competence” than that found in nonpartisan electoral
bodies.
The case of Nicaragua also suggests two additional lessons that are relevant for
inclusiveness and election administration more broadly. First, it is not only partisanship
or nonpartisanship of an electoral management body that is important. Rather, the nature
of partisanship also matters. Nicaragua’s CSE has always been partisan, but the nature of
its partisanship has changed over time, going from FSLN-led with opposition
representation, to an explicitly bi-partisan structure dominated by cartel parties, to once
again being FSLN-controlled with no effective opposition counterweight. These shifts in
the nature of partisanship have had important implications for inclusiveness and the
effective functioning of the electoral body, suggesting the appropriateness of
measurements of EMB partisan autonomy that distinguish between single-party and
multiparty structures (see Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo 2008).
Second, the experience of Nicaragua shows that the professionalism and
neutrality of an electoral management body can be undone. This challenges the view that
“once such independence has taken root, it tends to replicate itself over time and even
survive assaults by authoritarian rulers” (IDEA 2012, 9). While autonomy and
professionalism may be durable in many cases, the Nicaraguan case shows that even
countries that have built a highly professional election administration may be subject to
successful efforts to undermine the institutional independence and professionalism of the
electoral body (see Middlebrook 1998, 21-22).

305

The Specter of Election Fraud: Access versus Integrity
One of the central findings of this study concerns the relationship between voter
fraud and election administration inclusiveness. Hypothesis 5 suggested that a history of
election fraud would lead democratizing countries to adopt strict safeguards against
fraud, which may in turn impose procedural barriers to voting. Indeed, in two of the three
cases very restrictive practices were adopted at least in part to prevent particular types of
electoral manipulation, such as multiple voting, voter impersonation, voter intimidation,
and ballot stuffing. Restrictive measures responded to the major episodes of election
fraud that occurred in the pre-democratic period in which apparently victorious
opposition parties were cheated of their victory. In short, historical legacies strongly
influenced institutional choices during the transitional periods: legislators and election
administrators sought first and foremost to curb the ills that had afflicted previous
elections, “[i]llustrating the principle that people tend to rate most highly those values in
the shortest supply,” as Katz (1997, 301) put it when discussing electoral reform in a
different context.
Although concerns about fraud led to restrictive election administration practices,
the relationship between voter inclusion and preventing election fraud is more nuanced
than is presumed in popular debates over voting procedures. Some restrictive measures
were ineffective at preventing fraud, while in some instances making voting easier can
make some types of election fraud more difficult. For instance, while it is impossible to
know whether the centralization of polling places prevented fraud in Guatemala and El
Salvador, subsequent decentralization appears not to have resulted in more fraud in either
country. The decentralization of polling places also did not produce ballot stuffing or
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other irregularities in Nicaragua.234 In fact, in El Salvador and Nicaragua, small
decentralized voting centers have been thought to facilitate oversight by poll workers and
voters in identifying outsiders trying to vote in jurisdictions where they do not live.
Residential voting thus represents a “win-win” for election administration as a measure
promoting both voter access and electoral integrity.
Similarly, onerous voter registration processes did not result in reliable voter
registries. In both El Salvador and Guatemala, the burdensome registration process did
not ensure accurate voter rolls. In large part this results from the failure to incorporate
deaths and emigrations into the voter registry, but the very difficulty of registration also
plays a part, as citizens who change residences do not want to re-register, leading to
outdated residence information on the registry. In this case, registration obstacles actually
reduce the accuracy of the voter registry. Overcrowded voting centers are another
instance that can produce both obstacles to voter participation (long waits and difficulty
finding one’s polling table) and opportunities for error and fraud (due to poor vigilance
by overwhelmed poll workers in checking for ink on voters’ fingers, checking ID cards,
marking voters off on the voter roll, etc.).
None of this is to say that there are no tradeoffs between access and integrity. In
the case studies, such a tradeoff was clear in the case of residential registration fraud,
which is a substantial problem (although just how substantial is unknown). As noted,
making changes of residence on the voter registry difficult can lead to the accumulation
of outdated information on the rolls. Yet where it is easy for voters to change their
residence on the voter registry, politicians may organize the fraudulent transfer of voters
234

The 2008 and 2011 elections in Nicaragua were marred by irregularities, but these have not been the
result of polling places being highly dispersed; rather, the partisanship of election officials and poll workers
has been the root of electoral manipulation.
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across jurisdictions for electoral purposes. On this measure there is a tradeoff between
access and integrity, although different remedies place different burdens on voters and
election administrators. Most onerous for voters are early registration cutoff dates and the
requirement to obtain a new ID card listing one’s new address; less onerous are
requirements to provide some documentation (e.g., a utility bill) when updating one’s
residence; least onerous would be to place responsibility for verifying residence changes
on the EMB or civil registry, for example through data-sharing arrangements with other
state agencies.
The cases also revealed one instance in which concerns about a particular type of
electoral manipulation led to an inclusive administrative rule. Article 41 in the
Nicaraguan electoral law, which allowed voters whose names did not appear on the voter
list to cast a ballot if they presented an ID card showing an address pertaining to the
precinct, responded to concerns in the mid-1990s that election officials would manipulate
the voter registry by removing names of opposition supporters. Thus, while concerns
about ballot stuffing and multiple voting led to restrictive practices, in at least one
instance concerns about misconduct by election officials led to an unusually inclusive
measure.
In sum, the case studies revealed some trade-offs between voter access and
electoral integrity and presented evidence that concerns about particular types of election
fraud contributed to the adoption of restrictive administrative practices that made voting
more difficult for many citizens (though it wasn’t always clear that parties that had been
the victims of election fraud supported strict safeguards that reduced inclusiveness –
leaving the evidence for Hypothesis 6 inconclusive). Yet the cases also revealed some

308

instances where access and integrity can be pursued simultaneously, and one instance
where fears of fraud led to greater inclusiveness. These finding may have important
policy implications for the design of electoral procedures that balance the goals of voter
access and election integrity, and more research is needed on the relationship between
voter access and electoral integrity, as discussed below.

Civil Society
A focus on partisan interests, electoral management bodies, and debates over
voter fraud and inclusion centers on elites as the prime movers shaping electoral rules.
Chapter 2 suggested there might be other societal influences on election administration,
in the forms of organized civil society (particularly domestic election observation groups)
(Hypothesis 8) and diffuse public opinion (Hypothesis 9). The evidence presented in the
preceding chapters suggested strongly that neither civil society nor public opinion exerted
strong influence on election administration practices. Instead, the case studies showed
that the crafting of election administration rules was an elite affair driven by politicians
and administrators and relatively unconstrained by popular pressures.
Although the case studies did not explicitly analyze the role of public opinion, no
evidence was uncovered that public opinion on issues of electoral administration
influenced, or even constrained, the decisions of legislators or election administrators.
The activities of organized civic groups have been more influential, but only slightly. In
Guatemala, major election administration reforms were already on the agenda by the
mid-1990s, when civil society groups first became active in proposing reforms. While
endorsements from civil society added legitimacy to the reforms being considered, most
proposals from civic groups that deviated from reforms already under consideration were
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rejected. Likewise in El Salvador, civic groups involved in electoral matters have
proliferated since the country’s democratic transition, but although they submit proposals
to the Legislative Assembly and enjoy fairly good relations with the electoral
management body, they have had little influence on election administration rules. The
story was similar in Nicaragua, where several prominent, professional NGOs have
conducted election observation and made proposals for election administration reforms,
but have seen their recommendations largely ignored by the dominant political party.
Despite the advocacy efforts of civil society groups in all three countries, election
administration has been an elite affair dominated by the major political parties and
election administrators.

International Influences
The case studies revealed mixed results regarding the influence of international
actors on domestic election administration practices. International election observation
appeared to have only modest influence. It is difficult to determine whether
administrative practices for any given observed electoral process would have been less
inclusive in the absence of observers, or more inclusive for any given non-observed
electoral process (Hypothesis 10). Yet it is clear that observers did not prevent extremely
restrictive measures, even those that were highly visible leading up to and on election
day, as El Salvador’s 1991 and 1994 elections and Nicaragua’s 2011 elections
demonstrate. It is easier to evaluate the influence of post-election recommendations
issued by election observers, and consistent with recent work (Kelley 2012a), the case
studies revealed that the recommendations for reform issued by election observation
organizations had little impact on election administration inclusiveness within each
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country (supporting Hypothesis 11). Observers for the most part advocated more
inclusive practices such as voter registration reform, the decentralization of polling
places, and improved voter education, although in some instances observer groups
recommended more restrictive measures to safeguard against electoral manipulation (see
Appendix B). Yet the evidence presented in the case studies suggested that these
recommendations had only minimal influence on election administration in the recipient
countries.
Greater international influence was evident through two different channels:
geopolitical pressures and financial and technical electoral assistance. Geopolitical
pressure was a clear influence on electoral conduct in Nicaragua in its early democratic
period, increasing the importance of high turnout to legitimize the elections and raising
the costs of manipulation.235 In contrast to Nicaragua, which faced intense international
pressure and sought improved relations with Western powers, Guatemala and El Salvador
were U.S. allies and faced only modest (El Salvador) or hardly any (Guatemala) pressure
to improve the quality of elections. In El Salvador, according to Kelley (2012a, 145), “the
international community focused more on the success of the peace agreements and the
continued holding of passable elections than on pushing hard for improvements” (Kelley
2012a, 145). The importance of international political pressure has also been evident in
recent years in Nicaragua, as pressure for improvement in electoral quality from the U.S.
and European donors has been counterbalanced by Venezuelan support for the FSLN
government. The case studies thus supported the hypothesis that election administration
235

A comment from a Chilean general before the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s rule applies equally well to
Nicaragua’s 1984 and 1990 elections: “If the government’s candidate wins everyone will say it was fraud.
If he loses everyone will say it was a fair election. So it is more in our interests than anyone else’s to be
able to show it was an absolutely fair election” (quoted in Hyde 2011, 38-39). For the Nicaragua regime,
high turnout was part of the effort to demonstrate a legitimate electoral process.
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practices are more likely to be inclusive when a country seeks good relations with
Western democracies (Hypothesis 12).
Finally, the case studies supported the hypothesis that technical and financial
assistance makes election administration more inclusive by enhancing domestic capacity
(Hypothesis 13). In all three cases, international support was crucial in providing the
resources and technical expertise to carry out civil and voter registry modernization,
adopt cartographic technologies and decentralize polling places, and carry out voter
information campaigns. The availability of international financial assistance likely
explains why election costs and resource constraints, although important, did not help
explain variations in election administration practices in the three cases (contra
Hypothesis 7). While such assistance was not sufficient to ensure inclusive election
administration practices, it was often necessary in order to implement such practices.

Table 8.1 Summary of Findings

H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
H10
H11
H12
H13

Guatemala
Early
Period

Guatemala
Later
Period

Nicaragua
Early Period

Nicaragua
Later
Period

El
Salvador

I

S

NS

S

S

I

S

S

NS

I

NS
I
S
I
I
I
NS
NS
S
I
I

I
S
I
I
I
NS
NS
I
S
I
S

NS
I
I
I
NS
I
NS
I
I
S
S

S
I
I
I
NS
NS
NS
NS
S
S
I

I
S
S
S
I
NS
NS
NS
S
I
S

S = Supported; NS = Not Supported; I = Inconclusive.
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Conclusion

Partly
supported
Partly
supported
Inconclusive
Supported
Supported
Inconclusive
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

Contributions, Limitations, and Avenues for Future Research
This study is one of the first to offer an in-depth comparative analysis of election
administration practices. One of the study’s contributions has been descriptive: to
catalogue the variations in election administration practices in three countries and their
consequences for voter participation and electoral quality. A second contribution has
been to suggest a number of causal relationships that account for why countries adopt
particular election administration rules and practices. It did this by drawing hypotheses
from diverse strands of literature on election administration, electoral systems, and voting
rights, and probing the validity of those hypotheses through the close examination of
cases.
While the empirical evidence presented in this study sheds light on the origins of
election administration practices, it is important to note the study’s limitations. First is the
small-n research design, which raises the question of the generalizability of findings
drawn from three small, post-conflict Central American countries. Certain characteristics
of the cases, such as the wartime destruction of civil registries and the challenges of
registering repatriated voters, may only be applicable in similar post-conflict
circumstances. Other characteristics, such as financial scarcity and the role of
international technical assistance, may generalize more broadly to all developing
countries, while yet other features such as the influence of EMB partisanship and the
specter of election fraud may apply to all countries with competitive elections. Ultimately
the generalizability of the findings presented here is an empirical question that will need
to be addressed through further research.
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Secondly, while the case studies have identified a number of causal relationships,
the comparative case study approach carries shortcomings that Collier and Collier
([1991] 2004, 20) attribute to comparative historical work, namely that such a
methodological approach “lacks the capacity to state precisely the degree to which a
given factor is a partial explanation of some important outcome, and it lacks a precise
means of summarizing relationships in terms that are probabilistic rather than
deterministic.” These are strengths of quantitative and experimental methods, and future
research might employ such methods to test and refine the theoretical explanations of
election administration practices put forward here.
Considering this study’s limitations, there are a number of directions for future
research to add to our knowledge of electoral administration. First, on a descriptive level,
little comparative data on election administration practices is readily available, although
recent efforts have begun to compile such information for particular regions (Carter
Center 2013; Evrensel 2010). Compiling systematic and comparable data on both formal
institutions and informal practices will be an important step towards rigorous empirical
analysis of election administration.
Second, many of the causal factors assessed in this study call out for further
investigation. Research on partisan interests might investigate how much party
knowledge of voters’ support varies across different social contexts and party systems,
and whether this affects contestation over election administration practices. It also
remains an open question whether partisan interests other than office-seeking affect
negotiations over election administration, as scholars have suggested is the case for
electoral systems (Bowler, Donovan, and Carp 2006; Benoit 2004, 369; 2007, 384).
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Furthermore, scholarly research on the consequences of the institutional design of
electoral management bodies is just beginning, and more research is needed on this
highly policy-relevant subject (see Hyde and Pallister forthcoming). The finding of this
study that independent EMBs play leading roles in legislative reform is likely
generalizable beyond the three cases. One example is India’s independent election
commission, which has played a leading role in electoral law reform, and more generally
has been highly assertive of its regulatory powers in the context of a weak legislature and
judiciary, “arguably exceeding its proper constitutional role by asserting new executive
powers and attempting to impose sanctions without adequate legal authority” (McMillan
2012, 199). No doubt many other independent EMBs exceed their purely administrative
functions and help shape electoral legislation. Understanding this mode of influence, and
more generally unpacking the mechanisms by which EMB institutional structures affect
electoral quality, is a promising avenue for research.
More research is also needed on the relationship between voter access and
electoral integrity. While recent work has helped to clarify the concepts of election fraud,
electoral malpractice, and electoral integrity (Birch 2011; Norris forthcoming; Vickery
and Shein 2012), there is still much we do not know. For instance, how often do concerns
about fraud lead to the consideration of restrictive election administration measures? Do
some political actors seek restrictive measures as a substitute for other forms of electoral
manipulation? How do different countries balance the tradeoffs between access and
integrity differently, and why?
Future research might also focus on the impacts of technical and financial
electoral assistance as well as regional and global networks of electoral management
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bodies and electoral experts. Regional associations of EMBs exist in most regions of the
world,236 and in 1999 a global association was established (International IDEA 2006,
280-282). Interwoven with these EMB associations are a variety of intergovernmental
and international nongovernmental organizations that provide financial and technical
assistance for elections, including support for the institutional development of electoral
management bodies and for the conduct of all aspects of the electoral process.237 In
contrast to election observation, little is known about the effects of these international ties
on domestic electoral institutions and practices. While this study has suggested the
importance of technical and financial assistance in carrying out election administration
reforms, such international contacts provide an opportunity for scholars to study the
dynamics of socialization and norm diffusion (to determine whether transnational
contacts among election administrators and experts have facilitated the articulation and
diffusion of norms related to electoral administration) and the effects of international
democracy promotion.238
In sum, this study should be far from the last word on the study of election
administration inclusiveness. The administrative conduct of election processes and the
bureaucratic procedures to which prospective voters are subject can potentially have

236

These regional associations are: the Association of Electoral Institutions of Central America (known as
the Tikal Protocol) and the Association of South American Electoral Organizations (the Quito Protocol),
which coordinate under the Inter-American Union of Electoral Organizations (UNIORE) established in
1991; the Association of Central and Eastern European Electoral Officials (ACEEEO), established in
1991; the Association of African Election Authorities (AAEA), established in 1997; the Association of
Asian Election Authorities (AAEA), established in 1997; the Pacific Islands, Australia and New Zealand
Electoral Administrators Network (PIANZEA), established in 1997; and the Association of Caribbean
Electoral Organizations (ACEO), established in 1998 (International IDEA 2006, 280-281).
237
Organizations involved in such assistance include the International Foundation for Electoral Systems,
the Organization of American States, the European Commission, the United Nations Development
Program, and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division.
238
Kelley (2012b) suggests similar avenues for future research.
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important consequences for citizen participation and engagement, election results, and the
legitimacy of elected governments. It is a subject ripe for further scholarly research.

317

APPENDIX A
VOTER TURNOUT IN GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA, AND EL SALVADOR
Year

Turnout*

Type of Election

1985
1990
1994
1995
1999
2003
2007
2011

69.3
56.4
21.6
46.7
53.8
58.0
60.3
68.9

Concurrent
Concurrent
Legislative
Concurrent
Concurrent
Concurrent
Concurrent
Concurrent

1984
1990
1996
2000
2001
2004
2006
2011

75
86.2
76.4
57.0
73.2
50.8
66.8
No reliable data
available

Concurrent
Concurrent
Concurrent
Municipal
Presidential and Legislative
Municipal
Presidential and Legislative
Presidential and Legislative

1994
1997
1999
2000
2003
2004
2006
2009

53.6
38.8
38.6
38.5
41.0
69.4
54.2
61.9

Concurrent
Legislative and Municipal
Presidential
Legislative and Municipal
Legislative and Municipal
Presidential
Legislative and Municipal
Concurrent

Guatemala

Nicaragua

El
Salvador

Sources: Artiga-González 2008a; IPADE 2008; LASA 1990; Solórzano 2008; TSE 2012;
TSE-ES 2009.
*Turnout measured as the percentage of registered voters participating. In the case of
presidential elections, turnout is taken from the first round of voting; for concurrent
elections, turnout is measured as the percentage of registered voters casting ballots in the
presidential contest.
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APPENDIX B
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVER MISSIONS
Note: The tables below contain information on all recommendations bearing on election administration inclusiveness from international election
observers found in those observers’ official reports. Election observation organizations included are the Carter Center, the European Union, the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the International Republican Institute, the Organization of American States, the United Nations,
and the Centro de Intercambio y Solidaridad (CIS). This last group is based in El Salvador but run largely by American staff; it is perhaps most
appropriately considered a domestic (rather than international) observation group, but its recommendations are included due to its extensive
coverage of elections in El Salvador. Cells marked with an “I” represent a recommendation for the inclusive measure indicated for that row; cells
marked with an “R” represent a recommendation for a more restrictive measure; and cells marked with an “X” represent relevant
recommendations that are not directly inclusive or restrictive.
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Guatemala
Election Year 1995 1999 2003 2003 2003
Carter
Election Observation Organization OAS OAS OAS EU

2007 2007 2011
OAS

EU

OAS

Center
Decentralize polling places
Provide free transportation for voters
Automatic voter registration / registry collaboration
Increase voter registration efforts
Later closing date for registration
Earlier closing date for registration
Extend residency requirement
Require EMB to distribute voter rolls to parties for review
Improve voter education
Hold a verification period for voters to check their registration
information
Simplify / make more accessible election day voting procedures
Change election dates to facilitate participation
Reduce number of voters per polling place to reduce waiting
time

I
I
I
I
I

I
I

I
I

I

R
R
I
I
I

I
I

I

I

I

I

I
I

Nicaragua
Election Year 1996
Election IFES
Observation
Organization
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Complete
cedulization
process and reduce
the need for
substitute
documents
Improve
distribution of ID
cards
Streamline civil
registry and ID
process
Use mobile
registration units in
high schools
Simplify election
day voting
procedures
Reduce geographic
concentration of
polling places

Continued on next page

1996
Carter
Center

1996
OAS

1996
IRI

2000
Carter
Center

I

I

I

I

2001
Carter
Center

2001
OAS

2001
IRI

2001
EU

2006
Carter
Center

2006
EU

2006
OAS

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

2011
EU

I

I

I

2010
EU

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

Election Year 1996
Election IFES
Observation
Organization
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Increase
geographic
concentration of /
reduce number of
polling places
Eliminate Article
41 (pending
improvement in
registry accuracy)
Improve voter
education
Reduce/eliminate
partisanship in
EMB

1996
Carter
Center

1996
OAS

1996
IRI

2000
Carter
Center

2001
Carter
Center

2001
OAS

2001
IRI

2001
EU

2006
Carter
Center

R

2006
EU

2006
OAS

2010
EU

2011
EU

R

R

I

I

I
X

I
X

R

I
X

X

X

I

I

X

X

El Salvador
Election Year 1994
Election Observation UN
Organization
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Implement residential voting
Provide free transportation for
voters
Make voter registration automatic
Simplify voter registration
Introduce new ID card
Issue ID card free of charge
Strengthen proof of residence
requirements
Purge non-voters from registry
Improve voter education
Simplify / make more accessible
election day voting process
Implement alternative voting
methods (electronic, mail)
Reduce/eliminate partisanship in
EMB

I

1994
IFES
I
I

2000
CIS

2003
CIS

2004
CIS

I

I
I

I

2004
OAS

2006
OAS

I

2006
CIS

2009
OAS

2009
EU

2009
CIS

I
I

I

I
I

I
I

R

I
R

I
I

I
I

I

I
I

R
I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I
X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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34 Roberto Courtney. Executive Director, Ethics and Transparency (Ética y
Transparencia). October 17, 2011. Managua, Nicaragua.
35 Pedro Xavier Solís. Executive Director, Let’s Make Democracy (Hagamos
Democracia). October 18, 2011. Managua, Nicaragua.
36 Mario Medal. Deputy Director, NDI Nicaragua. October 21, 2011. Managua,
Nicaragua.
37 Manuel Ortega Hegg. Director, Center of Sociocultural Analysis, Central American
University (CASC-UCA); Adviser to Sandinista government in 1980s. October
24, 2011. Managua, Nicaragua.
38 Alberto Dávila. Staff, Let’s Make Democracy (Hagamos Democracia); Former
Municipal and Departmental Director of Voter Registration and Documentation
[cedulación] (Managua). October 26, 2011. Managua, Nicaragua.
39 Mario Narváez. Executive Director, Nicaraguan Youth Movement (Movimiento
Juvenil Nicaraguita. October 28, 2011. Managua, Nicaragua.
40 Harry Chávez. Coordinator of Electoral Program, for Development and Democracy
(IPADE). October 31, 2011. Managua, Nicaragua.
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41 Gonzalo Carrión. Director of Juridical Area, Nicaraguan Human Rights Center
(Centro Nicaraguense de Derechos Humanos, CENIDH). November 1, 2011.
Managua, Nicaragua.
42 Anonymous. Political Analyst. November 2, 2011. Managua, Nicaragua.
43 Rosa Marina Zelaya. Former President and Executive Secretary of Supreme Electoral
Council (Consejo Supremo Electoral, CSE). November 9, 2011. Managua,
Nicaragua.
44 Jaime Wheelock. President, Institute for Development and Democracy (IPADE);
Former member of FSLN National Directorate and Minister of Agriculture and
Agrarian Reform. November 14, 2011. Managua, Nicaragua.
45 Patricio Gajardo. Democracy and Elections Adviser, USAID Nicaragua; Deputy
Head of Mission, OAS election observation mission to Nicaragua, 2006; Former
Regional Director of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).
November 15, 2011.
46 Leonel Arguello. Magistrate, Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), 1984-1994 (FSLNaffiliated). November 21, 2011. Managua, Nicaragua.
47 Sergio Alvarez. Head Electoral Monitor (Fiscal Nacional), Alianza-PLI, 2011;
former official of PLC and ALN parties.. November 21, 2011. Managua,
Nicaragua.
48 Dionisio Pallacios Former Director of Voter Registration and Documentation
[cedulación]; former regional election council president, León and Chinandega,
1990. November 22, 2011. Managua, Nicaragua.
49 Ana Margarita Vijil. Member of National Executive Committee, Movimiento
Renovador Sandinista (MRS) political party. November 29, 2011. Managua,
Nicaragua.
50 Rómulo Rivas Blanco. President, Independent Movement for Electoral Reform
(MIRE). July 17, 2012. San Salvador.
51 Álvaro Artiga-González. Director of Political Science Graduate Program, Central
American University (UCA). July 19, 2012. San Salvador.
52 René Landaverde. Coordinator of Political Reform Area, Social Initiative for
Democracy (ISD). July 19, 2012. San Salvador.
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53 Delmy Valencia. Coordinator of Election Observation, Center for Exchange and
Solidarity (Centro de Intercambio y Solidaridad, CIS); alternate member of Junta
de Vigilancia Electoral (FMLN party). July 23, 2012. San Salvador.
54 Mario Valiente. Deputy in Legislative Assembly, 1991-1994, 2009-present (currently
on the Committee on Electoral and Constitutional Reform); Mayor of San
Salvador, 1994-1997; former director of National Registry of Natural Persons.
ARENA party. July 25, 2012. San Salvador.
55 Eugenio Chicas. TSE Magistrate, 2004-present (President, 2009-present). Deputy in
Legislative Assembly, 1994-2003. FMLN party. July 25, 2012. San Salvador.
56 Tomás Chévez. Secretary General, Democratic Change (CD) party. July 25, 2012.
San Salvador.
57 Oscar López Rivas. Institutional Advisor to the Legislative Assembly Committee on
Electoral and Constitutional Reform (since 2001). July 27, 2012. San Salvador.
58 Silvia Cartagena de Mármol. TSE Alternate Magistrate (2004-present). FMLN party.
July 30, 2012. San Salvador.
59 Eduardo Antonio Urquilla Bermúdez. TSE Magistrate (2004-present) (nominated by
the Supreme Court). July 30, 2012. San Salvador.
60 Juan José Martel. TSE Magistrate (2000-2004) (CDU party); Member of Junta de
Vigilancia Electoral (CD party); former member of COPAZ. July 31, 2012. San
Salvador.
61 Norma Guevara de Ramirios. Deputy in Legislative Assembly, 1994-2000, 2009present (currently president of Electoral and Constitutional Reform committee);
Member of Junta de Vigilancia Electoral (1993-1994); Member of COPAZ
electoral sub-commission (1992-1993); Secretary of electoral matters, FMLN
party. August 8, 2012. San Salvador.
62 Leslie Schuld. Executive Director, Center for Exchange and Solidarity (Centro de
Intercambio y Solidaridad, CIS). August 9, 2012. San Salvador.
63 Félix Ulloa. TSE Magistrate (1994-1999); Member of Junta de Vigilancia Electoral
(1993-1994); Member of COPAZ electoral subcommission (1992-1993).
Currently NDI Resident Director, Nicaragua. Email and telephone
communications.
64 Nineth Montenegro. Congressional Deputy, 1996-present (currently of Encuentro por
Guatemala [EG] party). Email communication.
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